

(2025) 12 GUJ CK 0006

Gujarat High Court

Case No: R/Criminal Appeal No. 1497 Of 2009

State Of Gujarat

APPELLANT

Vs

Ramchandra Chandrapal Yadav
& Ors

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: Dec. 2, 2025

Acts Referred:

- Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 378, 378(1)(3), 417
- Indian Electricity Act, 2003-Section 136(1)(A), 150

Hon'ble Judges: Sanjeev J.Thaker, J

Bench: Single Bench

Advocate: Yuvraj Brahmbhatt, Nachiket D Mehta

Final Decision: Dismissed

Judgement

Sanjeev J.Thaker, J

1. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Special Judge (Electricity), Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Sessions (G.E.B.) Case No.32 of 2008 dated 06.05.2009 awarding acquittal of accused, the State has preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973 ('Cr.P.C', for short).

2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that complainant Deputy Engineer, MGVCL gave complaint before the Police Inspector, MGVCL Police Station that he was discharging his duties at Karjan Sub-division and on 17.03.2008, theft of transformer of Oil and LT, HT winding coil, was committed by the accused persons worth Rs.28,480/-. On the same day, lineman K.R.Patel went to the place of offence and carried out panchnama of scene of offence and lodged complaint under Section 136(1)(A) and 150 of Indian Electricity Act, 2003. Thereafter, one Esteem Car was checked by Toll-Naka Police from where the accused were caught with muddamal and on the basis of said complaint, investigation was carried out and charge-sheet was filed against the accused. However, as the case was triable by the Special Electricity Court, the same was

registered as Special (Elec.) Case No.32 of 2008 and charge was framed against the accused persons for commission of offences under Section 136(1) (A) and 150 of the Indian Electricity Act. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. Prosecution has examined number of witnesses as well as produced various documentary evidence on record and at the conclusion of trial, learned Special (Electricity) and Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara was pleased to acquit the accused from the offences under Section 136(1) (A) and 150 of the Indian Electricity Act against which the State has filed appeal.

3.1 Learned APP Ms.Pathak argued that trial Court has committed an error in passing the order of acquittal and has failed to appreciate oral evidence of 10 witnesses which have been examined by the prosecution and failed to take into consideration 04 documentary evidences produced by the prosecution.

3.2 It has been contended that learned trial Court has failed in holding that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that oil of transformers and coil thereof were stolen by the accused and caught during police checking with muddamal. On all such grounds the State has prayed that the order passed by the learned Special Judge be quashed and set aside.

3.3 Learned APP for the appellant State has contended that the evidence of the complainant, who was examined at Exh.9, has fully supported the case of the prosecution as narrated in the complaint. However, learned Special Judge has committed error in arriving at the conclusion of acquittal of the accused respondents.

3.4 Learned APP has drawn attention of this Court to the fact that the muddamal is recovered in the form of meter which was used by the accused for committing theft and the fact that muddamal caught from the Esteem car and the driver of the car fled away from the scene of offence and rest of the three persons were caught.

3.5 It has been argued by learned APP that the learned Special Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of the panch witness by making undue importance to minor omissions and contradictions and the judge has passed the order without properly appreciating all other documentary and oral evidence.

4. Learned advocate for the respondent-accused has submitted that the Trial Court has appreciated all the the evidence in its true perspective and has not committed any error in acquitting the accused therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgment and the order of the acquittal passed by the Trial Court and has urged this Court to reject this Appeal.

5.1 Before advertng to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to

be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

5.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse.

5.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

5.4 In *Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others*, (2019) 2 SCC 752, the Apex Court has observed that:

“The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court”.

5.5 Yet in another decision in *Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh*, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under:

“9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:

12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had

taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide *Balak Ram v. State of U.P* (1975) 3 SCC 219, *Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar* (1990) 4 SCC 17, *Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P* (2003) 1 SCC 761, *Narendra Singh v. State of M.P* (2004) 10 SCC 699, *Budh Singh v. State of U.P* (2006) 9 SCC 731, *State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh* (2007) 13 SCC 102, *S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy* (2008) 5 SCC 535, *Arulvelu v. State* (2009) 10 SCC 206, *Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P* (2009) 16 SCC 98 and *Ram Singh v. State of H.P* (2010) 2 SCC 445)

13. In *Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor* AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See *Tulsiram Kanu v. State* AIR 1954 SC 1, *Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab* AIR 1957 SC 216, *M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra* AIR 1963 SC 200, *Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar* (1970) 2 SCC 450, *Sambasivan v. State of Kerala* (1998) 5 SCC 412, *Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P* (2002) 4 SCC 85 and *State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran* (2007) 3 SCC 755)

15. In *Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka* (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappraise and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and

strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.

The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)

“20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”

9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:

“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636).” (emphasis supplied)

9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of *Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police* (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

9.4 In the recent decision of *Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka*, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the and held as under:

“31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233)

“10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.”

31.1. In *Sambasivan v. State of Kerala* (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being

satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court.

While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)

“8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in *Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat* (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.”

31.2. In *K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala* (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappraise the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In *Atley v. State of U.P.* AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

*If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, *Surajpal Singh v. State* AIR 1952 SC 52; *Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P* AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.*

31.4. In *K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P.* (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”

(emphasis supplied).”

6.1 This Court has gone through the testimonies of the complainant, Prosecution Witness No.1 viz. Satishkumar Kantilal Suthar, vide Exh.9, who was Deputy Engineer at that relevant point of time and from his deposition it has been stated that theft has occurred before 17.03.2008, but no exact date is coming forward in his deposition as to on which date the said incident had occurred. He has deposed that complaint is made in view of the fact that customer had complained to village helper but the fact remains that transformers was in the farm of Manubhai Shankarbai Patel who had given information to the village helper but the statement of Manubhai Shankarbai Patel has not been taken by police nor is he examined by the prosecution. Moreover, from the cross-examination of the complainant, the said witness has specifically stated that in the

panchnama, it has not been mentioned that there was theft of oil when the complaint was filed vide Exh.12.

6.2 It has also come on record that the complainant was not an eye-witness to the alleged offence. Moreover, there are contradictions in the complaint and the panchnama.

6.3 With respect to the deposition of Prosecution Witness No.2 viz. Kanubhai Ratilal Patel, Exh.13, who has filed the complaint, which is produced at Exh.14, the Court has taken into consideration that for the same offence, there are two complaints filed i.e. one is at Exh.11 filed by the complainant Satishkumar Kantilal Suthar (Exh.9), Deputy Engineer and another filed by village helper Kanubhai Ratilal Patel Exh.14. In the said complaint filed at Exh.14, there is no mention of theft of oil.

6.4 In the deposition of Prosecution Witness No.3 Dolatsinh Khumansinh Chauhan, Exh.15, he has deposed that the fact of theft was informed only and he was not eyewitness to the incident.

6.5 The prosecution witness No.5 viz. Ganpatbhai Ambubhai, Exh.18, who was a member of the raiding party, but in his evidence there is mention of recovery of aluminum coil. But from his deposition, prosecution is not able to prove its case.

6.6 If the testimony of Joravarsing Vitthabhai Brahmabhatt Exh.23 and the panchnama prepared at Exh.24 is taken into consideration, the prosecution has failed to prove that the said muddamal is of the ownership of MGVCL.

6.7 Upon such premises, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Special Judge has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the accused deserves benefit of doubt. Further, learned Special Judge meticulously and rightly narrated Issue Nos.13 to 24 wherein it is discussed and held by the learned Special Judge that the prosecution has failed to prove its case not only that but it is observed that the prosecution has failed to prove that muddamal that has been recovered also belongs to MGVCL and on all such grounds, the Special Judge has rightly held that accused deserves benefit of doubt for the offences under Sections 136(1) (A) and 150 of the Electricity Act and, therefore, there is no requirement to interfere with the same.

6.8 Further, it appears that the order appears to be neither perverse nor capricious nor arbitrary nor illegal and, therefore, there is no requirement to interfere with the same and this judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge (Electricity) Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Special (Electricity) Case No.32 of 2008 dated 06.05.2009 stands confirmed. The bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. The appeal stands dismissed.

7. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned.