1. This appeal has been preferred by the State/Appellant being aggrieved with the judgment of acquittal dated 21.12.2016 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Raipur, District – Raipur (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.2528/2015 whereby the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused from the offence punishable under Sections 294, 323/34 & 324/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).
2. Facts of the case in brief are that complainant Punam Rathore (PW-1) lodged a complaint in the police station alleging therein that on 15.02.2015 at about 11:00 PM when she was going to toilet, the respondents/accused started quarrel with her saying that it is not your father’s toilet, why do you not clean the toilet. They also abused the complainant with filthy language and assaulted her by throwing photo frame. When husband of the complainant, namely, Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) tried to save the complainant, he also received injury on his right thumb and other fingers. On the basis of the said complaint, offence was registered against the respondents/accused. After completion of the trial, charge-sheet was filed. The Trial Court framed the charges against the respondents under Sections 294, 323/34 & 324/34 of the IPC. After completion of the trial and upon hearing both the parties, the Trial Court acquitted the respondents from all the charges. Hence, this acquittal appeal has been preferred by the State/Appellant.
3. Shri Sanjeev Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the State/Appellant would submit that the learned Trial Court has committed manifest illegality in acquitting the respondents of charges punishable under Sections 294, 323/34 & 324/34 of the Indian Penal Code, as the ingredients constituted in the offence under Sections 294, 323/34 & 324/34 of the IPC have been duly established by the prosecution and, therefore, the order of acquittal deserves to be set-aside.
4. Opposing the submissions made by the State Counsel, learned Counsel for respondents would submit that the learned Trial Court is absolutely justified in acquitting the respondents from the charges under Sections 294, 323/34 & 324/34 of the IPC. He would further submit that as such, view taken by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the record requiring interference by this Court.
5. I have heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, perused the order/judgment impugned and gone through the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Trial Court.
6. With regard to the offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC is concerned, the case of the prosecution is based upon the statements of complainant Punam Rathore (PW-1) and her husband Ravindra Rathore (PW-2). Bare perusal of the statement of Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) clearly shows that he reached at the spot after injuries were caused to Punam Rathore (PW-1) and alleged incident of abusing was not done before this witness. Though Punam Rathore (PW-1) in her Court statement deposed that the respondents abused her with filthy language but what abusive words or language was used by them, are not disclosed by her. From the statement of the complainant, it is also established that the act of abusing filthy language was done inside the house, which is not a public place. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents from the offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC.
7. With regard to the offence under Sections 323/34 & 324/34 of the IPC are concerned, again the case of the prosecution is based upon the statements of the complainant Punam Rathore (PW-1) and Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) and Dr. Santosh Bhandari (PW-3) who conducted medical examination of the injured Punam Rathore and Ravindra Rathore.
8. Both Punam Rathore (PW-1) and Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) in their Court statements have supported the case of the prosecution and deposed accordingly. They have categorically stated that at the time of incident, respondents committed marpeet with them and due to that they sustained injuries over their body. During cross-examination, Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) has admitted the fact that at the time of alleged incident, he entered in the house of the respondents and he also committed marpeet with them.
9. Dr. Santosh Bhandari (PW-3) conducted medical examination of the complainant Punam Rathore (PW-1) and Ravindra Rathore (PW-2). During examination, he found three cut injuries in the thumb and other fingers of Ravindra Rathore. However, during his cross-examination, he admitted the fact that if a person fell from the stair in the concrete where pieces of glass are lying, then such cuts injuries could be caused. On the basis of the admissions made by this witness, the Trial Court arrived on the conclusion that the injuries sustained by Ravindra Rathore were not caused by the respondents. On bare perusal of the entire evidence of the prosecution, no such evidence is available on record which shows that pieces of glass were present in the concrete near the stair and regarding this, not a single suggestion was made by the defence before the complainant Punam Rathore (PW-1) and Ravindra Rathore (PW-2). Thus, the findings recorded by the Trial Court is only based on the presumptions which is not in accordance with the evidence available on record.
10. In case of Anjanappa Vs. State of Karnataka (2014) Cri. L.J. 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 held as under:-
“9. It is well settled that an order of acquittal is not to be set aside lightly. If the view taken by the trial court is a reasonably possible view, it is not to be disturbed. If two views are possible and if the view taken by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view, then the appellate court should not disturb it just because it feels that another view of the matter is possible. However, an order of acquittal will have to be disturbed if it is perverse...........”
11. In case of Harijan Bhala Teja Vs. State of Gujarat AIR (2016) Supreme Court 2065, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 held as under:-
“12. No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open for the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating the evidence if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.......”
12. In light of above observation made by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and on examination of the facts as discussed above, clearly shows that the findings of the Trial Court with regard to offence punishable under Section 323/34 and 324/34 of the IPC, are only based upon the presumption. The evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly shows that the injuries sustained to Punam Rathore (PW-1) and Ravindra Rathore (PW-2) were caused to them by the respondents. There is no evidence available on record on the basis of which any other view can be taken in favour of the respondents.
13. Resultantly, I am of the view that the finding of the Trial Court with regard to the charge framed under Section 294 of the IPC is based upon the evidence available on record and, therefore, the acquittal of the respondents of the said charge is hereby affirmed.
14. Further, the finding recorded by the Trial Court with regard to the acquittal of the respondents of the charges framed under Sections 323/34 and 324/34 of the IPC, in my considered view, is perverse and not in accordance with the evidence available on record. Thus, the acquittal of the respondents of the charges under Sections 323/34 and 324/34 of the IPC is hereby set aside and the respondents are convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 323/34 and 324/34 of the IPC. As regards sentence for the said offences, considering the facts that the alleged incident occurred in the year 2015, the respondents are facing the lis for about 9 years and also considering the fact that at present respondent No.1 is 59 years old and respondent No.2 is 71 years old, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be served if both the respondents are sentenced with fine only instead of sending them to jail after about 9 years of the incident. Hence, both the respondents are sentenced with fine of Rs.1,000 each for the offence under Section 323/34 of the IPC and for the offence under Section 324/34 of the IPC they are sentenced with fine of Rs.3,000 each. The fine amounts shall be payable within a period of two months from today. In default of payment thereof, they shall be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and two months respectively.
15. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.
16. Record of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for information and necessary compliance.
