Shishir Kumar, J.@mdashBy means of the present writ petition the petitioner has approached this Court for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 1242002 for giving appointment under DyinginHarness Rules.
2. During pendency of the writ petition, an order dated 15112002 was passed rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Then an amendment application was filed. The said application has been allowed by this Court vide order dated 1052006 and a relief of certiorari quashing the order dated 15112002 has been prayed.
3. The present case is a very unfortunate case in which seven persons of the petitioner''s family has been murdered at one time. Only petitioner and her old grand motherinlaw Smt. Gena Devi survives. On 22112001, the petitioner lost her husband, her fatherinlaw, her motherinlaw and four other family members of the family. The fatherinlaw of the petitioner late Rakesh Chandra Rai was posted as cashier in District Cooperative Bank, Kauri Ram, Gorakhpur. The husband of the petitioner was the only son of late Sri Rakesh Chandra Rai, who was also murdered on the said unfortunate day. The petitioner was fully dependent upon his fatherinlaw on the date of murder. There is no person in the family to maintain, as such, the petitioner made an application before the respondent No. 3 being the only surviving heir of her family for compassionate appointment. The petitioner is a graduate lady. After repeated request and representations made by the petitioner, the respondents have not given appointment to the petitioner. Then the petitioner had filed the present writ petition and when the counteraffidavit has been filed by the respondents, an order dated 15112002 was annexed by which it has been stated that the claim of the petitioner has already been rejected and the ground of rejection by the respondents was that according to U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975, Regulation 104 defines ''family'' and as the petitioner does not come under the definition of ''family'', therefore, her claim cannot be considered and as such, is hereby rejected. It is also to be noted that the respondent No. 4 Smt. Renu Rai, who is the daughter of late Rakesh Chandra Rai also claims appointment. From the record, it is clear that she is a married daughter, therefore, married daughter does not come under the definition of ''family'' as such, she is not entitled to get an appointment.
4. The Counsel for the petitioner began his submission canvassing that since the petitioner was fully dependent upon his fatherin law, therefore, she will be treated to be a member of a family of the deceased who was working as a cashier in the respondent''s bank.
5. The Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment reported in 2003 (4) AWC 3205, Smt. Urmila Devi v. U.P. Power Corporation & Ors. The Counsel for the respondents on the other hand has submitted that as the daughterinlaw is not included in the definition of word ''family'' as defined in the relevant DyinginHarness Rules, which is applicable to Recruitment of Dependents of the deceased Government servants. The relevant rule, which in controversy is abstracted below for ready reference.
6. In view of the aforesaid fact, the question for consideration is whether the petitioner can be taken to be the family member of the deceased in the factsituation of the case. From the perusal of the aforesaid rule, it transpires that the word �family� has been interpreted to signify and include wife or husband, son, unmarried daughter and widowed daughter. The word `include'' has been interpreted in various decisions and has been observed by the Apex Court is that the use of word �include�, would enlarge the scope of the definition in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 1991 Suppl (2) SCC 18.
7. In another decision the word �include� it has been observed, is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words on phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. In Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works, (1991) 3 SCC 617 and in C.I.T. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1971) 3 SCC, 550, the Apex Court has expressed the view that word �includes� is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word �include� is also susceptible of other constructions. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturing Association v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601, the Apex Court signifies that it is true that �includes� is generally used as a word extension, but meaning of a word or phrase is extended when it is said to include things that would not properly fall within its ordinary connotation. It was also laid down by the Apex Court that there could not be any inflexible rule that the word �include� should be read always as a word extension without reference to the context. Paras 5 and 6 are quoted below:
�(5) In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons & Anr. (supra); the question for consideration was whether the respondents'' factories in view of the amendment to the definition of `seasonal factory'' have lost the benefit of exclusion from the Act. In connection with the question, the three Judge Bench observed that the word `include'' in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension and not with restriction. The word �include� is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. In the case under reference, the factory was seasonally factory within the meaning of Section 1 (4) of the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948 which was excluded from the operation of the Act.�
�(6) Subsequently Amending Act 44 of 1966 came into force and definition of seasonal factory was amended. After the amendment, the Employees'' State Insurance Corporation called upon the respondents to pay the contributions payable under the Act. The matter was taken to Karnataka High Court, which held that the purpose of the amendment was to enlarge and not to restrict the statutory concept of �seasonal factory� and the position of respondent''s establishments as seasonal factories under and from the purpose of the Act remained unaltered even after the amendment. The Apex Court upheld the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the terms aforestated.�
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar & Ors., 1999 (83) FLR 523, and has submitted that under the relevant DyinginHarness Rules a member of ''family'' of the deceased servant is entitled to get appointment under the DyinginHarness Rules. Rule 2 (c) of the U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servant DyinginHarness Rules, 1974 gives the definition of family and the petitioner was fully dependent upon the deceased Government servant, as such, she is included in the family and she is entitled for appointment. While considering the various cases, the Division Bench of this Court has affirmed the order of Hon''ble Single Judge and has directed to give an appointment. In the aforesaid case also the Hon''ble Single Judge while considering the word ''include'' and the definition of ''family'' has directed the respondents to give an appointment to the applicant.
9. After hearing Counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record of the present case, it is very unfortunate on behalf of the respondents that in spite of knowing fact that seven members of the family of the petitioner has already been murdered, the petitioner and the petitioner''s grant motherinlaw are the only surviving lady in the family but taking a very hyper technical view only on the ground that the definition does not include the petitioner in the definition of family, therefore, no appointment can be made. This Court in various cases as well as the Division Bench of this Court while interpreting the word ''include'' had directed that daughterinlaw includes as ''family'' member and will be treated to be dependent. There is no dispute by the respondents that the fatherinlaw of. the petitioner was not an employee of the respondent''s bank and died in harness. Therefore, in my view, the rejection of the claim of the petitioner is illegal.
10. As a result of foregoing discussions, I am of the considered view that word ''family'' in the provisions must be construed liberally having due regard to the inclusive definition of the term ''family'' as defined in and object sought to be served by the rules. The petitioner in the instant case being the daughterinlaw of the deceased and admittedly, the husband of the petitioner has been murdered and is no more, therefore, in my opinion the petitioner is entitled to be construed as one of the family members of the deceased in view of the inclusive definition of the word ''family'' and is thus entitled to be considered for appointment under the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974.
11. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed the order dated 15112002 passed by the Deputy Registrar rejecting the claim of the petitioner is hereby quashed and in consequence, it is directed that the respondents shall issue appropriate orders giving suitable appointment to the petitioner under the provisions of the rules aforesaid within a period of two months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order before the appropriate authority.
12. There shall be no order as to costs.
