Prabuddha Sankar Banerjee, J.@mdashThis appeal is directed against decree dated 15th December, 2006 passed in connection with Suit No. 61 of 1994 by the Hon''ble Single Judge of this Court. The said suit was brought by the present respondent No. 1 against the respondent No. 2 and present appellant with relief as per prayers (a) to (h) of the plaint.
2. The fact leading to filing of the said suit may be summed up thus:
i) That the respondent No. 1 on the basis of agreement entered in between the respondents supplied 50MT of T-3 MS round materials to the respondent No. 2. As per agreement, the respondent No. 2 who was the plaintiff before the Suit Court raised bill and on the basis of the said bill, the respondent No. 2 who was defendant No. 1 before the Court below issued post-dated cheques.
ii) It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 2 who was appellant before this Court undertook to honour the cheques which will be produced by the plaintiff before the bank.
iii) Subsequently, the plaintiff produced the said cheques details of which were duly mentioned in the plaint but those were dishonoured by the bank. Finding no other alternative the plaintiff had to file the suit with claims as per prayers of the plaint.
iv) The Hon''ble Single Judge by order dated 15th December, 1995 allowed the application of the plaintiff for passing judgment on admission in terms of prayers (a) to (d) of the petition. The Hon''ble Single Judge further directed the bank to pay a sum of 100 GMs as cost for deliberate delay caused by the bank.
3. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Hon''ble Single Judge, the instant appeal has been preferred by the defendant bank.
4. Mr. Hirak Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant challenged the order impugned mainly on the ground that under no circumstances there was any "admission". Mr. Mitra in course of his argument challenged the order also on the ground that before coming to the final decision in disposing of the application for passing judgment on admission, the Hon''ble Single Judge ought to have been sure that the alleged admission was unconditional. At the same time, Mr. Mitra challenged the order on the ground that the Hon''ble Single Judge wrongly awarded cost of 100 GMs against the present appellant for no fault on its part.
5. In course of his argument Mr. Mitra drew attention of the Court to the letter issued by the bank dated 26th August, 1992 which is at page 35 of the paper book and on the basis of the same Mr. Mitra contended that last paragraph of the said letter will go to show that there was one condition and on the basis of the same, the bank had no other alternative but to dishonour the cheques in question.
6. To meet all these points Mr. Utpal Bose, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1/plaintiff contended that under no circumstances the said letter can be treated as admission with condition. He drew attention of the Court to the letter issued by the bank dated 1st September, 1992. Relying upon the said letter dated l8t September, 1992, subsequent to letter dated 26th August, 1992 Mr. Bose contended that the said letter clearly provides for honouring the cheques which were issued by the other respondent namely A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. in favour of the plaintiff. On the basis of the said letter Mr. Bose contended that it is crystal clear from the said letter dated 1st September, 1992 that the bank agreed to honour the cheques for supply of T-3 materials not exceeding Rs. 6,80,000/-.
7. Mr. Bose drew attention of the Court to the said letter and contended that the said letter does not provide for any condition in other words it was the contention of Mr. Bose that the letter in question i.e. 1st September, 1992 issued by the bank is unconditional admission for honouring the cheques issued by A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. in favour of the plaintiff.
8. The other documents which are part of the paper book clearly provide that A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. requested the bank to honour the cheques issued by them in favour of the plaintiff. It is also clear from the letter issued by the said A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. that they asked the plaintiff for presentation of the cheques to the banker i.e. the appellant and on the basis of the same those were duly presented. In this regard, it is to be mentioned that the plaintiff wanted guarantee from A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. that the cheques which are to be issued by them should be honoured by their banker and further took the plea that no conditional undertaking by the bank was acceptable to them. This was revealed in the letter issued by the plaintiff in favour of A.G. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. dated 27.8.1992 which is at page 34 of the paper book.
9. In support of his contention Mr. Bose relied upon the following cases:
i)
ii)
iii)
10. On the basis of the same, Mr. Bose, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent contended that the Hon''ble Single Judge did not commit any error in passing the judgment on admission which was subsequently modified due to some error.
11. Let us now discuss the cases as referred by Mr. Bose.
12. In the case in between
12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
13. The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the Trial Court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the Trial Court has dealt with the same. When the Trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors'' meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and dear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made in dispute, and the Court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree, we think this approach is unexceptionable.
14. Before the Trial Judge, there was no pleading much less an explanation as to the circumstances in which the said admission was made, so as to take it out of the category of admissions which created a liability. On the other hand, what is stated in the course of the pleadings, in answer to the application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the stand is clearly to the contrary. Statements had been made in the course of the minutes of the Board of Directors'' meeting held on 30.5.1990 which we have already adverted to in detail. In the pleadings raised before the Court, there is a clear statement made by the respondent as to the undisputed part of the claim made by them. In regard to this aspect of communicating the resolution dated 30.5.1990 in the letter dated 4.6.1990 what is stated in the affidavit-in-opposition in application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is save what are matters on record and save what would appear from the letter (sic resolution) dated 30.5.1990 all allegations to the contrary are disputed and denied. This averment would clearly mean that the petitioner does not deny a word of what was recorded therein and what is denied is the allegation to the contrary. The denial is evasive and the learned Judge is perfectly justified in holding that there is an unequivocal admission of the contents of the documents and what is denied is extent of the admission but the increase in the liability is admitted.
13. It is therefore, clear that the Court should not take narrow view regarding entertaining of an application for passing judgment on admission.
14. In the instant case, we have already stated that the question of any condition does not arise as by subsequent letter issued by the bank they did not impose any condition.
15. On perusal of the case in between
16. In the case in between
In fact, Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is enacted for the purpose of and in order to expedite the trials if there is any admission on behalf of the defendants or an admission can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case without any dispute; then, in such a case in order to expedite and dispose of the matter such admission can be acted upon. In the present case, looking at the terms of the lease deed, there can be no two opinions that the tenancy was joint/composite and not an individual one. Therefore, on these admitted facts the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be justified. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, Their Lordships have held as follows: (SCC p. 121)
In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled."
The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment.
17. In this case we have already mentioned that in the subsequent letter issued by the bank dated 1st September, 1993 the Bank did not impose any condition.
18. Mr. Mitra, learned senior Counsel for the appellant lastly contended that imposition of cost of 100 GMs was not proper and as such, he prayed for setting aside the said portion of the judgment.
19. The Hon''ble Single Judge awarded the cost for deliberate delay caused by the Bank.
20. We have considered the said plea as raised by Mr. Mitra. However, on perusal of the documents, we are of clear opinion that there was deliberate attempt by the bank to frustrate the legal right of the respondent No. 1. As such, the said plea of Mr. Mitra cannot be accepted.
21. On the basis of materials on record coupled with the principle as laid down by the Apex Court in the above mentioned cases we are of the view that the Hon''ble Single Judge rightly passed judgment on admissinriand as such we do not find any reason to interfere with the said finding as.
22. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed with cost which we assess at 200 GMas.
23. However, the bank guarantee already furnished by the appellant in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 will remain in force until further order.
24. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be given to the parties within 15 days from the date of this judgment on proper application.
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
I agree.
