Anil K. Narendran, J.—This Original Petition arises out of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench dated
18.2.2013 in O.A. No. 458/2012. The 1st respondent herein filed the said O.A. seeking an order to quash Annex.A1 memo of charges and to
direct the petitioners herein to disburse his gratuity and commuted value of pension and to regularise his monthly pension and grant interest on
delayed payment of retiral benefits at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of retirement till date of actual payment.
2. The petitioners herein filed Ext.P3 reply statement contending that the 1st respondent herein is not entitled for the reliefs sought for in the O.A.
On receipt of the reply statement, the 1st respondent herein filed Ext.P4 rejoinder, which was followed by Ext.P5 additional reply statement filed
by the petitioners herein. After considering the rival contentions, the Tribunal by Ext.P1 order dated 18.2.2013 set aside the proceedings initiated
against the 1st respondent herein pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal, the petitioners herein
have approached this Court in this Original Petition.
3. We heard arguments of the learned Standing Counsel for Lakshadweep Administration representing the petitioners, the learned counsel for the
1st respondent/applicant and also the learned ASGI appearing for the 2nd respondent.
4. Going by the pleadings and materials on record, the applicant retired from service on 31.3.2010, while working as Deputy Collector (HQ),
Kavaratti. While working as Executive Magistrate and Deputy Collector (HQ), Kavaratti the applicant was issued with Annex.A1 memo of
charges dated 3.1.2009 proposing an inquiry under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The
charges levelled against him are regarding issuance of 376 Scheduled Tribe Certificates to ineligible persons, ignoring the guidelines and instructions
issued by the administration. The applicant denied the charges by filing Annex.A2 written statement dated 14.1.2009. The disciplinary authority
appointed the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries as the inquiring authority.
5. The applicant had approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 635/2011 challenging Annex.A1 memo of charges on the ground of delay. The said
O.A. was allowed in part by Annex.A8 order dated 20.7.2011, directing the petitioners herein to complete the inquiry and take a final decision in
the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within a period of four months. Paragraphs 3 and
4 of Annex.A8 order read thus:
3. Even though the challenge against the charge sheet is on the ground of delay, prima facie we are not satisfied to set aside the charge on the
aforesaid ground as it requires further proof under which circumstances the charge sheet was issued and whether there was any undue delay
resulting in denial of principles of natural justice. This is a matter to be inquired into based on facts and evidence regarding the same. Therefore, it is
open to the applicant to bring such factual aspects on record at the time of inquiry. But we are not happy that the inquiry is still not completed even
as on today. The applicant had already retired from service. He is being paid only provisional pension because of the pendency of the disciplinary
action.
4. In the circumstances, we feel that there cannot be any further delay in the matter of completing the inquiry. Accordingly, the only relief that can
be granted at this stage is to direct the respondents to complete the inquiry proceedings and to take a final decision on the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the applicant as expeditiously as possible at any rate within a period of four months. We order accordingly.
6. By Annex.A8 order the Tribunal granted four months'' time to take a final decision on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant.
Seeking enlargement of the time limit prescribed in Annex.A8 order, the petitioners herein had approached the Tribunal in M.A. No. 1063/2011.
The Tribunal by Annex.A10 order enlarged the time by two months from 29.11.2011. Since the inquiry could not be completed within the
aforesaid period, the petitioners herein filed M.A. No. 151/2012 seeking further enlargement of time, which application ended in dismissal by
Annex.A11 order dated 7.2.2012.
7. Contending that there is no justification in continuing the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges, beyond the time limit
prescribed by the Tribunal in Annex.A10 order, the applicant has approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 458/2012 seeking an order to set aside
Annex.A1 memo of charges and for other consequential reliefs. The Tribunal by Ext.P1 order dated 18.2.2013 set aside the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges, holding that the petitioners herein lack jurisdiction to complete
the disciplinary proceedings beyond the time limit fixed by the Tribunal. Paras 3 to 6 of Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal read thus:
3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that inquiry has been completed and the matter has been taken up with the
President of India for final action. It is also contended that the non-completion of the inquiry cannot be attributable on the part of the respondents
and it has happened because of the fact that the applicant himself sought for adjournment of the inquiry on one ground or another.
4. In this context it is pointed out by the counsel for the applicant that it is only during the one month''s period while he was away for Hajj
pilgrimage an adjournment was sought on his behalf.
5. It is not necessary to consider by us the rival contentions on this ground since we are not considering the fact of non-completion of the inquiry is
attributable on the part of the respondents or the applicant. If as a matter of fact the respondents has the case that it is because of the applicant that
the inquiry is not completed, they could only seek extension of time for completion of the disciplinary proceedings. This Tribunal has already
considered the enlargement of time and rejected the same on the ground that since the employee has retired as early as in March, 2010 and if the
respondents could not complete the inquiry within the reasonable time that too when the time is extended as per law. We do not find it a fit case to
enlarge the time any more. The order passed by this Tribunal became final as there was no challenge thereto.
6. Once the time is fixed by this Tribunal, it is the bounden duty of the respondents to complete the proceedings and take final action within the
aforesaid period. Not only that such proceedings were not completed within the initial period fixed by this Tribunal but not completed even within
the extended period. Once the time has already comes to a stop thereafter the respondents cannot complete the inquiry beyond the time fixed by
this Tribunal and it cannot be countenanced as a legally valid proceeding. The respondents looses its jurisdiction to complete the proceedings
beyond the time fixed by this Tribunal and which has become final.
8. Referring to Paras 6 to 8 of Ext.P3 reply statement and Paras.3 to 7 of Ext.P5 additional reply statement, the learned Standing Counsel for the
petitioners would contend that no intentional delay has been caused by the Department in conducting the inquiry proceedings. After completing the
inquiry, the report of the Inquiry Officer was forwarded to the applicant along with Annex.R2(e) letter dated 14.9.2012 for submitting
representation, if any. After completing the procedural formalities the report recording the finding of the disciplinary authority has been submitted
before the President of India, vide Ext.P6 letter dated 17.1.2013 for Presidential orders, since the delinquent employee had already retired from
service.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/applicant would contend that the Department lacks jurisdiction to complete the disciplinary
proceedings beyond the time limit fixed by the Tribunal in Annex.A10 order and as such Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal setting aside the proceedings
pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges is perfectly legal. Relying on Annex.A12 judgment of this Court dated 19.2.2002 in O.P. No.
27255/2001, the learned counsel would contend that, so long as the parents are islanders their children cannot be denied Scheduled Caste status,
merely because their birth took place at mainland. As such the charge against the applicant that he had issued Scheduled Tribe Certificates to
ineligible persons, ignoring the guidelines and instructions issued by the administration, will not stand.
10. As we have already noticed, while working as Executive Magistrate and Deputy Collector (HQ), Kavaratti the applicant was issued with
Annex.A1 memo of charges dated 3.1.2009 alleging that he had issued 376 Scheduled Tribe Certificates to ineligible persons, ignoring the
guidelines and instructions issued by the administration. The learned counsel for the applicant would rely on Annex.A12 judgment of this Court in
O.P. No. 27255/2001 to contend that the charges levelled against the applicant will not stand. However, while disposing of W.A. No. 1486/2002
arising out of the said judgment filed by Lakshadweep Administration, by a common judgment dated 7.3.2005 in W.A. No. 125/1999 and
connected cases, this Court has left open the question of law raised. Challenging Annex.A1 memo of charges on the ground of delay, the applicant
had approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 635/2011. By Annex.A8 order dated 20.7.2011 the Tribunal directed the petitioners herein to complete
the inquiry and take a final decision in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant within a period of four months. By Annex.A10
order in M.A. No. 1063/2011 the Tribunal enlarged the time by two months from 29.11.2011. Later, M.A. No. 151/2012 filed by the petitioners
herein seeking further enlargement of time ended in dismissal by Annex.A11 order dated 7.2.2012. It was thereafter that the applicant approached
the Tribunal in O.A. No. 458/2012 seeking an order to quash the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges, as it is beyond
the time limit prescribed by the Tribunal in Annex.A10 order.
11. The specific stand taken by the petitioners herein in Ext.P3 reply statement filed before the Tribunal was that, there was no intentional delay on
their part in conducting the inquiry proceedings against the applicant. In order to substantiate the aforesaid contention, the status report of the
inquiry proceedings was also furnished in Para.6 of Ext.P3 reply statement. As discernible from Para.6 of Ext.P3 reply statement, there were 28
sittings for the period from 3.1.2009 to 16.6.2012. The applicant was absent in 4 sittings on account of illness of his wife, Hajj pilgrimage, etc. The
Presenting Officer was absent in 4 sittings due to various reasons. 9 sittings were postponed due to nonarrival of documents from the concerned
offices, change in the Inquiry Officer, etc. The reasons for the absence of the Charged Officer, Presenting Officer and State witness on different
posting dates have been stated in Paras.7 and 8 of Ext.P3 reply statement. The aforesaid facts are not seriously in dispute, as discernible from
Ext.P4 rejoinder filed by the applicant.
12. In Ext.P5 additional reply statement filed by the petitioners herein it has been stated that the Inquiry Officer could not complete the inquiry due
to various reasons such as nonarrival of additional documents from the concerned offices, absence of Charged Officer, Presenting Officer, etc. The
Charged Officer was absent on 25.10.2010, 3.3.2012, 2.5.2012, 14.6.2012, 15.6.2012, 16.6.2012 and 23.6.2012. The Defence Assistant was
absent on 12.3.2009 and 2.5.2012. Similarly, the Presenting Officer was also absent on few dates due to medical reasons, non-availability of ship,
etc. During the pendency of O.A. No. 458/2012, the inquiry was completed and the report of the Inquiry Officer was forwarded to the applicant
vide Annex.R2 (e) letter dated 14.9.2012, for submission of representation, if any, as provided under Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. After
completing the procedural formalities the report recording the finding of the disciplinary authority has been submitted before the President of India,
vide Ext.P6 letter dated 17.1.2013 for Presidential orders, since the delinquent employee had already retired from service.
13. As discernible from Ext.P1 order, the fact that the inquiry pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges has been completed and the matter has
been taken up with the President of India for Presidential orders was also brought to the notice of the Tribunal during the course of arguments.
However, the Tribunal set aside the proceedings initiated against the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges on the ground that, once
the time fixed by the Tribunal has comes to an end, the petitioners herein lack jurisdiction to complete the disciplinary proceedings.
14. In State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998 (4) SCC 154) the Apex Court held that, the question as to whether disciplinary proceedings are to
be terminated on account of delay in concluding the same has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in each case. The essence of the
matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean
and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and
there is no explanation for the delay. The Apex Court held further that, it is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with
a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty
prescribed. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper
explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Para.19 of the judgment reads thus;
19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the
disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and
circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh
them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after
delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are
unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary
proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained
prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing
the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his
duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer
unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings.
Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations.
15. In Government of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy, (2007 (14) SCC 49) the Apex Court held that, so far as the question of delay in concluding the
departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be
determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (i) Where by
reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (ii) Where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a
case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry Officer.
16. In Forest Department v. Abdul Rasul Chowdhury, (2009 (7) SCC 305) the Apex Court reiterated that, the question as to whether the delay in
concluding the disciplinary proceedings is fatal or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the said judgment the Apex Court
held that the delay in concluding the domestic inquiry proceedings is not always fatal to the proceedings. It depends on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to
continue with the disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should be permitted to
continue.
17. In Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., (2014 (6) All LJ 662 : 2015 (1) KLT SN 86) the question that
came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court was that, where a Court has prescribed time for the disposal of a
disciplinary inquiry and the inquiry is not concluded within the time so fixed, would the consequence in law be to vitiate the inquiry proceedings
resulting in rendering the penalty imposed as being without jurisdiction. The Full Bench answered the reference as follows; If an inquiry is not
concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate
application to the Court setting out the reasons for the delay in conclusion of the inquiry. In such an event, it is for the court to consider whether
time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not
be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought. After referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in
Suresh Chandra v. State of M.P., (2015 (12) SCC 255) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Union of
India v. Satyendra Kumar Sahai, (W.P. No. 1056 of 2009) the Full Bench declared that, a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a
disciplinary inquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to
extend the time and it is open to the court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The
court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the inquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the inquiry on the ground
that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The Court has the inherent
jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be
considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the inquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest
administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of
misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of
time both before and after the period stipulated by the court has come to an end.
18. In the instant case, the charge against the applicant in Annex.A1 memo of charges is that, while working as Executive Magistrate and Deputy
Collector (HQ), Kavaratti he had issued 376 Scheduled Tribe Certificates to ineligible persons, ignoring the guidelines and instructions issued by
the administration. The fact that the charges levelled against the applicant are serious in nature is not in dispute. The seriousness of the charges
levelled against the delinquent employee is of vital importance while considering the question as to whether there was valid and sufficient reasons on
the basis of which the inquiry could not be concluded within the time stipulated. Ext.P3 reply statement and Ext.P5 additional reply statement filed
by the petitioners herein before the Tribunal contain valid and sufficient reasons for the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the applicant.
19. The judgments of the Apex Court in Radhakishan''s case, Appala Swamy''s case and Abdul Rasul Chowdhury''s case referred to supra
recognise the principle that, the delay in concluding the departmental proceedings against the delinquent employee would not ipso facto vitiate such
proceedings or render it invalid or non est. In that view of the matter, it is for the Court/Tribunal to determine after taking into consideration all
relevant factors, whether it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to continue even
after delay.
20. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi''s case (supra), where the
Court/Tribunal has stipulated a period of time within which an inquiry has to be concluded, the direction of the Court/Tribunal has to be duly
observed and it would not be open to the employer to wilfully disregard the fixation of a time limit as a matter of no consequence. However, Full
Bench has made it clear that, the fixation of a period within which a disciplinary inquiry has to be concluded, in an order of the Court, does not
deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to extend time in an appropriate case having due regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances. The Court
which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the Court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider
whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained.
21. In Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi''s case (supra), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has stated in categorical terms that, the Court can
suitably extend time for conclusion of the inquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the inquiry on the ground that it was
not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. Such an extension of time has to be
considered in the interests of justice, balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the inquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest
administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of
misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest and the Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of
time both before and after the period stipulated by it has come to an end.
22. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, we find absolutely no reason to sustain Ext.P1 order passed by the
Tribunal. Though the fact that the inquiry pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges has been completed and the matter has been taken up with the
President of India for Presidential orders, since the delinquent employee had already retired from service, was brought to the notice, the Tribunal
set aside the proceedings initiated against the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges on the ground that, once the time fixed by the
Tribunal has comes to an end, the petitioners herein lack jurisdiction to complete the disciplinary proceedings. When the Tribunal has ample power
in appropriate cases to extend the time for conclusion of disciplinary proceedings even suo motu, in order to ensure that a serious charge of
misconduct does not go unpunished leading to serious detriment to the public interest, the Tribunal went wrong in setting aside the proceedings
initiated against the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges. Considering the seriousness of the charges levelled against the applicant and
also the fact that, in Ext.P3 reply statement and Ext.P5 additional reply statement the petitioners herein have stated valid and sufficient reasons for
the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, the Tribunal ought to have extended the time for conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the applicant.
23. In that view of the matter, we set aside Ext.P1 order dated 18.2.2013 of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 458/2012 and permit the petitioners herein
to conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges, with in a period of three months
from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. It is made clear that, if the petitioners herein fail to conclude the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the applicant within the time limit stipulated as above, the applicant will stand exonerated of all the charges levelled
against him in Annex.A1 memo of charges.
24. We notice that, by Ext.P1 order dated 18.2.2013 in O.A. No. 458/2012, the Tribunal set aside the disciplinary proceedings initiated against
the applicant pursuant to Annex.A1 memo of charges. Challenging the said order, the petitioners herein filed the present Original Petition before
this Court on 4.6.2013. Though the Original Petition was admitted on 5.6.2013, this Court has not stayed the operation of Ext.P1 order of the
Tribunal. As such, the petitioners herein ought to have disbursed the gratuity and other terminal benefits due to the applicant. The learned Standing
Counsel for Lakshadweep Administration, representing the petitioners herein, could not point out any justifiable reason to withhold the gratuity
payable to the applicant for nearly three years after the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him was set aside by Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal.
In such circumstances, though the petitioners herein are permitted to conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant within the
time limit prescribed hereinbefore, it is hereby ordered that the petitioners herein shall disburse the gratuity payable to the applicant within a period
of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.
25. The Original Petition is allowed as above. No order as to costs.