Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J. - Heard Sri S.K. Tyagi, learned counsel for the applicants/ appellants.
2. This appeal has been filed beyond limitation 28 years and 355 days along with an application for leave to appeal and a delay condonation application. The deponent of the affidavit is one Sri Amit Nagar, aged about 27 years and has claimed himself to be grandson of appellant no.1/2.
3. From the perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that land of one Sri Fundan son of Chhote of village Gejha Tilpatabad, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budha Nagar was acquired by notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') dated 01.09.1977. The S.L.A.O. made the award on 15.12.1981. At the instance of the Executive Engineer Irrigation, Construction Division, Ghaziabad, the acquisition was made for total area of 33-12-13 bighas for construction of main drain in the area of Noida. The aforesaid acquired land includes the land of Sri Fundan. Several references were made at the instance of the tenure holders including L.A.R. No.127 of 1982 filed by the aforesaid Sri Fundan and all the references were decided by the court of III Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad by judgment dated 31.03.1986 awarding compensation @ Rs. 12,000/- per bigha along with other benefits under the Act. As per affidavit of the applicant, the aforesaid, Sri Fundan died in the year 1992. In the affidavit accompanying the delay condonation application, the applicant has stated as under:-
1. "That the deponent is grandson of appellant no.2, as such he is well acquainted with the facts deposed to below.
2. That the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants for enhancement of compensation given in the award dated 31.03.1986 passed by Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad now Gautam Budh Nagar.
3. That the land of the appellant Sri Fundan acquired in the year 1980 and S.L.O. given the award on 31.03.1986.
4. That the total area of the land acquired by State Government was only 2-7-7 and S.L.O. only awarded the compensation of Rs.16,107.35.
5. That the appellant Sri Fundan was are very poor and illiterate farmer and he was not given proper advice, thus the appellant Sri Fundan could not preferred the appeal against the award dated 31.03.1986.
6. That the appellant had no other source of income and therefore he could not file the appeal and was not able to spent huge amount in filing the appeal in the Hon''ble High Court.
7. That the appellant Sri Fundan had no son and he had only one daughter Smt. Ramwati who was married in the village Milakh Lakkshi, Ghaziabad now Gautam Budh Nagar.
8. That the appellant no.1 Sri Fundan died in the year 1992 and daughter of Sri Fundan thereafter had no connection and link with the village Gejha Tilpatabad.
9. That daughter of Sri Fundan is now 72 years old and her entire family is living out of village Gejha Tilpatabad therefore he did not get any knowledge about the litigation for compensation on behalf of other farmers of the village.
10. That the deponent recently met to one of the farmer of village Gejha Tilpatabad Sri Ram Kumar Tyagi and during discussion Sri Ram Kumar Tyagi informed the deponent about the judgment of Hon''ble High Court regarding enhancement of compensation of the farmers of villag Gejha Tilpatabad.
11. That Sri Ram Kumar Tyagi also informed that their maternal grandfather Sri Fundan was also having agricultural land in village Gejha Tilpatabad which was acquired by the State Government for construction of canal along with land of other farmers.
12. That the deponent thus contacted the counsel of Hon''ble High Court and upon his direction obtained certified copy of Judgment and Decree and filing the present appeal.
13. That therefore the Hon''ble Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 28 years in filing the present appeal on the facts and circumstances stated above, so that the appellant may get some compensation for their land as has been given to other tenure holders for their land during the same period in the interest of justice."
4. All the paragraphs of the affidavit have been sworn by the deponent i.e. Sri Amit Nagar on personal knowledge who is 27 years old and his birth year may be approximately the year 1988. Therefore, he can not have personal knowledge of the matters as stated in paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the affidavit which are of periods much before his birth. That apart, according to the case of the applicant, the tenure holder, Sri Fundan died in the year 1992. Therefore, the limitation for filing the appeal under Section 54 of the Act, had expired much before his death. Sri Fundan had accepted the impugned judgment which attained finality. Even the daughter of the aforesaid, Sri Fundan had not preferred any appeal. Now after about 29 years, this appeal has been filed along with a delay condonation application for condonation of delay without disclosing any sufficient cause.
5. From perusal of the aforequoted affidavit, particularly para 10 thereof indicates that the appellant has filed this appeal beyond limitation by 28 years and 355 days on coming to know that a higher compensation has been awarded to some persons who diligently filed first appeal before the High Court and contested it. Delay in such matters can not be condoned.
6. In Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, 1989 (2) SCC 356 (para-8) Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the law that petitioners who were not vigilant but were dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else''s case came to be decided, then their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. Hon''ble Supreme Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and latches observing as under:
"8. ��.. there is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else''s case came to be decided......................"
(Emphasis supplied by me)
7. In the case of State of Orrisa v. Mamta Mohanty, 2011 (3) SCC 436 (para-54), Hon''ble Supreme Court rejected the delay condonation application holding that where the petitioner approached the Court after coming to know of the relief granted in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches.
8. In the case of State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, (1996) 6 SCC 267, while considering the provisions of limitation under Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the explanation offered was that the applicants/ petitioners came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter, is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). It was held that the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.
9. In the case of Mafata lal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (5) SCC 536 (para-79), nine Judges Constitution Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court, held as under:
"79. We may now consider a situation where a manufacturer pays a duty unquestioningly - or he questions the levy but fails before the original authority and keeps quiet. It may also be a case where he files an appeal, the appeal goes against him and he keeps quiet. It may also be a case where he files a second appeal/revision, fails and then keeps quiet. The orders in any of the situations have become final against him. Then what happens is that after a year, five years, ten years, twenty years or even much later, a decision is rendered by a High Court or the Supreme Court in the case of another person holding that duty was not payable or was payable at a lesser rate in such a case. (We must reiterate and emphasize that while dealing with this situation we are keeping out the situation where the provision under which the duty is levied is declared unconstitutional by a court; that is a separate category and the discussion in this paragraph does not include that situation. In other words, we are dealing with a case where the duty was paid on account of misconstruction, misapplication or wrong interpretation of a provision of law, rule, notification or regulation, as the case may be.) Is it open to the manufacturer to say that the decision of a High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in the case of another person has made him aware of the mistake of law and, therefore, he is entitled to refund of the duty paid by him? Can he invoke Section 72 of the Contract Act in such a case and claim refund and whether in such a case, it can be held that reading Section 72 of the Contract Act along with Section 17 (1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for making such a claim for refund, whether by way of a suit or by way of a writ petition, is three years from the date of discovery of such mistake of law? Kanhaiya Lal is understood as saying that such a course is permissible. Later decisions commencing from Bhailal Bhai have held that the period of limitation in such cases is three years from the date of discovery of the mistake of law. With the greatest respect to the learned Judges who said so, we find ourselves unable to agree with the said proposition. Acceptance of the said proposition would do violence to several well accepted concepts of law. One of the important principles of law, based upon public policy, is the sanctity attaching to the finality of any proceeding, be it a suit or any other proceeding.
�..........�.�.................................. �............................
Once this is so, it is un-understandable how an assessment/adjudication made under the Act levying or affirming the duty can be ignored because some years later another view of law is taken by another court in another person''s case. Nor is there any provision in the Act for reopening the concluded proceedings on the aforesaid basis. We must reiterate that the provisions of the Central Excise Act also constitute "law" within the meaning of Article 265 and any collection or retention of tax in accordance or pursuant to the said provisions is collection or retention under "the authority of law" within the meaning of the said article. In short, no claim for refund is permissible except under and in accordance with Rule 11 and Section 11-B. An order or decree of a court does not become ineffective or unenforceable simply because at a later point of time, a different view of law is taken. If this theory is applied universally, it will lead to unimaginable chaos. It is, however, suggested that this result follows only in tax matters because of Article 265. The explanation offered is untenable, as demonstrated hereinbefore. As a matter of fact, the situation today is chaotic because of the principles supposedly emerging from Kanhaiya Lal and other decisions following it. Every decision of this Court and of the High Courts on a question of law in favour of the assessee is giving rise to a wave of refund claims all over the country in respect of matters which have become final and are closed long number of years ago. We are not shown that such a thing is happening anywhere else in the world. Article 265 surely could not have been meant to provide for this. We are, therefore, of the clear and considered opinion that the theory of mistake of law and the consequent period of limitation of three years from the date of discovery of such mistake of law cannot be invoked by an assessee taking advantage of the decision in another assessee''s case. All claims for refund ought to be,l and ought to have been, filed only under and in accordance with Rule 11/ Section 11-B and under no other provision and in no other forum. An assessee must succeed or fail in his own proceedings and the finality of the proceedings in his own case cannot be ignored and refund ordered in his favour just because in another assessee''s case, a similar point is decided in favour of the manufacturer/assessee. (See the pertinent observations of Hidayatullah, C.J. In Tilokchand Motichand extracted in para 46.) The decisions of this Court saying to the contrary must be held to have been decided wrongly and are accordingly overruled herewith."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
Law of Limitation:-
10. The ''law of limitation'' is enshrined in the legal maxim ''interest reipublicae up sit finis litium'' which means that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
11. Meaning of the word ''sufficient'' is ''adequate'' or ''enough'', inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. The words ''sufficient cause'' mean that the parties should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on his part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has not acted diligently or remained inactive. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court cannot allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. The expression "sufficient cause" should normally be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned. Whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation.
12. Where a case has been presented as the present appeal in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the ''sufficient cause'' which means "adequate and enough reason" which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. In such circumstances, no court could be justified in condoning an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever.
13. In the case of Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the order of the High Court and rejected the application for condonation of delay of five and a half years in filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court on the ground of illness of one of the appellant. After referring to the judgments in the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti (2011) 3 SCC 545, and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157, Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, Madanlal v. Shyamlal, (2002) (1) SCC 535; and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., (1973) 2 SCC 705, Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it upheld the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the Civil Appeal observing in paras-14 & 15 as under:
"14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(Emaphasis supplied by me)
14. In the case of Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2014 (11) SCC 351, a claimant/ tenure holder filed S.L.P. challenging the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay of ten years and two months and 29 days in filing the appeal by the claimant under Section 54 of the Act in spite of the fact that other persons who had preferred appeals in time had been given a higher compensation. Hon''ble Supreme Court referred to various judgments and held as under:
"11. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person.
15. In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29 days, the High Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the delay.
16. In view of the facts of the case and the above-cited judgments, we do not find any fault with the impugned judgment (Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, RFA No.5793 of 2012, decided on 22.11.2013). The petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
15. In the case of Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1997 (6) SCC 538, Hon''ble Supreme Court held has under:
"18. ����������� Suffice it to state that the appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684 and Ajit Singh''s (1996) 2 SCC 715) ratios. But Vir Pal Chauhan and Sabharwal''s [R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745] cases, kept at rest the promotion already made by that date, and declared them as valid; they were limited to the question of future promotions given by applying the rule of reservation, to all the persons prior to the date of judgment in Sabharwal''s case, which required to examined in the light of the law laid in Sabharwal''s case. Thus earlier promotions cannot be reopened. Only those cases arising after that date would be examined in the light of the law laid down in Sabharwal case Vir Pal Chauhan case and equally Ajit Singh case. If the candidate has already been further promoted to the higher echelons of service, his seniority is not open to be reviewed. In A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh [(1996) 6 SCC 65] case, a Bench of two Judges to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanik, JJ. were members, had reiterated the above view and it was also held that all the prior promotions are not open to judicial review. In Chander Pal & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (1997) 10 SCC 474, a Bench of two judges consisting of S.C. Agrawal and G.T. Nanavati, JJ. considered the effect of Vir Pal Chauhan, Ajit Singh, Sabharwal and A.B.S. Karmachari Sangh cases and held that the seniority of those respondents who had already retired or promoted to higher posts could not be disturbed. The seniority of the petitioner therein and the respondents who were holding the post in the same level or in the same cadre would be adjusted keeping in view the ratio in Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh''s cases; but promotion, if any, had been given to any of them during the pendency of this writ petition, was directed not to be disturbed. Therein, the candidates appointed on the basis of economic backwardness, social status or occupation etc. were eligible for appointment against the post reserved for backward classes if their income did not exceed Rs. 18,000/- per annum and they were given accelerated promotions on the basis of reservation. In that backdrop, the above directions came to be issued. In fact, it did not touch upon Article 16(4) or 16(4-A). Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to redo the seniority had by them in various cadres/grades though in the same services according to the 1974 Rules or 1980 Rules, are not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
16. The Constitution Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc, 1989 (2) SCC 754 (paras-8, 9 & 28), considered the doctrine of binding precedent and held as under:
"8. Taking note of the hierarchical character of the judicial system in India, it is of paramount importance that the law declared by this Court should be certain, clear and consistent. It is commonly known that most decisions of the courts are of significance not merely because they constitute an adjudication on the rights of the parties and resolve the dispute between them, but also because in doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding principle in future cases. In this latter aspect lies their particular value in developing the jurisprudence of the law.
9. The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a Court.
28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court. We would, however, like to think that for the purpose of imparting certainty and endowing due authority decisions of this Court in the future should be rendered by Division Benches of at least three Judges unless, for compelling reasons, that is not conveniently possible."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
17. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the order of the High Court condoning the delay of 1724 days in preferring an appeal by the State under Section 54 of the Act against the enhancement of compensation by the reference court and held as under:
"14. It is true that the power to condone the delay rests with the court in which the application was filed beyond time and decide whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay and ordinarily the superior court may not interfere with such discretion even if some error is to be found in the discretion so exercised by the court but where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior court. The High Court having found that the respondent in its application made incorrect submission that it had no knowledge of the award passed by the Reference Court ought to have refused to exercise its discretion. The High Court exercised its discretion on wrong principles. In that view of the matter we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court.
15. Whether the respondent had satisfied the court that it had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeals within the prescribed time? Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of prescribed period of limitation in certain cases and confers jurisdiction upon the court to admit any application or any appeal after the prescribed period if it is satisfied that the appellant or the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring such appeal or application within the prescribed period.
20. The respondent beneficiary of the acquisition did not initiate any steps whatsoever before the expiry of limitation and no circumstances are placed before the court that steps were taken to file appeals but it was not possible to file the appeals within time.
23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise courts'' discretion in its favour.
24. Learned senior counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon the decision of this court in Union of India v. Sube Ram and others [(1997) 9 SCC 69]. This court condoned delay of 3379 days in preferring the appeals by Special Leave. The said decision is mostly confined to the facts of that case and does not lay down any law as such requiring us to make any further analysis of the judgment.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
(Emphasis supplied by me)"
18. In the case of Simrat Kaur and others v. State of Haryana and others, (2015) 13 SCC 563 (paras-10, 11 & 12), Hon''ble Supreme Court referred to its judgments in the case of Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 151, State of Nagaland v. Lipokao and others, (2005) 3 SCC 752, D. Gopnathan Pillai v. State of Kerla, (2007) 2 SCC 322 and observed as under:
"Hon''ble the Supreme Court opined that when mandatory provision is not complied and the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic ground only."
19. From the above discussion, it is clear that in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others (supra), Rup Diamonds (supra) and Mafat Lal Ind. (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court has stated the law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. Petitioners who were not vigilant but content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else''s case came to be decided, can not re-agitate claims which they had not pursued for several years. These principles of law are judicially en-grafted principles and are binding in view of the law laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and another (supra) and the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs (supra). This squarely concludes the controversy. Therefore, the appellants cannot be permitted to take impetus of the judgment passed at the behest of some diligent person. Inordinate delay of 28 years and 355 days in filing this appeal on the ground of some judgment of the High Court awarding higher compensation, is not sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
20. The affidavit does not disclose "sufficient cause" indicating an adequate and enough reason which prevented the appellant to approach the court within limitation. In any case, the appellant was totally negligent and not bona fide and remained inactive for about 29 years and, therefore, it is not justified to condone such an inordinate delay. In fact the attempt of the appellant in filing these appeals is a device to cover an ulterior purpose which itself is reflected from the facts as noted above. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that in the facts of the case, the concept of liberal approach should be adopted, deserves to be rejected inasmuch as the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the concept of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed an unfettered free play. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of the appellants relating to their inaction, negligence, lack of bonafides as has been discussed in detail above; dis-entitles them for condonation of inordinate delay of about 29 years. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
21. In any case, the appellants kept sleeping over their rights for about 29 years and allegedly elected to wake up on the basis of some judgment of the High Court relating to a different acquisition and the village, and therefore, at this belated stage, the impugned judgment cannot be made amenable to judicial review. The appellant wants to reagitate the claims which they had not pursued for about 29 years and remained dormant and not vigilant and, therefore, the inordinate delay of 28 years and 355 days in filing the appeal without there being any sufficient cause, cannot be condoned.
22. In similar circumstances, this Court has considered in detail the question of condonation of delay and filing of such types of appeal after expiry of 27-28 years of limitation and dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 09.12.2016 passed in First Appeal No.126 of 2016 (Hari Singh v. State of U.P.).
23. In view of the aforesaid, the application for leave to appeal as well as the delay condonation application are rejected. Consequently, this appeal is also dismissed with cost of Rs.5,000/-, which shall be deposited by the appellant within a month from today with the Legal Cell Authority, High Court, Allahabad.
