1. The Special Appeal arises from an order of the learned Single Judge dated 11 December 2013 setting aside the orders that were passed against the respondent in disciplinary proceedings with a direction to the disciplinary authority to consider the claim of the respondent afresh by passing a reasoned order. The respondent was a Constable in the Railway Protection Force. A charge-sheet dated 1 September 2001 was issued to the respondent under Rule 153 of The Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. The charge of misconduct as contained in the charge-sheet is that on 6 January 2001 he was assigned duty in the shift from 00.00 hours to 08.00 hours at Jhansi Loco Post but he unauthorisedly remained absent from duty till the issuance of the charge-sheet. The Inquiry Officer held that the charge of misconduct was duly proved. A copy of the enquiry report was served on the respondent to which he submitted a representation. Finding the explanation of the respondent to be unsatisfactory, the disciplinary authority removed him from service by an order dated 28 November 2001. The appeal and the revision filed by the respondent were also dismissed on 6 June 2002 and 21 December 2002 respectively.
2. The learned Single Judge, after noticing that the respondent who was under treatment at the Medical Hospital at Ranchi reported for duty and was permitted to join on the basis of a fitness certificate issued to him on 12 October 2001, has interfered with the orders of the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority as the situation was found to be beyond the control of the respondent since he was under medical treatment and a certificate was also issued by the Mental Hospital, Ranchi. Moreover, it has been held that even if the respondent was not fit to discharge his duties as an armed constable, any other duty ought to have been allotted to him in the office or at any suitable place without issuing arms. On this ground, the orders that were impugned in the writ petition were set aside and the disciplinary authority was directed to consider the claim of the respondent afresh by passing a reasoned order.
3. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants is that the learned Single Judge has transgressed his jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed in the disciplinary proceedings on a charge of unauthorised absence with effect from 7 January 2001 until 12 October 2001 which was duly established. Rule 272 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 makes a provision for members of the force to be placed on the sick list. It has been submitted that in the present case, the respondent failed to show that the laid down procedure was followed. Moreover, it has been urged that the whole basis of the impugned judgment, which is that the respondent was under treatment at the Ranchi Mental Hospital, is incorrect as the respondent had admitted during the course of the inquiry that he was undergoing treatment at a private hospital and Annexure 1 to the writ petition, which is a certificate issued by Dr. B.B. Singh, Psychiatrist and Ex-Professor, would also make it clear that he was under treatment of a private doctor from 15 January 2001 to 1 October 2001. The respondent had claimed that he was under medical treatment at Ranchi but the learned Single Judge misconstrued this as treatment at the Ranchi Mental Hospital.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent supported the view which has been taken by the learned Single Judge and submitted that the period of unauthorised absence was due to a cause beyond the control of the respondent.
5. Interference by the Court in disciplinary proceedings in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is confined to a case of manifest perversity or where there is no evidence at all to substantiate the charge of misconduct. The High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction would not be justified in substituting its own conclusion on issues of fact and in re-appreciating the evidence. The disciplinary authority is vested with the jurisdiction to investigate into the charge of misconduct and if on the basis of the evidence on the record, it is found that the charge of misconduct is established, the Court should not substitute its own assessment of facts with the assessment of the disciplinary authority so long as it is substantiated by some evidence.
6. In this connection it will be useful to reproduce the observations made by the Supreme Court in
.....In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide
7. In
Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.
8. In
So far as the departmental-proceedings are concerned it is for the departmental authorities to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the prescribed rules. The role of the Court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the Court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record.
9. In the present case the respondent was a member of an armed force, namely the Railway Protection Force. A high degree of discipline is expected from members of the armed forces and the Court should not readily interfere with an order passed by the disciplinary authority which may affect the discipline and moral of the force as a cohesive unit.
10. There is no doubt about the factual position that the respondent remained absent from duty with effect from 6 January 2001 upto 12 October 2001. Again there is no doubt that the period of absence was unauthorised as the respondent had not taken permission of the competent authority. Rule 272 lays down a detailed procedure for a member of the force to be placed on the sick list but the respondent had not taken any steps for being placed on the sick list and nor was he placed on the sick list. In the writ proceedings the respondent stated that he was under treatment of Dr. B.B. Singh, a Psychiatrist at Ranchi Mental Hospital. The medical certificate dated 1 January 2001, which is at Annexure 1 to the petition, however, does not indicate that he was under treatment at Ranchi Mental Hospital. On the contrary, the respondent made a statement on 25 October 2001 that he had undergone treatment at a private hospital. The medical certificate issued by Dr. B.B. Singh, Ex-Professor of Psychiatry and Retired Superintendent merely states that the respondent had been examined at intervals. The medical certificate does not state that during the aforesaid period of unauthorised absence the respondent was incapable of performing duties because of mental illness. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has manifestly exceeded his jurisdiction by interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority which had been sustained in appeal and revision.
11. In fact the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the judgment appealed against partake the character of an appellate finding. In our respectful view, the learned Single Judge lost sight of the fact that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is not to substitute the Court''s own finding with that of the disciplinary authority. There was no procedural infraction in the conduct of the disciplinary authority. The finding of the disciplinary authority cannot by any means be regarded as being perverse or contrary to the weight of the evidence on record. In the circumstances and in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above in High Court of Judicature at Bombay (supra), Rae Bareilly Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra) and Sanjay Kumar Singh (supra), interference by the learned Single Judge was wholly unwarranted.
12. In this regard, the Court must also be guided by the judgment of the Supreme Court in
The High Court failed to bear in mind that the first respondent was a police constable and was serving in a disciplined force demanding strict adherence to the rules and procedures more than any other department. Having noticed the fact that the first respondent has absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, we are unable to appreciate the High Court''s observation that his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge. Even otherwise on the facts of this case, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the punishment holding that the punishment does not commensurate with the gravity of the charge'' especially when the High Court concurred with the findings of the Tribunal on facts.
13. This judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in
This Court had occasion to deal with the cases of overstay by persons belonging to disciplined forces. In
14. For these reasons, we allow the Special Appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated 11 December 2013 of the learned Single Judge. In consequence, the writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
