Rakesh Kainthla, J
1. The petitioners (defendants before the learned Trial Court) have filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking a
direction to the learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur (learned Trial Court) not to proceed further in Civil Suit No. 278/1 of 2000, which was
fixed for 14.01.2022 for arguments as the Regular Second Appeal, which is the outcome of the previous suit, is pending adjudication before this Court.
It has been asserted that petitioners/defendants filed Civil Suit No.251/1 of 2004/2000 before the learned Trial Court. Respondent/plaintiff
subsequently filed a Civil Suit No.278/1 of 2000 on the same matter. The suit filed by the petitioners/defendants is pending adjudication before this
Court in RSA No. 4106 of 2013. This Court had ordered the stay of the proceedings in the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs pending before
learned Civil Judge, Senior Division Court No.1, Ghumarwin vide order dated 14.03.2013 passed in CMPMO No. 270 of 2012 titled Vijender Chandel
and ors. versus Sukh Ram and ors. The Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.1, Ghumarwin, had also stayed the Civil Suit filed by the
respondents/plaintiffs vide order dated 18.04.2012. The learned Trial Court took the civil suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs for hearing and fixed it
for arguments on 14.01.2022 even though the matter in the previous suit filed by the petitioners/defendants is pending before this Court in the RSA
No. 4106 of 2013. The appeal is a continuation of the suit. The petitioners/defendants approached this Court by filing CMPMO No. 552 of 2018 titled
Vijender Chandel and others versus Sukhram, which was decided on 11.09.2019 and liberty was granted to the petitioners/defendants to move an
appropriate application under Section 10 of CPC before the learned Trial Court. The petitioners/defendants approached the learned Trial Court
seeking the stay of the civil suit; however, the application was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 18.12.2021 and the suit was
posted for addressing the arguments on 30.12.2021. Learned Trial Court failed to notice the order passed by this Court in CMPMO No. 270 of 2012
and in this manner, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested with him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, the order passed by
the learned Trial Court be set aside and the suit be stayed till the pendency of the Regular Second Appeal.
2. I have heard Mr. Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jeet Ram Poswal, learned counsel for the respondents.
3. Mr. Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in deciding to proceed further with the
suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs. This Court has already held in CMPMO No. 270 of 2012 that the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs cannot
proceed because of the earlier suit having been filed by the petitioners/defendants. The learned Trial Court had also stayed the proceedings in the suit
filed by the respondents/plaintiffs vide order dated 18.04.2012. The proceedings in the civil suit filed by the petitioners/defendants have not been
terminated since RSA no. 4106 of 2013 is pending before this Court and the appeal is the continuation of the proceedings. Learned Trial Court erred in
deciding to proceed further with the suit of the respondent/plaintiff. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by
the learned Trial Court be set aside.
4. Mr Jeet Ram Poswal, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs supported the order passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that the
dispute in the previous suit and the present suit is different and the learned Trial Court had rightly decided to proceed further with the suit filed by the
respondents/plaintiffs.
5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
6. The facts are not in dispute. It is not disputed that the petitioners/defendants and respondents/plaintiffs had filed separate suits before the learned
Trial Court. This Court has already decided in CMPMO No. 270 of 2012 that Civil Suit No.278 of 2000, which was later filed by the
respondents/plaintiffs cannot proceed further because of the pendency of the appeal in a suit filed by the petitioners/defendants in Civil Suit No. 251 of
2004/2000. Hence, the question of whether both the suits involve the same dispute or not has been authoritatively decided by this Court.
7. Learned Trial Court held vide order dated 18.12.2021 that the nature of the two suits is different and the provision of Section 10 of CPC is not
attracted to the present case. I am afraid that the learned Trial Court has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it by holding so. It has not only reviewed
the order passed by it in the Civil Suit on 18.04.2012 but has effectively set aside the order passed by this Court, wherein it was held that the nature of
the two suits is similar and the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs cannot proceed as long as the appeal filed by the petitioners/defendants is pending
before the Competent Court. It has acted as an appellate court over this Court by setting aside the finding recorded by this Court in CMPMO No. 270
of 2012. Learned Trial Court had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the order passed by this Court as it is bound by the decision passed by this Court.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 142 :
(1963) 3 SCR 338: AIR 1962 SC 1893 that a Tribunal over which the High Court has a power of Superintendence cannot ignore the Law declared
by the High Court and act contrary to such Law. It was observed:
This raises the question whether an Administrative Tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation
of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and any other purpose to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has
superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally
do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of the Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is
implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such
obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working: otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of the law and respect for the law would
irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence and that
they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority
signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without
jurisdiction.
8. This judgment was followed in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Godavari Devi Saraf, 1977 SCC OnLine Bom 215 : (1978) 113 ITR 589:
1978 ELT 624 wherein it was observed:
8. The question then arises what is going to be the effect of a decision of the Madras High Court holding that section 140A(3) is unconstitutional as violative of
Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution? A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector
of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893, wherein it was held that an administrative Tribunal cannot ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State. Taking
into consideration the provisions of articles 215, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court
has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceeding in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can
equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of the Supreme Court making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts.
It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it.
Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of the law and respect for the law would
irretrievably suffer.
9. In view of this clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not controverted by Mr Joshi on behalf of the revenue that an Income-tax Tribunal sitting at Madras
is bound to proceed on the footing that section 140A (3) of the Act is non-existent in view of the pronouncement of the Madras High Court in the case of A.M. Salt
Maricar, [1973] 90 ITR 116. Actually, the question of authoritative or persuasive decision does not arise in the present case because a Tribunal constituted under the
Act has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the constitutionality of the provisions of that statute. It should not be overlooked that the Income-tax Act is an All-
India statute and if an Income-tax Tribunal in Madras, in view of the decision of the Madras High Court, has to proceed on the footing that section 140A (3) was non-
existent, the order of penalty there under cannot be imposed by the authority under the Act. Until a contrary decision is given by any other competent High Court,
which is binding on a Tribunal in the State of Bombay, it has to proceed on the footing that the law declared by the High Court, though of another State, is the final
law of the land. When the Tribunal set aside the order of penalty it did not go into the question of intra vires or ultra vires. It did not go into the question of
constitutionality of section 140A (3). That section was already declared ultra vires by a competent High Court in the country and an authority like an Income-tax
Tribunal acting anywhere in the country has to respect the law laid down by the High Court, though of a different State, so long as there is no contrary decision of
any other High Court on that question. It is admitted before us that at the time when the Tribunal decided the question, no other High Court in the country had taken
a contrary view on the question of constitutionality of section 140A(3). That being the position, it is not possible for us to take the view that the Tribunal in Bombay,
when it set aside the order of penalty, went into the question of the constitutionality of that section and gave a finding that it is ultra vires following the decision of
the Madras High Court. What the Tribunal really did was that in view of the law pronounced by the Madras High Court, it proceeded on the footing that section
140A (3) was non-existent and so the order of penalty passed thereunder cannot be sustained.â€
9. Thus, it is not permissible for any authority in the State subject to the Superintendence of the High Court to ignore the law declared by the High
Court and the learned Trial Court could not have held that the nature of the two suits was different when this Court has already held that the nature
was similar.
10. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Trial Court is ordered to be set aside and it is
ordered that the learned Trial Court shall not proceed with suit No.278 of 2000 till the conclusion of the RSA no. 4106 of 2013 pending before this
Court. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court for information.
11. It is sincerely hoped and expected that the learned Trial Court will adhere to judicial discipline in future while deciding the cases.
12. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever, on the merits of the
case.
13. Consequently, the present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
