
Sri Kempaiah Vs Smt. Chikkaboramma and Others

C.A. No. 2304 of 1986

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision: Sept. 16, 1998

Acts Referred:

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) " Section 115#Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 " Section 2(9)

Citation: (1998) 7 AD 446 : AIR 1998 SC 3335 : (1998) AIRSCW 3275 : (1988) 6 JT 379 : (1998) 5 SCALE 287 : (1998) 6 SCC 667 : (1998) 7 Supreme 342

Hon'ble Judges: S. Saghir Ahmad, J; S. Rajendra Babu, J

Bench: Division Bench

Final Decision: Allowed

Judgement

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Rajendra Babu, J.

This appeal arises out of certain proceedings initiated by two rival claimants, namely, the appellant on the one hand and

respondents 2 to 4 on the other before the Tehsildar under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the

Act"). The Act was brought into effect from 1st February, 1963. The Tehsildar made an order on 22nd July, 1981 re-granting the "Neeraganti"

Inam Lands comprised in survey Nos. 33, 38, 41 and 130 of Yeliyur Village and Survey No. 49 of Yerehalli village in favour of the appellant.

Aggrieved by that order, the respondents 2 to 4 preferred an appeal to the District Judge in respect of Neeraganti Inam lands. On appeal the

learned District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the grant made in favour of the appellant. At the same time, the learned District Judge also

held that respondents 2 to 4 are not descendants of the original barawardar and thus are not holders of village office. He also held that they did not

perform the duties of village office of Neeraganti at any time much less did they held the lands attached by way of inam to that office. One Rawala

Ninga was the owner of original barawardar of the Neeraganti of the two villages Yeliyur and Yerehalli as per Ex. D1 and D2, the Barabaluthi

registers of the respective villages. Respondents 2 to 4 claim that they are the descendants of original Barawardar. Various documents put forth in

the proceedings were critically examined by the learned District Judge and he held that these documents would show that Jatta Boyi son of Rawala

Ninga, Thammaiah son of Rawala Ningana Rawala and Linga son of Mudda Boyi were enjoying the Neeraganti Inam lands and rendering

Neeraganti services. Thammaiah was shown as son of Rawala Ningana Rawala, i.e. grand son of Rawala Ninga. The documents disproved the

case of respondents 2 to 4 that Thammaiah was great grand son of Rawala Ninga. The District Judge also held that there was no document to

show the relationship of respondents 2 to 4 or to show that they actually performed the "Neeraganti" work or that they were in possession of

Neeraganti Inam lands at any time. He also examined the oral evidence put forth before the Court in the absence of any document in support of the

claim. He held ultimately that respondents 2 to 4 having placed no reliable evidence to show that they are the descendants of the barawardar or

that they were at any time performing Neeraganti services or that they were in possession of Inam lands. As such they cannot be held to be either

authorised holders holding the lands or holders of village office on the appointed date. On that basis he held that the claim of respondents 2 to 4

was rightly rejected by the Tehsildar.

2. On the claim made by the appellant he concluded on a careful examination of the documents produced before him that the Kirdi extracts which

show that the appellant had been paying land revenue for the Neeraganti Inam lands from 1950-51 and therefore it would appear that he has been

in possession of the Inam lands from about 10 to 12 years prior to the appointed date. However, he noticed that the appellant is not an authorised

holder inasmuch as the appellant had not been appointed as Neeraganti by any order. Even if he had been performing the duties of Neeraganti on

the appointed date, there was no evidence to show that he was holder of a village office and, therefore, he had no right to the office in terms of

Section 2(g) of the Act. On that basis, the District Judge rejected the claim made by the appellant.

3. The appellant as well as respondents 2 to 4 preferred Revision Petitions arising u/s 115 of the CPC. The High Court upheld that part of the

order by which the learned District Judge rejected the claim of the appellant. However, on the claim by respondents 2 to 4 the High Court allowed

the Revision Petition and set aside the order made by the learned District Judge and allowed the claim of respondents 2 to 4 for re-grant of the

lands in question. It is against this order, this appeal has been preferred by special leave.

4. So far as the claim of the appellant is concerned, the finding of the learned District Judge as affirmed by the High Court is unexceptionable. The

object of Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 is to abolish village offices which were held hereditarily before the commencement of the

Constitution and the emoluments appertaining thereto and to provide for incidental matters. "Village office" has been defined under the Act as to

mean a village office to which emoluments have been attached and which is held hereditarily before the commencement of the Constitution under

an existing law relating to such office for the performance of duties mentioned therein; "holder of a village office" or "holder" would mean a person

having an interest in a village office under an existing law relating to such office. By no stretch of imagination appellant can lay claim to any such

office. No material was placed by him to show that he held the office hereditarily before the commencement of the Constitution much less did he

trace his title to any such person to held that office in that capacity. Therefore, the appellant's claim was rightly rejected by the learned District

Judge and the High Court.

5. So far as the direction to re grant to respondents 2 to 4 the lands in question is concerned, we are constrained to state that the High Court in its

order virtually re-appreciated the evidence placed before the authorities as if it was a first appeal not noticing that it was only a proceeding arising

u/s 115 of the CPC. The learned District Judge had referred to every piece of material placed before the Court in the shape of oral or

documentary evidence and came to the conclusion as we have noticed earlier in the course of this order. Therefore, it was not open to the High

Court at all to re-appreciate the matter unless it could find that the District Judge had committed any error of jurisdiction or acted with material

irregularity affecting his jurisdiction. No such contention has been recorded. On this ground alone, the order made by the High Court on this aspect

of the matter will have to be set aside.

6. We will examine the matter on merits as well. The High Court came to the conclusion that respondents 2 to 4 have proved that they are the

descendants of original barawardar Rawala Ninga through Thammaiah. Without examining the correctness of this finding even if we assume it to be

correct, there is no finding to the effect that respondents 2 to 4 performed the Neeraganti services or that they held village offices before the

appointed date or were in possession of the inam lands. The mere fact that an unauthorised holder of lands resumed u/s 4 of the Act is liable to be

evicted will not confer any right on respondents 2 to 5 as provided u/s 6 of the Act. Unless it can be shown that a claimant was holder of a village

office and immediately prior to the appointed date held the resumed lands, the question of re-grant of lands u/s 5 of the Act would not arise. When

this requirement u/s 6 of the Act was not available as no material had been put forth before the Court on this aspect much less any finding

recorded, the High Court could not have given a direction for re-grant of the lands. In that view of the matter we cannot sustain the order made by

the High Court. Therefore, we set aside the order made by the High Court directing re-grant of lands in favour of respondents 2 to 4.

7. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order made by the High Court is set aside to the extent indicated above restoring that of the learned

District Judge. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.