
(2014) 3 JLJR 432

Jharkhand High Court

Case No: F.A. No. 133 of 2005

Bharat Coking Coal
Limited

APPELLANT

Vs

Budhni Mahtain

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: May 1, 2014

Acts Referred:

- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 18, 23, 4(1)

Citation: (2014) 3 JLJR 432

Hon'ble Judges: Dhrub Narayan Upadhyay, J

Bench: Single Bench

Advocate: Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate for the Appellant; Tejo Mistry, R.C. Sahu and S.C, Advocate for the Respondent

Judgement

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Dhrub Narayan Upadhyay, J.

Heard the parties. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Award dated 7th December, 2004 passed by Special Judge, Land Acquisition, Dhanbad in connection with LA. Reference Case No. 36/1991 whereby the appellant has been directed to pay compensation with statutory benefits against acquisition of land as per the Award signed on 16th December, 2004.

2. The facts in brief is that land pertaining to Khata Nos. 18 and 19, area 3.415 Acres within Mauza-Bhagaband, P.S.-Putki, District-Dhanbad belonging to the respondent No. 1 was acquired under L.A. Case No. 10/83-84 for the purpose of Bharat Coking Coal Limited and accordingly Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 16.1.1982. The valuation of the land was assessed at Rs. 19,012.37 Paise only by Land Acquisition Office as compensation to be paid to the land looser. Since the land looser were not satisfied with the amount of compensation assessed, objection

under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was filed and it was referred to the Special Judge, Land Acquisition and registered as L.A. Reference Case No. 36/1991.

3. The parties were given opportunity to produce documents and adduce evidence in support of their respective claims.

4. The appellant has assailed the impugned Judgment and Award on the ground that process adopted by the Special Judge, Land Acquisition to assess the value of land to decide just compensation is unknown to Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Sessions Judge did not follow requirements indicated in Section 23 of the Act to assess value of the land rather the Court has adopted a new method to judge market value of the land. The learned Special Judge has considered value of paddy which was likely to be produced from the land acquired. The learned counsel has vehemently raised a point that the learned Special Judge has not deducted the development charges after assessing value of the land and he has relied on the Judgment referred in the case of [Shimla Development Authority and others Vs. Smt. Santosh Sharma and another, .](#) The learned counsel has further relied in the case of [Tejuma Bhojwani \(Dead\) through Lrs. and Others Vs. State of U.P.,](#) and in the case of [State of Bihar \(Now Jharkhand\) Vs. Bijoy Rajwar and Others, .](#)

5. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondents-landlord, who have been substituted after death of respondent No. 1, submitted that the Special Judge, L.A. has not considered the Sale Deed (Ext.-1) and the Court has adopted capitalisation method to assess market value of the land. It is not that the Court has considered entire land acquired to be that of Class-I rather he has classified the land to assess the average produce of paddy per year and accordingly considered the market rate of paddy per mound and after deducting other expenses he has calculated net income that the land looser were earning from the produce of the land. So far deduction towards development charges is concerned, the appellant has failed to bring on record that the agriculture land acquired was likely to be converted one into homestead or it was acquired for the purpose of creating a township. Since no such evidence is available in record, there was no need to consider development charges and it was rightly not deducted.

6. I have gone through the impugned Judgment and Award as well as the lower court record. The land was acquired by the State Government and value of the land was assessed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Land Acquisition Officer has not been examined to support the assessment made by him. Since the land was acquired for the purpose of mining for appellant, they have been directed to satisfy the awarded amount and they appeared in the case.

7. It is apparent that the appellant has not adduced any evidence to the effect that the land was acquired for converting the agriculture land into homestead or for the purpose of creating any township, office or for the residential quarter for the persons engaged in mining of coal. It is not available on record as to what development on the land acquired

was likely to be done. What is available on record is that the land was acquired for the purpose of mining of coal.

8. I have further gone through the impugned Judgment in which learned Special Judge, instead of considering Sale Deeds indicating value of the adjacent land, has considered the produce and the net income which the land losers were earning from cultivation and due to acquisition of land expected loss which they sustained.

9. It is apparent from the discussions and calculation made by the learned Special Judge that he has done proper exercise to assess market value of the land and I do not find any illegality on the same. It is already indicated that the appellant has failed to bring on record as to what sort of development was likely to be done after acquisition of the land and therefore no occasion arose to deduct development charges. In the circumstances, I do not feel that any deduction towards development charge is required to be done and the Award needs any modification. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed. The respondents-landlords shall be at liberty to withdraw the awarded amount if it is lying with the Land Acquisition Officer or the Special Judge, Land Acquisition after proper verification, identification and receipt.