Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J
1. The sole appellant is before this Court against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed under Sections 302, 307, 324 and 326 of the IPC.
2. Informant of the case is the deceased whose statement was recorded on 07.07.2014 at 9.30 at RIMS, Ranchi during the course of her treatment. As per the FIR, on 06.07.2014 at 1.30 pm when she was at home with her family, appellant, who happens to be the brother-in-law (Dewar), entered into her house and inflicted injuries with knife to her husband and also injured her and her child. She died during course of treatment. The genesis of offence has been stated to be old family dispute.
3. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Ranchi Kotwali P.S. Case No.599/14 was registered under Section 326/307 of the IPC against the appellant, and after the death of the informant, Section 302 of the IPC was added.
4. Police on investigation, found the case true and submitted charge sheet against the appellant and he was put on trial for the offence under Sections 302, 307, 324 and 326 of the IPC. Altogether nine witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and relevant documents including post mortem examination report, injury reports have been adduced into evidence and marked as exhibits.
5. The main plank of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the incidence took place on the spur of moment and there was no intention to cause death. It has come in the FIR that there was hot exchange between the appellant and the deceased which resulted in the incidence. The death took place after 15 days of the incidence and the Doctor has not opined that the injuries sustained were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The immediate cause of death has been noted by the Autopsy Surgeon to be Septicemia. Reliance is placed on Maniben Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 8 SCC 796 where the death was caused by Septicemia and on burn injury, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
6. Learned A.P.P. has defended the judgment of conviction and sentence.
7. I find force in the argument advanced on behalf of the State that in normal course, a brother does not come to reason with his brother armed with knife. Intention is a mental element which can be fathomed only by the conduct of a person. The injuries were multiple and caused intentionally by the appellant to not one, but the deceased, her husband and also their infant child. While the deceased sustained fatal injuries, nature of injuries sustained by the other two were grievous in nature.
8. As per the post mortem examination report (Exhibit 6), proved by P.W. 8, the dead body of Soni Saran sustained the following stitched wounds: -
i. 5 cm x ¼ cm with two stitch mark on front of left chest upper part.
ii. 5 cm x ¼ cm with stitch mark on left thigh, middle side, middle part.
iii. 4 cm x ¼ cm with two stitch marks on front of left leg, upper part.
iv. 5 cm x ¼ cm with three stitch marks on right breast.
v. 5 cm x ¼ cm with four stitch marks front middle right arm, upper part.
vi. 5 cm x ¼ cm with two stitch marks gluteal (buttock), upper part.
The Doctor has noted in the report that the stitches were removed and wound had recently healed.
Surgical stitched wound: - 25 cm long with 16 stitches mark on front of left abdomen, middle part and adjoining front of right chest lower part.
Doctor opined that the above injuries were ante mortem and death was due to Septicemia.
P.W. 9 is the Doctor, who has deposed that he examined Bhagwati Saran on 06.07.2014 and issued injury report which was proved by him and marked as Exhibit 6/1 and found incised wound (penetrating wound) 5 cm x 3 cm over anterior chest wall which was grievous in nature caused by sharp cutting weapon. He had also examined his son Baibhav aged 7 months and has proved his injury report marked as Exhibit 6/2 which was grievous in nature. It was 3 cm x 1 cm x 2 cm over left arm.
9. Prosecution has put a water tight case that it was the appellant and none-else who had committed the offence. Informant died during the course of her treatment, and her statement given to the police which is the FIR of the case and proved by P.W. 7 as Exhibit 2/2 can be treated as dying declaration of the deceased, in which she has specifically stated that it was the appellant who had inflicted knife injury to them. P.W. 6- the husband of the informant who was also injured in the incidence and his injury report has been proved and marked as Exhibit 6/1. He has deposed that appellant came to his house and stated that why he had ousted his sister. He entered into an altercation with him and then inflicted knife injury to him, his wife and son. Law is settled that testimony of an injured witness is entitled to a higher degree of credence as his presence at the place of occurrence is proved and normally no injured witness will testify against someone, leaving aside the assailant. His testimony is corroborated by P.W. 2 who has deposed that when he went to the place of occurrence on hulla, he saw that informant, her husband, and child had sustained bleeding injuries. It was stated by the deceased/informant that the injuries were inflicted by the appellant- Ravi. Against these clinching evidence, there is no plea of defence during cross-examination, or in the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, to suggest that it was not the appellant, but someone else who had committed the offence.
10. Once the intentional injury inflicted, is proved and there is objective finding of the Doctor that the injuries were on vital part of the body resulting in death, it hardly matters whether death was caused immediately or during course of the treatment.
Explanation 2 of Section 299 of IPC provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury, shall deem to have cause the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment, the death might have been prevented.
Murder is aggravated form of culpable homicide; the difference is about likelihood of causing death. It has been held Virsa Singh Versus State of Punjab, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 37,
“No one has license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of their kind, they must face the consequence; and they can only escape it can be shown or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 summed up the factors to be looked to determine whether the case came within the definition of murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
“The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”
In Sudershan Kumar Vs. The State of Delhi, (1975) 3 SCC 831 appellant was accused of acid attack and death was caused due to acid burn injuries leading to septicaemia. Apex Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.
11. In the present case, it is apparent that the appellant came to the house of informant armed with knife and inflicted fatal injury to informant- Soni Devi, who died of it after 15 days of incidence during the course of treatment. He also inflicted stab injury on the vital part of body of her husband and in the same transaction, her seven months infant child also sustained cut injury over his hand. P.W. 6 and the appellant are full brothers and were living separately. Although the immediate cause of the incidence has come in the testimony of P.W. 6 that sister had been ousted from the house, but this cannot be a ground to launch the murderous assault against his entire family resulting in death and grievous injury to two. In any circumstance, the instant case will not come within Exception 4 to Section 300 as the appellant had acted in a most cruel manner. Deceased was admitted to RIMS Ranchi immediately after the incidence and therefore, the plea that she could have been cured by skilful treatment is not sustainable.
12. In view of above discussion, I do not find any infirmities in the judgment of conviction and sentence under Sections 302, 307 and 326 of the IPC. Judgment of conviction and sentence is accordingly affirmed.
In view of conviction and sentence under Section 326 of the IPC for causing grievous hurt to the infant child, no sperate conviction and sentence is warranted under Section 324 of the IPC.
Criminal Appeal stands dismissed.
Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, is disposed of.
Let the Trial Court Records be transmitted to the Court concerned along with a copy of this judgment.
