@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. Contempt Case No.965 of 2013 was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 12.11.2014. The present Contempt Application No.205 of 2016 filed therein seeks review of the said order and a direction to the respondents in the contempt case to implement the order dated 25.09.2012 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.33217 of 2011 by applying the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for brevity, the Act of 2013), instead of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing on the date of passing of the order, implementation of which was sought by way of the contempt case.
2. W.P.No. 33217 of 2011 was filed by the petitioners in this review application aggrieved by the action of the State and its officials in utilizing their land admeasuring Ac.01.95 cents and Acs.02.77 cents in Survey Nos.33/9 and 33/11 respectively of Kakkalapalli Village, Anantapur Mandal and District, for providing house sites to weaker sections without following the due procedure laid down by law. A consequential direction was sought to the State and its officials to notify and acquire the said lands under the Land Acquisition Act. This writ petition was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court on 25.09.2012 directing the respondents therein to pay compensation to the petitioners by initiating proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and completing the same within a time frame.
3. Alleging violation of the said order, C.C.No.965 of 2013 was instituted. The contempt case was assigned to a Division Bench by an administrative order passed by the then Hon''ble The Chief Justice on 02.07.2014. Thereupon, the Division Bench, comprising the then Hon''ble The Chief Justice and one of us, SK, J, disposed of the contempt case vide order dated 12.11.2014. The Division Bench observed therein that there was no specific allegation of wilful disobedience as required under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for brevity, the Act of 1971), and opined that the Court could not proceed with the contempt case. However, the Division Bench found favour with the alternate argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners in the contempt case that the petition could be used as one for seeking implementation of the order, in respect of which the contempt proceedings had arisen. The Division Bench observed that the respondents were bound to proceed with the matter for payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. Cause for grievance leading to the filing of the present review application is the direction thereafter by the Division Bench in para 27 of the order, which reads as under:
We accordingly direct the respondents to implement the order of this Court under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which was prevailing on the date of passing of the order, of which implementation is sought. This has to be done within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This order and direction passed by us will be subject to the decision which might be rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case.
4. The petitioners then filed C.A.No.1238 of 2014 in this contempt case, to take up the matter under the caption For Being Mentioned. Their contention was that the proceedings to be initiated for acquisition and payment of compensation should be under the Act of 2013 and not the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, the Act of 1894), as directed by the Division Bench in para 27 of the order. However, this Court closed the said application opining that it would be difficult to correct or clarify the order in the contempt case on such an application, but liberty was given to the petitioners to make an appropriate application. Thereupon, the present review application, under Article 215 of the Constitution read with Section 151 CPC, was filed.
5. Heard Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri N.V.Raghava Reddy, learned counsel for the applicants, and the learned Advocate General for the State of A.P for the respondents.
6. It may be noted that the Registry raised an objection as to the maintainability of this application at the threshold. However, by order dated 05.02.2016, the office objection was overruled observing that this Court, being a Court of Record, would have review jurisdiction even in contempt proceedings. The application was accordingly numbered as C.A.No.205 of 2016. However, as the learned Advocate General advanced copious arguments on this aspect and also cited case law, we propose to deal with this issue at some length.
7. In the affidavit filed in support of this review application, the petitioners stated that the Act of 1894 was repealed with effect from 01.01.2014 and stood replaced by the Act of 2013. They therefore contended that the State would have to initiate acquisition proceedings under the present Act of 2013 and that Section 24 thereof would have no application to the case, whereby acquisition proceedings could be taken up under the Act of 1894. They pointed out that the State had not even issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 and no such notification could be issued at this stage after the repeal of the Act of 1894, under Section 114 of the Act of 2013. They accordingly sought review of the direction in para 27 of the order, which reads to the contrary, and prayed for a direction to the State to implement the order passed in the writ petition by applying the Act of 2013 instead of the Act of 1894.
8. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantapur, the fourth respondent herein, filed a counter stating thus: Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC is the only provision whereby the Court could correct errors apparent on the face of the record, but no allegation or averment was made in the affidavit filed in support of the application indicating any error apparent in the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013. There is no provision in the Act of 1971 enabling the petitioners to file a review application in a contempt case. As the Act of 2013 had already come into operation by the time the order was passed, the direction of the Division Bench to proceed under the Act of 1894 was a conscious one. At the time the order dated 25.09.2012 was passed in W.P.No.33217 of 2011, the Act of 1894 was still operative and therefore, that would be the law applicable for purposes of the case on hand. The review application seeks exercise of appellate jurisdiction in the guise of review, which is contrary to law. He concluded by stating that the prayer in the review application travelled beyond the scope of a review by introducing a new plea, a new cause of action and a new relief, which could not be entertained, and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the review application.
9. As the larger questions raised by way of this review application as to the power of this Court to review its orders in contempt cases and the power to add something more to an order, while exercising contempt jurisdiction in relation thereto, warrant examination, we grant the review. The matter is taken up for hearing.
10. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General is to the maintainability of this review application. He would contend that the Act of 1971 does not confer the power of review and therefore, this Court cannot assume unto itself such power when the Act of 1971 is silent on this aspect. Learned Advocate General would submit that Article 215 of the Constitution provides that the High Court shall have the power to punish for contempt of itself but the exercise of such power should be governed by the Act of 1971, and once the said enactment does not speak of the power of review, such power cannot be taken for granted. He would rely upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) 7 SCC 549=AIR 2001 SC 2763 to the effect that, though the power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution could not be abrogated or stultified, it would have to be exercised in compliance with the provisions of the validly enacted law, the Act of 1971. He would also place reliance on Director Of Education, Uttaranchal v. Ved Prakash Joshi (2005) 6 SCC 98, wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:
7. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India (2001) 10 SCC 496). The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside.
11. Learned Advocate General would point out that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to deal with the maintainability of a review petition in a contempt case in State v. Baldev Raj, Advocate Order dated 10.09.1991 in C.C.No.101 of 1982. Therein, the Allahabad High Court held that the Act of 1971 not only defines civil and criminal contempt but also lays down the procedure and as it does not confer inherent power of recall or review, the power of the High Court to recall or review in matters of contempt cannot be invoked. Similar view taken by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Antony v. P.S.Rana Order dated 16.02.2005 in R.P.Nos.947 & 948 of 2004 is also pressed into service. The Kerala High Court observed therein that review is a substantive law and the power of review has to be specifically conferred. Noting that the Act of 1971 does not confer such power, the Kerala High Court held that it found no power of review conferred on the High Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. Learned Advocate General would point out that in D.N.Taneja v. Bhajan Lal (1988) 3 SCC 26, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution but an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 only when the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power, as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution, and imposes punishment for contempt. Learned Advocate General would contend that as appellate power, in the context of contempt jurisdiction, is limited by Section 19 of the Act of 1971 the power of review, which is not even spelt out in the Act of 1971, cannot be automatically assumed.
12. Per contra, Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, would assert that the High Court is a Court of Record and the plenary power vesting in it would extend to correcting patent errors even in its orders. Such inherent power, per the learned senior counsel, cannot be trammeled or circumscribed by enacted law. He would point out that the inherent plenary power of the High Court, as declared under Article 215 of the Constitution, is supreme and only certain procedural aspects in relation to exercise of such power are governed by the Act of 1971.
13. Learned senior counsel would point out that in the order dated 25.09.2012 passed in W.P.No.33217 of 2011 the direction was to the respondents to pay compensation to the writ petitioners by initiating proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act completing the same within a period of six months and that, at the time this order was passed, the Act of 1894 was in operation. He would submit that, had the respondents complied with the order in true letter and spirit within the stipulated time frame, there would have been no issue as the proceedings would have concluded well before the repeal of the Act of 1894 and the advent of the Act of 2013.
14. Learned senior counsel would however point out that as the State failed to implement the order, the contempt case came to be filed and by the date of its disposal on 12.11.2014, the Act of 1894 stood repealed and was replaced by the Act of 2013. This being the position as on that date, learned senior counsel would state that the direction in para 27 of the order in the contempt case, requiring the State to implement the order passed in the writ petition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which was prevailing as on the date of passing of the said order, thereby reviving the repealed Act of 1894, constitutes an error apparent on counts more than one. He would argue that this direction leads to a legal anomaly as the State would have to initiate proceedings under a repealed enactment from scratch, which is untenable in law. That apart, he would contend that, in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, the Division Bench could not have added a new facet to the final order passed in the writ petition. He would place reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in K.G.Derasari v. Union Of India (2001) 10 SCC 496 to the effect that the Court is not entitled in a contempt proceeding to consider the legality of its earlier order and that it would not be permissible for the Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision and reverse it. Learned senior counsel would rely upon the observations made in para 7 of Ved Prakash Joshi, extracted supra, in this regard. He would also place reliance on Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Limited v. Gautam Goswami (2008) 5 SCC 339. Therein, dealing with exercise of contempt jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed as under:
32. While exercising the said jurisdiction this Court does not intend to reopen the issues which could have been raised in the original proceeding nor shall it embark upon other questions including the plea of equities which could fall for consideration only in the original proceedings. The court is not concerned with as to whether the original order was right or wrong. The court must not take a different view or traverse beyond the same. It cannot ordinarily give an additional direction or delete a direction issued. In short, it will not do anything which would amount to exercise of its review jurisdiction. (See Director of Education v. Ved Prakash Joshi (2005) 6 SCC 98 and K.G.Derasari v. Union of India (2001) 10 SCC 496)
15. Learned senior counsel would also place reliance on the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shyamsundar v. Lokesh Chandra 2010 Law Suit(Bom) 2004. Therein, the Bombay High Court framed the question for determination as follows:
Whether the High Court while exercising power under the Contempt of Courts Act, by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India has jurisdiction to review its own order?
16. Drawing support from Halsburys Laws of England and precedents, the Bombay High Court observed that the High Court is a superior Court of Record having inherent and plenary powers and such inherent power could be used to correct its record, which would also imply the power to correct errors on the judicial side. The Bombay High Court observed that restrictions in ordinary law, which apply to authorities constituted by a statute, that jurisdiction to review must be conferred by the statute would have no application to the power to deal with contempt exercised by the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution, as such power to review would be available to it even beyond Section 114 CPC and Order 47 CPC so as to advance the cause for which the High Court is constituted. The Bombay High Court therefore answered the question in the affirmative holding that, in exercise of power to punish the contemnor by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution notwithstanding the provisions of the Act of 1971, the High Court has jurisdiction to review its own order.
17. Lastly, the learned senior counsel cited M.M.Thomas v. State Of Kerala (2000) 1 SCC 666. Therein, the Supreme Court dealt with the question as to whether the High Court would have power to correct its own orders even in the absence of statutory conferment of such power if it was satisfied that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. Referring to Article 215 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, being a Court of Record, has inherent powers to correct its records and has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. It was therefore held that if any apparent error was noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it, the High Court not only has the power but also a duty to correct it.
18. On facts, Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, pointed out that the order dated 25.09.2012 passed in W.P.No.33217 of 2011 had attained finality as SLP(Civil) No.29559 of 2013, filed by the State assailing its confirmation by a Division Bench of this Court, was also dismissed. He would therefore state that once the order stood confirmed, it was not open to this Court to introduce something into it thereafter, while exercising contempt jurisdiction. He would assert that the same would amount to an error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of the inherent plenary power vesting in this Court to correct it.
19. Having given our earnest consideration to the contentions urged before us, we are of the opinion that the High Court would have power to review its orders even in contempt proceedings. No doubt, there appears to be a conflict of opinion amongst various High Courts on this issue, but with due respect to such contrary thought processes, we find that the observations of the Supreme Court in various judgments as to the scope and import of Article 215 of the Constitution are sufficient to put it beyond the pale of doubt that the High Court would have such power.
20. In M.V.Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment And Trading (P) Limited 1993 SUPP (2) SCC 433, the Supreme Court held as under:
66. The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. (See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra. As stated in Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edn., Vol. 10, para 713:
Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognisance of the particular court.
21. In M.M.Thomas, the Supreme Court referred to M.V.Elisabeth and observed that if the power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices apparent errors, the consequence would be that the superior status of the High Court would dwindle down. The Supreme Court held that it is only proper that the plenary power of the High Court should include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of the record.
22. In the light of the case law cited and referred to supra, the inherent and plenary power of the High Court to correct errors even on the judicial side cannot be doubted. That being so, there is no reason as to why such power cannot be exercised even in relation to orders passed in contempt cases. A learned Judge of this Court held to this effect as long back as in the year 1999 in District Collector/chairman Dist. Scheduled Caste Service Co-Op. Society Ltd., Adilabad v. U.Shankar 1999 (2) ALD 74. Significantly, the learned Judge was specifically dealing with the issue as to whether a review petition would lie in a contempt case. In coming to that conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union Of India (1998) 4 SCC 409, wherein the Supreme Court held that the power to punish for contempt, being inherent in a Court of Record, it follows that no Act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Record to punish for contempt and the power of legislation cannot be exercised so as to stultify the status and dignity of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
23. We therefore hold that the High Court, being a superior Court of Record with inherent and plenary powers vesting in it, would have the power to review and correct any errors apparent on its record, including errors in orders passed on the judicial side. Such plenary power is not denuded or abridged even in contempt cases merely because the Act of 1971 does not confer the power of review. The inherent plenary power of the High Court in this regard cannot be circumscribed by enacted law.
24. The next question that falls for consideration is whether there is any error apparent in the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013, warranting exercise of review jurisdiction.
25. Notably, when W.P.No.33217 of 2011 was disposed of in September, 2012, the Act of 1894 was still operative. It may be noticed that in the order dated 25.09.2012 passed in the said writ petition, there was no mention, as such, of the Act of 1894 but only a general reference to the Land Acquisition Act. The inference, obviously, was that steps were to be initiated under the extant Land Acquisition Act. However, as the State failed to implement the said order within the time stipulated, a change in the circumstances was occasioned by the repeal of the Act of 1894 with effect from 01.01.2014 and the introduction of the Act of 2013 in its place. Once the Act of 1894 stood wiped off the statute book, except to the extent it stood saved under the Act of 2013, the general law applicable to compulsory acquisition of land by the State would be the Act of 2013 alone. That being so, it would lead an anomalous situation to expect the State to now start acquisition proceedings from scratch under the repealed Act of 1894. There is no legal sanction for undertaking such an exercise, in terms of the Act of 2013. Having failed to take timely steps in terms of the order dated 25.09.2012 in W.P.No.33217 of 2011, it is now too late for the State to try and fall back on the Act of 1894, ignoring the fact that it stood repealed by the Act of 2013.
26. That apart, the question would also arise as to whether it was open to this Court to interpret the order dated 25.09.2012 in W.P.No.33217 of 2011 while exercising contempt jurisdiction and introduce a new facet in its implementation. The order dated 25.09.2012 merely referred to the Land Acquisition Act in the context of the steps to be initiated for payment of compensation to the petitioners. While so, in the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013, this Court added the rider that the order dated 25.09.2012 in W.P.No.33217 of 2011 should be implemented under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which was prevailing on the date of passing of the said order. This was clearly an addition to the order dated 25.09.2012 in W.P.No.33217 of 2011.
27. Pertinent to note, VED PRAKASH JOSHI is of no avail to the State but fully supports the petitioners in the review application. It did not deal with the issue of maintainability of a review petition in a contempt case but with the scope of contempt jurisdiction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court therein, the High Court while exercising contempt jurisdiction, has no authority to give additional directions or delete any direction in the original proceeding. This principle was reiterated thereafter by the Supreme Court in GAUTAM GOSWAMI and the Bombay High Court in Shyamsundar.
28. It may also be noticed that in Amali English Medium High School v. The Government Of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993 AP 338 FB, a Full Bench of this Court held that while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the Court cannot say anything touching on the merits of the main judgment or correct it.
29. This being the legal position, we hold that the direction in para 27 of the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013, to the effect that the order in the writ petition should be implemented under the Land Acquisition Act which was prevailing on the date of passing of the said order, was an addition made to the order in the original proceeding, viz., the order dated 25.09.2012 in W.P.No.33217 of 2011. Such an addition could not have been made by way of an order in a contempt case. Even if the order dated 25.09.2012 was indefinite or ambiguous requiring interpretation, which it is not, it was not for this Court, in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, to attach a rider to it by way of the direction in para 27 of the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013, as to which Land Acquisition Act is to be applied. This was an improper exercise in law and constituted an error apparent on the record, warranting correction.
30. The review application is accordingly allowed. The words which was prevailing on the date of passing of the order, of which implementation is sought in para 27 of the order dated 12.11.2014 in C.C.No.965 of 2013 shall stand deleted. No order as to costs.
