
(2022) 01 PAT CK 0019

Patna High Court

Case No: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 20017 Of 2021

Pradip Kumar
Choudhary

APPELLANT

Vs

State Of Bihar

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: Jan. 6, 2022

Acts Referred:

- Constitution Of India, 1950 - Article 226
- Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 - Section 4, 5

Hon'ble Judges: Sanjay Karol, CJ; S. Kumar, J

Bench: Division Bench

Advocate: Vinay Kumar Mishra, Subhash Prasad Singh

Final Decision: Disposed Of

Judgement

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Petitioners have prayed for the following relief(s):-

“That this application is being filed in the nature of Public Interest Litigation for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate

writ/rule/direction quashing memo No. 4224 dated 25.12.2020 (Annexure-4) whereby and whereunder notification no. 6049 dated 11.09.2017 has been

cancelled and also the Memo No. 4260 dated 25.12.2020 whereby and whereunder Parishad, Baheri has been converted into Nagar Panchayat,

Baheri only with a view to include east and west on village Baheri and thereby Nagar Parishad, Baheri has been converted into Nagar Panchayat,

Baheri only by adding village Baheri on the intervention of the local politicians and thereby in exercise of power under section 3(1)(a),(4), (5), (6) and

(8) Nagar Panchayat Baheri has been notified by including only village Baheri by Memo NO. 989 dated 03.03.2021 (Annexure-6) in most illegal and

arbitrary manner and thereby the respondent authorities may be directed to enforce Notification No. 6049 dated 11.09.2017 through which Nagar

Parishad Baheri was notified to be constituted where objection were also sought from the public under section 5 of Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and on

expiry of one month from the date of publication of Notification under section 4 and after consideration of all or any of objection, the final notification

for constitution of Nagar Parishad, Baheri, was to be done but in place of doing so the notification No. 6049 dated 11.09.2017 (annexure-2) has been

cancelled by converting Nagar Parishad, Baheri into Nagar Panchayat, Baheri in most illegal and arbitrary manner and also in contravention to the

provision of Bihar Municipal Act, 2007.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. N. Jeevaraj Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka & Ors, (2016) 2 SCC 653, paragraphs 34 to 38

observed as under:-

“34. The learned counsel for the parties addressed us on the question of the bona fides of Nagalaxmi Bai in filing a public interest litigation. We

leave this question open and do not express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the High Court in this regard.

35. However, we note that generally speaking, procedural technicalities ought to take a back seat in public interest litigation. This Court held in Rural

Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] to this effect as

follows: (SCC p. 515, para 16)

“16. The writ petitions before us are not inter parties disputes and have been raised by way of public interest litigation and the controversy before

the court is as to whether for social safety and for creating a hazardless environment for the people to live in, mining in the area should be permitted or

stopped. We may not be taken to have said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not apply. At the same time it has to be remembered

that every technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence when a matter of grave public importance is for consideration before the

court.

36. A considerable amount has been said about public interest litigation in R&M Trust [R&M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group,

(2005) 3 SCC 91] and it is not necessary for us to dwell any further on this except to say that in issues pertaining to good governance, the courts ought

to be somewhat more liberal in entertaining public interest litigation. However, in matters that may not be of moment or a litigation essentially directed

against one organisation or individual (such as the present litigation which was directed only against Sadananda Gowda and later Jeevaraj was

impleaded) ought not to be entertained or should be rarely entertained. Other remedies are also available to public spirited litigants and they should be

encouraged to avail of such remedies.

37. In such cases, that might not strictly fall in the category of public interest litigation and for which other remedies are available, insofar as the

issuance of a writ of mandamus is concerned, this Court held in Union of India v. S.B. Vohra [Union of India v. S.B. Vohra, (2004) 2 SCC 150: 2004

SCC (L&S) 363] that: (SCC p. 160, paras 12-13)

“12. Mandamus literally means a command. The essence of mandamus in England was that it was a royal command issued by the King's Bench

(now Queen's Bench) directing performance of a public legal duty.

13. A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who

has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by

operation of law. The writ of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder from a failure of

justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been

granted.

38. A salutary principle or a well-recognised rule that needs to be kept in mind before issuing a writ of mandamus was stated in *Saraswati Industrial*

Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India [*Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India*, (1974) 2 SCC 630] in the following words: (SCC pp. 641-42,

paras 24-25)

"24. The powers of the High Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to which proceedings for prerogative writs are

subject in English practice. Nevertheless, the well-recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a mandamus would issue when there is no

failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Even in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties, the salutary general rule,

which is subject to certain exceptions, applied by us, as it is in England, when a writ of mandamus is asked for, could be stated as we find it set out in

Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 11, p. 106:

"198. Demand for performance must, precede application. "As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has

known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means, of considering whether or not he should comply, and it must be shown by

evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which, the party, seeking, the mandamus desires to enforce, and that that demand was

met by a refusal.

25. In the cases before us there was no such demand or refusal. Thus, no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ, order, or

direction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

After the matter was heard for some time, learned counsel for the petitioners, under instructions, states that petitioners shall be content if a direction is

issued to the authority concerned to consider and decide the representation which the petitioners shall be filing within a period of four weeks from

today for redressal of the grievance(s).

Learned counsel for the respondents states that if such a representation is filed by the petitioners, the authority concerned shall consider and dispose it

of expeditiously and preferably within a period of four months from the date of its filing along with a copy of this order.

Statement accepted and taken on record.

As such, petition stands disposed of in the following terms:-

(a) Petitioners shall approach the authority concerned within a period of four weeks from today by filing a representation for redressal of the

grievance(s);

(b) The authority concerned shall consider and dispose it of expeditiously by a reasoned and speaking order preferably within a period of four months

from the date of its filing along with a copy of this order;

(c) Needless to add, while considering such representation, principles of natural justice shall be followed and due opportunity of hearing afforded to the

parties;

(d) Equally, liberty is reserved to the petitioners to take recourse to such alternative remedies as are otherwise available in accordance with law;

(e) We are hopeful that as and when petitioners take recourse to such remedies, as are otherwise available in law, before the appropriate forum, the

same shall be dealt with, in accordance with law and with reasonable dispatch;

(f) Liberty reserved to the petitioners to approach the Court, if the need so arises subsequently on the same and subsequent cause of action;

(g) Liberty also reserved to the petitioners to make a mention for listing of the petition on priority basis. As and when any such mention is made,

Registry shall take steps for listing the petition at the earliest.

(h) We have not expressed any opinion on merits. All issues are left open;

(i) The proceedings, during the time of current Pandemic- Covid-19 shall be conducted through digital mode, unless the parties otherwise mutually

agree to meet in person i.e. physical mode;

The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.