Anu Sivaraman, J.@mdash1. These appeals are against the judgment in a writ petition. In their listed sequence, they are respectively by the writ petitioner; the third respondent, a judicial officer; and, the first respondent State of Kerala. The parties are referred to hereinafter in terms of their status in the writ petition. The reliefs sought for by the writ petitioner are for an order directing the State to pay Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner by way of public law remedy; for a direction to the State to realise that compensation amount from the third respondent judicial officer; to direct the second respondent High Court of Kerala to initiate disciplinary proceedings against that judicial officer; and for other appropriate reliefs as this Court may deem fit to grant.
2. The facts and circumstances which led to the filing of the writ petition are as follows:
"(a) On 25/01/2011, one Shahul Hameed moved the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam with a complaint against the writ petitioner alleging offences punishable under Sections 466, 469, 471 and 500 IPC. The complaint was forwarded to the Station House Officer of the Central Police Station, Ernakulam under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, CrPC, for short. Crime No. 370 of 2011 was registered in that Police Station for the offences punishable as per the Sections enumerated in the complaint. The writ petitioner was arrested on 18/03/2011. He was produced in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam on 19/03/2011 and was remanded to judicial custody. He was enlarged on bail on 23/03/2011. Thereafter, final report was laid in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. That Court took cognizance on the basis of that final report. The third respondent judicial officer was the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam during the aforesaid events.
(b) Writ petitioner''s application under Section 482 CrPC was allowed by this Court on 31/10/2011 as per Ext. P6 judgment quashing the entire proceedings in Crime No. 370 of 2011.
(c) The Sub Inspector of Police, who had arrested the writ petitioner and had registered the crime, was placed under suspension and imposed with a punishment of barring of three increments with cumulative effect. The Kerala State Human Rights Commission passed an order awarding Rs. 50,000/- to the writ petitioner to be paid by the Government in a petition filed by the writ petitioner against the Government and that Police Officer.
(d) On 25/04/2013, writ petitioner preferred a complaint to the Registrar General of this Court seeking action against the third respondent judicial officer. In response to his query under the Right to Information Act, the writ petitioner was informed by the Public Information Officer of the High Court that his petition was ordered to be filed as no action need be taken in the matter.
(e) Thereupon, the writ petition was filed complaining inaction on the part of the High Court to take disciplinary proceedings against the third respondent and also seeking compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs on the plea that the third respondent judicial officer had, through his acts, failed to exercise his due judicial powers and duty and this has resulted in infringement of valuable rights of the writ petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and hence, the eligibility for the compensation claimed."
3. The writ petition was admitted and notice was taken by the Government Pleader on behalf of the State but notice to respondents 2 and 3 was dispensed with. After considering the contentions of the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader, the learned Single Judge held that the registration of the FIR as against the petitioner was erroneous in terms of Sections 195 and 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said circumstances, the State was directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to the petitioner. Petitioner has preferred this writ appeal raising the argument that the amount awarded was unreasonably low in view of the hardship suffered by him and that the prejudice caused to him was due to the illegal and unwarranted action of the third respondent. The writ petitioner also contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have directed recovery of amounts paid as compensation from the third respondent and ordered the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him.
4. Heard Sri. A.X. Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in WA No. 1524 of 2014, Sri. Jaju Babu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant in WA No. 1821 of 2014, Sri. Sujith Mathew, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State and Sri. Elvin Peter P. J., learned counsel appearing for the High Court of Kerala.
5. It is the case of the writ petitioner/appellant in WA No. 1524/2014 that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC specifically provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 of the IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint, in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Further, Section 199 CrPC provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI IPC except on a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the offences alleged against the appellant being under Sections 466, 469, 471 and 500 IPC, no cognizance could have been taken by the Court in respect of the offences at the instance of the de facto complainant in a private complaint. In the above circumstances, the third respondent erred in directing an investigation by the officer-in-charge of the Police Station, it is urged.
6. The learned counsel further contends that when the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed to the appellant has been infringed due to an action of a judicial officer, even if such action is in exercise of his judicial function, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is empowered to direct the Government to award adequate compensation to the wronged individual and to direct recovery from the officer who is guilty of the wrongful act. He would place reliance on the decisions of this Court in Vypeen Vishamadhya Koottakola Virudha Samithy v. State of Kerala and Others 2005 (1) KAJ 547 to contend that the power to order payment of compensation is available to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision reported in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Others , 2007 KHC 4052: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692: JT 2007 (11) SC 276:2007 (11) SCALE 318 : (2008) 5 SCC 668:2008 (3) KLT SN 57 is relied on to contend that a Magistrate is expected to apply his mind to the facts and law involved before ordering police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC It is further held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter where the need of application of mind is to be emphasised.
7. In State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for Governance Trust and Others , 2007 KHC 3129: (2007) 3 SCC 587: JT 2007 (1) SC 315 : AIR 2007 SC 777, the Apex Court has held that right to protect one''s reputation is also inherent in the Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The decision reported in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and Another , 2000 KHC 896 : (2000) 1 SCC 416 : (2000) SCC (L&S) 144: AIR 2000 SC 22:1999 (5) SLR 615: 2000(1)LLN 317 is relied on to contend that Judges exercise sovereign judicial power and that judiciary represents the State and its sovereign power. It is further contended that the High Court has the duty and the responsibility to maintain discipline in the subordinate judiciary. It is further submitted that the Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others , 2015 KHC 4242 : 2015 (2) KLJ 491 : 2015 (2) KHC SN 30 : 2015 (1) KLD 699 : 2015 (4) SCALE 120 : 2015 (2) KLT 451 : 2015 CriLJ 2396 : AIR 2015 SC1758: (2015) 6 SCC 287 held that the power under Section 156(3) CrPC warrants application of judicial mind. The decision reported in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shihshkumar Rangrao Patil and Another , 1997 KHC 519 : (1997) 6 SCC 339 : 1997 (2) KLT SN 27 : (1997) SCC (L&S) 1486 : AIR 1997 SC 2631 :1997 (4) SLR 321 :1997 (2) LLN 470 :1997 (1) Guj LH 997 is also relied on in support of the proportion that the conduct of every judicial officer should be beyond reproach and that High Courts have to maintain constant vigil to weed out corruption in judiciary. The learned counsel also relied on decisions of the Apex Court holding that where mal practices are alleged, officers exercising quasi-judicial functions are not immune from disciplinary proceedings.
8. In WA No. 140 of 2015 filed by the State, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant contends that one of the offences alleged against the writ petitioner was under Section 469 IPC as well. It is urged that one of the offences alleged against the writ petitioner being cognizable, Section 155(4) CrPC provides that the case itself shall be a cognizable one, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable. It is therefore contended that there was no illegality in the Magistrate ordering investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. The bar provided in Section 195 CrPC is only against the Court taking cognizance of offences under Section 471 IPC otherwise than on a complaint of the Court. The bar under Section 199 also operates only for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 500 IPC. It is further submitted that the case in hand cannot be treated as one of false imprisonment or malicious prosecution. A question of false imprisonment would arise only in cases where a person is committed to prison without the due process of law. In the instant case, there was a remand order issued by the Magistrate and the police was only acting in terms of the order. It is therefore contended that the order of awarding compensation was unwarranted in the facts of the case.
9. The learned Government Pleader also placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in State of Orissa v. Sharat Chandra Sahu and Another , 1996 KHC 975: (1996) 6 SCC 435: (1996) SCC (Cri) 1387 :AIR 1997 SC 1, to contend that where facts disclosing both cognizable and non-cognizable offences are made out, the police is not debarred from investigating non-cognizable cases and including them in the charge-sheet. The decision reported in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh and Another , 1998 KHC 250: (1998) 2 SCC 391 : 1998(1) KLTSN 75 : (1998) SCC (Cri)642 : AIR 1998 SC 768 : 1998 CriLJ 1104 is also relied upon in support of the contention that the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is contended that the embargo in Section 195 is only with regard to the Court taking cognizance of the offence. In Mahesh Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others , 2010 KHC 6165 : (2009) 15 SCC 519 : AIR 2010 SC 812 : 2010 CriLJ 890 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 660 the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in spite of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC, a private complaint in such a case was maintainable. Further, the decision in Rajendar Singh Pathania and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others , 2011 KHC 4703 : (2011) 13 SCC 329 : 2011 (9) SCALE 124 : 2011 (3) KLT SN 140 : 2012 CriLJ 609 : 2011(105) AIC 57 was relied upon to contend that award of compensation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for violation of fundamental rights can be made against the State or its servants only after a proper enquiry on the questions of fact alleged in the complaint. It is also stated therein that award of monetary compensation is permissible when that is the only practical mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers.
10. In WA No. 1821 of 2014, which is an appeal at the instance of the third respondent in the writ petition, who is the concerned judicial officer, it is contended that no notice in the writ petition was issued to the third respondent before rendering the judgment, which contained observations prejudicial to him. It is contended that the High Court was also not put on notice before the impugned judgment was rendered. In the above circumstances, while admitting WA No. 1821 of 2014, a Bench of this Court had permitted respondents 2 and 3 to file pleadings in these proceedings and they have done so.
11. The High Court of Kerala in its counter-affidavit contends that no pleading of any mala fides had been made as against the third respondent by the petitioner in the writ petition. It is stated that the judicial officer was only carrying out his duties as a Chief Judicial Magistrate and even if the orders issued by him are erroneous, no personal action can be taken as against him in the absence of any allegation of mala fides or dishonest exercise of power as against him. Reliance is placed on the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1963 and the Judges Protection Act, 1985 to contend that even in case of a mistaken or erroneous order, the judicial officer would not be liable for any action including liability to compensation in view of the specific provisions of law.
12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Judicial Officer, 3rd respondent in the writ petition would contend that there was no erroneous exercise of power by the Magistrate and that he had only considered a private complaint and directed the investigation on the same. The learned counsel places reliance on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar and Others , 1997 KHC 378 : (1997) 8 SCC 476 : 1997(2) KLT 358 : AIR 1997 SC 3104 : 1997 CriLJ 3757 to contend that if a complaint to a Magistrate discloses a cognizable offence the direction by the Magistrate asking the police to register a case and investigate the same was held to be not illegal. The learned counsel also relies on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others , 2001 KHC 852 : (2001) 6 SCC 491 : 2001 (3) KLT SN 15 : AIR 2001 SC 2788 to contend that bona fide and erroneous exercise of judicial power would not amount to misconduct on the part of the Judicial Officer making him liable for disciplinary action. Relying on the decision reported in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Another , 1988 KHC 999: (1988) 3 SCC 370: (1988) SCC (L&S) 797: AIR 1988 SC 1395:1988 (2) SLR 564 it is contended that judicial officers should not be proceeded against even in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction unless wrong orders passed by them are found to be with corrupt motives. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer, Ranga Reddy District Courts and Others , 2009 KHC 6411 : AIR 2009 AP 174 held that authorities discharging judicial functions are not covered under the Right to Information Act and that their actions while discharging such functions are protected under the Judicial Officers Protection Act.
13. It is clear from a reading of Ext. P1 complaint and Ext. P6 judgment of this Court in OP (Crl) No. 1599 of 2011 that the matter in issue was with regard to a dispute which was in existence between the writ petitioner and one Shahul Hameed which had led to the filing of a writ petition seeking Police protection before this Court. The document said to have been forged by the writ petitioner was allegedly one which was used during the consideration of the said writ petition. It is also noted that in the remand report in respect of the petitioner''s case, the Police Officer had noted that the cause of action arose on 28/09/2010 in the High Court when a false document was produced. This Court, in Ext. P6, exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, after examining the materials produced, found that no such document was produced by the parties in Court. It was therefore found that the registering of the FIR based on such a complaint and the arrest and detention of the writ petitioner was unwarranted. It was also found that crime had been registered against the petitioner where one of the offences was under Section 500 IPC, oblivious of the fact that there is a clear bar under Section 199 of the CrPC. It was on these findings that the crime registered against the writ petitioner was quashed. The petitioner was also set at liberty to initiate legal proceedings if so advised.
14. Ext. P6 judgment is dated 31/10/2011. It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner had submitted a complaint before the Human Rights Commission against the Station House Officer and by Ext. P10 order dated 20/09/2012 the Commission had directed the State to make payment of an amount of Rs. 50,000/- to him. This was evidently as a measure of compensation for the wrongful arrest and detention suffered by him.
15. Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code defines ''Judge'' as follows:
"The word "Judge" denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person,-
who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or
who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment."
16. Section 20 defines the Court of Justice, which reads as under:
"The words "Court of Justice" denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially."
17. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 define ''Court'' to include all Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence. The Code of Criminal Procedure defines a judicial proceeding to include "any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath". A judicial act or a judicial function has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court to be one which consists in the interpretation of law and its application by Rule or discretion to the facts to a particular case "if a Judge dealing with a particular matter, has to exercise his discretion in arriving at a decision, he is acting judicially". Judicial function is exercised under legal authority to decide on disputes, after hearing the parties, may be after making an enquiry, and the decision effects the rights and obligations of the parties.
18. Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts contains a discussion on the liability of the officers of superior Courts in Clause 152 of Chapter 19, which reads as follows:
"152. LIABILITY OF THE OFFICERS OF SUPERIOR COURTS
A Judge of one of the superior Courts is absolutely exempt from all civil liability for acts done by him in the execution of his judicial functions. His exemption from civil liability is absolute, extending not merely to errors of law and fact, but to the malicious, corrupt, or oppressive exercise of his judicial powers. For it is better that occasional injustice should be done and remain unredressed under the cover of this immunity than that the independence of the judicature and the strength of the administration of justice should be weakened by the liability of Judges to unfounded and vexatious charges of error, malice, or incompetence brought against them by disappointed litigants- "otherwise no man but a beggar, or a fool, would be a Judge." The remedy for judicial errors is some form of appeal to a higher Court, and the remedy for judicial oppression or corruption is a criminal prosecution or the removal of the offending Judge; but in neither case can he be called on to defend his judgment in an action for damages brought against him by an injured litigant. Nor is the Crown vicariously liable for his acts, as judicial error is not a tort. It is possible that there is liability under the European Convention on Human Rights."
Judges of inferior Courts possess same immunity as Judges of superior Courts so long as they do not exceed their jurisdiction.
19. Ratanlal and Dheerajlal''s Law of Torts 25th edition, referring to the protection available to judicial officers under the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 and the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, notes as follows:
"The Act enacts the common law rule of immunity of Judges and is somewhat wider in that unlike the common law rule it makes no distinction between Judges of Superior Courts, Judges of inferior Courts and Magistrates. Every person acting judicially, whether high or low, has the same protection. The principle behind the Act is the same that it is in public interest that a person holding a judicial office should be in a position to discharge his functions with independence and without fear of consequences. The act came up for construction before the Supreme Court in Anwar Hussain v. Ajay Kumar, , AIR 1965 SC 1651 and the following propositions follow from that case: (1) If an act done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in the discharge of his judicial duties is within the limits of his jurisdiction, he is protected whether or not he has discharged those duties erroneously, irregularly, or even illegally, or without believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do the act complained of; (2) If such an act is without the limits of the officers jurisdiction, he is protected if, at the time of doing or ordering it, he, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to order it; (3) The expression "jurisdiction" in Section 1 of the Act does not mean the power to do or order the act impugned, but generally the authority of the judicial officer to act in the matter; (4) The Act protects a judicial officer only when he is acting in his judicial capacity and not in any other capacity; and (5) if a judicial officer arrests a person ''recklessly and maliciously'' not in discharge of the duties of his office as a Magistrate but on the ground that he acted under the direction of his superior officer, he can be said to be acting in an executive capacity and not in a judicial capacity and therefore, he is not protected under the Act."
20. In a decision reported in Abdulla K. M. v. Secretary and Others , 2010 (1) KHC 593: , ILR 2010 (1) Ker. 897:, 2010 (1) KLT SN 96, rendered by one of us (Justice Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan) the fundamental nature, functions and role of Courts of justice and the judiciary was examined in the light of authoritative commentaries and precedents and observed that Courts of justice are entrusted with the sovereign function of dispensation of justice and the role of the judiciary in a democratic set up is of prime importance for the enforcement of the rule of law. In Infoseek Solutions v. Kerala Law Times , 2006 KHC 1013 : 2006(4) KLT 311: ILR 2006 (4) Ker. 343: AIR 2007 Ker. 1 : 2006(3) KLJ 919, while considering the question whether a publisher has copyright over reports of judgments of Court, this Court held that a Judge is empowered by law to give a definite judgment in any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, and that judgments are decisions of the Court, which is an institution and not of an individual. It is further held in paragraph 13 of the judgment as follows:
"13......When the judiciary acts as the duly authorised societal agent of the State, it acts as the representative of the sovereign, namely, the people. The power to adjudicate, determine, apply the laws and to give the verdict is essentially the power of the Republic, being exercised through the judicial limb of the State, and made available through the Courts which are the institutions where the republic carries out its activities that it has to, through the judicial limb of the State."
21. A Judge is thus a person who is duty bound to act fairly and judicially in the exercise of his judicial functions. A judicial officer is interdicted from deciding matters in which he has a personal interest, however small. Similarly, a judicial officer is expected to decide cases placed before him for decision in a fair and equitable manner. Such decision has to be informed by the law to be applied in the case as well as the facts available therein. In the exercise of judicial powers and functions, the officer is to be guided by a proper application of mind. There could be instances of wrong or erroneous orders issued by judicial officers. This is true in the case of all jurisdictions, civil, criminal or special. The general rule applicable in the case of the issuance of a wrong order is that it is liable to be corrected in appeal. In the instant case, the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction was corrected by this Court under Section 482 CrPC by the quashing of the FIR registered against the writ petitioner. He was also compensated for the detention suffered by him.
22. The provisions of the Kerala Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1963 provides that no Judge, Magistrate, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. The Judges Protection Act, 1985 provides additional protection to Judges by stipulating that no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty or judicial duty or function. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court or any High Court to take such action whether by way of civil, criminal or departmental proceeding or otherwise against any person who is or was a Judge. The provision of this Act are to be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force for protection of Judges.
23. The writ petitioner had rightly approached this Court for quashing the FIR registered against him, which petition was allowed by this Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. The effect of the registration of a crime against the writ petitioner stood obliterated by Ext. P6 judgment of this Court. Thereafter, the writ petitioner approached the Human Rights Commission with a petition only against SHO, who had arrested him. Ext. P10 order was also rendered by the Human Rights Commission in the year 2012. This compensation was evidently granted to compensate for the wrongful incarceration undergone by the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner therefore stood compensated for the wrongful imprisonment as well. It was only long thereafter that the writ petitioner had thought it fit to approach this Court seeking further compensation and for action against the judicial officer concerned. Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Limitation Act provide for one year as a period of limitation for suits for compensation for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel and slander. The writ petitioner was thus filed long after the cause of action arose. The injury suffered by the petitioner had occurred in the course of an adversarial litigation as between him and another private person. The writ petitioner had not even pleaded that he belongs to any socially or economically marginalised background.
24. The question to be decided is whether the writ petitioner is liable to be compensated for the injury allegedly suffered by him due to the exercise of judicial power by the 3rd respondent. The public law right to compensation for violation of fundamental rights is an extension into the realm of Constitutional Law of the principles of Tort. Thus the principles of Law of Torts would apply in such cases as well. A Judge may be liable to be proceeded against for a wrongful act done by him while acting in his personal capacity. He may also become liable to be proceeded against if he misuses his judicial power for personal gains or where the erroneous use of judicial power is shown to be dishonest or mala fide. Except in these exceptional circumstances, a judicial officer is protected from legal action of whatever nature for wrong orders rendered by him. Thus, when a judicial officer is acting judicially, even if he commits an error and passes an erroneous order, he would be protected from legal action. Otherwise, the consequence of every order reversed in appeal could be an action against the author of the original order for damages, which cannot be conducive to public good and indeed to the rule of law. The maintenance of the independence of the judiciary being a larger public interest which overrides the public law rights of individual citizens, an action for compensation against a judicial officer for the issuance of an erroneous order is also opposed to public interest. The judicial officer would also be protected from any judicial proceeding in a case like the present one.
25. In P.C. Joshi''s case (supra), referring to earlier decisions, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment held:
"7.....that there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate Court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly."
It is seen that the decisions relied on before the learned Single Judge by the writ petitioner and on which reliance was placed were cases of wrongful imprisonment, police excess or compensation for wrongful acts or criminal neglect on the part of the State and its officers. Orders of compensation have been issued to the State directing the recovery from officers or those responsible for the exercise in question. In the instant case, the distinction is that the action complained of was a wrong exercise of power by a judicial officer. As stated earlier, no malice or bias of any kind was alleged against the judicial officer. What was alleged was a lack of proper application of mind. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are of the opinion that no compensation would be payable to the petitioner on the allegation that he was forced to undergo imprisonment on the basis of a wrong judicial order. The order of the learned Single Judge directing payment of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to the petitioner on account of his wrongful imprisonment is hereby vacated. The compensation due to the petitioner will be limited to Rs. 50,000/- as ordered by the Human Rights Commission. WA No. 1524 of 2014 is dismissed. WA No. 1821 of 2014 and WA No. 140 of 2015 are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is vacated and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
