Mulla, J.@mdashThis is an application in revision by two persons; named Sat Narain and Ganga Prasad who have been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class for a breach of a bye law framed by the District Board of Farrukhabad under the power vested in it by Section 174 of the District Boards Act, 1922. Each Applicant has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50. The criminal proceeding which resulted in the conviction of the two Applicants was instituted upon a complaint made by the Secretary of the District Board, Farrukhabad. The charge brought in that complaint against the Applicants was that they had made excavations and buildings for burning a kiln in the town of Jalalabad near the public road. Section 174 of the District Boards Act, 1922, Sub-section (1) runs as follows:
A board by special resolution may and where required by the Local Government shall, make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district, consistent with this Act and with any rule for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of such area and for the furtherance of the administration of the district under this Act.
2. It is this section which gives the District Board power to frame bye-laws in respect of the various matters referred to therein. The second sub-section of the same section enumerates various matters in respect of which bye-laws can be framed by the District Board but it clearly lays down that this list is not exhaustive and that it is without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by Sub-section (1). One of the items mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 174 is:
regulating slaughter-houses and offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings, or practices and prescribing fees to defray the expenditure incurred by a board for this purpose.
3. In the exercise of the power given to it by these provisions the District Board of Farrukhabad framed bye-laws for the regulation of brick and lime kilns in the rural area of the district. They are to be found in Notification No. 2995-II-IX-49-1932, dated the 9th of December, 1935. These bye-laws have been confirmed by the Governor of the Province acting with his ministers. The first bye-law with which we are concerned in the present case runs as follows:
No person shall burn lime or bricks within 300 and 1,000 feet respectively of a hospital, institution or building used for residential purposes or for the storage of petroleum, jute, cotton, clothes or other inflammable articles.
4. The second bye law provides:
No person shall be allowed to construct and burn such kilns or make any excavations within a distance of 300 feet of a public road.
5. Section 175 of the District Boards Act provides that in making a bye-law the board with the sanction of the Local Government may direct that a breach of it shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 100 and when the breach is a continuing breach with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 5 for every day after the date of the first conviction during which the offender is proved to have persisted in the offence. In accordance with the power given by Section 175 the District Board of Farrukhabad prescribed a penalty for a breach of the bye-laws referred to above in the following terms:
A breach of any of the provisions of these bye-laws shall be punishable with fine, which may extend to Rs. 50 and in the event of a continuing breach, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 5 for every day after the date of the first conviction during which the offender is proved to have persisted in the offence.
6. The two Applicants in this Court are admittedly partners and joint owners of a brick kiln and the case which the prosecution put forward against them was that they had made excavations in connection with a brick kiln in contravention of the bye-laws referred to above. The trying Magistrate found that case established against them and he convicted each one of the two Applicants and sentenced each one of them to pay a fine of Rs. 50. The Applicants went up in revision to the learned Sessions Judge of Farrukhabad but he refused to interfere, though it appears from his judgment that he was impressed by a point urged before him by Learned Counsel for the Applicants. The Applicants have now come up in revision to this Court.
7. Two points have been urged by Learned Counsel for the Applicants : firstly, that the bye-laws referred to above which have been framed by the District Board of Farrukhabad were ultra vires of the Board and secondly, that the maximum penalty imposed upon each one of the Applicants separately is illegal. The first contention is based upon item (k) of Sub-section (2) of Section 174 which I have set out above. It is argued that the business of making bricks is not an offensive trade or calling or practice and hence it was not within the competence of the District Board of Farrukhabad to enact any bye-laws in order to regulate that business. With reference to this argument the learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that in the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the setting up of a kiln and the making of bricks has been mentioned amongst many other trades and callings under the heading of "offensive trade". Learned Counsel for the Applicants argues that we must interpret the word '' offensive trade" as it stands in item (k) independently of any reference to anything contained in the U.P. Municipalities Act. Reference has been made in this connection to a Privy Council case--Laurence Arthur Adamson v. Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works AIR 1929 PC 181, which lays down that every work used in a particular statute must be construed in its technical sense and it is not a satisfactory proceeding to refer to other statutes for the definition of that term I may state at once that I have no quarrel with that proposition, for nothing of the sort has been done in the present case. The simple question for consideration in the present case is whether the business of making bricks is or is not an offensive trade within the meaning of item (k) of Sub-section (2) of Section 174 District Boards Act. The word "offensive" has got no technical meaning assigned to it hi any legal enactment and it is not, therefore, possible to say that this word must be interpreted in that particular technical sense We must, therefore, resort to the dictionary meaning of the word which is "liable or calculated to cause annoyance". Now, I have no hesitation in holding that the setting up of a brick kiln or the preparing of bricks is a business which is liable or calculated to cause annoyance to the residents of the neighbourhood and it is, therefore, an offensive trade within the meaning of item (k) of Sub-section (2) of Section 174 of the District Boards Act. It is merely to fortify that conclusion that a reference may be made to the fact that in the United Provinces Municipalities Act, which also contains similar provisions, this trade of preparing bricks and the setting up of a kiln has been mentioned along with several others in a list under the heading of "offensive trades". I would, therefore, overrule the first contention of the Learned Counsel for the Applicants.
8. The next contention is that the Magistrate was not entitled to impose any penalty in excess of a fine of Rs. 50 which is provided by the penal clause incorporated at the end of the bye-laws referred to above. It is argued that there was in fact only one breach and that was punishable at the utmost by a fine of Rs. 50. The fact that the breach was committed by two persons did not legally justify the trying Magistrate in imposing the maximum penalty upon each one of the two persons, committing the breach.
9. Learned Counsel for the Crown has referred me to the Full Bench case of Amrita Lal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta (1917) 44 Cal. 1025 : 42 IC 305 and I find that the judgment of Mukerji, J. in that case totally repels every possible argument that can be advanced in support of the contention pressed by Learned Counsel for the Applicants. The general principle in criminal cases is, in my judgment, quite clear and that is that every offence for which a punishment is provided is a several offence and every person who participates in that offence is punishable to the extent of the maximum penalty provided by the law irrespective of the, fact whether any person joint with him in committing he offence is or is not punished separately. This principle has been fully discussed and enunciated by Mukerji, J. in the judgment in the case to which I have referred and I very respectfully adopt it for the purposes of the present case.
10. The result, therefore, is that I see no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence of the two Applicants and dismiss this application in revision.
