
Jarnail Singh Vs State of Punjab

Criminal Appeal No. 1298-SB of 2004

Court: High Court Of Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh

Date of Decision: April 28, 2008

Acts Referred:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) â€” Section 313#Evidence Act, 1872 â€” Section 114#Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) â€” Section 15, 34, 35, 50, 54

Citation: (2008) 4 RCR(Criminal) 294

Hon'ble Judges: Harbans Lal, J

Bench: Single Bench

Advocate: B.S. Kathuria and Mr. Rajiv Vij, for the Appellant; Manjari Nehru, D.A.G., Punjab, for the Respondent

Final Decision: Allowed

Judgement

Harbans Lal, J.

This judgment will dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 1298-SB of 2004 preferred by Jarnail Singh alias Jaila and Criminal

Appeal No. 83-SB of 2005 filed by Jasvir Singh against the judgment/order of sentence dated 1 April, 2004 rendered by the Court of learned

Judge, Special Court, Jalandhar whereby he convicted and sentenced both the above mentioned accused/appellants to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lac each and in default of payment of fine, the defaulter to further undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of six months u/s 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity "the Act").

2. The miniature of facts is that on 16.8.2000, Inspector Wazir Singh, the then Officer Incharge of the Police Station Phillaur alongwith other police

officials happened to be present at Nawanshahar Adda Phillaur, where he received secret information to the effect that Jasvir Singh, Jarnail Singh

and Deep Singh (Proclaimed Offender) were found in possession of poppy husk in truck bearing registration No. PB-08-6852, parked on the

road leading from Ganna Pind to Bhaini. Ruqa Ex.PF was sent to the police station. On its basis formal FIR Ex.PF/1 was registered. The police

party immediately proceeded towards the disclosed place. On the way, it joined Nirpal Singh Sarpanch. On reaching at the spot, the police party

found the abovementioned truck lying parked on Bhaini road near the turning. The occupants of the same were apprehended. The accused Jasvir

Singh was sitting on the driver seat whereas Jarnail Singh and Deep Singh were seated beside him. The Investigating Officer told the above said

trio that he had suspected of there being some contraband in the truck and therefore, he wanted to take search of the same. He apprised the

accused of their rights of search of their truck in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. They offered the search of the truck to be

made in the presence of a Gazetted Officer. On receipt of message, PW Sajjan Singh Cheema, DSP Phillaur came at the spot, introduced himself

to the accused and informed them of their rights to have the search of their truck in the presence of a Magistrate. The accused reposed their

confidence in him. On search of the truck, 200 bags of salt and 30 bags of poppy husk concealed beneath the salt bags were recovered. Two

samples of 250 grams each were drawn from each bag and converted into parcels. The residue of each bag when weighed, came to 34.500

grams, which were also made into parcels and sealed with seals "WS" and "SS". The Investigator after use, entrusted his seal to ASI Kewal Singh

whereas DSP Sajjan Singh retained his seal with him. All the sample parcels along with the sealed bags as well as the truck were seized vide

recovery memo Ex.PE. Wazir Singh Investigator prepared the rough site plan showing the place of recovery, arrested the accused and on return to

the police station, deposited the case property with MHC Jaswinder Singh. On receipt of chemical examiner's report and after completion of

investigation, the charge-sheet was laid in the Court for trial of the accused.

3. The accused were charged u/s 15 of the Act, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. During the pendency of the trial, the accused

Deep Singh escaped from the custody of the police on 3.2.2000 while being produced before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Nakodar and

subsequently, he was declared Proclaimed Offender on 13.7.2000.

4. To bring home guilt against the accused, the prosecution has examined PW11 Lehamber Ram Clerk, District Transport Officer, Jalandhar,

PW2 Amar Singh, Lambardar, PW3 Sajjan Singh Cheema, DSP, PW4 ASI Kewal Singh, PW5 Inspector Wazir Singh, Investigating Officer,

PW6, MHC Jaswinder Singh, PW7, Constable Bawa Singh and closed its evidence.

5. When examined u/s 313 Cr.P.C., both the accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against

them. The accused Jasvir Singh came up with the following plea:

I am innocent. I have been falsely implicated in this case. No recovery was effected from me. Moreover, the truck number from which recovery is

alleged to have been made is wrong and non-registration of the case regarding forgery of the truck number clearly shows that the truck in question

though alleged to bearing the scooter number yet no action was taken.

6. Accused Jarnail Singh has put forth that ""I am innocent. I have been falsely implicated in this case. No recovery was effected from me."" They

did not lead evidence in defence.

7. After hearing the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, learned defence counsel and examining the evidence on the record, the

learned trial Court convicted and sentenced both the accused as noticed at the outset. Feeling aggrieved therewith, they have preferred the

abovementioned appeals.

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with due care and circumspection.

Learned counsel for the appellants making a short shrift of their arguments maintained that (a) as alleged the recovery was effected in the presence

of Nirpal Singh, an independent witness but as per the evidence of Wazir Singh, Investigator, the seal after use was handed over to ASI Kewal

Singh whereas, the law requires that in the presence of a public man, the seal after use, should not be handed over to an official witness to rule out

the possibility of tampering with the contents of the sample parcel; (b) there was a delay of 13 days in despatch of the sample parcels, though, as

per the standing instruction No. 1/88 dated 15.3.1988 of the Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi, the sample parcel should be sent for the

chemical examination within 72 hours; (c) the conscious possession of the accused has not been established in view of the observations made in re:

Avtar Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 2002 (4) RCR (Cr.) 180 (SC) and these infirmities are fatal to the prosecution case.

9. To overcome these submissions, Ms. Manjari Nehru, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab on behalf of the State maintained that there is no legal

mandate that the seal after use necessarily should be handed over to the independent witness. As regards delay in despatch of the parcels, the

chemical examiner's report reveals that when the sample parcels were received in his office, the seal affixed thereupon tallied with the sample seal

and the same were intact and thus, the link evidence is complete in this case. She further argued that as regards conscious possession, the accused

were found present in the cabin of the truck. Thus, in view of the provisions enshrined in Section 35 as well as Section 54 of the Act, the

presumption is available to the prosecution that they were in the conscious possession of the bags. These contentions are unacceptable for the

discussion to follow hereinafter:

10. Allegedly, the seal after use was handed over to ASI Kewal Singh instead of Nirpal Singh PW, who was joined in the investigation. In re

Ramji Singh v. State of Haryana and Sukhvinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 2007 (3) RCR (Crl.) 452, the seal was not given to independent

witness but remained with police. The samples were sent to the chemical examiner after 8 days of recovery. It was held that where the seal remains

with the police after use and the sample has been sent after a delay of 72 hours, this circumstance would be fatal to the prosecution.

11. The standing instruction No. 1/88 dated 15.3.1988 issued by the Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi reads in the following terms:

1.13 Mode and Time limit for despatch of sample to Laboratory.

The samples should be sent either by insured post or through special messenger duly authorised for the purpose. Despatch of samples by

registered post or ordinary mail should not be resorted to. Samples must be despatched to the Laboratory within 72 hours of seizure to avoid any

legal objection.

12. It is abundantly clear from the above instruction that the sample should be despatched within 72 hours of seizure whereas, in the instant case,

the sample parcels were sent after 13 days from the date of the recovery qua which no luculent or cogent explanation has been given by the

prosecution. The record is quite barren to show that CFSL form was filled at the spot or deposited in the malkhana. The handing over of the seal

to the abovementioned police official, sending all the sample parcels for chemical examination after 13 days coupled with non-preparation of CFSL

form at the spot or its deposit in the malkhana are cumulatively fatal to the prosecution case. An identical view was taken in Ramji Singh's case

(supra).

13. As emanates from PW Wazir Singh's evidence, the accused was sitting on driver seat whereas Jarnail Singh accused was seated by his side

alongwith Deep Singh. The Apex Court in re: Avtar Singh and another (supra) held as under:

The word "possession" no doubt has different shades of meaning and it is quite elastic in its connotation. Possession and ownership need not

always go together by the minimum requisite element which has to be satisfied in custody or control over the goods. Can it be said, on the basis of

the evidence available on record, that the three appellants one of whom was driving the vehicle and other two sitting on the bags, were having such

custody or control ? It is difficult to reach such conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. It transpires from evidence that the appellants were not the

only occupants of the vehicle. One of the person who was sitting in the cabin and another person sitting at the back of the truck made themselves

scarce after seeing the police and the prosecution could not establish their identity. It is quite probable that one of them could be the custodian of

goods whether or not he was the proprietor. The persons, who were merely sitting on the bags, in the absence of proof of anything more, cannot

be presumed to be in possession of the goods. For instance, if they are labourers engaged merely for loading and unloading purposes and there is

nothing to show that the goods were at least in their temporary custody, conviction u/s 15 may not be warranted. At best, they may be abettors,

but, there is no such charge here. True, their silence and failure to explain the circumstances in which they were travelling in the vehicle at the odd

hours, is one strong circumstance that can be put against them. A case of drawing presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act could perhaps be

made out then to prove the possession of the accused but, the fact remains that in the course of examination u/s 313 Cr.P.C. not even a question

was asked that they were the persons in possession of poppy husk placed in the vehicle. The only question put to them was that as per the

prosecution evidence, they were sitting on the bags of poppy husk. Strangely enough, even the driver was questioned on the same lines. The object

of examination u/s 313, it is well known, is to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against

him. It is unfortunate that no question was asked about the possession of goods. Having regard to the charge of which appellants were accused,

the failure to elicit their answer on such a crucial aspect as possession, is quite significant. In this state of things, it is not proper to raise a

presumption u/s 114 of Evidence Act nor is it safe to conclude that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were

in possession of poppy husk which was being carried by the vehicle. The High Court resorted to the presumption u/s 35 which relates to culpable

state of mind, without considering the aspect of possession. The trial Court invoked the presumption u/s 54 of the Act without addressing itself to

the question of possession. The approach of both the courts is erroneous in law. Both the courts rested their conclusion on the fact that the

accused failed to give satisfactory explanation for travelling in the vehicle containing poppy husk at an odd hour. But, the other relevant aspects

pointed out above were neither adverted to nor taken into account by the trial Court and the High Court.

14. In re: Raj Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2005 (1) RCR (CrL.) 70, the bag containing 8.250 grams of opium was lying on the seat between the two

accused. They both were charged for possession of opium, but neither of them had been asked any question in their statements u/s 313 of Cr.P.C.

that they were in conscious possession of opium. It was held by the Division Bench of this Court that neither the presumption u/s 35 nor u/s 54 of

the Act would be attracted, as it was necessary for the trial Court to frame a specific question regarding the presumption which is sought to be

raised either u/s 35 or Section 54 of the Act when examining the accused u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. But no such question was framed or put to the

accused regarding their conscious possession. It was held that their conscious possession is not established.

15. In re: Buddharam and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (3) RCR (CrL.) 168, two accused while coming on motorcycle were

intercepted. One was riding and the other one was the pillion rider from whom a bag containing opium was recovered. The prosecution did not

prove that the accused who was on the motorcycle had knowledge of the fact that the pillion rider was carrying opium. In the face of these

circumstances, the conviction of motorcycle rider was set aside, though, the conviction of the pillion rider was upheld.

16. In re: Kashmir Singh v. State of Punjab, 2006 (2) RCR (Crl.) 477, contraband was recovered from the possession of the accused. It was

held that there is presumption of culpable mental state and conscious possession on the part of the accused under Sections 35 and 54 of the Act,

but these presumptions are rebuttable and the same will not be available to the prosecution unless trial judge gives an opportunity to accused to

rebut the same by putting questions u/s 313 of Cr.P.C.

17. It can be culled out from the conspectus of the afore-quoted authorities that the presumptions arising u/s 35 ibid as well as 54 ibid would be

available to the prosecution only if a specific question regarding these presumptions arising under these Sections qua conscious possession is

formed and put to the accused when he is being examined u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. The rationale or philosophy lying behind the formulation of such

question is to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain about his conscious possession qua the recovered contraband. It is an abstract rule of

law that every presumption is rebuttable.

18. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is put to the accused Jasvir Singh in his statutory statement that ""He (referring to DSP Sajjan Singh)

had a suspicion of narcotic."" So is the question in the statement of Jarnail Singh accused. On going through their statutory statements, it follows that

no specific question has been formed and put to these accused that they were in conscious possession. It has not been put specifically that they

were in conscious possession of the poppy husk bags allegedly recovered from the vehicle. Thus, in view of the law discussed hereinbefore, the

presumption arising under Sections 34 or 54 of the Act is not available to the prosecution.

19. It is in the cross-examination of DSP Sajjan Singh Cheema PW3 that ""some of the seals on the bags are broken and not legible."" Thus, the

case property has not connected with the accused. It is in his further cross-examination that ""the number written on the truck has been duly written

on the back side (dalla) but it is subsequently painted and now the legible letters are PAT 71 and digit 71 is legible and two digits before 71 are not

legible. No registration number plate is affixed on the truck. However, it appears that registration number was written on the bumper which is not

legible today."" This evidence gives an inkling that the alleged truck produced at the trial was not the same from which the recovery was allegedly

effected. This witness has also stated that ""it is correct that no gunny bags containing salt, tarpal have been produced today."" Thus, complete case

property was also not produced. It is in the further cross-examination of this witness that ""it is correct that memos Ex.PC, Ex.PD and Ex.PE are

not signed by Wazir Singh Investigating Officer. Wazir Singh signed on my statement Ex.DA."" He has not given any satisfactory explanation as to

why these documents did not bear the signatures of Wazir Singh, though, he was the Investigating Officer. It is in his further cross-examination that

at the time of preparing Ex.PC, Ex.PD and Ex.PE, I was suspecting that accused were having poppy husk in the truck but the word `suspect`

inadvertently has been left Ex.PC, Ex.PD and Ex.PE. Particulars of the case are not mentioned in Ex.PC, Ex. PD and Ex.PE. I did not prepare any

case diary regarding this case. Ruqa was not written in my presence, therefore, I cannot tell the contents of the same. This evidence further makes

the Court to look upon the alleged recovery with suspicion. It is in the examination-in-chief of ASI Kewal Singh PW4 that "during investigation of

this case on 10.11.2K, I verified the registration from the D.T.O. Office, Jalandhar, regarding the ownership of the truck, which revealed that the

truck was bearing fictitious registration number and in fact this number belongs to a scooter. My report to this effect is Ex.PJ. In the face of this

evidence, the real owner of the truck was also required to be challaned whereas the record is barren in this behalf. According to the aforesaid ASI

on 17.8.2000, MHC Jaswinder Singh entrusted to him the case property along with the accused for producing the same before the Illaqa

Magistrate and after producing the same, he again deposited the same with the MHC. It is in his cross-examination that "I had stated in my

statement recorded by Wazir Singh on 17.8.2K that Jaswinder Singh had given me the case property on that day. Statement Ex.DB has been read

over to the witness wherein it is not so recorded that case property was handed over to me by Jaswinder Singh, whereas it is recorded that case

property was handed over to me by Wazir Singh alongwith the accused for producing in the court. Thus, in the face of this evidence, it is every

difficult to believe that the case property was produced before the Illaqa Magistrate. The Investigating Officer Wazir Singh PW5 has stated in his

cross-examination that "it is correct that in Ex.DB, the date of giving case property to Kewal Singh is not mentioned. It is also correct that in

Ex.DB, it is mentioned that I myself had handed over the case property to ASI Kewal Singh for the production of the same before the Area

Magistrate alongwith the accused. It is in his further cross-examination that "I did not hand over the case property to Kewal Singh, on 17.8.2K,

for producing before the Illaqa Magistrate. This evidence gives an inkling that either ASI Kewal Singh was telling a lie or it has been recorded

incorrectly. It is also in the cross-examination of Wazir Singh (sic) that "the accused were not challaned under Motor Vehicles Act or under I.P.C.

for placing wrong number plate on the truck. As surfaces in the cross-examination of Wazir Singh (sic) "it is correct that it is not mentioned in the

consent memos Ex.PG, Ex.PH and Ex.PI that the accused had right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. It is correct that the

number which was to be searched is not mentioned. It is in the examination-in-chief of Inspector Wazir Singh PW5 that "I apprised the accused

that I had a suspicion that there was some narcotic substance in their truck and they have the right for their search to be conducted in the presence

of Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate." On reading between the lines, it is deducible from this evidence that the person of the accused was also

offered to be searched before the Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. In re: Dilip & Anr. v. State of M.P., 2007 (1) RCR (Cr.) 586 : 2007 (1) RAJ

235 (SC) the contraband was recovered from the scooter. The person of the accused was also searched. The Apex Court observed that in view

of the fact that the person of the accused was also searched, it was obligatory to comply with the provisions of Section 50 ibid. In view of these

observations, if the person of the accused in the instant case was searched, in that the mandatory provisions of Section 50 ibid were required to be

observed in their letter and spirit, whereas according to the above evidence, the mandatory provisions of Section 50 ibid have also been given a

go-by. Furthermore, it is in the cross-examination of PW6 MHC Jaswinder Singh, with whom the case property was allegedly deposited, "it is

not mentioned in Ex.DC (police statement of this witness) that sample seals were also deposited by the I.O. in the malkhana. It is not also

mentioned that the sample seals were sent to Area Magistrate." This evidence shows that the sample seals were not deposited with the MHC. If

so, it has been left in the womb of mystery as to whence the sample seals came for being sent with the sample parcels to the chemical examiner.

Thus, patently the link evidence is missing. It is in the cross-examination of PW7 Constable Bawa Singh who carried the sample to the office of

Chemical Examiner, "it is not mentioned in my affidavit regarding total number of samples handed over in the office of Chemical Examiner." This

further causes dent in the prosecution case.

In view of the infirmities enumerated above, these appeals succeed and are accepted. Sequel, the impugned judgment of conviction/order of

sentence is hereby set aside and the appellants are hereby acquitted of the charged offence.