@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Dipankar Datta, J.@mdashThese two revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been heard together, since common questions of law and fact are involved. This common judgment shall govern both the revisional applications. The two petitioners were proceeded against separately under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereafter the Act) for unauthorized occupation of public premises. The Estate Officer arrived at the conclusion that they were in unauthorized occupation of public premises and, accordingly, passed separate orders dated November 22, 2010 directing their eviction from the respective public premises which they were occupying. The orders of eviction were challenged by the petitioners by preferring separate appeals u/s 9 of the Act. The learned District and Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair (being the appellate authority) by separate but identical judgment and order dated October 31, 2011 affirmed the order of the Estate Officer and dismissed the appeals.
2. Feeling aggrieved by the orders of eviction, since affirmed in appeal, the petitioners have presented these applications.
3. Mr. Jayapal, learned advocate representing the petitioners, raised three points in support of his contention that the eviction orders cannot be sustained. First, he contended that having regard to the terms of appointment of the opposite party No. 2 as Estate Officer by Gazette notification dated March 28, 1981 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, he did not have jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against the petitioners. According to him, the said notification authorized the Estate Officer to initiate proceedings for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises comprising of residential and non-residential buildings only and did not extend to land without structure. Since the petitioners were sought to be evicted from separate lands without structure, the opposite party No. 2 assumed a jurisdiction which was not conferred on him. Secondly, it was urged that proceedings were conducted against the petitioners in utter violation of natural justice. According to him, the petitioners were not given reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend themselves. Although he conceded that adjournments were granted thrice by the Estate Officer, grievance was voiced that the adjournments were too short, which disabled the petitioners to raise effective defence. Thirdly and finally, it was contended that civil suits had been initiated by the petitioners claiming right, title and interest in respect of the premises forming subject-matter of the proceedings under the Act and the Estate Officer committed gross illegality in proceeding against them without waiting for a decision of the Civil Court. Referring to the observation made by the appellate authority that Section 15 of the Act created a bar for the Civil Court to entertain any civil suit pertaining to an order of eviction under the Act, it was contended that the appellate authority totally misdirected himself in rejecting the contention of the petitioners. Section 15 of the Act, it was contended, would bar a civil suit in respect of an order made under the Act but there is no prohibition to seek declaration in respect of land occupied by a party and that too when the suit preceded the proceedings under the Act. A prayer was, accordingly, made to set aside the orders of eviction.
4. Answering the contentions of Mr. Jayapal, Mr. Khan, learned advocate for the opposite parties contended that no case at all has been set up by the petitioners deserving interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. In respect of the authority of the Estate Officer to proceed against the petitioners, he submitted that the issue is no longer res integra. According to him, the Division Bench of this Court while rendering its decision dated November 23, 2011 in FMA No. 009 of 2011 (Smti. Renu Bala Mondal v. Tehsildar and others) had the occasion to consider a similar contention and observed that the notification dated March 28, 1981 empowered the Block Development Officer, Diglipur to issue notice u/s 4 of the Act even in respect of an action for eviction from land without structure and, therefore, this Court ought to follow the same. The allegation of breach of principles of natural justice was countered by Mr. Khan by submitting that despite adjournment granted by the Estate Officer on three occasions, the petitioners did not file their response to the show cause notices and, therefore, the Estate Officer was left with no other alternative but to proceed against the petitioners without further waiting for their responses. According to him, a party who does not wish to avail of opportunity of raising defence extended to him cannot turn around and question the propriety of the order ultimately passed against him on the ground that he was denied reasonable and adequate opportunity of defending himself. So far as the final contention of Mr. Jayapal is concerned, it was urged that the petitioners did not obtain any orders of injunction in connection with the civil suits instituted by them and, therefore, there was no bar in proceeding against them. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the revisional applications.
5. This Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials on record.
6. To appreciate the first contention raised by Mr. Jayapal, it would be proper to read certain relevant provisions of the Act.
7. Section 2 (c) and (e) define "premises" and "public premises" as follows:--
2. (c) ''premises'' means any land or any building or part of a building and includes,--
(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building, and
(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;
(e) ''public premises'' means--
(1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat;
(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of,--
(i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company,
(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government,
(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act,
(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961),
(v) any Board of Trustee constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963),
(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted u/s 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under subsection (6) of Section 80 of that Act; and
(3) in relation to the National Capital Territory of Delhi-
(i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee;
(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority; and
(iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory;
8. Section 3 of the Act provides for appointment of Estate Officer. It reads as follows:--
3. Appointment of Estate Officer.-- The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette--
(a) appoint such persons being gazetted officers of Government or officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority, as it thinks fit, to be estate officers for the purposes of this Act:
Provided that no officer of the Secretariat of the Rajya Sabha shall be so appointed except after consultation with the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and no officer of the Secretariat of the Lok Sabha shall be so appointed except after consultation with the Speaker of Lok Sabha:
Provided further that an officer of a statutory authority shall only be appointed as an estate officer in respect of the public premises controlled by that authority; and
(b) define the local limits within which or the categories of public premises in respect of which, the estate officers shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.
9. The first contention of Mr. Jayapal is that Section 3 authorizes the Central Government to appoint an Estate Officer for the categories of public premises in respect of which he shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties imposed on an Estate Officer by or under the Act and since the notification dated March 28, 1981 refers to exercise of powers by the Estate Officer only in respect of buildings and non-residential buildings, the opposite party No. 2 was not authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed thereby or thereunder. He has also contended that the Division Bench while deciding the case of Renu Bala Mondal (supra) did not have the occasion to look into the provision of Section 3(b) of the Act in some detail and, therefore, the said decision is not an authority for the proposition that the notification dated March 28, 1981 authorizes the Estate Officer appointed thereby to exercise powers in respect of vacant land without structure also.
10. It would now be worthwhile to note the relevant portion of the notification dated March 28, 1981. It reads as under:--
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (40 of 1971) and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs o. (sic) D.O. 1037 dated 14th July, 1980, the Central Government hereby appoints the officers mentioned in Column (1) of the Table below, being Gazetted Officers of the Government, to be Estate Officers for the purpose of the said Act, who shall exercise the powers conferred and perform duties imposed on an Estate Officers under the said Act in respect of the public premises comprising of residential and non-residential buildings belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by and on behalf of the Administration of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and situated within the local limits specified in column (2) of the said Table.
11. It is true that the Division Bench while deciding the case of Renu Bala Mondal (supra) did not assign elaborate reason for arriving at the conclusion that the notification dated March 28, 1981, published in the Gazette of India dated April 11, 1981, authorized the Estate Officers appointed thereby to exercise powers conferred and perform duties imposed by or under the Act in respect of land but on a careful reading of the said notification together with the relevant provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the Estate Officer, who was none else but the Additional District Magistrate, Port Blair, the opposite party No. 2, did have the authority to initiate proceedings against the petitioners under the Act. Section 3 provides to the Central Government two alternatives. It may either appoint an Estate Officer for a particular area where the public premises is situated. It may also appoint an Estate Officer for a particular category of public premises. The categories of public premises do not mean land or building as one finds in the definition of "premises" in Section 2 (c) of the Act. The categories of public premises are those which are comprehended within the meaning of clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Act. The Central Government has authorized the Additional District Magistrate, Port Blair to exercise powers conferred and perform the duties imposed on an Estate Officer by or under the Act in respect of "public premises" situated within the Port Blair Municipal area. The words "comprising of residential and non-residential buildings" as appearing in the notification dated March 28, 1981 do not mean that the Estate Officer appointed by the said notification was authorized to exercise powers and/or perform duties only in respect of public premises that are either residential or non-residential buildings. Use of the words "comprising of residential and non-residential buildings" is explanatory and does not derogate from the intention of the Central Government to authorize the Estate Officers appointed by the said notification to exercise powers conferred and perform duties imposed on Estate Officers by or under the Act in respect of "public premises" which are in respect of land (vacant without structure as in the present cases), since the same is comprehended within the meaning of "premises" as well as "public premises". The words "comprising of residential and nonresidential buildings" have to be read as clarifying the position that "building" referred to in Section 2 (c) would include not only residential but also non-residential building and the Estate Officer would be authorized to initiate proceedings against unauthorized occupants thereof. This interpretation appears to this Court to be reasonable having regard to the fact that the notification dated March 28, 1981 has been issued by the Central Government in respect of the first alternative that was available to it in terms of Section 3(b) of the Act with the intention of applying it to all the "public premises" taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Administration of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
12. Even otherwise, the notification dated March 28, 1981 has been held to empower the Estate Officers appointed under the Act to initiate proceedings also in respect of land by the Division Bench in Renu Bala Mondal (supra) and such decision being binding on this Court, the contention of Mr. Jayapal has to be and is accordingly overruled.
13. Regarding the next contention of breach of principles of natural justice, it appears to be equally without merit. After receipt of the notice dated July 15, 2010 issued u/s 4(1) of the Act, the petitioners appeared with their learned advocates before the Estate Officer on July 19, 2010. Hearing was adjourned on that date and July 28, 2011 was fixed as the next date on the prayer of the learned advocate for the petitioners. Hearing was again adjourned on that date till August 10, 2010. Once again hearing was adjourned on August 10, 2010 till August 19, 2010 to enable the petitioners to file their written statements of defence. Ultimately, hearing progressed on November 10, 2010 being the adjourned date before the Estate Officer. Since the petitioners neither filed their written statement nor produced any evidence in support of their occupation of the public premises in question, the Estate Officer proceeded to pass the final orders dated November 22, 2010. Considering the factual scenario, it is difficult to return the finding that the petitioners were not offered reasonable and adequate opportunity to raise defence.
14. Insofar as the contention that the civil suits are pending and, therefore, the Estate Officer ought to have stayed his hands is concerned, it is without any substance and has been raised to be rejected. Mere institution of a civil suit does not tie the hands of the Estate Officer to proceed under the Act. Even though the appellate authority might have misdirected himself in making the observations he did in the judgments and orders impugned, that is hardly of any relevance. Mr. Khan is right in his submission that the civil court had not passed any prohibitory order restraining the Estate Officer to proceed.
15. In course of hearing, Mr. Jayapal was called upon to produce documents in support of the claim of the petitioners that they were occupying the public premises in question with valid authority. Needless to observe, no evidence could be produced by him and, therefore, the finding that the petitioners have been occupying the public premises in question without valid authority stands fully substantiated.
16. Considering all aspects of the matter, it is held that by passing the orders of eviction of the petitioners from the public premises in question, neither was any statutory provision breached nor were the petitioners denied a fair trial. There is absolutely no merit in these revisional applications.
17. The judgments and orders impugned in these revisional applications are affirmed. These revisional applications stand dismissed without order as to costs.
18. Photostat copy of this judgment and order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court), shall be retained with the records of CR No. 003 of 2012.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.
