1. Heard Sri Rahul Jain, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondents and perused the record.
2. This writ petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has arisen from judgment and order dated 7th September 1994 passed by U.P. Public Services Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ''Tribunal'') rejecting petitioner''s Claim Petition No. 227/F/5 of 1984.
3. Petitioner was working as ''Cleaner'' in the erstwhile Roadways Department of State Government and was subsequently transferred to U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''U.P.S.R.T.C.'') in June 1972 after its constitution. He was placed under suspension on 30.9.1976. A charge-sheet dated 14th October 1976 was served upon him. Thereafter, he was reinstated vide order dated 1.7.1977 and transferred to Rath. The order of transfer was challenged by petitioner by filing claim petition before Tribunal. He was again suspended on 27.8.1979 and a charge-sheet dated 30.10.1979 was served upon him containing three charges. Petitioner submitted reply dated 14.11.1979 denying the charges levelled against him. An oral inquiry was conduced. Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding all the charges proved. Disciplinary Authority (Service Manager) accepted report of Inquiry Officer and agreeing therewith, has imposed punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 20.3.1982. Thereafter petitioner filed claim petition, which has been dismissed by Tribunal.
4. The order of Tribunal as well as dismissal order have been challenged on the ground that petitioner has been dismissed by an officer not competent to do so. N.C. Gupta, Service Manager was directly appointed as Assistant Transport Engineer by U.P.S.R.T.C. and being not an officer of State Government, could not have dismissed petitioner from service. Further adequate opportunity of defence was not afforded to petitioner inasmuch as he was not supplied copies of relevant documents and not permitted to produce his own witnesses or to cross-examine witnesses produced by U.P.S.R.T.C. in support of charges and, therefore, inquiry is vitiated by law, being in violation of principles of natural justice. Copy of inquiry report was not supplied to petitioner before passing impugned order of dismissal and order of dismissal is nonspeaking. It is also contended that Inquiry Officer has disbelieved certain evidence which was in favour of petitioner and has acted as illegal.
5. Respondent U.P.S.R.T.C. has filed a counter affidavit stating that petitioner was a daily wage ''Cleaner'' engaged in erstwhile Roadways Department of U.P. Government w.e.f. 12.7.1971. He was given regular substantive appointment against a clear vacancy on the post of ''Cleaner'' in U.P.S.R.T.C w.e.f. 1.6.1974. The service conditions of petitioner thus, were governed by Rules framed by U.P.S.R.T.C. applicable to its employees. Full opportunity was afforded to petitioner to cross-examine departmental witnesses and produce his own witnesses. Inquiry Officer submitted his report after considering material on record and Disciplinary Authority has concurred with report of Inquiry Officer, hence has imposed punishment of dismissal.
6. Sri Rahul Jain, learned counsel for petitioner has assailed impugned orders of punishment as well as Tribunal only on following grounds.
(1) Copy of inquiry report was not given before passing impugned order of dismissal, therefore, punishment is vitiated in law.
(2) Petitioner''s witnesses have been disbelieved to hold the charges proved against him, therefore, inquiry report itself vitiated in law.
7. Now so far as first aspect is concerned, we find that there was no statutory provisions, which required Disciplinary Authority to supply copy of inquiry report to delinquent employee afforded him opportunity to show cause and thereafter pass an order of punishment. This aspect was considered for the first time in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588 and it has been held, where inquiry has been conducted by an officer other than Disciplinary Authority and report submitted against employee, Disciplinary Authority must supply a copy of inquiry report to delinquent employee and give an opportunity to make representation and thereafter order should be passed.
8. A question was raised, whether this law laid down by Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) would apply to punishment orders passed before aforesaid decision. In ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and other 1993 (67) FLR 1230 (SC) a Constitution Bench held that judgment of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) is prospective and law laid down therein would apply to order of punishments passed on and after aforesaid judgment and those punishment orders, which are of a date earlier to judgment of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) would not stand vitiated only on the ground that copy of inquiry report was not supplied before passing of punishment order.
9. In the present case, order of punishment was passed on 20.3.1982, hence only for this reason it cannot be said that order of punishment is bad.
10. Then comes second question regarding non-believing of evidence of petitioner. It is not in dispute that oral inquiry was conducted and Inquiry Officer has recorded his findings on the basis of documentary and also oral evidence produced before him. The question, what evidence is creditworthy, is within the realm of assessment of evidence and within the domain of Inquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority. Neither Tribunal nor this Court while considering orders of punishment, inquiry proceedings, in judicial review would not sit in appeal to have a fresh assessment of evidence adduced before Inquiry Officer unless delinquent employee shows that findings recorded by Inquiry Officer are perverse or based on no evidence or he has taken into consideration some evidence, which were not admissible even in departmental inquiry or has ignored to consider some relevant evidence.
11. In case of departmental inquiry scope of judicial review is limited. The scope of judicial review and interference in the matter of disciplinary proceedings has been examined in detail by a Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Sharma v. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr., 2006 (2) ESC 1153, and after considering a catena of decisions on the subject, this Court has crystallized aspects which can be examined by Court and which may justify judicial interference and not otherwise and the same are reproduced as under:
"(1) The Tribunal exercising quasi judicial functions neither bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor bound by the strict rules of evidence.
(2) They may obtain all information material for the points under enquiry and act upon the same provided it is brought to the notice of the party and fair opportunity is afforded to explain.
(3) The judicial enquiry is to determine whether the authority holding enquiry is competent, and whether the procedure prescribed is in accordance with the principle of natural justice.
(4) There should exist some evidence accepted by the competent authority which may reasonably support the contention about the guilt of the officer. Adequacy or reliability of the evidence can not be looked into by the Court.
(5) The departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court.
(6) There is no allergy to hearse evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
(7) The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice.
(8) It is not necessary that the Disciplinary authority should discuss material in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Office.
(9) The judicial review is extended only when there is no evidence or the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached on the basis of the material available."
12. The legal dictum with the passage of time has not gone under any substantial change and the subsequent authorities of Apex Court also have reiterated what has been noticed above. In A. Savariar v. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and another, 2013(3) SC 170, Court has said:
"The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is very limited. The Courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The Court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the Court."
13. In the present case, counsel for petitioner could not point out any such manifest error. The contention that some part of statement of witnesses, which was in favour of employee, has not been believed, by itself cannot vitiate proceedings, where report is founded on a well considered and indepth appreciation of evidence available before authorities concerned.
14. No other point has been argued.
15. In view of our discussion, we do not find any error in the order impugned, apparent on the face of record.
16. Writ petition lacks merit and it is accordingly, dismissed.
