Mr. Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. (Oral) - By the judgment and order, dated 30.04.2015, passed, in Sessions Trial No. 207 of 2010/37 of 2014, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nawada, the accused-respondent, namely, Lalji Chauhan, has been acquitted of the charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The grievance of the present appellant is that the accused-respondent ought to have been convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded by the First Information Report, may, in brief, be described as under :
(i) On 23.07.2007, at about 1.00 PM, while the prosecutrix was carrying food for her husband towards the field, where her husband was working, the accused, suddenly, appeared before her and threatened her by showing her pistol, closed her mouth by hand, forcibly took her into the bush and committed rape on her.
(ii) As one Gyani Chauhan (PW 2) was passing through the field, he heard hulla raised by the prosecutrix and saw the accused committing rape on the prosecutrix and as PW 2 started raising hue and cry, the prosecutrix�s husband and others, who were working in the nearby field, rushed to the place of occurrence and the accused fled away by resorting to blank firing.
(iii) Though the prosecutrix went to the Police Station to report the occurrence, no case was registered by the police and, therefore, two days thereafter, i.e., on 25.07.2007, a complaint was filed in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, which was sent to the police for investigation. Based on the said complaint, which was treated as the First Information Report, police investigated the case and submitted a final report. However, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial.
3. At the trial, when a charge, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, was framed against the accused aforementioned, he pleaded not guilty thereto.
4. In support of their case, prosecution examined as many as 10 (ten) witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, in his examination aforementioned, the accused denied that he had committed the offence, which was alleged to have been committed by him.
5. The learned trial Court, has, having reached the conclusion that the case against accused-respondent, namely, Lalji Chauhan, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, acquitted him accordingly.
6. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of the accused-respondent herein, the prosecutrix has, as indicated above, preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard Mr. Sheo Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State of Bihar. We have also perused the judgment and order, under challenge, and have also scrutinised the materials available on record.
8. While considering the present appeal, what needs to be noted is that according to the evidence, as given in the examination-in-chief, by the prosecutrix (PW 3), while she was carrying food for her husband in the field, accused appeared there, caught hold of her, threw her into the bushes and committed rape on her. It is in her evidence that the accused gagged her mouth, tore her saree and committed rape and, on hulla being raised by her, her husband (PW 7) and PW 2 rushed to the place of occurrence, but the accused fled away by resorting to blank firing. However, in her cross-examination, it is the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW 3) that when the accused caught hold of her and threw her on the ground, she became unconscious on falling on the ground and regained her consciousness at home meaning thereby that her evidence, given in the examination�in-chief, to the effect that she had raised hulla and, attracted by the hulla raised by her, her husband and PW 2 came to the place of occurrence were untrue.
9. Similarly, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned trial Court, her complaint before the Magistrate was to the effect that while the accused was committing rape on her, PW 2 happens to pass by and, on seeing the commission of rape on PW 3 by the accused, it was PW 2, who had raised hulla and, attracted by the hulla so raised, her husband and others came and the accused fled away.
10. From what have been pointed out above, it becomes abundantly clear that the evidence of the prosecutrix are inconsistent, contradictory and, therefore, wholly unsafe to place reliance upon.
11. Coupled with the above, though the prosecutrix claimed that she had sustained injuries, she was, admittedly not examined or treated by any doctor nor was any torn saree was produced before police.
12. As far as PW 2 (Gyani Chauhan) is concerned, his evidence is to the effect that while proceeding through the field, he saw the accused committing rape on the prosecutrix, he tried to catch hold of the accused, but the accused fled away. This description of the occurrence is, again, contradicted by the contents of the complaint and also by the evidence of the prosecutrix inasmuch as according to the complaint and the evidence given by the prosecutrix, PW 2 did not try to catch hold of the accused, but raised hulla and, attracted by the hulla so raised by PW 2, prosecutrix�s husband and others came and the accused fled away by resorting to blank firing.
13. Moreover, according to the evidence of PW 2, the occurrence took place in the month of Aghan, i.e., November, and it was winter season, when paddy crops were harvested; whereas, according to the prosecutrix�s version, the occurrence took place on 23rd July, 2007, i.e., in the month of July, i.e., Aasadh or Saawan and not in the month of Aghan, i.e., November. Thus, even the month of occurrence has not been consistently proved by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
14. As far as PW 1 and PW 7 are concerned, they are, admittedly, hearsay witnesses inasmuch as it is their evidence that when they reached the place of occurrence on hearing hulla, they came to learn about the occurrence from the prosecutrix. However, the prosecutrix has, nowhere, deposed in her evidence that she had reported the occurrence to PW 1; her evidence is, rather, to the effect that she had become unconscious on falling on the ground and, regained her consciousness at her home.
15. Coming to the evidence of PW 7, who is husband of the prosecutrix, we notice that according to him, he reached the place of occurrence on hulla being raised by the prosecutrix, while the prosecutrix�s own evidence is that on falling on the ground, she became unconscious and regained consciousness at her home. Hence, the question of her raising hulla did not arise.
16. As far as PW 10 is concerned, he is, admittedly, a hearsay witness inasmuch as on returning home, he came to learn about the occurrence.
17. So far as PW 4, PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 are concerned, they were merely tendered as witnesses the prosecution.
18. The scheme, under Section 138 of the Evidence Act, clearly shows that a witness is required to be first examined-in-chief and, then, he may be subjected to cross-examination and, in order to seek any clarification, the witness may be re-examined by the prosecution. The practise of tendering witnesses for mere cross-examination by the defence, in a sessions trial was in vogue under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The reason, behind taking recourse to such a practise, which is inconsistent with Section 138 of the Evidence Act, was that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, prior to its amendment by the Act 26 of 1955, a full-fledged magisterial enquiry was to be held in a case, which was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions or the High Court. Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provided that the evidence of the witnesses, so recorded by the committing Magistrate, could be treated, at the discretion of the Sessions Judge, as substantive evidence at trial. Taking advantage of this provision, prosecution used to seek and obtain leave of the sessions Court to treat the deposition of the witnesses, examined in a committal proceeding, as substantive evidence, at the trial, without examining the witnesses afresh. In other words, therefore, the prosecution used to resort to tendering of witnesses for mere cross-examination by the defence by bringing on the record of the sessions court the depositions of those witnesses, whose evidence might have been recorded, in the committal proceeding.
19. Under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which replaced Code of 1898, recording of the evidence, in a committal proceeding, has been totally done away with and Section 288 of the old Code has been omitted. Necessarily, therefore, the question of tendering of a witness for mere cross-examination, under the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not arise.
20. Referring to the case of State of U. P. v. Jaggo, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 42, the Supreme Court has pointed out in, Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 367, speaking through Dr. A. S. Anand, J., that Jaggo�s case (supra) was decided, when the Code of 1898 was in operation and, therefore, decision in the aforesaid case, which seems to have permitted the requirement of tendering of a witness for cross-examination by defence is not applicable in the context of the scheme of the Code of 1973.
21. In no uncertain words, therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that tendering of a witness for cross-examination is contrary to Section 138 of the Evidence Act and the tendering of witness by the prosecution amounts to giving up the witness. The relevant observations, appearing in Sukhwant Singh (supra), read as under : -
"It would, thus be seen that Section 138 (supra) envisages that a witness would first be examined-in-chief and then subjected to cross-examination and for seeking any clarification, the witness may be re-examined by the prosecution. There is, in our opinion, no meaning in tendering a witness for cross-examination only. Tendering of a witness for cross-examination, as a matter of fact, amounts to giving up of the witness by the prosecution as it does not choose to examine him in chief. � � �"
22. In no uncertain words, the Supreme Court has pointed out, in Sukhwant Singh (supra), that when a witness is material and is required for unfolding the truth of the prosecution�s case, he ought to be examined-in-chief. The Supreme Court has also made in clear, in Sukhwant Singh (supra), that the effect of a witness being tendered only for cross-examination amounts to the failure of the prosecution to examine the witness at the trial and non-examination of such a witness will seriously affect the credibility of the prosecution�s case and detract materially from its reliability.
23. The practise of tendering of a witness for cross-examination, therefore, needs to be eschewed and not to be resorted to, whereas in the case at hand as many as four witnesses were merely tendered by the prosecution. This practise, we must reiterate, shall forthwith be done away with.
24. In the light of what has been discussed above, it becomes more than abundantly clear that the prosecutrix had failed and failed miserably to adduce any reliable evidence to being home the charge framed against the accused.
25. We do not find that the learned trial Court�s finding of the accused-respondent having not been proved guilty of the offence of having committed rape beyond reasonable doubt suffers from any infirmity, legal or factual.
26. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment and order do not suffer from any such infirmity, legal or factual, which require interference by this Court in appeal.
27. This appeal is, therefore, not admitted and stands accordingly dismissed.
