Hemant M. Prachchhak, J
1. The appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment
and order dated 06.07.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.6, Gondal Camp at Jetpur (hereinafter be referred
to as “the trial Courtâ€) in Sessions Case No.26 of 2002, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the accused from the offences punishable under
Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as “the IPCâ€) and under Section 3(1)(7) of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
Brief facts of the present case :
2. It is the case of the prosecution that one Hetal daughter of the complainant married with accused No.2 and the marriage life of Hetal was going on
smoothly. It is the case of the prosecution that after some time, altercation took place with regard to dowry and the accused were giving mental and
physical torture to Hetal and taunting her about the dowry and, therefore, she went to her parental home where she consumed poison and tried to
commit suicide. Thereafter, she was taken to the hospital and during the course of the treatment, she succumbed to the injuries. The FIR being
C.R.No.18/2002 was registered before the Jetpur City Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the IPC and
Under Section 3(1)(7) of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2.1 Pursuant to the aforesaid FIR, the police started investigation and prepared panchnama of the scene of offence as well as prepared inquest
panchnama and recorded the statements of various witnesses and arrested the accused and recovered the certificate of the deceased and the P.M.
Report and after completion of investigation, as the sufficient evidence was found, the police has filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the
Judicial Magistrate, First Class. As the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class has committed the case under
Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions, Gondal Camp at Jetpur wherein it has been registered as Sessions Case No.26
of 2002.
2.2 The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial Court on 26.04.2004 vide Exhibit 1 for the aforesaid offences against the accused.
On being explained it to them, the accused have denied having committed any offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for
trial and hence, the case was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Gondal Camp at Jetpur.
2.3 It appears from the records that the prosecution has examined the prosecution witnesses and also produced the oral as well as documentary
evidence in support of the case of the prosecution.
3. After completion of the trial and having heard both the sides, the trial Court has acquitted the accused from the charges levelled against them.
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal.
5. Heard Mr.Yuvraj Brahmbhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant â€" State of Gujarat and Ms.Nasrin Shaikh, learned
counsel for Ms.Srushti Thula, learned counsel appearing for the respondents â€" accused.
Submission made on behalf of learned Additional Public Prosecutor:
7. It is submitted that the marriage span of the deceased and accused No.2 was of three years and, therefore, the trial Court has failed to draw the
inference under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. It is submitted that the prosecution has examined the mother and sister of the deceased i.e. P.W.1
Sudhaben Jaysukhbhai at Exhibit 28 and P.W.2 Bhavishaben Jaysukhbhai at Exhibit 30 and both the witnesses have supported the case of the
prosecution, but their evidence has not been properly appreciated by the trial Court under the provision of Section 113A of the Evidence Act. It is
submitted that the independent witnesses have also supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial Court has ignored and overlooked the
depositions of these witnesses and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is submitted that though the prosecution has produced the
documentary evidence in support of the case, the trial Court has failed to appreciate the said evidence. It is submitted that the present appeal be
allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal be quashed and set aside.
7.1 In support of the submissions, the learned APP has relied upon the following decisions.
(1) State Of West Bengal Versus Orilal Jaiswal reported in AIR 1994 SC 1418;
(2) Satpal Versus State Of Haryana reported in AIR 1999 SC 1476;
(3) Nallam Veera Satyanandam Versus Public Prosecutor, High Court Of A.P. reported in AIR 2004 SC 1708;
Submission made on behalf of the respondents â€" accused :
8. It is submitted that the trial Court has, after appreciating the evidence and considering the oral as well as documentary evidence, passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal, which is completely in consonance with the settled principles of law and there is no infirmity or illegality or
perversity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is submitted that though the dying declaration at Exhibit 39 of the deceased was
recorded by the Deputy Execution Magistrate, the prosecution has not examined the said Deputy Execution Magistrate in support of its case and even
the original copy of the dying declaration was not produced on record. It is submitted that from bare perusal of the contents of the dying declaration
recorded by the Deputy Executive Magistrate, it appears that the deceased herself has stated that by mistake she consumed the poisoness substance
instead of taking medicine for cold and fever and she has neither stated anything adverse against any of the accused nor has alleged with regard to
mental and physical torture on account of demand of dowry and other allegations. It is submitted that the deceased has also stated before the
Executive Magistrate that she was residing with her in-laws i.e. father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law including husband and against none of the
accused, the deceased has alleged with regard to ill-treatment or harassment on account of the demand of dowry and others. It is also submitted that
the said fact was confirmed by near relatives of the deceased i.e. P.W.4 Dineshbhai Nanjibhai at Exhibit 32 and P.W.5 Mahendra Nanjibhai at Exhibit
33 and under such circumstances, the trial Court has, after considering relevant evidence, passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is
further submitted that the exaggeration and contradiction has been proved from the evidence of P.W.8 Gulabsinh Dhaniramsinh Rajput at Exhibit
36. It is submitted that the incident had taken place on 24.01.2002 and though during the course of treatment, the deceased was alive for three days,
the prosecution has not recorded the other statement of the deceased. It is submitted that the deceased died on 26.01.2002 and the complaint came to
be filed by Sudhaben, P.W.1 on 29.01.2002 i.e. after three days of the death of the deceased, for which, no any explanation was given by the
prosecution for delay of three days of lodging the complaint and the delay goes to the route of the matter. It is submitted that the appeal being
meritless deserves to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be confirmed.
9. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
10. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived
at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court
has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate
the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of
the crime with which he is charged.
Issues of the case :
(a) Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is required any interference considering the evidence recorded by
the trial Court or not?
(b) Whether the trial Court has committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal or not?
(c) Whether the prosecution has proved the charge levelled against the accused with regard to the cruelty as alleged under Section 498A of the IPC
on account of demand of dowry which leads the deceased to commit the offence of suicide under Section 306 r/w. Section 114 of the IPC or not?
11. For the aforesaid issues, this Court has perused the depositions of the witnesses, documentary evidence led by the prosecution and the arguments
advanced by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. The undisputed facts of the present case are that the marriage span of the
deceased and accused No.2 was more than three years only. The deceased went to her parental home on 16.01.2002 i.e. prior to eight days of the
alleged incident. On 22/23.01.2002, the husband and mother-in-law visited the house of the complainant to take the deceased back to her matrimonial
home, however, she did not return to her matrimonial home along with the accused and on the next day i.e. on 24.01.2002, the deceased consumed
poisoness substance which is using for preserving the grain. The deceased was immediately taken to the hospital at Jetpur and for further treatment,
she was shifted to the hospital at Junagadh where she was treated for three days and ultimately, she succumbed to the injuries on 26.01.2002. The
impugned FIR came to be registered on 29.01.2002.
12. In view of the above referred undisputed facts and in view of the discussion of the evidence of the witnesses, it appears that P.W.1 Sudhaben,
mother of the deceased has deposed in her examination that there was cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased on account of demand of
dowry during the three years and earlier occasion also, the deceased left the matrimonial home and after settlement, she again returned to matrimonial
home for which P.W.1 has never pointed out the facts to any other family members prior in point of time during these three years. If there is any
dispute with regard to the demand of dowry or ill-treatment or cruelty meted out to the deceased, naturally the conduct of the mother that she will not
allow the deceased to go back without registering complaint or informing to the family members since her husband was died prior to ten years from
the date of marriage of deceased. Under these circumstances, the natural conduct of P.W.1 is either to register the complaint or raise the grievance
before the community leader or any other members, but the same has not been done. P.W.1 has admitted that what she has stated before the Court
was not stated before the police while recording the statement. Similarly, P.W.2 has deposed the same facts which are narrated by P.W.1. Though
P.W.2 has tried to make out the case that she has raised the dispute before her community leader, but in her cross-examination, she has admitted that
whether the said grievance was raised either in writing or orally or not, she did not know. P.W.2 has admitted that she has not raised any grievance or
made any complaint prior to registration of the offence. Even in the police statement, the deceased has not stated with regard to any cruelty on
account of demand of dowry or harassment meted out to the deceased and this fact is proved from the evidence of P.W.8 i.e. Investigating Officer. It
is also relevant to note that the prosecution has failed to examine the Deputy Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration of the
deceased and even the original copy of the dying declaration is also not produced on record. Though said fact was revealed from the evidence of
P.W.1, why it was not come on record of the trial Court. The trial Court had an occasion to consider the said dying declaration as it was certified by
the Investigating Officer during the course of the investigation and, then, the trial Court had an occasion to go through the said evidence and referred
the same in the case. Under such circumstances, the story put forward by the prosecution creates doubt about the case of the prosecution and if this
Court considers the said evidence in its totality then the deceased has neither suggested the name of the accused nor involved the accused in the
alleged offence nor raised any dispute or made any complaint against the accused with regard to ill-treatment or harassment or any mental or physical
torture on account of demand of dowry meted out to her. Viz-a-viz, the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, in cross-examination the evidence come on
record that there was no any prior reason or occasion that there was any grievance raised by P.W.1 and P.W.2 by filing any complaint raising any
dispute before their community leader or family members. Under such circumstances, the trial Court has not committed any error of facts and law in
passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is relevant to note herein that the incident has been taken place on 24.01.2002, thereafter, the
deceased treated for three days in hospital and on 26.01.2002, the deceased died and till 29.01.2002 why the complainant keep silent and not
registered the complaint against the accused. This fact creats doubt and the complaint is filed with deliberation with family members. It is proved from
the evidence that if there was any cruelty or harassment on account of any demand of dowry or any other reason, the natural conduct of the mother
of the deceased is to raise the grievance, to make voice against the said ill-treatment or harassment and perhaps she could have filed criminal
complaint or raised dispute before their community leader but in the present case there was no material on record with regard to the same. Even the
deceased was died at her parental home and she has not registered any complaint nor filed any maintenance proceedings nor raise any dispute against
the accused. So it appears that the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the accused.
13. It is profitably to refer to Section 113A of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:-
“113-A. presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman (Presumption of fact) : When the question is whether the commission
of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to
cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband
or by such relative of her husband.
It states that upon proof of the relevant facts predicate, a court in an abetment of suicide case 'may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case,' that the victim's suicide was abetted by the defendant.
The use of the phrase 'may presume' in section 113-A signifies the presence of a Section 4 presumption of fact. Presumptions of this kind
reflect ""those natural inferences which the 'common course of natural events,' human conduct, and public and private business suggest to
us. Discretion has been given to the Court to presume a fact or refuse to raise such a presumption.
If it refuses to exercise discretion, then it may call upon the parties to prove the fact by leading evidence or if the Court finds that it is a fit
case for raising presumption, in that event, such fact stands proved unless and until it is disproved by other side or may call for further
proof of it.
In this respect, it is ""permissive, optional and discretionary. The presumption raised under Section 113-A does not necessarily shifts the
burden of persuasion; it necessarily shifts only the burden of going forward with evidence.
Presumption of fact requires a court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to draw the conclusion specified in the statute. But, if
evidence to the contrary is presented, the presumption does not compel a particular result. It is permissive in this respect. The function
served by the presumption of fact is this: it compels a party who might otherwise remain silent to speak. If the party against whom the
presumption is raised wishes not to have the point decided against him, he must come forward with evidence.
14. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nipun Aneja and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 654 of 2017 dated 03.10.2024, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para â€" 17, 18, 19,
20 and 21 as under:-
“17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan and another reported in (2021) 19 SCC 144, after considering the provisions of
Section 306 of the IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, has observed as under:-
“14. Section 306 of IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same.
....
15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court
in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, has defined the word ‘instigate’ as under:-
“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an actâ€.â€
16. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its corelation with Section 306 IPC has been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In the
case of S.S. Cheena Vs. 12 Crl.A.654/2017 Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr (2010) 12 SCC 190, it was observed as under:-
“25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive
act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and
the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear
mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and
that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.â€
18. This Court in M. Arjunan v. State, represented by its Inspector of Police reported in (2019) 3 SCC 315, while explaining the necessary
ingredients of Section 306 of the IPC in detail, observed as under:-
“7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or
instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will
not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to
instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be
convicted under Section 306 IPC.â€
19. This Court in Ude Singh & Others v. State of Haryana reported in (2019) 17 SCC 301, held that in order to convict an accused under
Section 306 of the IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability. It was
observed as under:-
“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide.
It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a
vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behavior and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for
abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In
the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the
part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of
occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another; the consideration would be if the accused is
guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation
means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and
the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to
hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct
creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners
of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self- respect of the victim, which eventually draws
the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mensrea on the part of the accused in
such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature
where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of
abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or
was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each
case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche
of the accused and the deceased.â€
20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno & another v. The Inspector of Police reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387, Criminal Appeal No.
1628 of 2022 decided on 12th October, 2022, after referring to the above referred decisions rendered in context of culpability under
Section 306 of the IPC observed as under:-
“44. …It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time
of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable.â€
15. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported
in (2007) 4 SCC 415. The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa (supra) reads as under:-
“The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on
the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted
conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.â€
16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another
reported in (2022) 3 SCC 471. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decisions has held and observed in paragraphs No.22 to 30 as under:-
“22. In Atley vs. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807, the approach of the appellate court while considering a judgment of acquittal was
discussed and it was observed that unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the acquittal was perverse, it
could not set aside the same. To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His
Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 (Sanwat Singh case, AIR pp 719-20 para 9):
9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a
case disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) 'substantial and
compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of
an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should
not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of
its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to
hold that the acquittal was not justified.
The need for the aforesaid observations arose on account of observations of the majority in Aher Raja Khimavs. State of Saurashtra, AIR
1956 SC 217 which stated that for the High Court to take a different view on the evidence ""there must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.
23. M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through
Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was). This Court observed that the approach of the High Court (appellate court) in dealing with
an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused ""is not certainly weakened
by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial.
24. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: (SCC p.799, para 6)
6…...In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice
potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and
chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.
25. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225, spoke about the approach of the appellate court while
considering an appeal against an order acquitting the accused and stated as follows: (SCC p.229, para 7)
7…..While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings
of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above
question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded,
that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the
evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.
The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. In another words, there should
not be an acquittal of the guilty or a conviction of an innocent person.
26. In Ajit Savant Majagvai vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110, this Court set out the following principles that would regulate and
govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court: (SCC pp. 116-17, para 16)
16. This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by the High
Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated
as under:
(1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while
hearing an appeal against an order of conviction.
(2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in
place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words,
perverse.
(3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to
record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is
entitled to acquittal.
(4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in
favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court.
(5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is
another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted.
(6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing
their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box.
(7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such
as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.
27. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 observed vis--vis the powers of an appellate court while
dealing with a judgment of acquittal, as under: (SCC p.229, para 7))
7.... While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings
of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above
question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded,
that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the
evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.
28. This Court in Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, highlighted that there is one significant difference in
exercising power while hearing an appeal against acquittal by the appellate court. The appellate court would not interfere where the
judgment impugned is based on evidence and the view taken was reasonable and plausible. This is because the appellate court will
determine the fact that there is presumption in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt but if it decides to
interfere it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of acquittal.
30. In Nepal Singh vs. State of Haryana- (2009) 12 SCC 351, this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the
judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court and restored the judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused on reappreciation of
the evidence.
17. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras â€" 37 to 40
as under:-
37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: -
29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [ Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ]
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ""substantial and compelling reasons"", ""good and sufficient grounds"", ""very strong circumstances"",
distorted conclusions"", ""glaring mistakes"", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against
acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ""flourishes of language"" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.
38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: -
8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the
view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded
on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal
recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:-
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;
(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence
available on record.
40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if
it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.
18. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, it clearly transpires that the Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence
threadbare and has not committed any error of facts and law in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. The impugned
judgment and order is not perverse one and the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned judgment and order does not warrant any
interference at the ends of this Court. This Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning and ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court.
19. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned
judgment and order dated 06.07.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.6, Gondal Camp at Jetpur in Sessions
Case No.26 of 2002 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
