1. Notice of Motion No. 528 of 2015 has been filed by defendant No.1 seeking the following reliefs:-
“(a) That without prejudice to the rights and contentions of Defendant No.1 that the Plaint was not filed as per law and rules of procedure and is
not a legally instituted Plaint, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the Plaintiff to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that Firas El-Kurdi the person
who has verified the Plaint and filed an Affidavit in support of the Plaint is acquainted with the facts of the case in terms of Order VI Rule 15 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.â€
2. Notice of Motion No. 534 of 2015 has been filed by defendant No.3 seeking the following reliefs :-
“(a) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to dismiss the suit as filed by the Plaintiff.
(b) That in the alternative to Prayer Clause “a†above, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to reject the Plaint as filed by the Plaintiff under Order VI
Rule 14 or under Order VII Rule 11 and/or under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.â€
3. Since both these Notice of Motions were heard together and common arguments are advanced on behalf of defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3, both the
above Notice of Motions are being disposed of by this common Judgment and Order.
4. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to Notice of Motion No. 528 of 2015. In the affidavit in support of this Notice of Motion it is stated by
defendant No.1 that the plaint in the above suit has been signed and verified by one Mr Firas El-Kurdi (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Kurdiâ€)
claiming to be the constituted attorney of the plaintiff having personal knowledge of the alleged facts stated in the plaint. In the suit, the plaintiff has
also taken out Notice of Motion No. 313 of 2014 seeking various interim and ad-interim reliefs. The affidavit in support of Notice of Motion No. 313
of 2014 has also been signed and verified by said Mr. Kurdi claiming to be the constituted attorney of the plaintiff having personal knowledge of the
alleged facts stated in the plaint and the said affidavit.
5. Mr Kapadia, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No.1, submitted that in the plaint, grave and serious allegations of forgery,
collusion and trespass have been made against defendant No.1 and the other defendants. Mr Kapadia submitted that in these facts it is of great
relevance and significance that this Court be satisfied that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the facts of the case. This is for the simple
reason that the facts alleged in the plaint have a direct connection and bearing on the outcome, not only of the suit but also the Notice of Motion taken
out by the plaintiff. Mr Kapadia submitted that when one goes through the averments in the plaint, it is quite clear that Mr Kurdi has no personal
knowledge of what has been stated therein. In fact, Mr Kapadia brought to my attention the verification clause which inter alia states that Mr Kurdi
does solemnly declare that what is stated in paragraphs 1 to 60 of the plaint is true to his knowledge and what is stated in the remaining paragraphs 61
to 94 is stated on information and belief and he believes the same to be true. Mr Kapadia pointed out that if one looks at the allegations in the plaint it
would be clear that the entire dispute in the present suit relates to the defendants allegedly and without the authority of law entering into the suit
premises being (i) Flat No. 21 admeasuring about 7000 square feet situated on the 5th floor; (ii) the office / room on the ground floor and (iii) the room
on 6th floor (adjacent to the terrace) of the said building, namely, Al-Sabah Court situated at 73/105, Marine Drive, Mumbai â€" 400 020 along with a
garage or any part/portion thereof. It is, in these circumstances, that the plaintiff seeks a declaration that all the defendants are the trespassers and
have no right of any nature whatsoever in the suit premises.
6. Mr. Kapadia submitted that according to the plaint, this so called trespass has taken place on 6th May, 2013. He submitted that as stated in
paragraph 16 of the plaint, immediately upon Mr Faizal Essa Alyousuf Al-Essa (for short “Mr Faizalâ€) leaving the country on 6th May, 2013, the
defendants took illegal and forcible possession of the suit premises by winning over the servant/staff of the plaintiff by paying them substantial sums
and bringing pressure upon them to toe their line. Mr Kapadia submitted that admittedly, Mr Kurdi and who is a Canadian National, was not in India at
the time when the alleged incident took place. This being the position, he submitted that it can hardly be contended by Mr Kurdi (the constituted
attorney of the plaintiff) that what is stated in the plaint is true to his knowledge, and therefore, the verification clause is clearly defective.
7. Mr Kapadia brought to my attention the provisions of Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the CPCâ€) which
deals with verification of pleadings. Mr Kapadia submitted that the aforesaid provisions clearly stipulate that, save as otherwise provided by any law
for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proving to
the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. He submitted that sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 of Order VI stipulates that the person
verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon
information received and believed to be true. Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 15 of Order VI further stipulates that the verification shall be signed by the person
making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. Sub-Rule 4 of Rule 15 of Order VI states that, the person verifying
the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings. Thereafter, Mr Kapadia brought to my attention the provisions of Order IV and
more particularly Rule 1 thereof, which stipulates that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in
that behalf. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 1 of Order IV of the CPC stipulates that, every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII, so
far as they are applicable. Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 1 of Order IV of the CPC (and which has been inserted with effect from (w.e.f.) 1st July, 2002)
stipulates that, the plaint shall not be deemed to be duly instituted unless it complies with the requirements specified in sub-rules (1) and (2). He
submitted that if the defendants are able to show that the constituted attorney of the plaintiff and who has verified the plaint is not aware of the facts
to his own knowledge as stipulated in Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC, then, by virtue of the provisions of Order IV Rule 1 sub-rule 3 of the CPC, the
plaint shall not be deemed to be duly instituted. In such an event, an opportunity be given to the plaintiff to cure the defect failing which the plaint ought
to be returned, was the submission. In support of his submissions, Mr Kapadia relied upon the following decisions:-
(1) BBN (UK) Ltd & Ors. Vs. Janardan Mohandas Rajan Pillai & Ors. 1995 AIHC 1216.
(2) Consolidated Foods Corporation Vs Brandon & Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1960 SCC OnLine Bom 74 : (1960) 62 Bom LR 799
(3) Amar Singh Vs Union of India & Ors. (2011) 7 Supreme Court Cases, 69
(4) Madholal Sindhu Vs Asian Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 1945 SCC OnLine Bom 44 : AIR 1954 Bom 305 : (1954) 56 Bom LR, 147
(5) Om Prakash Berlia & Anr Vs. Unit Trust of India & Ors. 1982 SCC OnLine Bom 148 : 1983 Mah LJ 339 : AIR 1983 Bom 1 : (1983) 54 Comp
Cas 136 (Para 26).
8. As far as defendant No.3 is concerned, and who has filed Notice of Motion No.534 of 2015, Mr Kamat, the learned counsel appearing on their
behalf, basically adopted the arguments canvassed by Mr Kapadia. In addition to the aforesaid arguments canvassed by defendant No.1, Mr Kamat
also brought to my attention the provisions of Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC which inter alia stipulates that, in all cases in which the party pleading relies
on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary
beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items, if necessary) shall be stated in the pleadings. He submitted
that by virtue of Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC it was, therefore, in a case where fraud or misrepresentation is alleged, all the more important for the
person verifying the plaint to be aware of what is stated therein is true to his knowledge. In the facts of the present case and on reading the plaint as a
whole, nothing that is stated therein factually can be said to be to the knowledge of Mr Kurdi and who was the constituted attorney of the plaintiff, and
therefore, clearly the plaint ought to be rejected either under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC or by invoking Section 151 (inherent
powers of the Court) of the CPC, was the submission of Mr. Kamat.
9. In addition to the aforesaid argument, Mr Kamat submitted that the power of attorney on the basis of which the present suit has been filed is an
unstamped and/or insufficiently stamped document. Hence, on the basis of this unstamped/ insufficiently stamped power of attorney no plaint could
have been instituted and taken cognizance of by this Court on the date when it was filed. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the power of
attorney has been subsequently properly stamped, would make no difference as the plaint itself, on the date of institution of the suit, was on the basis
of a power of attorney which was unstamped, and therefore, could not have been acted upon as more particularly set out under the provisions of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. In support of the arguments canvassed by Mr Kamat, he relied upon the following decisions:-
(1) Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers & Ors. (2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases, 168
(2) I.T.C.Ltd. Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors. (1998) 2 Supreme Court Cases, 70
(3) SMS Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. Vs Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 14 Supreme Court Cases, 66
(4) Baldev Singh Vs. Shinder Pal Singh & Anr. (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 341
(5) Smt. Savithramma Vs Cecil Naronha & Anr. 1988 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 655.
10. Mr Bookwala, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No.2, basically supported the arguments canvassed on behalf of
defendant Nos.1 and 3.
11. On the other hand, Mr Jagtiani, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, submitted that there is no merit in the contentions
raised by any of the defendants. He submitted that the building Al-Sabah Court was taken on a long term lease by the late Emir of Kuwait, namely,
Shaikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah (for short “Shaikh Abdullahâ€) in the year 1955. Shaikh Abdullah passed away on 24th November, 1965.
Thereafter, vide a succession certificate dated 1st May, 1966, his Excellency Shaikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah (for short “Shaikh Saadâ€) got
the Inheritance Certificate. The said Shaikh Saad also passed away on 13th May, 2008. After the demise of Shaikh Saad, the present heirs have got
their succession certificate from the State of Kuwait, Ministry of Justice Legal Authentication Inheritance Division vide Succession Certificate No.
770/2008.
12. Mr Jagtiani submitted that it is stated in the plaint that on 30th October, 2012, with a view to encroach upon one of the suit premises (Flat No.21),
defendant No.1 initially forged and fabricated the Tenancy Agreement with respect to the premises on the 5th floor being Flat No.21. He submitted
that what is important to note is that this agreement is purported to be executed between defendant No.1 and Shaikh Abdullah, who passed away as
far back as on 24th November, 1965. It is inconceivable that this document (Tenancy Agreement dated 30th October, 2012) could have been
executed on the said date even by the power of attorney holder of Shaikh Abdullah (Mr. Faizal) for and on behalf of Shaikh Abdullah, when Shaikh
Abdullah himself had left for his heavenly abode on 24th November, 1965. The fact that Shaikh Abdullah passed away on 24th November, 1965 was
to the knowledge of the constituted attorney of the plaintiff (Mr. Kurdi), and therefore, clearly any document that was entered into thereafter was
clearly fraudulent to the knowledge of the constituted attorney because such document could not have been executed long after the demise of Shaikh
Abdullah. Similar is the case also with reference to the Tenancy Agreements entered into with defendant Nos.2 and 3 dated 31st January, 2013
respectively. With reference to these Tenancy Agreements also it has been stated in the plaint that the same are forged and fabricated as they have
been entered into by defendant Nos.2 and 3 with Shaikh Abdullah through his constituted attorney â€" Mr Faizal.
13. Mr Jagtiani then pointed out that it is stated in the plaint that in order to give legitimacy to the act of trespass and legitimize his occupation,
defendant No.1 filed an application for standard rent (R.A.N. Application No. 47 of 2012) in the Small Causes Court on 1t2h December, 2012. This
Standard Rent Application surprisingly joined Shaikh Abdullah as defendant No.1 and his constituted attorney (Mr Faizal) as defendant No.2. If one
looks at the Standard Rent Application, the address of Shaikh Abdullah is shown as his office on 6th Floor, Al-Sabha Court, 73/105, Marine Drive,
Mumbai 400 020. However, as per the alleged Tenancy Agreement dated 31st January, 2013, entered into between Shaikh Abdullah and defendant
No.2, defendant No.2 was in actual and physical possession of said 6th Floor from 15th August, 2012. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that it is surprising that
the address of Shaikh Abdullah is shown as the same address of defendant No.2 and who claims to have the Tenancy Agreement in his favour and
claims to be in occupation from 1st August, 2012. Mr Jagtiani pointed out that all these documents have been annexed to the plaint.
14. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that today, when this Motion is heard, the Court has to be satisfied that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the
facts of the case. He submitted that the question of proof is different from the question of establishing that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted
with the facts. The question of proof would arise at the trial of the suit and not at this stage. If what is stated in the plaint is not proved by the plaintiff
either through his constituted attorney or any other person, the suit will fail. However, that does not mean that the plaint has been incorrectly verified.
These are two separate and distinct matters. He submitted that reading the plaint as a whole and which sets out in great detail, what has transpired in
the above matter and which is mainly based on documentary evidence coupled with the fact that those alleged documents have been entered into with
a person who passed away as far back as on 24th November, 1965, it is totally incorrect on the part of the defendants to contend that the plaint is
defective as it is not properly verified. He submitted that the fact that these documents were entered into with a person who had long passed away
and even if one reads the averments in the R.A.D. suits filed by the defendants in the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai, it is clear that a fraud was
writ large over all the Tenancy Agreements that were entered into by the defendants with Shaikh Abdullah through his power of attorney Faizal.
15. Mr Jagtiani then submitted that even the other tenants of the building Al-Sabah Court have given the affidavits and which are annexed at Exh Y-1
to Y-16 to the plaint which corroborate the facts which have been stated in the plaint. He submitted that the arguments canvassed by the defendants
are very hyper technical in nature and are being canvassed only because they are aware that the inevitable conclusion that would be reached after
perusing of these documents is that the defendants are guilty of perpetrating a fraud on the plaintiff and by usurping property in Mumbai which would
today be valued at least at Rs.100 Crores, for a paltry sum of Rs.16,666/- per month.
16. Mr Jagtiani took me through the plaint in great detail and submitted that it is clearly stated in the plaint that the documentary evidence annexed to
the plaint goes to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit premises till May 2013 and the claim of the defendants that they were put in
possession of the suit premises in August / September 2012 is clearly false. Mr Jagtiani also brought to my attention the provisions of Section 3 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 wherein the word “Fact†is defined to mean and include anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being
perceived by the senses; or any mental condition of which any person is conscious. He submitted that the meaning of the word “Fact†has been
given a very wide meaning under the provisions of the Evidence Act. In this regard he also brought to my attention the statutory illustrations under the
said definition one of which states that, a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith, or fraudulently, or uses a particular
word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact. He submitted that another statutory illustration
states that, a man having a certain reputation, is a fact. So also that a man heard or saw something, is a fact. Looking at the wide terminology used in
the definition along with the statutory illustrations given thereunder, it can hardly be contended by the defendants that what is stated in the plaint and
the way it is recorded are not facts to the knowledge of the constituted attorney of the plaintiff, was the submission. He submitted that these Notice of
Motions have been filed only with a view to ensure that the main Notice Motion (Notice of Motion No.313 of 2014) filed by the plaintiff for interim
reliefs is delayed and not heard expeditiously. This is the only motive for filing the above Notice of Motions, was the submission of Mr Jagtiani. This
being the position, Mr Jagtiani submitted that there was absolutely no merit in the contentions canvassed on behalf of the defendants and the Notice of
Motions be dismissed with compensatory costs.
17. As far as the issue of stamping is concerned, Mr Jagtiani submitted that there is absolutely no merit in the arguments canvassed by Mr Kamat that
the power of attorney executed in favour of Mr. Kurdi is an unstamped document. In this regard he tendered before me a colour xerox copy of the
said power of attorney which has been duly adjudicated by the Stamping Authority and the stamp duty adjudicated thereon, is duly paid. He submitted
that the argument of Mr Kamat that only the translation of the power of attorney has been stamped and not the power of attorney itself is also
incorrect in view of the fact that the document that was submitted to the Stamp Authority for adjudication was consisting of eight pages and which is
recorded on the endorsement by the Stamping Authorities itself which includes the original power of attorney in Arabic along with its translation. In
these circumstances, it was futile to suggest that the power of attorney was not duly stamped, was the submission.
18. Mr Jagtiani fairly brought to my attention that it is true that the stamping of the power of attorney was done only on 4th August, 2015 (after the
date of filing of the present suit) but he submitted that this would make no difference. He submitted that the provisions of the Stamp Act are for the
purposes of securing the revenue and not to arm a dishonest litigant with an argument of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. Once the
revenue is secured, the Stamp Act has no role to play in a dispute inter-se between the parties. In the facts of the present case and considering that
the stamp duty has already been paid and when it is certainly a curable defect, this argument canvassed by Mr Kamat would not survive at all, was
the submission of Mr Jagtiani.
19. I have heard the learned counsel for parties at length and have perused the papers and proceedings in the above suit as well as the Notice of
Motions. I have gone through the plaint in great detail. The plaint is instituted by one Sheikhah Fadiah Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah through her
constituted attorney Firas El-Kurdi. In the plaint it is stated that the plaintiff is the elder daughter of the late Shaikh Saad who passed away in the year
2008 and who was the Prime Minister of Kuwait and then went on to become the Ultimate Head of the State of Kuwait, which position is honoured
as “Emir†of the State of Kuwait. It is also stated in the plaint that after the demise of the late Shaikh Saad, the plaintiff, her mother and her
siblings have obtained heir-ship/succession certificate in respect of the estate of the late Shaikh Saad and that now the plaintiff along with her mother
and her siblings are the Royal Family of Kuwait. Thereafter it has been set out in great detail that the building “Al-Sabah Court†is owned by the
Ruler/ Royal family of Kuwait and some units/ flats in the said building are tenanted and the Royal Family of Kuwait is the landlord of these units/
flats. It has been stated that the said building was taken on a long term lease by late Emir of Kuwait, namely Shaikh Abdullah in the year 1955. Shaikh
Abdullah expired on 24th November, 1965 and thereafter vide a Succession Certificate dated 1st May, 1966 Shaikh Saad got the inheritance
certificate. Thereafter Shaikh Saad expired in the year 2008 and after his demise the present heirs got a succession certificate from State of Kuwait,
Ministry of Justice Legal Authentication Inheritance Division vide Succession Certificate No. 770 of 2008. Both the aforesaid succession certificates
have been annexed to the plaint.
20. It is thereafter stated in the plaint that during the life time of Shaikh Abdullah as well as Shaikh Saad, Mr Faizal was authorized to take care of the
said building. After the demise of Shaikh Abdullah and Shaikh Saad, the present heirs including the plaintiff, granted the necessary and specific
authority to Mr Faizal to take care of the said properties including said building. Thereafter, details with regard to him have also been set out as to how
he was the Former Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Kuwait and the Ex-Counsel General of the State
holding a Special (Diplomatic) Passport.
21. It is also stated that the entire building is occupied by the tenants except the suit premises on 5th floor, room/ office premises on the ground floor
admeasuring about 270 sq. feet (carpet) next to flat No.1 and room adjacent to the terrace admeasuring about 300 sq. feet (carpet) which are
collectively described as the suit premises. It is stated that the suit premises were fully seized by the late Shaikh Abdullah and thereafter by Shaikh
Saad and now by the heirs of Shaikh Saad including the plaintiff.
22. It is thereafter stated that when in Mumbai, Mr Faizal lived in a building, named Al-Jabariya, which is close to and within a walking distance from
the building in which the suit premises are situated. It is also stated that Mr Faizal, however, used to regularly visit the suit premises and had employed
full time staff for looking after the premises. Name of the staff members is also mentioned. It is thereafter stated that in the last week of April 2013,
Mr Faizal had hosted guests in part of the suit premises, namely, flat No.21 admeasuring about 7000 square feet situated on the 5th floor who can
vouch for the fact and describe in detail the interiors of the said flat when they visited part of the suit premises (Flat No.21).
23. Thereafter paragraphs 13 to 25 of the plaint deal with the events leading to the alleged dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit premises by the
defendants. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that Mr Faizal on leaving the country on 6th May, 2013, the defendants took illegal and forcible
possession of the suit premises. It is also specifically stated that as a part of this illegal activity, the defendants have created false and fabricated
documents creating illegal tenancies in respect of the suit premises. The details also have been set out in the subsequent paragraphs.
24. Thereafter, paragraphs 26 and 27 deal with a criminal complaint filed by defendant No.1 against Mr Faizal and it is specifically averred in the
plaint that neither the plaintiff nor Mr Faizal were aware of any such proceedings when Mr Faizal left for Kuwait on 6th May, 2013. In fact, in
paragraph 28 it is categorically stated that immediately on Mr Faizal leaving for Kuwait, the defendants, in connivance with the servants of the
defendants took forcible and illegal possession of the suit premises and started carrying out heavy renovation work therein. It is stated that at that time
some of the tenants of the said building informed Mr Faizal, who in turn informed the plaintiff about the same. On plaintiff making further inquiry, the
plaintiff was shocked to learn that the defendants had filed the aforesaid false and frivolous complaint against Mr Faizal with the apparent purpose to
deter him from returning to India.
25. Thereafter paragraphs 33 to 47 deal with the alleged false and fabricated Tenancy Agreements dated 30th October, 2012 (entered into with
defendant No.1) and 31st January, 2013 (entered into with defendant Nos.2 & 3 respectively) as also the proceedings initiated by the defendants in
the Small Causes Court by filing Standard Rent Applications and declaratory suits. It has been specifically stated that the suits have not only been filed
against a dead person, but even the service of the writ of summons was never effected. According to the plaintiff one of these factors is that the writ
of summons was purportedly served upon Mr Faizal on 8th April, 2013 at the suit premises, whereas, according to the defendants, they were all in
occupation and possession of the suit premises long before the said date. It is, in these circumstances, that the plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the
decrees passed in R.A.D. Suits and that too which were passed within 30 days from the alleged service of the writ of summons, are a complete nullity
in the eyes of law. There are other facts also stated in the plaint including the fact that other tenants have in fact executed affidavits confirming that
Mr Faizal was in use, occupation and possession of the suit premises till 6th May, 2013.
26. In paragraph 62 of the plaint it is stated that all the documentary evidence annexed to the plaint go a long way to show that the plaintiff was in the
suit premises till May 2013 and that the claim of the defendants that they were put in possession of flat No.21 on the 5th floor (part of the suit
premises) in September 2012, is false.
27. On going through the plaint in great detail, I am unable to agree with the argument of Mr Kapadia that there is a defect in the verification as such
that would non-suit the plaintiff. Order VI Rule 14 of the CPC deal with how the pleadings are to be signed. It states that, every pleading shall be
signed by the party and his pleader (if any). The proviso to Rule 14 carves out an exception that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for
other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.
Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC deals with verification of pleadings. It states that, save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force,
every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the
Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. It further stipulates that the person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs
of the pleadings, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. From what is stated in
the plaint, it is quite apparent, at least prima facie, that the constituted attorney of the plaintiff, Mr Kurdi is acquainted with the facts of the case. Mr
Kurdi has referred to and relied upon several documents in the plaint including the alleged forged and fabricated Tenancy Agreements, as well as the
Succession Certificates granted by Kuwaiti Authorities, first to Sheikh Saad on the death of Sheikh Abdullah, and then to the plaintiff on the death of
Sheikh Saad. In fact, the reliefs in the plaint revolve around the fact that the Tenancy Agreement dated 30th October, 2012 entered into with
defendant No.1 and two Tenancy Agreements dated 31st January, 2013 entered into with defendant Nos.2 and 3 are forged and fabricated
documents and do not bind the plaintiff. This is the real dispute in the suit. All the facts pleaded in the plaint are in relation to establishing that these
Tenancy Agreements are bogus. The fact that Sheikh Abdullah expired on 24th November, 1965 is to the knowledge of the constituted attorney of the
plaintiff. It is this fact, and which is to the knowledge of the constituted attorney of the plaintiff, which is really important. This is for the simple reason
that everything else flows from this. The contentions with reference to the Tenancy Agreements being forged and fabricated is on the basis that they
are supposedly entered into with Sheikh Abdullah (through his constituted attorney Mr Faizal) who expired way back on 24th November, 1965. It is
impossible that an agreement is entered into with a dead person. I am not going into greater details with reference to these Tenancy Agreements as
that would prejudice the rights of the parties when they argue the main Notice of Motion No. 313 of 2014. However, at least to my mind, the plaintiff
has satisfied the requirements of Order VI Rule 15 Sub-Rule 1 of the CPC which clearly stipulates that it should be proved to the satisfaction of the
Court that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the facts of the case. I clearly find that this test is met in the facts and circumstances of
the present case. As mentioned earlier, I have in great detail set out what is stated in the plaint. I have also perused the documents that have been
annexed to the plaint in great detail. On going through the same I do not think that it is correct on the part of the defendants to contend that the
verification clause is defective so as to non-suit the plaintiff by virtue of the provisions of Order IV Rule 1 sub-rule 3 of the CPC which stipulates that
the plaint shall not be deemed to be duly instituted unless it complies with the requirements specified in sub-rules (1) and (2). In turn sub-rule 2 of Rule
1 of Order IV of the CPC stipulates that every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII of the CPC so far as they are
applicable. What is important to note is that Order IV Rule 1 sub-rule 2 of the CPC uses the word “so far as they are applicableâ€. It does not
mean that every rule of Order VI or Order VII of the CPC have to be complied with in its strict sense so as to non-suit the plaintiff. For example,
Rule 2 of Order VI of the CPC stipulates that the pleadings should contain and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence for which they are to be proved. If the argument of
Mr Kapadia is to be accepted, then if the evidence is mentioned in the pleadings, there would be non-compliance of Rule 2 of Order VI of the CPC
which would in turn, non-suit the plaintiff by virtue of Order IV Rule 1 sub-rule 2 of the CPC. I do not think, this was ever the intention of the
Legislature. This is more so when one clearly takes into consideration that it is now well settled that the laws of procedure are the handmaidens of
justice. Rules of procedure are to advance justice and not to scuttle or thwart the same. This being the position I am unable to agree with the
arguments canvassed by Mr Kapadia that the verification clause is defective, and therefore, by virtue of provisions of Order IV Rule 1 sub-rule 3 of
the CPC, the plaint is deemed to be not properly instituted.
28. I also find considerable force in the argument of Mr. Jagtiani that when the present Notices of Motion are being heard, the Court has to be
satisfied that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the facts of the case (as contemplated under Order VI Rule 15). The question of proof
is different from the question of establishing that the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the facts. The question of proof would arise at the
trial of the suit and not at this stage. If what is stated in the plaint is not proved by the plaintiff either through his constituted attorney or any other
person, the suit will fail. This would be at the trial of the suit. However, that does not mean that the plaint has been incorrectly verified. These are two
separate and distinct matters. Reading the plaint as a whole and which sets out in great detail what has transpired in the above matter and which is
mainly based on documentary evidence coupled with the fact that those alleged documents have been entered into with a person who passed away as
far back as on 24th November, 1965, I find that Mr. Jagtiani is correct in his submission that it is wrong on the part of the defendants to contend that
the plaint is defective as it is not properly verified.
29. This now only leaves me to deal with the argument canvassed by Mr Kamat that the power of attorney executed in favour of Mr Kurdi is an
unstamped document and hence the suit as filed, cannot be said to be properly instituted and taken cognizance of by this Court.
30. I do not find any merit in this contention. In this regard, I must mention that a colour photo copy of said power of attorney has been tendered
before me and which has been duly adjudicated by the Stamping Authority and the stamp duty adjudicated thereon is duly paid. In fact, it is not only
the Arabic version of the power of attorney but also its translation that has been duly stamped. This is quite apparent from looking at the endorsement
of the Stamping Authority which includes not only the original of power of attorney in Arabic but also its translation. In fact, not only was the stamp
duty adjudicated but penalty was also levied and both have been paid. This is not in dispute. In these circumstances, it is futile to suggest that the
power of attorney is not duly stamped. It is true that stamping of the power of attorney was done only on 4th August, 2015, namely, after the date of
filing of the present suit. However, this would make no difference. As correctly submitted by Mr Jagtiani, the provisions of the Stamp Act are for the
purpose of securing the revenue and not to arm the litigant with an argument of technicality to meet the case of the opponent. Once the revenue is
secured, the Stamp Act has little role to play in a dispute inter-se between the parties. Non-stamping of the document, even under the provisions of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 is a curable defect. This defect has been duly cured by payment of the requisite stamp duty and penalty. Once this
defect is cured, then the argument canvassed by Mr Kamat cannot survive. In the view that I take, I am supported by a decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs M/s Dilip Construction Co. [(1969) 1 SCC 597 : AIR 1969 SC 1238].
Paragraph 7 of this decision (of the SCC report) reads thus :-
“7. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments: It is not enacted to arm a litigant
with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue once
that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the
instrument. Viewed in that light the scheme is clear. Section 35 of the Stamp Act operates as a bar to an unstamped instrument being admitted in
evidence or being acted upon ; Section 40 provides the procedure for instruments being impounded, sub-section (1) of Section 42 provides for
certifying that an instrument is duly stamped, and sub-section (2) of Section 42 enacts the consequences resulting from such certification.â€
(emphasis supplied)
31. This decision of the Supreme Court is also followed by a Division Bench of our Court in the case ofA sset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. Vs.
Alpha & Omega Diagnostics (India) Ltd. [2017 (3) Mh. L.J. 315.] In fact the Division Bench of this Court relies upon very same paragraph of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. (supra). From what is stated in the aforesaid two Judgments it is now quite clear
and well settled that a litigant cannot use this provision, namely, the question of non-stamping as a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his
opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue and once that object is secured according to law, the party
staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument. I think that the aforesaid two decisions
clearly answer the contention raised by Mr Kamat on the issue of stamping. Even if the power of attorney might not have been initially stamped when
the suit was filed, that defect has been cured by paying the requisite stamp duty and penalty on 4th August, 2015. This initial defect having been cured,
I do not think that Mr Kamat is correct in his submission that the suit is deemed to be not properly instituted because on the date when the suit was
instituted the power of attorney was not properly stamped. This argument, therefore, will have to be rejected.
32. Now I shall deal with the decisions that were relied upon by defendant No.1 and defendant No.3 in support of their submissions. The first decision
relied upon by Mr. Kapadia was in case of BBN (UK) Ltd and Ors (supra). This decision of a single Judge of this Court was rendered in a Chamber
Summons filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and who were Directors of Britannia Industries (7th defendant in that suit). By the said Chamber Summons
the said defendants sought the name of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 to be struck out and/or deleted from the cause title of the plaint; that portions of the
pleadings in the plaint as more particularly mentioned in the Schedule to the Chamber Summons be struck out and/or deleted; and the verification
clause of the plaint be struck out and the plaint be returned as defective. The learned Judge in paragraph 24, after a detailed discussion, came to a
factual finding that the verification of the plaint in that case was contrary to the provisions of Order VI Rule 15. He, however, did not dismiss or return
the plaint as defective but gave an opportunity to the plaintiff to have the plaint verified in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions
of Order VI Rule 15. I fail to see how this decision supports the case of defendant No.1 or 3. In the facts of the present case, after perusing the plaint
in great detail, I have come to the conclusion that the verification is not defective. Once I have come to this factual finding, the decision relied upon by
Mr. Kapadia in this case as well as in the other decisions of Consolidated Foods Corporation (Supra) and Amar Singh (supra) are of no assistance to
defendant No.1 and/or No.3.
33. As far as the decisions in the case of Madholal Sindhu (supra) and Om Prakash Berlia and Anr (supra) are concerned, the same were decisions
rendered at the time of the final hearing of the suit. These decisions are not under Order VI Rule 15. These decisions only point out how a document
has to be proved in evidence. As mentioned earlier, different considerations would arise (i) when a document is to be admitted in evidence at the trial
of the suit; and (ii) whether the person verifying the plaint is acquainted with the facts as required under Order VI Rule 15. It could very well be that
though the person verifying the plaint has acquainted himself with the facts may not be the best person, who at the trial of the suit, may be able to
prove those facts. Those facts then would have to be proved by some other person by entering into the witness box. This by itself would not mean that
the plaint is incorrectly verified. When one looks at it from this perspective, then, clearly the aforesaid two decisions in Madholal Sindhu and Om
Prakash Berlia can be of no assistance to defendant No.1 and/or No.3.
34. As far as the judgments relied upon by Mr. Kamat are concerned, the first decision relied upon by Mr. Kamat is a judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of Shipping Corporation of India (supra). This judgment is rendered under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC. Mr.
Kamat relied upon this decision to substantiate his argument that even though Order VI Rule 15 has not been specifically mentioned under Order VII
Rule 11, the Court can always invoke its power under Section 151 to reject a plaint. I find that this judgment has absolutely no application to the facts
of the present case. As the facts reveal, the appellants before the Supreme Court had appointed the respondent as the steamship agent of the
appellant for the purpose of handling tankers, bulk carriers and tramp vessels, calling at the port of Tuticorin. It was the contention of the appellant that
the said agreement provided for termination of the contract. On being dissatisfied with the conduct of the respondent, the appellant invoked the clause
of termination in the contract and for the said reasons terminated the contract of agency. The respondent before the Supreme Court challenged the
said termination by way of a suit in the City Civil Court at Chennai. During the pendency of the said suit the respondent also prayed for an interim
injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the agency of the respondent. The trial Court by an order dated 24th November, 1995 granted
interim relief sought by the respondent which became final upon the appellant’s challenge to the same being rejected by the High Court. During
the continuation of the agency, the appellant allegedly noticed certain financial irregularities and was contemplating to take fresh steps to terminate the
agency once again. Anticipating such subsequent termination, the respondent filed another suit before the trial court praying for production of accounts
of the appellant and appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to scrutinize the accounts of the parties. During the pendency of the above noted two
suits filed by the respondent, the appellant by a notice dated 23rd August, 2001 again terminated the agency of the respondent on the ground of the
respondent was charging excess amount and on the charge of tampering with invoices and bills. The said notice stated that the appellant was
terminating the agency under clause 31 of the agency agreement and on the expiry of 90 days from the date of receipt of the said notice the agency
would stand terminated. Challenging this termination, a third suit was filed by the respondent (OS No.5100 of 2001) for a permanent injunction. After
the third suit was filed, the appellant filed IA No. 20651 of 2001 in OS No. 4212 of 1995 (the first suit) inter alia praying for dismissal of that suit on
the ground that the same had become infructuous because of the subsequent and fresh notice of termination which was the subject matter of the third
suit (OS No. 5100 of 2001). This IA was rejected by the trial Court as well as the High Court. It is against the said order of the High Court that the
appellants came before the Supreme Court in appeal. In this context, the Supreme Court held that on the basis of the order of the two Courts below by
the issuance of the second notice the earlier termination notice stood superseded. If that be so, then the first suit had clearly become infructuous and
therefore the Supreme Court held that in such a case the provisions of Section 151 of the Code could be invoked by the Court to make a suitable order
to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. Though there can be no dispute with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision, I do not find that
the same can be made applicable to the facts of the present case. In view of the detailed discussion above and coming to a factual finding that the
verification of the plaint is not defective and in any event is a curable defect, there is no question of invoking Section 151 for rejecting the plaint as
sought for by defendant No.3 in its Notice of Motion.
35. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Kamat is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of I.T.C. Ltd. (supra). In this decision the Supreme
Court has inter alia laid down that whilst examining whether the plaint discloses a cause of action the Court has to ascertain whether the plaint created
an illusion of a cause of action by clever drafting. If it did not disclose a cause of action then the plaint was liable to be rejected. Once again, I do not
see how this decision can be of any assistance. Having gone through the plaint, clearly a cause of action is made out. In fact, the cause of action has
been pleaded in great detail with reference to how the Tenancy Agreements supposedly entered into by the plaintiff with defendant No.1 as well as
defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are forged and fabricated documents. This is predicated on the ground that these agreements are supposedly entered into by
Mr. Faizal as the constituted attorney of Shaikh Abdullah who passed away as far back on 24th November, 1965. Perusing the plaint, it can hardly be
canvassed that the cause of action pleaded in the plaint is illusory by clever drafting. I therefore find that even this decision is of no assistance to the
defendants.
36. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Kamat is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SMS Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. (supra). This decision
was rendered under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and more particularly Section 11 thereof for an appointment of the
arbitrator. In this decision, the Supreme Court inter alia held that if a document is not duly stamped it cannot be acted upon. The Court then should
proceed to impound the document and follow the procedure under the Stamp Act. If however, the deficit stamp duty and penalty is paid before the
Court or before the Collector as contemplated under the Act, the defect with reference to deficit stamping is cured and the court may treat the
document as duly stamped. I fail to see how this decision can be of any assistance to Mr. Kamat on the issue of stamping of the power of attorney. In
fact, this decision runs counter to his argument in the facts of the present case. In the facts of the present case, the initial defect of non-stamping of
the power of attorney has been cured and therefore cannot be a ground to non-suit the plaintiff. This decision also therefore is of no assistance to Mr.
Kamat.
37. The next decision relied upon by Mr Kamat is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Singh (supra) and more particularly
paragraphs 22 and 23 thereof. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has held that an election petition is required to be verified in terms of
Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC and must be strictly in terms thereof. It was, thus, incumbent on the part of the defendant to specifically state as to
which statement made in the election petition were true to his knowledge and which were true to his belief. I do not think there can be any dispute on
the aforesaid proposition laid down by the Supreme Court. However, in view of the detailed discussion made earlier in this judgment, I fail to see how
this decision can be of any assistance to defendant No.3 especially for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC or under the
provisions of Section 151 of the CPC. In fact, in another decision of the Supreme Court in the case ofF .A. Sapa and Ors Vs. Singora & Ors. [(1991)
3 SCC 375], three Judges of the Honourable Supreme Court have clearly held that the verification of an election petition as required by Section 83(1)
(a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 must be in the manner laid down by Rule 15 of Order VI of the CPC. The defect in the verification
can be (i) of a formal nature and not very substantial (ii) one which substantially complies with the requirements and (iii) that which is material but
capable of being cured. The object of requiring verification of an election petition is clearly to fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations in
the petition on the person signing the verification and at the same time discouraging wild and irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. The
relevant portion of this decision reads thus:-
“20. That brings us to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83, which provides that an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and
verified in the manner laid down by the Code for the verification of the pleadings. Under Section 83(2) any schedule or annexure to the pleading must
be similarly verified. Order 6 Rule 15 is the relevant provision in the Code. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 says that the person verifying shall specify with
reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies on his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and
believed to be true. The verification must be signed by the person making it and must state the date on and the place at which it was signed. The
defect in the verification can be (i) of a formal nature and not very substantial (ii) one which substantially complies with the requirements and (iii) that
which is material but capable of being cured. It must be remembered that the object of requiring verification of an election petition is clearly to fix the
responsibility for the averments and allegations in the petition on the person signing the verification and at the same time discouraging wild and
irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. Then comes the proviso which provides that in cases where corrupt practice is alleged in the petition,
the petition shall also be supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form i.e. Form 25 prescribed by Rule 94-A of the Rules. Lastly sub-section (2) of
Section 83 lays down that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be similarly signed and verified. Two questions arise: (i) what is the
consequence of a defective or incomplete verification and (ii) what is the consequence of a defective affidavit? It was also said that the verification
clause in regard to averments or allegations based on information ought to disclose the source of information which had not been done in this case.
21. It must at the outset be realised that Section 86(1) which lays down that the High Court ‘shall’ dismiss an election petition which does not
comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 does not in terms refer to Section 83. It would, therefore, seem that the
legislature did not view the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 83 with the same gravity as in the case of Section 81, 82 or 117. But it was
said that a petition which does not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 83 cannot be said to be an election petition within the contemplation
of Section 81 and hence Section 86(1) was clearly attracted. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore [(1964) 3 SCR 573 :
AIR 1964 SC 1545] one of the defects pointed out was that though the verification stated that the averments made in some of the paragraphs of the
petition were true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner and the averments in some other paragraphs were verified to be true on advice and
information received from legal and other sources, the petitioner did not in so many words state that the advice and information received was believed
by him to be true. The Election Tribunal held that this defect was a matter which came within Section 83(1)(c) and the defect could be cured in
accordance with the principles of the Code. This Court upheld this view in the following words: (SCR p. 583)
“It seems clear to us that reading the relevant sections in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification
which is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings as required by clause (c) of sub-
section (1) of Section 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition.â€
It is thus clear from this decision which is binding on us that mere defect in the verification of the election petition is not fatal to the maintainability of
the petition and the petition cannot be thrown out solely on that ground. As observed earlier since Section 83 is not one of three provisions mentioned
in Section 86(1), ordinarily it cannot be construed as mandatory unless it is shown to be an integral part of the petition under Section 81.
28. From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and
the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the
verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to
the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such
averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit
in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts
will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case
whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will
follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter.
29. A charge of corrupt practice has a two-dimensional effect: its impact on the returned candidate has to be viewed from the point of view of the
candidate's future political and public life and from the point of view of the electorate to ensure the purity of the election process. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that such an allegation involving corrupt practice must be viewed very seriously and the High Court should ensure compliance
with the requirements of Section 83 before the parties go to trial. This is quite clear from the observations of this Court in the case of K.M. Mani v.
P.J. Anthony [(1979) 2 SCC 221 : (1979) 1 SCR 701 ]. While defective verification or a defective affidavit may not be fatal, the High Court should
ensure its compliance before the parties go to trial so that the party required to meet the charge is not taken by surprise at the actual trial. It must also
be realised that delay in complying with the requirements of Section 83 read with the provisions of the Code or the omission to disclose the grounds or
sources of information, though not fatal, would weaken the probative value of the evidence ultimately led at the actual trial. Therefore, an election
petitioner can afford to overlook the requirements of Section 83 on pai∼n of weakening the evidence that he may ultimately tender at the actual trial of
the election petition. That is because as held in Mani case [(1979) 2 SCC 221 : (1979) 1 SCR 701] the charge of corrupt practice has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt and not merely by preponderance of probabilities. Allegation of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in nature, the failure to
supply full particulars at the earliest point of time and to disclose the source of information promptly may have an adverse bearing on the probative
value to be attached to the evidence tendered in proof thereof at the trial. Therefore, even though ordinarily a defective verification can be cured
and the failure to disclose the grounds or sources of information may not be fatal, failure to place them on record with promptitude may lead the court
in a given case to doubt the veracity of the evidence ultimately tendered. If, however, the affidavit or the schedule or annexure forms an integral part
of the election petition itself, strict compliance would be insisted upon.â€
38. From the aforesaid decision it is clear that a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured. It is not essential that the verification clause should
disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information and believed to be true. If the
defendant desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the plaintiff may be required to
supply the same but that by itself would not be fatal to the filing of the suit.
39. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of All India Reporter Ltd Vs. Ramchandra Dhondo Datar [1959 SCC OnLine Bom 152 : AIR
1961 Bom 292] has clearly held in paragraph 12 that the provisions contained in Order VI of the CPC relating to verification and presentation of the
plaint relate merely to procedure and if the same are not strictly complied with, would not cease to be a valid plaint or a nullity because of such defects
or irregularities. Paragraph 12 of this decision reads thus :-
12. The question is whether the provisions contained in O. VI relating to signing, verification and presentation of the plaint relate merely to procedure
or whether a plaint which does not strictly comply with the requirements of O. VI would cease to be a valid plaint and would be a nullity because of
such defects or irregularities. It is true that when a plaint is presented to the Court or to such officer as the Court appoints, it is open to the Court or to
the officer to point out the defects or irregularities to the person presenting the suit and to require him to rectify the defects or irregularities. But can it
be said that the defects or irregularities would make the presentation of the suit itself invalid although the plaint is admitted and particulars of the plaint
are entered in a register of suits as provided by O. IV, r. 2? In this connection it is necessary to note that O. VII, r. 11, which refers to the rejection of
a plaint, enumerates only four cases in which a plaint has to be rejected, but it does not enumerate any of the defects or irregularities referred to in O.
VI, r. 14, O. VI, r. 15, or O. VI, r. 2. It is clear from the provisions contained in O. VI that these rules relate only to procedure, and the better view
would be to regard them as mere matters of procedure and to hold that if a plaint is not properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in the
register of suits it does not cease to be a plaint and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted merely because of the existence of some defects
or irregularities in the matter of signing and verification of the plaint.â€
40. The last judgment relied upon by Mr Kamat was another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt Savithramma (supra) and more
particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof. On going through this decision also, I find that the same has absolutely no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. Considering the factual findings that I have given in the earlier part of this judgment, none of the decisions relied
upon by Mr Kamat would, in any way, bolster his case for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC or Section 151 of the CPC.
41. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in either of the Notice of Motions. They are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
