,,,,,
,,,,,
been, in all probability, injuries sustained by him accidentally while the accused was striking on the head of PW2.",,,,,
17. Let us now deal with the sustainability of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 302 IPC. As noted, the",,,,,
accused struck on the head of PW2 repeatedly with MO1 rolling pin and thereby caused 15 lacerated wounds on her head. There is nothing on record,,,,,
to suspect the evidence tendered by PW2 in this regard. It has been categorically stated by PW12 that the injuries suffered by PW2 are sufficient in,,,,,
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The said part of the evidence tendered by PW12 has not even been challenged by the accused in cross-,,,,,
examination. In the circumstances, we do not find any infirmity in the finding rendered by the Court of Session that the accused is guilty of the offence",,,,,
punishable under Section 307 IPC.,,,,,
18. We have already found that the injuries found on the body of the child might have been, in all probability, injuries sustained by him accidentally",,,,,
while the accused was striking on the head of PW2. The pointed question, therefore, is as to the offence committed by the accused, if injuries were",,,,,
sustained by the child in the said fashion. As noted, it was while PW2 was sleeping beside the child or sitting on the cot, the accused attacked her with",,,,,
MO1 rolling pin. But for the attack on PW2, the death of the child would not have been caused. Inasmuch as death of the child was caused as a result",,,,,
of an act committed by the accused, the questions to be examined are whether the accused intended to cause the death or a bodily injury as is likely to",,,,,
cause death of the child, and if the accused had not intended to cause the death or a bodily injury as is likely to cause the death of the child, whether",,,,,
the act has been done by the accused with the knowledge that he is likely by such act, to cause death of the child. As already indicated, the evidence",,,,,
on record is not sufficient to hold that the accused intended to cause the death of the child or bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the child. But,",,,,,
on the facts of this case, we are inclined to hold that the accused shall certainly be attributed with the knowledge that he is likely, by such act, to cause",,,,,
the death of the child who was lying on the cot, for it is only natural that when a person strikes on the body of another who either lies or sits on a cot",,,,,
repeatedly in a brutal manner, the possibility of one of the hits falling on the child lying on the cot, cannot be ruled out. If that be so, the act committed",,,,,
by the accused would fall within the third limb of Section 299 IPC, punishable under Part II of Section 304 IPC. We take this view as the expression",,,,,
“knowledge†used in Section 299 IPC is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue [See Jai,,,,,
Prakash v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1991) 2 SCC 32]. The adjudication on the point cannot be stopped at this stage, for, if the knowledge that could be",,,,,
attributed to the accused is of such a degree that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is",,,,,
likely to cause death, and he committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury as aforesaid, the offence would be",,,,,
one punishable under Section 302 IPC, as such cases would certainly fall under the head “fourthly†in Section 300 IPC. On a meticulous",,,,,
examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to hold that the accused did the act with the knowledge that his act would, in all",,,,,
probability, cause the death of his child, and he did the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death of his child. Needless to say,",,,,,
the accused is liable to be convicted in the place of Section 302 IPC, only for the offence punishable under Section Part II of Section 304 IPC.",,,,,
19. Point (iii): The sentence provided for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may,,,,,
extend to ten years. The Court of Session sentenced the accused for imprisonment for a period of ten years. Having regard to the peculiar facts and,,,,,
circumstances of this case, we do not find any reason to interfere with the sentence imposed on the accused for the said offence. Coming to the",,,,,
offence committed by the accused under Part II of Section 304 IPC, we are of the view that the appropriate sentence to be awarded to the accused",,,,,
would be imprisonment for a period of eight years with fine. The point is answered accordingly.,,,,,
In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, sustaining the conviction of the accused under Section 307 IPC and altering the conviction under Section",,,,,
302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. The sentence imposed on the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC is sustained and the,,,,,
accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of eight years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, and to undergo simple",,,,,
imprisonment for a period of six months, in default of payment of fine for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. As directed by the",,,,,
Court of Session, the sentence passed on the accused shall run concurrently.",,,,,
