,,
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by the consent of the parties.,,
2. This Civil Revision Application is in the face of concurrent findings. Though it is under Section 115 of CPC, it raises a question of law. To be",,
precise, a question of law and fact: limitation.",,
3. To put the issue in its proper perspective, I need to touch upon the facts in the earlier rounds of litigation. For the preceding litigation provides the",,
background for the Court to reckon whether the respondent’s suit is barred by the limitation.,,
4. SGM Properties and Investments Pvt., Ltd., (“the Companyâ€) is the landlord; it purchased the property in March 1982. As its title is not in",,
dispute, we leave it at that. By the time the Company purchased the property, it was occupied by, as the Company asserts, three persons: the cousins.",,
The company treated them as trespassers “in an illegal occupation.†So it wanted their eviction. For that purpose, it filed SC Suit No.685 of 1990.",,
In that suit, on 30th January 1990, the Company sought an interim relief of injunction. Even this relief does not affect our discussion.",,
5. The fact remains that the suit was filed in January 1990.,,
On 31st January 1990, Bansantkumar Bilasria Rungta, one of the occupants, received the notice. Though the other two defendants were also served",,
soon, they did not contest the suit. So we will exclude from the reckoning the chronology that concerns the other two.",,
6. Rungta, as the sole contesting-defendant, filed his vakalatnama on 24.02.1990. Then, on 10.04.1992, he took out a notice of motion. As the second",,
defendant, he wanted the trial Court to injunct the Company, among other things, from interfering with his possession. The next month, that is on",,
26.05.1992, the company took out its own notice of motion 2888 of 1992. It wanted the trial Court to appoint a receiver under Order 40 of CPC.",,
7. The Trial Court disposed of both the notices of motion: one by the Company and the other by Rungta. Through a common order, dated 24.08.1994,",,
the trial Court appointed a receiver. Through the same order, it also secured Rungta’s interest as was soughtâ€"his possession was protected.",,
8. But pending the Company’s suit, Rungta filed RAE Suit No. 2074 of 1996. In November 1996, he sued for a declaration that he is a tenant. In",,
that suit, the Company, as the defendant, among other things, raised two objections: that the receiver is a necessary party, and that the suit is barred by",,
limitation.,,
9. The trial Court has declared Rungta to be the tenant. And it overruled the Company’s specific objection about limitation. Aggrieved, the",,
Company filed an intra-court Appeal: Appeal No. 392 of 2008. The Appellate Bench of the Small Cause Court concurred with the trial Court and,,
dismissed the appeal. As a result, the Company has invoked Section 115 of CPC and filed this Civil Revision Application.",,
Submissions:,,
Petitioner’s:,,
10. Shri Pravinchandra Shah, the learned counsel for the Company, has submitted that this case raises a pure question of lawâ€"that is, limitation. If",,
this Court rules on that, it obviates all discussion on the merits. According to him, the Company’s suit for eviction has still been pending, and all",,
issues relevant on either side have already been raised in that suit. To elaborate, Shri Shah has brought to my notice, first, Article 58 of the Limitation",,
Act. In that statutory background, he contends, next, that when a right to sue accrues to a person, he ought to sue the opponent in three years.",,
11. In this context, Shri Shah terms as merit-less Rungta's claim that he had the cause of action accruing to him either on the termination of the suit",,
proceedings initiated by the Company or, in the alternative, when the Trial Court in that suit appointed the receiver.",,
12. At any rate, Shri Shah has stressed that the courts below have concurrently erred on a material question of law and that has affected their",,
respective jurisdictions. So the orders impugned are amenable to revision under Section 115 of CPC. To support his contentions, Shri Shah has relied",,
on Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC 126, Peter Francis Conceicao v. Candolina Conceicao 2016 (6) Bom C.R. 727, and",,
Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v. Hargovind Jasraj (2013) 3 SCC 182.,,
Respondent’s:,,
13. Shri Vishal Kanade, the learned counsel for the respondent- plaintiff, has submitted that this Court ought not to interfere with the concurrent",,
findings of the courts below. According to him, none of the grounds the Company raised in this Civil Revision Application affect the jurisdiction of the",,
courts below. In other words, the Company has established no jurisdictional error for inviting this Court’s indulgence under Section 115 of CPC.",,
14. According to Shri Kanade, under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the right to sue has a distinct legal connotation. According to him, there should",,
have been a real, rather than a perceived, threat to Rungta’s status as a tenant. The Company’s mere denial about his status would not have",,
provided Rungta with a right to sue the Company. That denial, Shri Kandae insists, does not amount to a cause of action.",,
15. To elaborate, Shri Kanade has submitted that once the company has sued, Rungta took all steps to defend himself. And for that purpose, he has",,
filed the written statement and asserted his status. Therefore, the Company’s allegation that Rungta is a trespasser must first receive judicial",,
acceptance before it provides Rungta the cause of action to sue. That is, unless the Company has its suit decreed, its assertion about Rungta’s",,
status does not amount to a material denial.,,
16. In the alternative, Shri Kanade has submitted that when the trial Court, in the Company’s suit, appointed the receiver, he took symbolic",,
possession. Thus, the receiver has started to exercise his powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of CPC. Only then has Rungta faced a real threat to his",,
status as a tenant. Consequently, Rungta must establish his status as a tenant before a court of law. Precisely for that purpose, Shri Kanade submits,",,
he has sued. And Rungta filed that suit well-within three years after the trial Court appointed the receiver.,,
17. In the end, Shri Kanade urges this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below.",,
Discussion:,,
18. The first plea: mere filing of a suit with a particular assertion does not amount to an effective denial of Rungta’s status as a tenant. The suit,,
must have culminated in a decree. That is, the Company’s assertion must have received judicial imprimatur.",,
Description of suit,Period of limitation,Time from which period begins to run
To obtain any other declaration,Three Years,When the right to sue first accrues
33. I am afraid even this plea must fail. The Company has never disputed the Rungta's possession over the property, and the receiver’s taking",,
symbolic possession is a non sequiturâ€"beside the point. So I conclude that the trial court’s appointing the receiver has not upset Rungta’s,,
scheme of things. Then, what follows is this: (a) the Company’s assertion in the suit that Rungta is not a tenant but a trespasser has given Rungta",,
his right to sue for the first time; (b) the Company’s assertion need not receive any judicial acceptance before it transforms itself into a cause of,,
action;,,
(c) the Company’s assertion is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe Rungta’s right as an alleged tenant; it has in fact effectively invaded,,
or jeopardized Rungta’s claim to be a tenant;,,
(d) so the Company’s filing the suit has provided Rungta a cause of action for the first time; (e) other subsequent developments may have,,
provided Rungta later causes of action. And Rungta filed the suit beyond three years after his receiving the suit summons or, at least, after his",,
receiving a plaint copy.,,
What follows?,,
34. That said, I must also note that with the dismissal of Rungta's suit as not maintainable on the grounds of limitation does not affect his claim to be",,
the tenant, rather than a trespasser.",,
As I see from the issues framed by the trial Court in Suit No.685 of 1990, there is a specific issue framed about Rungta's status: “Do the",,
defendants prove that they are not the trespasser, there is in possession as tenant.â€",,
35. As both the Courts below have erred in interpreting Article 58 of the Limitation Act, I consider it a jurisdictional failure in their deciding a question",,
of law or at least a mixed question of fact and law.,,
Conclusion:,,
36. As a result, I set aside the Appellate Bench’s order, dated 5th May 2018, and declare that RAE Suit No. 2074 of 1996 is barred by limitation.",,
As a matter of abundant caution, I also declare that this order does not prejudice the rights of either party before SC Suit No.685 of 1990 on any",,
aspect, including the defendant’s status.",,
37. As Rungta's suit now stands dismissed for want of limitation, the parties may apply to the trial Court for the return of documents, if any.",,
The Civil Revision Application is allowed.,,
