
(2000) 4 PLJR 179

Patna High Court

Case No: C.W.J.C. No. 368 of 1998 (R)

Bihar Co-operative
Bank Employees Union

APPELLANT

Vs

Ranchi-Khunti Central
Cooperative Bank
limited and Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: Sept. 30, 1999

Citation: (2000) 4 PLJR 179

Hon'ble Judges: A.K. Ganguly, J

Bench: Single Bench

Advocate: Anil Kumar Sinha, Samir Prasad and T.N. Verma, for the Appellant; D.N. Sinha, for the Respondent

Judgement

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

A.K. Ganguly, J.

In this writ petition the petitioner Union has challenge the legality of the order dated 3.11.999 issued by the Managing

Director Ranchi-Khunti Central Co-operative bank Limited (hereinafter called the said bank which was issued on the basis of the resolution taken

by the Administration the said Bank by which house rent allowance of the members of the petition union has been reduced. The grievance of the

petition Union is that by the said resolution it was resolved that the excess amount paid to the members of the petitioner union will be recovered

from their salary. Being aggrieved by the said resolution, the same has been challenged in this writ petition on various grounds.

2. When the matter was taken up for hearing at the admission stage. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank mispreliminary objection as to the

attainability of this writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that under the provision, of Section 48 of the Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935

(hereinafter the said Act) there is a self contained mechanism for resolution of dispute under the provision of the said Act. Learned counsel for the

respondent Bank urged that u/s 48 (1) (c) of the said Act, any dispute between the society of its Managing Committee and any servant of the

society touching the business of the society should be resolved in the manner provided u/s 48 of the said Act. As such the impugned cannot be

challenged by filing this writ petition without exhausting the said remedy.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contested the said proposition, inter alia, by contending that by section 48 (1) of the said Act itself

certain disputes have been taken out of the purview of the said section and the dispute raised in the instant case also is one in the excepted

category. Learned counsel for the said Bank, however, seriously questioned the said contention raised by the petitioner.

4. Therefore, in order to appreciate the rival contentions, the provisions of section 48 (1) of the said Act are set out below: 48 (1). If any dispute

touching the business of a registered society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its managing committee

against a paid servant of society) arises:

(a) amongst members, past members, persons claiming through members, past members or deceased members, and sureties of members, past

members or deceased members, whether such sureties are members or non-members; or

(b) between a member, past member, persons claiming through a member, past member of deceased member, or sureties of members, past

members or deceased member, whether such sureties are members, or non-members, and the society, its managing committee or any officer,

agent or servant of the society; or

(c) between the society or its managing committee and any past or present officer, agent or servant of the society; or

(d) Between the society and any other registered society; or

(e) between a financing bank authorized under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 16 and a person who is not a member of a registered

society. Such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar:

Provided that no claim against a past member or the estate of a deceased member shall be treated as a dispute if the liability of the past member or

of the estate of the deceased member has been extinguished by virtue of section 32 or section 63.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly contended that if this court holds that the dispute raised in the present writ petition is covered u/s 48

(1) of the said Act, then of course this writ petition is not maintainable. Therefore, it is necessary to decide, as a preliminary issue, whether the

dispute raised in this writ petition is covered u/s 48 (1) of the said Act.

6. It is no doubt true that section 48(1) of the said Act does not cover all disputes inasmuch as some of the disputes have been expressly taken out

from the purview of section 48 of the said Act. The dispute which has been taken out from the purview of the said Act is a dispute regarding the

disciplinary action taken by the society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society.

7. The expression "disciplinary action" has a well known connotation in service jurisprudence. By "disciplinary action" is meant an action whereby

the employer punishes an employee on the ground of proved misconduct in order to enforce discipline in the organization. Such disciplinary action

is normally not general in nature but it is an action on specific and proved charges in respect of individual employees on the ground of misconduct

and in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the rules which permit reasonable opportunity to the employee to defend himself against such

an action.

8. Therefore, when a general policy decision for reduction in the rate of house rent allowance is taken, the same cannot be equated with disciplinary action.

9. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that such a step, namely, reduction in the house rent allowance would also be included within the sweep of disciplinary action and in support of the said contention he has relied on a few judgments.

10. The first judgment on which the learned counsel relied is the judgment of this Court in the case of Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union

Ltd. Vs. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Another, . in the said judgment the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the word

"dispute" in section 48 does not include within its ambit service condition of the employees of the society. In the said case the point of dispute was

the question of promotion from the post of Cashier to the post of Accountant. The learned Judges held that the question of promotion being a

matter relating to service condition of the employees is out of the purview of section 48 of the said Act.

11. The next decision on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner was in the case of the The Bihar State Co-operative

Bank Ltd. Vs. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Another, . In that case the dispute was about the seniority amongst its employees. In that

case also the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the question of seniority amongst the employees is a dispute over which the Registrar

has no jurisdiction u/s 48.

12. Learned counsel for petitioner further relied on a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in the case of Tisco Oriya Co-operative Credit

Society Ltd. Vs. The Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society and Another, . In that case the question was about the dismissal an employee of

the Co-operative Society without a show cause notice and the question was whether such a dispute we included within section 48 (1) of the said

Act. The learned Judges of the Full Bench held in paragraph 6 of the said judgment that a dispute of the above nature is excluded from the purview

sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the said (sic In the said Full Bench judgment in Tisco Oriya Co-operative Credit Society (supra) the learned

Judges held that decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited (supra) was

arrived at without follow. the earlier binding decision of Patna High Court in the case of Ramashanka Tewari vs. Gopal Banerjee reported 1971

B.L.J.R., 671. The said earlier judgment of the Division Bench of Patna High Court has held that the word "business" in the Bihar Act has not used

in a narrow sense and a wide interpretation has to be given to it.

13. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank, on the other hand, relied another Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in the case of

Chandeshwar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar reported in 1987 PLJR., 159. While construing section 48 of the said Act, the learned Judges held

that powers given u/s 48 are judicial in nature and power exercised by the Registrar u/s 48 is a power of a Court and within the meaning of the

word "dispute" u/s 48, the election dispute would also be included.

14. Learned counsel also relied on a Supreme Court judgment in support of his submission. The said decision is in the case of M/s. Electrical

Cable Development Association Vs. M/s. Arun Commercial Premises Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. And Another, . In the said case section

91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act came under consideration. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court while construing section 91

of the said Act held that a claim by a society together with some members for ejection of a licensee upon revocation of the license is a dispute

falling within section 91 of the said Act. Such ejection proceeding is maintainable despite pending proceeding under Bombay Rent Act.

15A. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Tiwari Vs. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation

Ltd. and others, . In the said case the provisions of section 64 of the MP. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 came up for consideration.

Considering section 64 of the said Act, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the dispute relating to disciplinary matter of an employee of

a Cooperative Society is also covered by section 64. The exact wording of section 64 of the said Act is set out below :

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a

society or the liquidation of a society shall be referred to the Registry by any of the parties to the dispute.

16. Considering the said section, the Supreme Court held that the "expression" dispute relating to the management or business of the society is a

very comprehensive one and the learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that such terms must be given a very wide meaning. In the said

judgment the learned Judges held that in view of the special provision u/s 64 of the Act, reference u/s 10 of the Societies Act is excluded and the

learned Judges came to the conclusion that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs.

Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others, has no application to the facts of that case.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, wanted this Court to follow the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in the case of Bihar

State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited (supra) and the Bihar State Co-operative Bank Limited (supra). Learned counsel further urged that

the first of these two decisions of the Division Bench has been affirmed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Tisco Oriya Cooperative

Credit Society Ltd. (supra). Therefore, this Court should put a narrow interpretation of the word "business" occurring in section 48 of the said Act

and hold that the present dispute over reduction in the rate of house rent allowance is outside the purview of section 48 of the said Act.

18. But it is difficult for this Court to come to the aforesaid finding. It is wrong to assert that the Division Bench judgment in the case of Bihar State

Cooperative Marketing Union Limited (supra) has been affirmed by the Full Bench in Tisco Oriya Co-operative Credit Society Limited (supra).

On the other hand the Full Bench questioned the correctness of the Division Bench judgment. In paragraph 2 of the Full Bench judgment in Tisco

Oriya Co-operative Credit Society (supra) Chief Justice Untwalia (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Full Bench recorded that the

Division Bench judgment in Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited (supra) has not noted the earlier Division Bench judgment in the

case of Ramashankar Tewari (supra). In paragraph 2 at page 209 of the report, while referring to the Division Bench judgment the following

observation has been made by the learned Chief Justice :

It is unfortunate that the attention of the Bench was not drawn to any of the three earlier decisions of this Court on the point out of which one

decision had considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain

and Others, .

In the said paragraph 2 the learned Chief Justice further held as follows:

In the circumstances, one could say that if the attention of the Bench deciding the case of Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. Vs. The

Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Another, was not drawn to the earlier decisions and especially the one reported in 1971 BLJR 671, the

earlier decision was binding and not the later.

19. Therefore, the learned Chief Justice in the said Full Bench judgment followed the previous Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of

Ramashankar Tiwary (supra) and held, on a comparison of the language of the said Act and Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, which was

considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others, , that there is a

difference between the phraseology of those two sections in two different Acts. The learned Chief Justice held in paragraph 5 of the said Full

Bench judgment that the word business in section 48 of the Bihar Act has been used in a wider sense to cover even at fairs of the society.

20. In Ramashankar Tewari (supra) a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chief Justice Untwalia (as His Lordship then was) and Justice S.

Sarwar Ali (sic) strung section 48 of the said Act held of a comparison with the provisions of Section 91 of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies

Act, 1960 that ""a wider meaning has got to be given to section 48 of the Bihar Act so as to bring within its ""the affairs of the society"". Therefore the

learned Judges held ""that the matter" relating to the affairs of the society can be a dispute within the meaning of subsection (1) of Section 48 of the

said Act (See para 4, pages 473-474 of the report).

21. Therefore, in view of the Full Bench judgment in Tisco Oriya Cooperative Credit Society Limited (supra) and also the well considered view of

the Division Bench in Ramashankar Tiwary (supra) this Court is of the opinion that the word ""business"" in section 48 of the said Act will also

include ""affairs of the society"" and so construed the matter relating to reduction in the payment of within the expression of the word ""business"" of

the society and obviously it is within the ambit of the word "dispute u/s 48 of the said Act.

22. In coming to the finding that the word ""business"" must be given a wide interpretation, this Court is not only relying on the judgment of the Full

Bench and the Division Bench pointed out above but also on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Tiwari (supra) where in

paragraph 3 of the judgment the learned Judges held that the dispute resolution clause in the Co-operative Societies Act is a very comprehensive

as has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court (para 3 page 127 of the judgment).

23. On the question of following the precedent, this Court sitting singly and having regard to the judicial discipline in the matters of following the

precedent, judgment in the case Ramashankar Tiwary (supra) which is affirmed by the Full Bench in Tisco Oriya Co-operative Credit Society

Ltd., (supra) and need not follow the two Division Bench judgments in the case of Bihar State Cooperative Marketing Union Limited (supra) and

the Bihar State Co-operative Bank Limited (supra). Apart from that there exists judicial opinion in support of the stand that where there is a

conflict between the two contrary decisions rendered by the Benches of equal strength, even of Supreme Court, the High Court can follow the one

which, according to it, is better in point of law. Reference in this connection may be made to the views of Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia (as His

Lordship then was) while delivering the Full Bench decision in Punjab High Court in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited Vs. Umrao and Others, .

24. There is also another difficulty on the part of this Court to give a narrow construction of the word "business" occurring in section 48 of the said

Act by excluding various affairs of the Society apart from one relating to disciplinary action of the employees which has been statutorily excluded

from the section itself. This is because of the cardinal principle of statutory construction expressed in latin maxim ""expressio unius exclusio alterius.

The said principle means Express enactment shuts the door to further implication"". Explaining this principle further in Caries on Statute law, Seventh

Edition, the learned author said as follows at page 259 :

If there be any one rule of law clearer than another, it is this, that, where the legislature have expressly prescribed one or more particular modes of

dealing with property, such expression always excludes any other mode, except as specifically authorised.

Explaining the same dictum Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) has stated at page 293 as follows :

By the rule usually known in the form of this Latin maxim, mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding

all other members of the class : expresses facia cess-are taciturn.

25. Therefore, u/s 48 of the said Act, a dispute regarding "disciplinary action" taken by the Society or its managing committee against a paid

servant of the Society is one which, even though touches the business of the society, has been expressly excluded by the statute. Therefore,

applying the principle of "expression units exclusion apterous", this Court holds that all other disputes touching the business or affairs of the society

must be construed to be included within the ambit of section 48 of the said Act. Since the Full Bench has given the word "business" a wide

construction so as to include within it, the affairs of the society, this Court holds that the dispute relating to reduction of house rent allowance is one

which touches the business and affairs of the society. As the same has not been expressly excluded, it is included within the ambit of section 48 of

the said Act and the petitioner must exhaust the remedy provided u/s 48 before coming to this Court.

26. It has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chandeshwar Prasad (supra) that the power of the Registrar u/s 48 of the said

Act is a judicial power. Therefore, there is no reason why the said self contained machinery, in the Act for dispute resolution be by passed and

this writ petition should be filed. In that view of the matter, this Court holds that the instant writ petition is not maintainable and as such it is

dismissed on this preliminary question but not on merits. The parties are given opportunity to raise dispute u/s 48 of the said Act. If such a dispute

is raised within a period of one month from today, the authority concerned will examine the same without insisting on the period of limitation, if any,

and thereafter decide the same in accordance with law and as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of filing of

the dispute. This Court, however, observes that till the dispute is decided under the provisions of section 48 of the said Act, the recovery from the

salary of the employees of the concerned Society of excess amount of house rent allowance already paid shall remain stayed. The question of

recovery will depend upon the outcome of the dispute. There will be no order as to cost.