Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.@mdashThis petition as originally drafted under Article 226 of the Constitution is for quashing of the order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Stamp Reporter refused to accept the petition on the ground that a petition under Article 226 would not be maintainable, and the petitioner can only file a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is further pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that he personally went to the Stamp Reporter and requested him to accept the petition, as framed, inasmuch as, there is no legal embargo in maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order of a tribunal. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
2. He further submitted that the petitioner is still seeking a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus, as the petition is directed against the order of Permanent Lok Adalat, which is acting as a tribunal and not a Civil Court.
3. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner appears to have force. In the case of Radhey Shyam (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the reference made to it by a two judge bench, expressing doubts about correctness of the law laid down in
"It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or Court which are not Civil Courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above."
(emphasis supplied)
4. Thus, while referring the matter to a Larger Bench, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, drew a distinction between the orders passed by the inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction and the order of inferior tribunals or Courts, which are not Civil Courts. Thus, the reference to the larger bench was confined only to the consideration of the question regarding scope of a writ of certiorari in relation to the orders of Civil Courts and not those of inferior tribunals.
5. The Supreme Court while answering the reference held that the orders of the Civil Courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the said dictum of law, as noted above, is confined only to judicial orders of Civil Courts and not those of the tribunals, which as noted above, stand on a different footing. This is also clear from the following observations made by the Supreme Court while answering, the reference:
"... All Courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227 . Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or Courts other than judicial Courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate Courts. Control of working of subordinate Courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227 . Orders of Civil Court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or Courts other than judicial/Civil Courts......"
(emphasis supplied)
6. Thus, it is clear that the judgment in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) lays down the law only in relation to the orders of Civil Courts and it does not extend to the orders passed by inferior tribunals or Courts, which are not Civil Courts.
7. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the objection being raised by the Stamp Reporter in relation to petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging orders of tribunal is not correct. Accordingly, the petitioner is permitted to convert this petition into that under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it was originally drafted.
8. The office is directed to treat the petition, as one under Article 226 and to place it before the appropriate Court hearing such matters, after registering as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if possible as fresh case on 29.9.2015. This order be placed before the Stamp Reporter, for its guidance in matters coming to it for reporting.
