Description of application,"Period of
Limitation",Time from which period begins to run
136. For the execution of any decree
(other than a decree granting a
mandatory injunction) or order of any
civil court.","Twelve
Years","When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order
directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at
recurring periods, when default in making the payment or deliver in respect of which execution is
sought, takes place:
Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual
injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.
137. Any other application for which
no period of limitation is provided
elsewhere in this division.","Three
years",When the right to apply accrues.
filed on 2 April 2018 is required to be held as maintainable. In supporting these contentions, Dr.Tulzapurkar has placed reliance on various decisions",,
namely in Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited Vs. AMCI (India) Private Limited & Anr. (2009) 17 Supreme Court Cases 79, 6Shree",,
Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras (1992) 3 Supreme Court Cases 1, Force Shipping",,
Ltd. Vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. 2003 C L C 877, Tropic Shipping Co. Ltd. Vs. Kothari Global Limited 2002(2) Bom.C.R. 9,3 M/s.Bharat Salt",,
Refineries Ltd. Vs. M/s. Compania Naviera O.S.A. No.52 of 2008 dated 01/08/2008 and M/s.Compania Naviera 'SODNOC' Vs. Bharat Salt,,
Refineries Ltd. & Anr. AIR 2007 MADRAS 251.,,
12. In rejoinder Dr.Saraf, learned Counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner that the foreign",,
award has a stamp of a decree is the observation of the Supreme Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) in a different,,
context. It is submitted that these observations of the Supreme Court are required to be read in the context of erstwhile Arbitration Act (Arbitration,,
Act of 1940) under which the Court was called upon to pass a decree in terms of the award and which is not the position under the present Arbitration,,
Act. It is thus contended that necessarily an application under Sections 47 to 49 for the purpose of limitation would fall under Article 137. Dr.Saraf,",,
learned Counsel for respondent No.1 in supporting this submission would refer to the decision in Noy Vallesina Engineering Spa v/s. Jindal Drugs,,
Limited (supra) and M/s.Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A., 29 v/s. Sakuma Exports Limited (supra). Dr.Saraf would next contend that Articles",,
136 and 137 prescribe the time from which period begins to run, namely that in case of Article 136 when a decree and order becomes enforceable and",,
in case of Article 137 when the right to apply accrues. The Court's attention is drawn to Articles 116, 126 and 137 to point out that these articles",,
provide for the limitation to start running from the date of the decree or order. It is submitted if Section 49 of the Arbitration Act is considered, it",,
clearly prescribes that only when the Court holds that the foreign award is enforceable under the said chapter, the award shall be deemed to be",,
decree of the Court and not before that. It is hence submitted that considering this clear position, Article 136 of the Limitation Act as contended on",,
behalf of the petitioner even otherwise is not applicable.,,
13. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, the short question which has arisen for consideration at this stage of the proceeding is as to whether",,
the present petition is filed within the prescribed limitation or the petition would be required to be held as time barred.,,
14. Some admitted facts are required to be noted. The three awards as sought to be executed by the petitioner are the awards dated 9 February 2006,",,
24 August 2007 and the final award dated 27 March 2008 of the ICC London. It is also not in dispute that the respondents approached this Court on,,
27 July 2008 by filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act challenging these foreign awards. As the Section 34 petition was filed beyond,,
the period of 90 days, however, within the extended period of 120 days, a delay condonation application (Notice of Motion) No.2560 of 2008 was filed",,
by the respondents in the said petition. By an order dated 10 June 2013 passed by this Court on the said application filed by the respondents, this Court",,
condoned the delay in filing Section 34 petition as also it was held that the Section 34 petition although it assailed a foreign award(s) was maintainable.,,
The petitioner being aggrieved by the said orders passed by this Court, approached the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme",,
Court by an order dated 19 November 2013 stayed the proceedings of the Section 34 petition. The Supreme Court finally by an order dated 10 March,,
2017 set aside the orders passed by this Court holding that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petition. Thereafter on 2 April 2018,,
the petitioner filed the present petition seeking enforcement and execution of the Award.,,
15. The provisions of the Arbitration Act would be required to be given a broader meaning and the Court would not take a narrow pedantic approach,",,
more particularly considering the situation in hand when the petitioner has foreign awards in its favour, recognised by the foreign court and requiring",,
enforcement and execution. The provisions of Sections 47 to 49 are required to be applied in a meaningful manner which would not defeat the,,
substantive and concluded arbitral proceedings between the parties. It is in this perspective, even the submission as urged on behalf of the respondents",,
that the petitioner should have filed a delay condonation application, praying for condonation of delay in filing this petition for enforcement and",,
execution of the award would be required to be considered. This for more than one reason. Indisputedly it was the respondents who brought about a,,
situation by approaching this Court by filing Section 34 proceedings challenging the awards, although with a delay. This Section 34 petition was filed on",,
27 July 2008. The delay was condoned on 10 June 2013. Although there were already proceedings pending before this Court from July 2008 till 10,,
June 2013 when the delay condonation was granted, in the facts of the case it cannot be said that the awards were instantly available to the petitioner",,
for enforcement and execution inasmuch as there was a situation brought about that there were substantive proceedings challenging the award(s),,
were pending before this Court. The fate of the award(s) itself was the subject matter of consideration before this Court. The order dated 10 June,,
2013 condoning the delay would surely relate back to the date on which the petition was filed. Considering the provisions of the Arbitration Act prior,,
to its amendment by the 2015 Amendment Act (with effect from 23 October 2015), filing of the Section 34 petition amounted to stay of the award.",,
The law in this regard is well settled. In Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited Vs. AMCI (India) Private Limited & Anr. (supra) the,,
Supreme Court held that until disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, there is an implied prohibition on the enforcement of",,
the arbitral award as the very filing and pending of an application under Section 34, in effect operated as a stay on the enforcement of the award. The",,
Court in paragraphs 19 and 20 held thus:-,,
“20. Section 36 provides that an award shall be enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court, but only on the expiry of the time",,
for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34, or such application having been made, only after it has been refused.",,
20. ……….Until the disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Act, there is an implied prohibition of enforcement of the arbitral award. They",,
very filing and pendency of an application under Section 34, in effect, operates as a stay of the enforcement of the award.â€",,
(emphasis supplied),,
16. The order dated 10 June 2013 passed by this Court condoning delay in filing Section 34 petition would be required to be taken relating back to the,,
day on which Section 34 petition was filed that is it would relate back to 27 July 2008.. In this context learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would,,
be correct in relying on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Amita Nand Aggarwal,,
(supra) has observed as under:-,,
9. ….. … … …. .. In the present case, the objections were filed though beyond 90 days but within the priod of 120 days and the objections raised by",,
the Registry were also removed within the period of two weeks. I consider, since the petition / objections under Section 34 of the Act was returned",,
for want of court fees and certain technical reasons and the objections raised by the Registry were complied with and after rectification, the petition",,
was re-filed within a reasonable period, the petition must be considered to have been filed on the original date when it was filed in the Registry and not",,
on the date when it was re-filed after removing objections. .. … .†(emphasis supplied),,
17. Hence, the legal position as had arisen was that with effect from 27 June 2008, the Section 34 petition as filed by the respondents could be said to",,
be pending. Thus even if the petitioners were to file a petition within three years after the awards, and before the delay was condoned i.e. upto 10",,
June 2013, nonetheless the petitioners were met with a fate of stay of the awards, and the awards were thus not available for enforcement and",,
execution.,,
18. The orders passed by this Court dated 10 June 2013 condoning the delay and holding that Section 34 petition is maintainable came to be challenged,,
by the petitioner. By an order dated 19 November 2013 the Supreme Court granted stay to the proceedings of the Section 34 petition and finally on 10,,
March 2017 the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by this Court holding that Section 34 petition was not maintainable before this Court, the",,
award(s) being foreign award(s).,,
Thus, it is only after 10 March 2017 the award(s) became available to the petitioner to be enforced. In my opinion, it is at this juncture, even if Article",,
137 of the Limitation Act as being pressed into service on behalf of the respondents, is applied and a period of three years is to be available to the",,
petitioners to file an enforcement petition, this petition which was filed on 2 April 2018 would be required to be held to be filed within the limitation of",,
three years as prescribed under Article 137, as clear from the above facts. It would be required to be held that the substantive cause of action had",,
arisen to the petitioner to file the present petition only on 10 March 2017 when the Supreme Court set asides the order passed by this Court holding the,,
Section 34 petition to be not maintainable.,,
19. The respondents have contended that once a stay was granted by the Supreme Court to the proceedings of the Section 34 petition, it would bring",,
about a situation of the Section 34 petition not being on the file of this Court. This may not be a correct proposition for the respondents to urge. In this,,
context and considering the facts of the case, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would be correct in placing reliance on the decision of the",,
Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras (supra) to contend that",,
the stay which was granted by the Supreme Court on 19 November 2013 to the proceedings of Section 34 petition would not have any effect on the,,
Section 34 petition to say that the same was not on the file of the Court or the Section 34 petition in any manner had come to an end or that there was,,
no stay on the enforcement of the award. The Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the said decision has observed thus:-,,
“… … … … The said stay order of the High Court cannot have the effect of reviving the proceedings which had been disposed of by the,,
Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991. While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under",,
challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order Quashing of an order results in the restoration",,
of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to",,
such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not,,
mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence.â€,,
20. Apart from the above discussion now it is well settled that a foreign award is stamped as a decree and hence, as a decree it can be enforced and",,
be executable in one and the same proceeding. In that event Article 136 of the Limitation Act would surely become applicable prescribing a limitation,,
of twelve years from the date when award becomes enforceable and/or the award directing payment of money as specifically provided, under Article",,
136. This particularly, when the execution of such award is held to be permissible in the same proceedings in two parts/stages. One on its enforcement",,
and the second part being the execution. The law in this context is required to be noted.,,
21. In Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) the issue which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court was in respect,,
of the arbitral proceedings which commenced before the Arbitration Act,1996 (brought into force on 25 January 1996), and the award being delivered",,
after the commencement of the Arbitration Act on 24 September 1997. The issue was whether the provisions of the Arbitration Act,1940 or",,
Arbitration Act,1996 would become applicable in regard to enforcement of the foreign award. It is in this context the Court considered as to what is",,
the nature of a foreign award. The Supreme Court while observing that there is not much difference between enforcement of the foreign award under,,
the Old Act and the New Act, held that the only difference is that while under the regime of Arbitration Act,1940 read with Foreign Awards",,
(Recognition and Enforcement) Act,1961, a decree follows, whereas under the Arbitration Act, 1996 the foreign award is already stamped as a",,
decree. It would be appropriate to note the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 40 of the decision which reads thus:-,,
As a matter of fact if we examine the provisions of Foreign Awards Act and the new Act there is not much difference for the enforcement of the,,
foreign award. Under the Foreign Awards Act when the court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under that Act the court shall order,,
the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment accordingly and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow. Sections 7 and,,
8 of the Foreign Awards Act respectively prescribe the conditions for enforcement of a foreign award and the evidence to be produced by the party,,
applying for its enforcement. Definition of foreign award is same in both the enactments. Sections 48 and 47 of the new Act correspond to Sections 7,,
and 8 respectively of the Foreign Awards Act. While Section 49 of the new Act states that where the court is satisfied that the foreign award is,,
enforceable under this Chapter (Chapter I, Part II, relating to New York Convention Awards) the award is deemed to be decree of that court. The",,
only difference, therefore, appears to be that while under the Foreign Awards Act a decree follows, under the new Act foreign award is already",,
stamped as the decree. Thus if provisions of the Foreign Awards Act and the new Act relating to enforcement of the foreign award arc juxtaposed,,
there would appear to be hardly any difference.â€,,
(emphasis supplied),,
22. The Supreme Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) again commented on the nature of a foreign award prior to the,,
Arbitration Act,1996 coming into force namely during the regime of the erstwhile Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act,1961. The",,
Supreme Court again held that under the Arbitration Act 1996, the foreign award is already stamped as a decree and the party holding the foreign",,
award can apply for enforcement of the award but the Court before taking further effective step for execution of the award is required to proceed,,
under Sections 47 and 49. It is held that in one proceeding there may be different stages, the first stage being that the Court would be required to",,
decide enforceability of the award, having regard to the requirement of the said provisions and thereafter once it is decided that the foreign award is",,
enforceable, it is to proceed to take further effective steps for execution of such an award. There did not arise question of making foreign award a",,
rule of court/decree again. It is further observed that if the object and purpose of the provisions of Sections 47 to 49 of the Arbitration Act can be,,
served in the same proceedings, there is no need to take two separately proceedings resulting into multiplicity of litigation. The observations of the",,
Supreme Court in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 are required to be noted which read thus:-",,
“30. Alternatively it was contended that a party holding a foreign award has to file a separate application and produce evidence as contemplated,,
under Section 47 and also satisfy the conditions laid down under Section 48 and it is only after the Court decides about the enforceability of the award,",,
it should be deemed to be a decree under Section 49 as available for execution. In other words, the party must separately apply before filing an",,
application for execution of a foreign award. The Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 was promulgated with the object to consolidate and",,
amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral award and to define law",,
relating to conciliation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. In para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the,,
Act, the main objects of the Bill are stated. To the extent relevant for the immediate purpose, they are:",,
“i) to comprehensive cover international commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation;,,
(ii) --(iv) * * *,,
(v) to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process;,,
(vi) * * *,,
vii) to provide that every final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court;â€,,
31. Prior to the enforcement of the Act, the Law of Arbitration in this country was substantially contained in three enactments namely, (1) The",,
Arbitration Act, 1940, (2) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 and (3) The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act,",,
1961. A party holding a foreign award was required to take recourse to these enactments. Preamble of the Act makes it abundantly clear that it aims,,
at to consolidate and amend Indian laws relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral",,
awards. The object of the Act is to minimize supervisory role of court and to give speedy justice. In this view, the stage of approaching court for",,
making award a rule of court as required in Arbitration Act, 1940 is dispensed with in the present Act. If the argument of the respondent is accepted,",,
one of the objects of the Act will be frustrated and defeated. Under the old Act, after making award and prior to execution, there was a procedure for",,
filing and making an award a rule of court i.e. a decree. Since the object of the act is to provide speedy and alternative solution of the dispute, the",,
same procedure cannot be insisted under the new Act when it is advisedly eliminated. If separate proceedings are to be taken, one for deciding the",,
enforceability of a foreign award and the other thereafter for execution, it would only contribute to protracting the litigation and adding to the",,
sufferings of a litigant in terms of money, time and energy. Avoiding such difficulties is one of the objects of the Act as can be gathered from the",,
scheme of the Act and particularly looking to the provisions contained in Sections 46 to 49 in relation to enforcement of foreign award. In para 40 of,,
the Thyssen judgment already extracted above, it is stated that as a matter of fact, there is not much difference between the provisions of the 1961",,
Act and the Act in the matter of enforcement of foreign award. The only difference as found is that while under the Foreign Award Act a decree,,
follows, under the new Act the foreign award is already stamped as the decree. Thus, in our view, a party holding foreign award can apply for",,
enforcement of it but the court before taking further effective steps for the execution of the award has to proceed in accordance with Sections 47 to,,
49. In one proceeding there may be different stages. In the first stage the Court may have to decide about the enforceability of the award having,,
regard to the requirement of the said provisions. Once the court decides that foreign award is enforceable, it can proceed to take further effective",,
steps for execution of the same. There arises no question of making foreign award as a rule of court/decree again. If the object and purpose can be,,
served in the same proceedings, in our view, there is no need to take two separate proceedings resulting in multiplicity of litigation. It is also clear from",,
objectives contained in para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, Sections 47 to 49 and Scheme of the Act that every final arbitral award is to",,
be enforced as if it were a decree of the court. The submission that the execution petition could not be permitted to convert as an application under,,
Section 47 is technical and is of no consequence in the view we have taken. In our opinion, for enforcement of foreign award there is no need to take",,
separate proceedings, one for deciding the enforceability of the award to make rule of the court or decree and the other to take up execution",,
thereafter. In one proceeding, as already stated above, the court enforcing a foreign award can deal with the entire matter. Even otherwise, this",,
procedure does not prejudice a party in the light of what is stated in para 40 of the Thyssen judgment.,,
32. Part II of the Act relates to enforcement of certain foreign awards. Chapter 1 of this Part deals with New York Convention Awards. Section 46,,
of the Act speaks as to when a foreign award is binding. Section 47 states as to what evidence the party applying for the enforcement of a foreign,,
award should produce before the court. Section 48 states as to the conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. As per Section 49, if the Court is",,
satisfied that a foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that court and that court has to proceed",,
further to execute the foreign award as a decree of that court. If the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is accepted, the very purpose of",,
the Act in regard to speedy and effective execution of foreign award will be defeated. Thus none of the contentions urged on behalf of the respondent,,
merit acceptance so as to uphold the impugned judgment and order. We have no hesitation or impediment in concluding that the impugned judgment,,
and order cannot be sustained.â€,,
(emphasis supplied),,
23. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Force Shipping Ltd. Vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. (supra) referring to the decision in Fuerst Day Lawson,,
Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) observed that along with application for enforcement it would be open to a party seeking enforcement of a foreign,,
award to apply for execution in the form prescribed so that once the court proceeds to hold that the Award is enforceable, it can thereafter proceed to",,
execute the decree without further procedural requirements.,,
24. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in,,
M/s.Compania Naviera 'SODNOC' Vs. Bharat Refineries Ltd. & Anr. (supra) in which the court referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in,,
Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) rejected the contention of the respondent that as the award was passed on 2 March 2000 the,,
petition to enforce the award should have been filed within three years and as the same being filed in the year 2005, the relief was barred by limitation.",,
It was held that the foreign award is already stamped as a decree and the party having the foreign award can straight away apply for enforcement of,,
the foreign award, the party would have 12 years time like that of a decreeholder to execute the foreign award. The Court in paragraphs 41 and 42",,
has made the following observations:-,,
“41. The next objection of the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent is that as the award was passed on 2.3.2000, the petition to enforce the",,
award should have been filed within 3 years and as the same was filed only in 2005, the relief is barred by limitation.",,
42. I am unable to accept this submission also. Under the Act, 1996, the foreign award is already stamped as a decree and the party, having a foreign",,
award can straight away apply for enforcement of it and in such circumstances, the party having a foreign award has got 12 years time like that of a",,
decree holder. Therefore it cannot be said that the present petition is barred by limitation.â€,,
25. In another decision in M/s.Bharat Salt Refineries Ltd. Vs. M/s. Compania Naviera (supra) another learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court,,
referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) rejected the contention that the petition for,,
enforcement should have been filed within three years from the date of the award. In paragraph 20 the Court held as under:-,,
“20. The contention of the appellant that as the award was made on 2.3.2000, the petition for enforcement should have been filed within three",,
years therefrom and the petition for enforcement filed in the year 2005 is hit by limitation is raised only for rejection. Under the 1996 Act, the foreign",,
award is stamped as a decree and the party having a foreign award has got 12 years time like any other decree for its enforcement or execution.,,
Hence the point of limitation is also decided against the appellant, in the sense, the petition filed for enforcement is well within the period of limitation.",,
Our view is fortified by the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of M/S FUERST DAY LAWSON LTD. VS. JINDAL EXPORTS LTD (AIR 2001,,
Supreme Court 2293), ………….. ……….â€",,
…..…….,,
A reading of the above it is clear that once the Court decides that a foreign award is enforceable, it can proceed to take further effective steps for",,
execution of the same and also the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that Court.,,
26. It is thus beyond a pale of doubt that enforcement and execution can form part of the same proceedings. If this be so then certainly Article 136,,
under the Limitation Act becomes relevant. If the argument of non applicability of Article 136 as urged on behalf of the respondent is accepted, it",,
would be contrary to the principle of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) apart from,,
deeply damaging the decreetal interest of the award creditors apart from being contrary to the object of Section 47 to 49 of the Arbitration Act.,,
27. In fact the above legal position now stands reinforced as seen from a recent decision of the Supreme Court in M/S.Shriram EPC Ltd. Vs. Rioglass,,
Solar SA14, the Supreme Court taking note of the decisions in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) and Thyssen Stahlunion",,
GMBH Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) has held that the observations of the Supreme Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports,,
Ltd. (supra) that “the only difference as found is that while under the Foreign Awards Act a decree follows, under the new Act the foreign award",,
is already stamped as the decree.†to mean that the expression “stamped†means “regarded†This means that the foreign award is to be,,
regarded as a decree. The following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 read thus:-,,
“One sentence in Fuerst Day Lawson (supra) reads, ""[T]he only difference as found is that while under the Foreign Awards Act a decree follows,",,
under the new Act the foreign award is already stamped as the decree."" This sentence does not lead to the conclusion, following the judgment in",,
Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (1999) 9 SCC 334, that under the 1996 Act, a foreign award is considered to be stamped",,
already. All that this sentence means is that the foreign award is to be regarded as a decree. The expression ""stamped"" means ""regarded"". This",,
judgment also does not carry us much further.â€,,
(emphasis supplied),,
28. Now coming to the contention as urged on behalf of the respondents, the main thrust of the respondents’ argument is the decision of the",,
learned Single Judge of this Court in Noy Vallesina Engineering Spa v/s. Jindal Drugs Limited (supra). In my opinion considering the facts of the,,
present case and as noted above, that the Supreme Court on 10 March 2017 set aside the order passed by this Court holding that the Section 34",,
petition filed by the respondents was not maintainable and the present proceedings being filed on 2 April 2018, even by applicability of the provisions of",,
Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the petition is not barred by limitation. In any case, applying the princple of law as laid down in Fuerst Day Lawson",,
Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) and M/S.Shriram EPC Ltd. Vs. Rioglass Solar SA (supra), the Court cannot overlook the prayers as made by the",,
petitioner which are in the nature of a combined petition namely for enforcement and for execution of the award. As observed above a broader view,,
is required to be taken to advance the object and intention of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and not a hard technical approach as urged by the,,
respondents that the petition be held as time barred, by applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act in the absence of a delay condonation applicaton and",,
the delay being condoned. This contention of the respondents militates against from what the Supreme Court has now further clarified in M/S.Shriram,,
EPC Ltd. Vs. Rioglass Solar SA (supra)that when it was observed in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd (supra) that the Foreign award,,
is already stamped as a decree, it means that “the foreign award is to be regarded as a decree.†In view of this clear position in law there is no",,
manner of doubt and more particularly as seen the prayers as made in the petition that this petition cannot be held to be time barred, as contended on",,
behalf of the respondents.,,
29. In so far as the reliance on behalf of the respondents on the decision in Hameed Joharan (Dead) & Ors. vs. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.,,
(supra), this decision may not assist the respondents when the issue is of enforcement of a foreign award. The Supreme Court in this decision has",,
considered as to what would be the purport of the word “enforce†as used in Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court was,,
considering the meaning of the word “enforce†as used in Article 136 of the Limitation Act. However, in the present facts considering that the",,
award is a foreign award, the reliance on this decision is not well founded, more particularly in view of the principles of law in regard to the",,
enforceability of a foreign award as laid down in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) and M/S.Shriram EPC Ltd. Vs. Rioglass,,
Solar SA (supra).,,
30. The decision in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Subash Projects And Marketing Limited (supra) would also not assist the,,
respondents, as the question which fell for determination of the Court was as to whether the appellants were entitled to extension of time under",,
Section 4 of the Limitation Act,1963 and the context of the words “prescribed period†as used in the said provision. It was held that Section 2(j) of",,
the Limitation Act defines the period of limitation and when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act,1996, the prescribed period for",,
making an application for setting aside the arbitral award was three months. It was held that the period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that,,
follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not the “period of limitation†and therefore, not the ‘prescribed period’ for the",,
purpose of making an application for setting aside the arbitral award. It was held that the period of 30 days beyond three months which the Court may,,
extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso below sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act being not a period of limitation,,
(prescribed period), and Section 4 of the Limitation Act would thus not be applicable. I wonder as to how this decision would at all is applicable in the",,
present facts.,,
31. The decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in M/s.Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A., 29 v/s. Sakuma Exports Limited (supra)",,
would also not assist the respondents. This was a case where initially the execution application simplicitor came to be filed without filing of an,,
enforcement petition. Subsequently, the enforcement petition was filed and the learned Judge referring to the decision of the learned Single Judge of",,
this Court in Noy Vallesina Engineering Spa v/s. Jindal Drugs Limited (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. Vs.,,
Jindal Exports Ltd. (supra) the Court held that the petition was not barred by limitation. Learned Judge in paragraphs 46, 48 and 49 has made the",,
following observations:-,,
“46. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. (supra) has held that there is no need to take two separate proceedings,,
resulting in multiplicity of proceedings. It is also clear from objectives contained in the statement of objects and reasons that in view of Section 47 to,,
49 and the scheme of Arbitration Act, every final arbitral award is to be enforced as if it were a decree of the court. The Supreme Court held the",,
submission that the execution petition could not be permitted to convert as an application under Section 47 is technical and was of no consequence in,,
the view the Supreme Court had taken in the said judgment. It is held that in one proceedings, the court enforcing a foreign award can deal with the",,
entire matter and that the procedure does not prejudice a party. It is not in dispute that the said execution application filed by the petitioner was,,
pending for quite some time. No objection was raised by the respondent by filing reply.,,
….. ….. ….,,
48. In the said judgment, this Court held that such an application for enforcement of the foreign award would attract Article 137 and according to that",,
Article, the period of limitation is three years and would commence from the date when right to apply occurs. This Court has also observed that the",,
least that could be said is that the question as to whether any period of limitation is prescribed for making an application for enforcement of the foreign,,
award and if there is period of limitation prescribed, what would be that period of limitation, was not a question free from doubt and this Court",,
accordingly, condoned the delay filed by the petitioner. In my view, the petitioner has filed the execution application which was within four months",,
from the date of the said foreign award and was prosecuting the same in good faith and with due diligence. The respondent raised an objection about,,
the maintainability of the said application for the first time before the Division Bench and not earlier. In my view, the petitioner has thus made out a",,
case for condonation of delay in filing the petition under Section 47 of the Arbitration Act. The judgment of this Court in case of Noy Vallesina,,
Engineering Spa (supra) assist the case of the petitioner and not the respondent.,,
49. I am not inclined to accept the submission made by learned senior counsel for the respondent that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not",,
be attracted to Arbitration Petition (No.47 of 2015) filed by the petitioner. The petitioner filed the said application based on the interpretation of the,,
judgment of the arbp47-15g Supreme Court in M/s.Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. (supra) and the said proceedings were pending. The Division Bench of,,
this Court did not find the said execution application not maintainable but on the contrary directed that if any application is filed under Section 47 by the,,
petitioner, the same shall be heard along with the said execution application. In my view, there is thus no substance in the submission of learned senior",,
counsel that Section 14 would not be applicable to the facts of this case. I am therefore of the view that the delay in filing the arbitration petition,,
deserves to be condoned. I shall now deal with the submissions made by both the leaned counsel on enforceability of the foreign award.â€,,
(emphasis supplied),,
32. In fact the Court has recognized the clear applicability of the well settled principle of law as laid down in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal,,
Exports Ltd. (supra),,
33. As a sequel to the above discussion, the respondents objection that the petition is required to be held as time barred, cannot be accepted. It is held",,
that the present petition is filed within the prescribed limitation.,,
