S.C. Mathur, J.
1. This petition arises from proceedings under the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for short ''the Act''. The short question for consideration is, whether the petitioners have acquired tenancy rights in the premises in question, under Section 14 of the Act.
2. Undisputedly, opposite party no. 1 Smt. Tajwar Jehan is owner and landlady of the premises in question. Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui was its tenant. Sri Siddiqui acquired a house in L.D.A. Colony at Aish Bagh, Lucknow, and shifted there. The petitioners plea is that they had been living in the premises in question along with Sri Siddiqui from the very inception of tenancy and on vacation of the premises by Sri Siddiqui in the year 1985 they have acquired tenancy rights under Section 14.
3. The plea of the landlady is that the petitioners had not been residing with Sri Siddiqui and they entered into possession only in the year 1985. It is also her case that she never recognised the entitlement of the petitioners and never accepted rent from them.
4. Petitioner no. 2 is sister of the erstwhile tenant and petitioner no. 1 is her son.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, the material question for determination before the Rent Control Officer, Opposite Party No. 2, was whether the petitioners had been in occupation of the premises in question since the inception of tenancy or they came into occupation in the year 1985, as alleged by opposite party no. 1. Both the parties adduced evidence before opposite party no. 2, on appraisement of which he has recorded the positive finding that the petitioners came into possession of the premises in question in the year 1985 only. This is a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the finding of fact is vitiated by nonconsideration of evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioners. I have been taken through the order of opposite party no. 2 and I find that the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the evidence adduced by the petitioners has not been considered is not correct. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that a few documents filed by the petitioners have not been referred to in the order of opposite party no. 2, that alone will not be sufficient to quash the order so long as it is based on relevant evidence on record. Opposite party no. 2 has referred to the voters list for recording the finding that the petitioners were not residing in the house in question. Voters list was an important document for determination of controversy of the nature involved in the present case. The petitioners had filed voters list of the year 1985 and the landlady had filed voters list of the years 1973 and 1976. The petitioners'' names do not figure in voters lists of 1973 and 1976 but they figure for the first time in the amended list of 1985. From this, inference was possible to be drawn that the petitioners did not reside in the premises in question prior to 1985 and this is the inference which has been drawn by the Rent Control Officer. The petitioners also filed photocopy of ration card prepared on 18th June, 1985 but they did not file any ration card prepared prior to the year 1985. This also led to the same inference. Thus the finding of the Rent Control Officer is based on evidence on record and cannot be said to have been arrived at arbitrarily.
7. The petitioners had indeed filed certain papers of the years prior to 1985 in which the address of petitioner no. 1 was shown as, care of Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. From these documents inference was deducible both ways. These papers did not lead to one conclusion and one alone. When two inferences are possible from the evidence on record and the authority below chooses to accept one of the two possible inferences there would be no justification for this Court to interfere with such finding in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or even under Article 227.
8. The authority below has noticed in detail the evidence adduced from either side and has examined the effect of such evidence. In paragraph 4 of the impugned order the officer has mentioned the evidence filed on behalf of the petitioner and in paragraph 5 he has mentioned the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlady, opposite party. In paragraphs 6 and 7 he has referred to the rulings cited from either side. In paragraph 8 he has considered the effect of the relevant evidence filed from either side. He has specifically considered the effect of the voters lists of the years 1973, 1976 and 1985 and the ration card prepared in the year 1985. He has also, specifically considered the effect of the petitioners'' address being shown as, care of Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui in the papers of the years prior to 1985. The learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, not justified in submitting that the finding of fact is vitiated by nonconsideration of petitioners'' evidence. In fact the order of the Officer is welldiscussed one and wellwritten too.
9. Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution this Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction. This Court cannot, therefore, interfere with findings of fact arrived at on appraisement of relevant evidence on record. If the finding has support of evidence on record, the said finding cannot be upset on the ground that certain document has not been specifically referred to in the judgment or order.
10. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the finding of fact recorded by the officer that the petitioner did not normally reside in the house in question with the erstwhile tenant Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui and came to occupy the same only in the year 1985 when Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui left it is not vitiated by any legal error.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited certain authorities to press the petitioners claim. None of these authorities lays down that a relation of a tenant who never lived with him will acquire tenancy rights under Section 14 of the Act on the tenant vacating the house or on deemed vacancy occurring in respect of the house of which he was the tenant. These authorities, therefore, do not require any examination. They may only be mentioned. They are:
(1) 1981 Allahabad Rent Cases 305, Smt. Ram Devi Shakkya and another v. First Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and another;
(2) 1985 Allahabad Law Journal 643 Mohd. Azim v. District Judge, Aligarh and others; and
(3) 1986 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 132, Meera Paul and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Faizabad and others.
12. Section 14 on the basis of which tenancy rights were claimed by the petitioners reads as follows:
�14. Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants Notwithstanding; anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of section 2A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licencee or tenant of such building.�
The above provision regularises tenancy and licence. In respect of tenancy the words used are �tenant in occupation.� The rights, therefore, arise from occupation. The finding of fact is that the petitioners were not in occupation. Section 2A uses the words �may permit any other person (hereinafter in this section referred to as licensee) to occupy.� Therefore, the licensee''s right also arises from occupation. In view of the unassailable finding of fact, the petitioners did not become either tenants or licensees of the accommodation in question. It may of course be mentioned that the petitioners did not claim to be licensees but tenants.
13. In view of the above, the petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to opposite party no. 1 which are assessed at Rs. 300. The interim order is vacated.
(Petition dismissed.)
