

## Chandra Deo Missera and Others Vs Harpal Singh and Others

**Court:** Allahabad High Court

**Date of Decision:** Jan. 19, 1911

**Citation:** 9 Ind. Cas. 293

**Hon'ble Judges:** Tudball, J; Richards, J

**Bench:** Division Bench

**Final Decision:** Dismissed

### Judgement

1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs sought possession of zemindari share in some eight villages.

The property was purchased on

the 20th of June 1881 in the name of one Baldeo Sahai. At that time shares in eighteen villages were purchased. The plaintiffs are the brothers and

a nephew of Baldeo Sahai. The property which is sought to be recovered in the present suit is part but not all which was comprised in the sale-

deed. Part of the property, the subject matter of this suit, was mortgaged by Baldeo Sahai first of all on the 31st of August 1885. This mortgage

was really a renewal of the mortgage dated the 3rd of December 1880. We are perfectly satisfied that the mortgage of the 3rd of December 1880,

which was renewed as already mentioned by the mortgage of the 31st August 1885, was executed for the purpose of raising in part the purchase-

money required for the purchase of the property, the subject-matter of the sale-deed of the 20th of June 1881. On the 28th of February 1894, a

decree was obtained against Baldeo Sahai on foot of the mortgage of the 31st August 1885. The property, the subject-matter of the mortgage,

was put up for sale, sold and purchased by the decree-holders in September 1897. The proceeds of the sale of the mortgage property proved

insufficient and the decree-holders applied for a decree u/s 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. A decree u/s 90 was obtained and a certain share

in the village of Odhra Salempur, (which has nothing to do with the present suit), was sold. At the same time a share in the village of Hajipore was

also sold. This share in the village of Hajipore is part of the property which the plaintiffs in the present suit seek to recover. It is to be mentioned

that the present plaintiffs were not parties to the suit on foot of the mortgage and the decree, nor were they parties to the application for the decree

u/s 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs' case according to their plaint was that the purchase by Baldeo Sahai was in truth and in fact

not a purchase for his own benefit entirely. They contended that the purchase was made partly for Baldeo Sahai himself, partly for one Sheo Harak

Singh and partly for them. They accordingly contended that they were not bound in any way by the decrees of sales which had taken place. Their

case was that, at the time of the purchase, each of the persons above-mentioned contributed his quota to the purchase money and was entitled

accordingly. The present suit was instituted in the year 1908. In the year 1903, a previous suit had been brought by the present plaintiffs against the

defendants and it is material to mention the circumstances that gave rise to this suit. After the decree-holders had executed their mortgage decree

and got the decree u/s 90 of the Transfer of Property Act which had been partially executed, they made a further application for the sale of further

property in execution of the decree u/s 90. That property was a 7 anna odd shares in Mouza Odhra Salempur which was also a part of the

property, which was the subject-matter of the sale of 1881 and a part of which had already been sold by the decree-holders in execution of their

decree u/s 90. The plaintiffs set forth in their plaint in that suit the obtaining of the decree of foot of the mortgage bond, the sale of the mortgage

property the obtaining of the decree u/s 90 of the Transfer of Property Act and the partial execution of that last mentioned decree. They stated

boldly in the plaint that the property which up to that time had been sold was the property of Baldeo Singh, the judgment-debtor, but that now the

decree-holders were seeking to sell a further share which they had previously expressly omitted in their application for execution and they claimed

a declaration that the property which was then sought to be sold was not the property of the judgment-debtor but was their property. The

plaintiffs' case then was apparently very much what it is now, namely, that it was a purchase by Baldeo Sahai in his own name for the benefit of

himself and other persons in certain shares. The plaint, so far as it purports to set forth the title of the plaintiffs, is vague in the extreme. The

evidence that was given in support of it would appear from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and afterwards of the District Judge in appeal to

have been scanty and meagre. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case. In appeal, however, the learned District

Judge allowed the plaintiffs to put forward or put forward for them quite a different case and remanded an issue to obtain a finding upon such new

case. The case thus put forward is not consistent with the case put forward by the plaintiffs in the present litigation. It was a case that the purchase

in 1881 was a joint purchase made by Baldeo Sahai as manager of a joint Hindu family, the purchase being made out of joint family funds and, of

course, intended to retain the character of a family property. The Subordinate Judge found the issue against the plaintiffs and indeed reading the

evidence in that suit given by one of the plaintiffs himself, it is difficult to see how he could have done otherwise. It is quite clear that Hardat Singh

could hardly manage to bring himself to say that the property was purchased by the joint family. However, on appeal the learned District Judge

held that the purchase was a purchase by Baldeo Sahai as the managing member of the joint family. No second appeal lay from that finding of fact

and there the matter rested. The defendants now among other defences strongly rely on the statements made by the plaintiffs themselves in their

plaint in the previous litigation, where undoubtedly it is clearly and expressly stated in several paragraphs that the property, which had been sold in

execution of the original mortgage decree and also under the decree u/s 90, was the property of Baldeo Sahai; and it is to be remembered that the

property which the plaintiffs now seek to recover as theirs is four-fifths of the very property, which, in their plaint in 1903, they so stated to be the

property of Baldeo Sahai. The plaintiffs, who have been represented by Mr. Surendra Nath Sen, also rely on the decree which was obtained in

this suit. Mr. Surendra Nath Sen contends that, the District Judge having decreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to the 7 annas odd share in Odhra

Salempur, which was the subject-matter, that the purchase of 1881 was a joint purchase, the same decree must necessarily be now made in

respect of the rest of the property which was the subject-matter of that purchase. On the general merits of the case, we have very little sympathy

with the plaintiffs. From the evidence it clearly appears that the sale was a sale made to Baldeo Sahai alone.... The mortgage was made by Baldeo

Sahai alone. Mutation of names was effected in his name alone, and we are satisfied that so far as the mortgage property was concerned,

possession was given in 1893 to the purchasers. Whether or not the purchase was really a joint family purchase or a purchase by Baldeo Sahai in

trust for himself and others, he was the ostensible owner at least of so much of the property as was mortgaged by the mortgage bond of 31st

August 1885 and of so much of the property as was actually sold by the decree-holders after they had obtained a decree u/s 90 of the Transfer of

Property Act. There is a great deal of evidence to support this view and there is overwhelming evidence of the plaintiffs' own plaint of the 17th July

1903. Paragraph 1 of the plaint is as follows: "'On the 28th of February 1894, defendant No. 1 obtained a hypothecation against defendant No. 2

(Baldeo Sahai) from the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Azamgarh and having brought the property of the judgment-debtor to sale, purchased

it himself"". Paragraph 2 the plaint of is as follows: ""After the sale of the hypothecated shares, defendant No. 1 obtained, u/s 90 of the Transfer of

Property Act, a simple decree in respect of the balance of the amount decreed against defendant No. 2 and having brought the remaining property

of the judgment-debtor to sale, purchased it himself"". The plaint then goes on to draw a sharp contrast between the property which had actually

been sold and the 7 annas odd share which the decree-holders were then seeking to sell. If the plaint has any meaning at all, it means that in 1903

the very plaintiffs in the present suit admitted and were satisfied that all the property, which was sold up to that time and which includes the

property now in suit, was the property of Baldeo Sahai the judgment-debtor and has been properly sold and realized. Possibly the suit of 1903

was a genuine suit and that, in the events that had happened between the purchase in 1881 and the year 1903, the property which the decree-

holders were then seeking to sell had become the property of the plaintiffs. This may have been brought about by partition or otherwise. Assuming

that the plaintiffs and Baldeo Sahai were joint at the time of the purchase and perhaps we are bound to assume that they were, having regard to the

decree in the previous litigation, the family were undoubtedly separate and had been separate for some time prior to 1903 and, therefore, the

property which may at one time have been joint could very well have ceased to be so at the time that the decree-holders were seeking to sell the 7

annas odd share in Odhra Salempur. In our opinion, as to so much of the property, which the plaintiffs seek to recover in the present suit as was

comprised in the mortgage, the plaintiffs have no case whatever. As already pointed out on the assumption that the purchase was a joint purchase,

we are satisfied that the mortgage of 1885, being a renewal of that of the 3rd of December 1880, was a mortgage for the purpose of raising funds

to carry out the family purchase. The family purchase being in the name of Baldeo Sahai and the mortgage being also in his name, the necessary

inference is that the mortgage was also made by him in the capacity of the manager of the family. This being so, the family was bound by the

mortgage. The property could be sold in execution even though other members of the joint family were not parties to the decree. With regard to so

much of the property sought to be recovered in the present suit as was not comprised in the mortgage, but was sold in execution of the decree u/s

90 of the Transfer of Property Act, we hold that the plaintiffs can not go behind the clear and unequivocal statement that that property was the

property of Baldeo Sahai the judgment-debtor and not theirs at the date of the sale. We cannot decree possession to the plaintiffs of property

which they expressly admitted belonged to the representatives of the defendant. It is quite clear that the suit is devoid of all kind of merit. It has

been brought at a very late period and was probably suggested after unexpected success in the suit of 1903. We may mention that if there was any

possible ambiguity in the plaint of 1903, it is set at rest by the evidence of the plaintiff Hardat Singh to be found at page 4 of the appellant's book.

This was the evidence given after the District Judge had remanded the case for a finding on the issue as to whether or not the purchase was a joint

family purchase. The witness says referring to the mortgage decree: A decree was passed in respect of the said amount due to Badri Nath and the

property was sold by auction. The property which was sold belonged to Baldeo Singh. The property which Baldeo Singh hypothecated to Badri

Nath was his (Baldeo Singh's) "exclusive property". It is true that he subsequently made a supplemental statement to which we attach no

importance whatsoever. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs in both Courts,

which in this Court will include fees on the higher scale. The objections under the circumstances cannot be pressed and are dismissed.