1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order by which the Court below has refused an application ostensibly made under sec. 22 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907. The Petitioner alleges that he obtained a mortgage decree against one Rakhal Das Ghosh on the 20th March 1908. That decree was made absolute on the 7th December 1909. Before the decree could be executed, the mortgagor made an application in insolvency on the 31st May 1910. During the pendency of the proceedings under the Insolvency Act, the decree was executed and the mortgagee purchased the properties at the execution sale, on the 24th November 1910. The mortgagor was subsequently adjudged an insolvent on the 31st May 1911, and a Receiver was appointed on that date with direction to act in accordance with law. On the 25th July 1911 the Receiver sent to the Court a sale proclamation in which he included the properties purchased by the Petitioner. The sale proclamation was served on the 1st August 1911. On the 28th August 1911, the mortgagee purchaser appeared in Court and presented a petition of objection in which he stated that the Receiver had no authority to sell the properties purchased by him. His application was based on the allegation that the properties in question had ceased to be part of the estate of the insolvent long before the Receiver had been appointed : and that the Receiver was not competent to sell properties which did not in reality belong to the insolvent. The Court summarily overruled the objection on the ground that it had been made after the expiry of 21 days from the date of the order of the Receiver. The propriety of this order is assailed before us, and the question in controversy is whether sec. 22 has any application to the matter. Sec. 22 provides that if the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the Receiver, he may apply to the Court and the Court may affirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of and make such order as it thinks fit. The Petitioner is not the insolvent, nor is he one of the creditors, because his case is that he ceased to be a creditor (sic) execution sale took
Tiff is not clear page No. 367
parte Sidebotham 14 Ch D. 458 (1875) that a person aggrieved means a person who has suffered a legal grievance: a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something: and does not mean a person who has lost a benefit which he might have obtained, if an order had been made. If the allegations of the Petitioner are well-founded on fact the intended sale by the Receiver cannot affect his title, because the properties in question are no longer the properties of the insolvent. Consequently, he cannot be deemed to be a person aggrieved by the act of the Receiver. Sec. 22 of the Provincial Insolvency Act has consequently no application to the case before us.
2. But it does not follow that the Court is not competent to deal with the objection taken by the Petitioner. When a Receiver has been appointed, he becomes an officer of the Court, and if he is about to act in excess of his authority, it is competent even to a stranger to bring that fact to the notice of the Court, which has inherent power to review the conduct of the Receiver and to make an appropriate order so that the stranger may not be prejudiced by an unlawful act of its own officer and for this purpose the Court may hold a summary enquiry. This view is in accord with that taken in the cases of Ex parte Cochrane L. R. 20 Eq. 282 (1875), Searle v. Choat 25 Ch. D. 743 (1884) and In re Rasul Hazi Cassum 13 Bom. L. R. 13 (1910). The inference follows that the application made by the Petitioner to the Court below must be entertained and an enquiry held into the truth or otherwise of his allegations; but the application is not one under sec. 22 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and is consequently not subject to the period of limitation prescribed by the proviso to that section.
3. The result is that this Rule is made absolute, the order of the Court below set aside and the case sent back to that Court for enquiry whether or not the allegations of the Petitioner are well-founded. If it is found as a fact that the Petitioner has acquired a valid title to the properties by his purchase at the mortgage sale on the 24th March 1910, the Receiver plainly cannot proceed to sell them as the properties of the insolvent. As the application has not been opposed, we make no order as to costs.
4. It is conceded that this order will govern the other Rule (25 of 1913). The Appeals (Mis. Appeals Nos. 567 and 568 of 1912) are dismissed under Or. 41, r. 11, C. P. C.
