Sujana Ram Vs Authority Under Payment of Wages Act and Others

Allahabad High Court 20 May 1994 C.M.W.P. No. 12864 of 1984 (1995) 70 FLR 276 : (1995) 2 LLJ 524 : (1994) 3 UPLBEC 1989
Bench: Single Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

C.M.W.P. No. 12864 of 1984

Hon'ble Bench

S.K. Keshote, J

Advocates

P.C. Jhingan, for the Appellant; R.K. Jain and Rajiv Sharma, for the Respondent

Final Decision

Allowed

Acts Referred

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226#Payment of Wages Act, 1936 — Section 15

Judgement Text

Translate:

S.K. Keshote, J.@mdashThe petitioner filed this writ petition before this Court against the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages

Act, 1936, Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as the Authority under the Act, 1936) dated March 7, 1984, under which the application filed by

him for the order of the payment of the salary to him for the period from September 2, 1980 to December 28, 1981 has been dismissed on the

ground that the same is barred by time. The petitioner has come up with the case that the employer M/s. Krishna Enterprises, Industrial Area,

Hardwar, District Saharanpur through its proprietor Smt. Krishna has illegally withheld the salary of the petitioner for the period September 2,

1980 to December 28, 1981. The petitioner had filed an application to the said effect before the Authority under the Act 1936 on April 23, 1982

along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the said application. The petitioner filed number of documents and also got himself

examined in support of his claim. He has made a statement on May 25, 1982 that the respondent-employer had collected many persons in

connection with her plots and in the presence of those persons she has stated that the payment of the wages will be made by the employer to the

petitioner within a week. The petitioner has stated that he made a complaint on February 24, 1982 to the Labour Inspector, Hardwar in

connection with withholding of his wages by the employer. The Labour Inspector, Hardwar by his letter dated July 17, 1982 informed the

petitioner that the said authority has written letter to his employer for the payment of his wages but no communication has been received by it and

the petitioner has been advised by the said letter of the Labour Inspector, Hardwar to file a case under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The

petitioner accordingly submitted an application before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 before the respondent No. 1 on April

23, 1982. The petitioner further stated that no oral or documentary evidence has been produced by the employer to contest his application for

condonation of delay. The petitioner filed another document i.e. letter of the employer dated June 25, 1981 which has been sent to him in response

to his letter dated June 15, 1981, in which the liability to make payment of his wages has been admitted and he was assured that as soon as

erection of building and installation of Bituminised Water Machine is completed his all claims shall be paid in lump sum. The Authority under the

Act 1936 has discarded all the documents filed by the petitioner only on the ground that those documents have not been proved. Some of the

documents, which have been exhibited by the petitioner, have also been discarded on the ground that the same has not been proved.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Authority under the Act 1936 has committed a serious illegality in exercise of its

jurisdiction in rejecting the application of the petitioner as sufficient cause has been made out for filing of the application after limitation. Next, he

has argued that the said authority has discarded the documentary evidence on the grounds which are not tenable in the eyes of law. Strict rule of

evidence is not applicable. The documents have been produced and the same have also been exhibited. The order of the said Authority which has

been given by it by excluding the documentary evidence filed by the petitioner is perverse and arbitrary on the face of it.

3. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the said Authority has not considered an important fact that whole of the claim of the

petitioner was not barred by time. At the most the application could have been rejected on the ground of limitation in respect of the claim which

has become barred by time in case the delay in filing thereof would have been considered to be there.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 on the other hand argued that the order of the said Authority dated March 7, 1984 is appealable u/s

17 of the Payment of Wages Act and as such this writ petition is not maintainable. On the merits he argued that the findings which have been

recorded by the said Authority is a finding of fact on the question whether a sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay or not and

as such this Court will not sit as court of appeal over the said findings. He next argued that no wages whatsoever of the petitioner has been

withheld by the employer and it is a false case which has been made out by the petitioner. He further argued that even if the claim of the petitioner

for payment of wages for certain period was within time, the said Authority has not committed any illegality in rejecting the application as the

petitioner has filed a composite application and it could not have been spitted up.

5. Replying to the objection of the counsel for the respondents regarding the availability of alternate remedy, learned counsel for the petitioner has

argued that the appeal was not maintainable as under the impugned order only the matter has been considered regarding the condonation of delay

in filing of the application u/s 15 of the Act 1936. He placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Khema Nand Vs. East Indian Rly.,

Administration, , Sitaram Ramcharan and Others Vs. M.N. Nagrashna and Another, and Manik Chand Bhaumik v. Regional Manager, N.E.

Frontier Railway 1975 LIC 1696.

6. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties. So far as the objection of the counsel for the respondents regarding the

availability of the alternate remedy to the petitioner is concerned, it is sufficient to state that this writ petition has been filed in the year 1984 and it

has been admitted on January 20, 1986. The opposite parties have filed counter- affidavit in this case in which no such objection has been taken.

At the stage of final hearing after about 10 years of filing of the writ this objection was taken. It will, therefore, not be proper, to reject the writ

petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy at this stage, when the writ petition has been admitted and it remained pending for hearing

in this Court for about 10 years and both the parties filed their counter and rejoinder affidavit, will not be proper to dismiss the same on the ground

of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner. In view of this fact I do not think it proper to discuss the authorities which have been cited by

the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the argument that against the impugned order the appeal does not lie. Therefore, the preliminary

objection, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents deserves no consideration and the same is disallowed.

7. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the Authority under the Act 1936 has excluded from consideration the material documentary

evidence produced by the petitioner in support of his case that there was no delay on his part in filing of the application. The petitioner has filed

documentary evidence to show that his liability has been accepted by the employer. The petitioner when failed to get his wages from the

respondent No. 3 he made a complaint dated February 24, 1982 to the Labour Inspector, Hardwar. The Labour Inspector, Hardwar has failed to

get the wages paid to the petitioner from the employer and as such he advised the petitioner to file an application before the Authority under the

Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has not considered the oral as well as documentary

evidence filed by the petitioner. Even the documents, which have been exhibited by the petitioner, have not been accepted on the ground that the

same have not been proved. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has not considered that the strict rule of Evidence Act is not

applicable to the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act.

8. It is true that the finding on the question that there was sufficient cause or not in filing the application is a finding of fact, but the present is a case

where the said Authority has recorded the said finding by excluding the material and relevant documentary evidence filed by the petitioner and as

such the said finding, in my opinion, is perverse on he face of it. Non-consideration of material evidence or excluding of the material evidence from

consideration on an illegal ground renders the finding recorded by the said Authority to be illegal and perverse. Apart from this the said Authority

did not consider that whole of the claim of the petitioner was not barred by time. I do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel for

the respondents that the application could not have been splitted up as it is a composite application for the whole of the claim, part of which is

within time and part of which is not within time. The said Authority has also not considered that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a beneficial

provision/The said Authority has also not considered that the question of condonation of delay in filing the application should have been considered

liberally and in a manner to advance the cause of low paid employee. The order, which has been passed by the said Authority is, therefore,

patently illegal and cannot be allowed to sustain.

9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the respondent No. 1 dated March 7, 1984 is set aside and the case is

remanded back to the said authority with the direction to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and the observations made in this

judgment above. Parties are left to bear their own costs.