I.A. Ansari, J.@mdashMore than twenty years ago, and, to be precise, it was, in the year 1988, that the opposite party herein knocked the doors of the Court seeking eviction of their tenant, Sudhir Chandra Das (since deceased), on two grounds, namely, (i) that the defendant is a defaulter in respect of payment of rents and (ii) that the suit premises were required bonafide by the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation. The struggle to get the house vacated by the plaintiffs continues inasmuch as this revision has been filed by the successorininterest of the said deceased Sudhir Chandra Das resisting the decree for their eviction.
2. In order to correctly appreciate the respective cases of the parties concerned and the merit of this revision, let me take note of the material facts and various stages, which have continued to keep the suit pending.
3. The opposite party herein, as indicated above, instituted, as plaintiffs, a suit seeking eviction of the defendant, Sudhir Chandra Das, predecessorininterest of the present petitioners, the case of the plaintiffs being, in brief, thus: Sudhir Chandra Das (since deceased) has been a tenant since the year 1970 under Hari Narayan Goala, father of the plaintiffs. After the death of their father, the properties, left by Hari Narayan Goala, was partitioned amongst his heirs, 2/3rd of the suit premises fell, on partition, in the share of late Hari Narayan Goala''s son, Madan lal Goala, who is plaintiff No. 1, and 1/3rd of the suit premises fell in the share of late Hari Narayan Goala''s son, Kishore lal Goala, who is plaintiff No. 2. In the year 1970, rent fixed was Rs. 60/ per month. Out of the said amount, Rs. 40/ came to the share of plaintiff No. 1 and the remaining Rs. 20/ in the share of plaintiff No. 2.
4. Alleging that the tenant, Sudhir Chandra Das, was a defaulter in respect of payment of rents and also that the suit premises were bonafide required by the plaintiffs, as landlord, for their own use and occupation, they instituted the suit, which gave rise to Title Suit No. 30/88 aforementioned.
5. On the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court held that the tenant was not a defaulter. Though the eviction of the tenant had also been sought for on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord, no issue, in this regard, was framed and the suit was accordingly dismissed.
6. On appeal having been preferred, the learned appellate Court, on 26.07.1994, allowed the appeal and remanded the suit for framing of appropriate issues and for decision of the suit afresh. On the suit being so remanded, the learned trial Court, on 26.11.1996, decreed the suit on the ground of bonafide requirement. This decree was put to challenge by the tenant in appeal, which gave rise to Title Appeal No. 02/1997. The appeal was allowed and the decree, granted in the suit, was set aside.
7. A revision was, then, filed by the plaintiffs, which gave rise to CRP No. 2687 2000. This Court, by judgment and order, dated 14.06.2004, set aside, the order passed by the learned appellate Court and directed the learned trial Court to decide the suit afresh. The suit was accordingly decided and came to be decreed on the ground of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the paintiffs. The present petitioners, as successorsininterest of Sudhir Chandra Das, impugned the decree of their eviction by way of an appeal, which gave rise to Title Appeal No. 13/2004. The appeal has been dismissed on 15.06.2005 and the finding of the learned trial Court, on bonafide requirement, stands affirmed. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of facts, reached by the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court, this revision has been filed.
8. Considering the fact that the sole issue, which has led to the passing of the decree, in the suit, is the issue of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffsopposite party as landlord, this Court is only required to determine as to whether the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below that the suit premises are bonafide required by the plaintiffs can be interfered with. In this regard, it needs to be noted that if, on the basis of the evidence on record, the view taken by the learned Court below is a reasonably possible view and is not such a view, which is based on no evidence or on ignoring evidence or on misconstruing evidence or incorrect application of law relevant thereto, no interference, with the concurrent findings would be possible by this Court even if this Court happens to take a different view as a more reasonably possible view.
9. It is settled position of law that bonafide requirement means that the requirement must be honest, the requirement is not a facade for securing eviction of the tenant, the pleading for requirement is not tainted with any oblique motive and the requirement is not a mere desire or wish. (See G.C. Kapoor Vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 610).
10. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble Vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde, (1999) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court, while considering the bona fide need of the landlord, expressed the view that when a landlord claims that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has the burden to prove it, but this burden does not warrant presumption "that his need is not bonafide". It was also held, in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble (supra), that while deciding the question of bona fide requirement, the Court would look into the broad aspects of the case and if the Court feels any doubt as regards landlord''s bonafide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt.
11. In Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co., reported in (1999) 4 SCC 1, which was a case for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord, for nonresidential purpose, on the ground that he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood, the Supreme Court clarified that it was not necessary for a landlord to prove that he has money to invest in the new business contemplated by him nor is he obliged to prove that he had requisite experience to do the business, which he seeks to carry out at the suit premises.
12. Bearing in mind the requirement of law as indicated above, when I turn to the facts of the present case, what is clearly noticed is that the plaintiffs, as landlord, have stated in their plaint that the suit premises are bonafide required for use and occupation of the plaintiffs. In his evidence, the plaintiff No. 1 deposed that he has six unemployed sons and his brother too is unemployed and that the suit house is required to establish them and that they had issued pleader''s notice to the defendant, in the year 1987, asking him to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises, but the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and, hence, they had to institute the suit.
13. In his written statement, the defendant asserted that the plea of bonafide requirement was a false plea, the defendant''s case being, briefly stated thus: The plaintiff No. 1 has been carrying on his business of a Tea Stall, along with his eldest son, in an adjacent room of the suit holding, his second son lives separately after having married a girl of separate caste and his remaining two sons are minor and not yet acquired maturity to do business and that the plaintiff No. 2 had been living an isolated life on the mercy of his sister having abandoned his wife since long.
14. From the evidence given by PW 2, sister of the plaintiff as well as plaintiffs, it clearly surfaced (as has been correctly noted by the learned trial Court), that the suit holding has fallen in the share of the plaintiffs on mutual partition amongst them and she has no claim over the suit premises inasmuch as she has got her share separately in a house adjacent to the suit holding, hi her crossexamination, PW 2 stated that all sons of the plaintiff No. 1 are employed in the Tea Stall of the plaintiffs. It is in the evidence on record that the suit holding is situated within the commercial area of Karimganj town and that the sons of the plaintiff No. 1 and his brother (i.e., plaintiff No. 2) are unemployed. The plaintiff No. 1 and his eldest son work in their tea stall and the size of the tea stall is small. In fact, the plaintiff No. 1 has deposed, in his evidence, that the business of tea stall is being carried on in a room of 8 cubits by 9 cubits and, in the adjacent room, he has been staying with his wife and that the size of the suit holding is 13 cubits by 9 cubits and the same is sufficient for his dwelling as well as his business purposes.
15. It can be clearly noticed from the evidence on record that the room, where the business of tea stall is being carried out, is too small. It has also clearly come on record, as noted by the learned trial Court, that two of the sons of the plaintiff No. 1 are unemployed. It is also in the evidence on record that one of the sons of the plaintiff No. 1 has been working as a helper to a mason.
16. In the face of the fact that the room, where the plaintiff No. 1 has been carrying on his business, is too small and he has four grown up sons, the learned Courts below were wholly justified in taking the view that when the plaintiff No. 1 claims that he wants to engage his sons and his brother in business in the suit premises, there is no reason for the Court to take a view otherwise, particularly, when the defendants have not been able to bring out anything on record, by crossexamining the plaintiffs or their witnesses or by adducing evidence, that the plaintiffs have taken a false plea of bonafide requirement or that their pleaded case of bonafide requirement is not genuine.
17. Situated thus, it is clear that the concurrent findings of the facts, reached by the learned Courts below, cannot be said to be without evidence or wholly against the evidence on record nor can the findings of bonafide requirement, which the learned Courts below have reached, can be said to be contrary to law.
18. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court does not find that there is any infirmity, legal or factual, in the findings reached by the learned Courts below. The impugned decree, therefore, does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This appeal, therefore, fails and the same shall stand dismissed with cost of Rs. 2,000/.
19. Send back the LCR.
