

(2023) 02 GUJ CK 0007

Gujarat High Court

Case No: R/Special Civil Application No. 1018 Of 2023

Dudabhai Virambhai
Daki

APPELLANT

 V_S

State Of Gujarat

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: Feb. 2, 2023

Acts Referred:

Gujarat Prevention Of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 – Section 2(b), 3(2)#Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B, 406, 419, 420

Citation: (2023) 02 GUJ CK 0007

Hon'ble Judges: Vipul M. Pancholi, J; Hemant M. Prachchhak, J

Bench: Division Bench

Advocate: Kishan Prajapati, Mahesh K Poojara, Jay B Trivedi

Final Decision: Allowed

Judgement

Vipul M. Pancholi, J

1. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties.
2. The present petition is directed against order of detention dated 28.11.2022 passed by the respondent "A" detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short "the Act") by detaining the petitioner "A" as a detinue as defined under section 2(b) of the Act.
3. Learned advocate for the detinue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground

of registration of solitary offences under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, as referred to in the order of detention, by itself cannot bring the case of

the detainee within the purview of definition under section 2(b) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detainee submits that illegal activity likely

to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the

most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in

pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detainee with breach of

public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity

of the detainee with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life

of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detainee had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system

to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order.

4. Learned AGP for the respondents supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was

found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detainee indicate that detainee is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined

under section 2(b) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order

deserves to be upheld by this Court.

5. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction

arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot

have any bearing on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that

the allegations as have been levelled against the detainee cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detainee within the meaning of

section 2(b) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as

to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said

that the detainee is a person within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act. Except general statements, there is no material on record which shows that

the detainee is acting in such a manner, which is dangerous to the public order. In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the

Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 SC 852], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order'

has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows :

“Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of

assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a

street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities

under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The

contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In

this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure

the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a

secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the

Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.”

6. In the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen v/s. State of Telanga and Ors and Syed Sabeena v/s. State of

Telangana and Ors. rendered in Criminal Appeal No.908 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.4260 of 2022 with Criminal Appeal No.909 of 2022 (@ SLP

(Crl.) No.4283 of 2022 dated 22.06.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made following observations in para 17 and 18 :-

“17. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution

should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention

law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.

18. In fact, in a recent decision of this Court, the Court had to make an observation regarding the routine and unjustified use of the Preventive

Detention Law in the State of Telangana. This has been done in the case of Mallada K. Sri Ram Vs. The State of Telangana & Ors. 2022 6 SCALE

50, it was stated as under: “17. It is also relevant to note, that in the last five years, this Court has quashed over five detention orders under the

Telangana Act of 1986 for inter alia incorrectly applying the standard for maintenance of public order and relying on stale materials while passing the

orders of detention. At least ten detention orders under the Telangana Act of 1986 have been set aside by the High Court of Telangana in the last one

year itself. These numbers evince a callous exercise of the exceptional power of preventive detention by the detaining authorities and the respondent-

state. We direct the respondents to take stock of challenges to detention orders pending before the Advisory Board, High Court and Supreme Court

and evaluate the fairness of the detention order against lawful standards.”

7. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of

maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power

under section 3(2) of the Act. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention No.DM/DTN/PASA/53/2022

dated 28.11.2022 passed by the respondent " detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty

forthwith if not required in any other case.

8. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.