@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Nooty Ramamohana Rao, J. - This Writ Petition is instituted, challenging the legality and validity of the orders passed on 31.05.2012, by the Principal District Judge, Namakkal, reverting the petitioner from the post of Assistant to that of Junior Bailiff permanently with effect from 01.06.1992.
2. Bereft of all other unnecessary details, it would be enough for us to notice that the petitioner was promoted from the post of Office Assistant to that of Junior Bailiff on 13.03.2007 and he was further promoted as Senior Bailiff on 23.06.2008 and, thereafter, he was also promoted as Assistant through the proceedings, dated 28.08.2009, of the respondent. At the relevant point of time, he was working as Assistant in the Court of District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Paramathy. It appears, he was entrusted with the task of performing the duties of Bench Clerk of the Court. It further appears that the petitioner handled the said work so clumsily that there were enormous difficulties faced by the Presiding Officer, the practitioners and the litigant public. He was, it was alleged, missing out calling several cases during the call work; mixing up the bundles and was also not maintaining the records and the registers carefully and properly. He was consuming obviously enormous time for rectifying the mess he was creating. Fed up with the poor quality of work of the petitioner, the Presiding Officer of the Court appeared to have sent up a complaint against him on 12.10.2011 to the learned Principal District Judge, Namakkal. Immediately thereafter, the services of the petitioner were withdrawn from the Court at Paramathy and he was deputed to work at the Principal District Court, Namakkal. The learned Principal District Judge drew a memo on 13.10.2011 and called for the explanation of the petitioner. In response to the said memo, the petitioner has filed his explanation on 29.10.2011, the essential part of the said explanation reads as under :
VERNACULLAR MATTER
(when roughly translated, the above statement would convey that the petitioner has not deliberately and wilfully committed the errors pointed out; but, on those few occasions when he erred, he did so, because of the pressure of work on that specified day.)
3. Strangely enough, the learned Principal District Judge, acting on a representation, said to have been submitted by the members of the Bar against the petitioner on 19.11.2011, has constituted a monitoring committee - what are they supposed to monitor, one wonders - and the said monitoring committee submitted its report on 30.04.2012, expressing the opinion that the petitioner is inefficient and incapable of discharging the duties of a magisterial bench clerk. Taking into account all these factors, the impugned order was passed on 31.05.2012, reverting the petitioner from the post of Assistant to that of Junior Bailiff permanently. Hence, this Writ Petition.
4. Heard Sri G. Sankaran, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Sri C.T. Mohan, learned Standing Counsel, who has accepted notice for the respondent/Principal District Judge and filed a counter affidavit in the matter.
5. Judicial Ministerial Service employees are also regulated in the matter of disciplinary control by Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules,1955, as amended from time to time. Rule 8 thereof has spelt out as to what penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed on the members of the civil services and they include the reduction to a lower rank in the seniority list or to a lower post not being lower than that to which he was directly recruited or to a lower time scale of pay not being lower than that to which he was directly recruited or to a lower stage in a time scale of pay. Thus, one of the punishments listed out was reduction to a lower post, which, in common parlance, is known as reversion. In the instant case, that was the penalty that visited the petitioner through the impugned order.
6. Realising the difficulty, to sustain the impugned order, Sri C.T. Mohan, learned counsel for the respondent, has attempted an answer, by drawing our attention to explanation (2) incorporated in Rule 8, which has spelt out as to what circumstances shall not amount to imposition of a penalty within the meaning of the said Rule 8 and he would refer in particular to clause (iii) thereof. Clause (iii) of explanation (2) to Rule 8 sets out that reversion of government servant officiating in higher service, grade or post to lower service, grade or post on the ground that he is considered to be unsuitable for such higher service, grade or post or on any administrative ground unconnected with his conduct, does not amount to a penalty. Therefore, it is urged before us that since the petitioner''s services were found unsuitable, the impugned order cannot be construed as imposition of penalty of reversion and, hence, cannot also be declared per se illegal. (emphasis supplied)
7. Though the argument has proceeded on certain amount of ingenuity, yet, it is not at all difficult for us to understand as to what has been contemplated, in reality, by clause (iii) of explanation (2) to Rule 8. Wherever the suitability of a civil servant to hold a particular post has fallen for consideration and if the competent authority has come to the conclusion that the individual is not suitable to hold such a post, a consequential order passed thereafter, reverting him back to the original post, would not amount to imposing a penalty. Normally, whenever a civil servant is promoted from one post to another, he or she is to be put on probation. Either during the course of the period of probation or towards the end of it, his or her suitability for holding the higher post will have to be assessed and only in the event he or she is found to be suitable to hold the higher post and shoulder higher responsibilities, his or her probation will be declared to have been satisfactorily completed and either he or she will be confirmed in the promoted cadre if a permanent vacancy within the cadre is available or, alternatively, his or her services will be regularised, duly declaring him or her to have completed satisfactorily the period of probation. Therefore, during any such assessment, where the quality of services rendered by the promoted candidate, who is undergoing probation, was found such that he is not suitable to hold the higher post, calling for greater responsibility to discharge by such an individual, any order reverting him back to the original cadre from where he got promoted would not be construed as a measure of imposition of penalty. That being not the case in the instant case, and, at any rate, it is not the case set up in the impugned order that the probation of the petitioner has come for assessment and consideration for declaration of probation, the question of reverting him in terms of clause (iii) of explanation (2) of Rule 8 is completely out of reckoning. There, clause (iii) of explanation 2 of Rule 8 does not come to the rescue of the respondent.
8. As was set out by Rule 8 itself, for good and sufficient reasons, the penalty of reversion can be imposed on a civil servant. But, however, Rule 17 of the Rules has provided for the procedure to be adopted and followed in the matter of imposition of penalties. Penalties have been broadly classified as minor penalties and major penalties. Mercifully, there is no quarrel that reversion to a lower post is treated as a major penalty under the rules. The procedure to be adopted for imposition of major penalty, such as, reversion, compulsory retirement, removal from service and dismissal from service, which are all treated as major punishments, has been delineated in great detail in Rule 17-B of the Rules. What all Rule 17-B provides for is, a strict adherence and compliance with the principles of natural justice, namely, no person should be condemned unheard and without affording him a fair and reasonable opportunity to establish his innocence/defense. In the case on hand, the major punishment of reversion has been imposed on the petitioner by the learned Principal District Judge, Namakkal, without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rule 17-B. On this short ground alone, the impugned order passed by him on 31.05.2012 becomes wholly unsustainable. We have, therefore, no hesitation whatsoever to set aside the said order, dated 31.05.2012, and restore the position of the petitioner back as Assistant.
9. No public service can survive without public servants discharging their functions sincerely, honestly, faithfully and diligently. Any delinquencies, when pointed out, if are not removed, the problem associated with the inefficiency would not only result in impairing the fair name of the office where such an inefficient employee is working, but would also become a breeding ground for repetition, not only by the same individual, but by others. After all, it is not the good that gets repeated as fast as the bad. It is, therefore, appropriate that inefficiency is not to be suffered, but has to be dealt with firmly. Hence, leaving the issue open to the respondent to proceed strictly in accordance with law, this Writ Petition is allowed, duly setting aside the impugned order, dated 31.05.2012, with a declaration that the petitioner shall be treated to have continued as Assistant and that he is entitled to payment of differential pay and allowances between what has been paid to him already and what he would have otherwise drawn, had he continued in service as Assistant. No costs.
10. Since the impugned order has unnecessarily burdened the State with certain amount of additional financial commitment without extracting corresponding services from the writ petitioner, we consider it appropriate to direct the Registry to place the related papers before My Lord The Hon''ble Chief Justice, for taking appropriate action, for fixing accountability and responsibility on the then learned Principal District Judge, Namakkal.
