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Date: 24/08/2025

Gaurishankar Balmukund Vs Chinnumiya and others

Court: Privy Council

Date of Decision: June 13, 1918 Citation: (1918) AIR(PC) 168

Hon'ble Judges: Bart, Walter Phillimore, Ameer Ali, John Edge, Lord Shaw, JJ.

Advocate: E. Dalgado, J.M. Parikh, DeGruyther, for the Appearing Parties.

Judgement

Lord Shaw

By section 325 A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) it is provided that :-

So long as the Collector can exercise or perform in respect of the judgment-debtor"s immoveable property, or any part thereof, any of the

powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by sections 322 to 325 (both inclusive), the judgment-debtor or his representative in interest shall

be incompetent to mortgage, charge, lease, or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector, nor shall any Civil

Court issue any process against such property or part in execution of a decree for money.

In the present case the two salient facts are simply these:

That in 1891 the Collector of the district came under the Act into possession of the property in question; and that, secondly, while he was still in

possession of that property, a mortgage upon it was granted on the 22nd July, 1892, by the judgment-debtor. It is now sought to make that

mortgage operative in the appellant"s favour by reason of this: that the construction, it is alleged, of section 325-A is not to be read in the

complete and operative sense natural to the words that is to say, of incompetency to mortgage such property, but must be read with an implied

limitation. The limitation suggested is that there still remained in the judgment-debtor a power to mortgage the property so as to become operative

over any residue that might arise to the latter after the Collector"s regime had ended. It is the fact that the Collector"s regime has now ended, but it

is also the fact that, pending his regime, namely, on the 22nd July, 1892, the mortgage which is now founded upon was granted.

Their Lordships have been referred to authority upon this question. That which is founded on by the appellant particularly is the case of Magniram

Vithuram v. Bakubai $1912\ 36\ Bom\ 510 = 16\ I.C.\ 570 = 14\ Bom\ L.\ R.\ 598$. Their Lordships are of opinion that that case was erroneously

decided. Upon the contrary, the case of Murray v. Marat Singh, 1907 3 N. L. R. 171, referred to in the judgment under appeal, and the case

which has been decided, recently by the Full Bench of the Central Provinces in Salu Bai v. Bajat Khan, 1917 13 N. L. R. 130 = 42 I.C. 200

(F.B.), are in the opinion of the Board proper decisions and sound in law.

In short, the solo point in this appeal is whether a declaration by statute that a judgment-debtor shall be incompetent to mortgage his property is or

is not to be read in the exact and plain sense which the words imply. It is not necessary to go into reasons for the statute, but if reasons were to be

implied, it is manifest that a confusion of title of a somewhat extraordinary kind would arise if it was held that there was a competency on the one

hand to mortgage the residuary interest, so to speak, of the judgment-debtor by him, leaving, on the other, uncontrolled and unimpaired during the

same time, all those acts of administration by a Collector, which it is admitted in argument would be perfectly competent. The confusion emerging

from such a situation is not hard to figure. Their Lordships content themselves with holding that the judgments of the Courts below on this point are

right, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be disallowed. No other point was taken upon the appeal. The respondents

not having appeared, there will be no order as to costs.