Rakesh Kainthla, J
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.05.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajgarh, Camp at Sarahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. It was asserted that a bus was going from Mangarh towards Solan, and a pick-up bearing regist ation No. HP-71-0971 was going towards Mangarh on 15.05.2010 at 08:15 am. The driver of the pickup reversed his vehicle to enable the bus to pass. Yashpal (PW4) and Bhupinder Singh (PW5) were sitting on the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-14A-0729, which was parked on t e roadside. The pickup hit the motorcycle. Yashpal (PW4) jumped, but Bhupinder Singh (PW5) was dragged for a considerable distance. The motorcycle was damaged in the accident. Yashpal (PW4) and Bhupinder Singh (PW5) sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital, and an intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ex-PW10/A) was recorded in the police station. HC Varinder Kumar (PW11) and Constable Kamal Kumar were sent to verify the correctness of the information. HC Vinod Kumar recorded the statement (Ex-PW1/A) of Yudhvir Singh (PW3), which was sent to the police station where FIR (Ex-PW11/A) was registered. HC Varinder Kumar investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex-PW11/C) and seized the vehicles along with the documents vide memos (Ex-PW1/A and Ex. PW9/A). The photographs of the spot (Ex- PW1 to PW5) were taken. Constable Suresh Chand (PW7) mechanically examined the motorcycle and the pickup. He did n t find any defect in them which could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (EX-PW7/A & Ex-PW7/B). Bhupinder Singh (PW5) was medically examined by Dr Tajinder Bansal, who found that Bhupinder Singh (PW5) had sustained simple and grievance injuries. He issued the MLC (Ex-PX1/A). Yashpal (PW4) was treated in a private ospital, and the treatment summary (Ex-PX/2) was taken into possession. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared, and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Parmod Kumar (PW1), Sushil Kumar (PW2) and the informant Yudhvir Singh (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Yashpal (PW4) and Bhupinder Singh (PW5) sustained injuries in the accident. Anil Kumar (PW6), Chaman Lal (PW8) and Subhash Sharma (PW9) did not suppo he prosecution's case. Suresh Chand (PW7) mechanically examined the vehicle. Constable Vipin Kumar (PW10) pr ved the entry of the daily dairy. HC Virender Kumar (PW11) investigated the matter. Satish Kumar (PW12) is the owner of the vehicle who proved that the accused was driving t e vehicle at the time of the accident.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-71-0971. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that some of the witnesses used to ask him for a lift, but he never allowed any person to board his vehicle. The witnesses deposed against him due to the enmity. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant did not support the prosecution's case and stated that the motorcycle was moving, which is contrary to the prosecution’s case that the motorcycle was parked. Bhupinder stated that Yashpal was not skilled in driving the motorcycle, which suggested that the accident occurred due to a lack of skill on the part of Yashpal. The prosecution’s witnesses contradicted each ther regarding the motorcycle being parked. The prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The efore, the accused was acquitted.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slips od and perfunctory manner. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. It was proved by the testimonies of Parmod Kumar (PW1), Sushil Kumar (PW2), Yudhvir Singh (PW3), Yashpal (PW4) and Bhupinder Singh (PW5) that the accused had reversed the vehicle and hit the motorcycle parked on the left side of the road. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the motorcycle was being driven, which is contrary to the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The fact that Yashpal (PW4) was not skilled in driving the motorcycle was not material because the motorcycle was parked on the roadside. Learned Trial Court had taken a view which was not possible based on the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellan /S ate and Ms Aruna Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the witnesses proved that the motorcycle was parked on the roadside, and the accused reversed the vehicle in a negligent manner without caring for the motorcycle parked on the roadside. This proved that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Ms Aruna Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, which was possible based on the evidence led before it. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have g ne through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:
“23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering vari us earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482 -83, para 29)
“29. After referring o a catena of judgments, this Court culled out he following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.
(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case acquittal, there is a double presumpti n in favour of the accused. Firstly, he presumption of innocence is available o him under the fundamental principle of c iminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent c urt of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)
8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can inter ere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a inding that the only conclusion which can be rec rded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acq ittal recorded by the trial court in fav ur f the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”
24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”
14. Sushil Kumar (PW2) stated that he had not seen the accident; therefore, his testimony does not establish the negligence of any person.
15. Yudhvir Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that he had reached the spot after the accident and had not seen he accident; therefore, he could not say that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the m t rcycle rider, who had negligently hit the pick-up. Since he had reached the spot after the accident, therefore, his testimony does not establish the prosecution's case regarding the negligence of the accused.
16. Chaman Lal (PW8) stated in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that the rear side of the pickup was not visible from the bus, and the motorcycle was being driven behind the pickup. His statement that the motorcycle was being driven was correct.
17. The testimony of this witness shows that the motorcycle was being driven at the time of the accident. The rear side of the pickup was not visible to him, and he could not tell the exact manner of the accident. His testimony makes the prosecution's case doubtful that the pick-up had hit a parked motorcycle.
18. It was submitted that he was declared hostile, and his credibility is suspect. This submission is not acceptable. He was not contradicted with his previous statement, and he admitted the previous statement reco ded by he police. Thus, his credit has not been impeached nder Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, and there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Selvamani v. State, 2024 S OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record and the version which is as per the prosecution evidence or the defence version can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence on record. It was observed:
“9. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627: 1991 INSC 153, relying on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v.State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389: 1975 INSC 306, Sri Rabindra Kuamr Dey v. State of Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233: 1976 INSC 204, Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30: 1979 INSC 126, has held that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. It was further held that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a scrutiny thereof.
10. This Court, in the case of C. Muniappanv State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567: 2010 INSC 553 , has observed thus:
“81. It is a settled legal proposition that (Khujji case, SCC p. 635, para 6)
‘6..… the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in t to merely because the prosecution ch se to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is fo nd to be dependable on a scrutiny thereof.’
82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra,(1996) 10 SCC 360], this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543, Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516, Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh,(2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462.
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.”
19. Thus, the testimony of this witness cannot be discarded simply because he was declared hostile by the prosecution.
20. The statement of this witness proves an alternative version that the motorcycle was being driven. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398: 2003 SCC (Cri) 326: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1061 that when two versions appear on he ecord, the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred. It was observed at page 413:
“33. In the facts and circumstances recited above, we are clearly f the view that the prosecution has not come up with the true story. It has suppressed the facts. If that be the case, the whole prosecution story would stand on quicksand. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is now a well-settled principle of law that if two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused and the other adversely against it, the view favouring the accused must be accepted.”
21. Thus, the learned Trial Court cannot be faulted for accepting the version propounded by the witness that the motorcycle was being driven at the time of the accident.
22. Bhupinder Singh (PW5) stated in his cross-examination that Yashpal used to drive the motorcycle after its purchase, but he was not skilled in driving the motorcycle. Learned Trial Court held that the lack of skills of Yashpal in driving the motorcycle had contributed to the accident. This inference was probable by the cross-examination of Bhupinder Singh (PW5), and it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court had taken a view which no reasonable person would have taken.
23. Parmod Kumar (PW1), Yashpal (PW4) and Bhupinder Singh (PW5) supported the prosecution's case and stated that the motorcycle was parked. The pickup was negligently reversed, and it hit the motorcycle. Even if all hese estimonies are taken to be correct, these are not s fficient to convict the accused because of another version appearing on the record that the motorcycle was moving and was not stationary. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that an appellate Court shall not interfere with t e order of acquittal merely because another view is possible and the Court would have taken another view had it been trying the matter for the first time. When the view taken by the learned Trial Court is probable, the appeal against acquittal is to be dismissed.
24. In the present case, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was probable, even though not the only one; therefore, it is not possible to interfere with the view of the learned Trial Court while deciding the present appeal.
25. No other point was urged.
26. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed.
27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
28. Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
