S.N. Terdal, J
1. We have heard Mr.Anil Singal, counsel for applicant and Ms. Asiya Khan for Mrs. Rashmi Chopra, counsel for respondents, perused the pleadings
and all the documents produced by both the parties.
2. In this OA, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
“1. To quash and set aside the impugned Show Cause Notice dt.14.9.2012, Order of Punishment dated dt. 26.11.2012 and Appellate order dt.
4.3.2014 with all consequential benefits.
2. To declare Rule 16 (11) of D.P (P&A) Rules as ultra vires to the Provisions of Section 21 of the Delhi Police Act and also ultra vires to the
provisions of Constitution of India.
3. To award costs in favor of the applicant and pass ay order or orders which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem just & equitable in the facts &
circumstances of the case.â€
3. The relevant facts of the case are that a Show Cause Notice (SCN) was issued to the applicant for imposing of minor penalty of “Censure†for
disrespecting and disregarding the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) to appear before him on 7.09.2012. The SCN is as under:
“SHOW CAUSE NOTICEâ€
Hon’ble Court of Sh.Brijesh Kumar Garg, ASJ,KKD Courts, Delhi has observed following lapses on the part of Inspr. Rakesh Kumar, No.
D/3099 SHO/Jyoti Nagar in case FIR No.356/11 u/s 308/324/34 IPC, PS Jyoti Nagar.
1. On 08.08.12, the Ld. ASJ has directed to Inspr.Rakesh Kumar, No.D/3099 to redeposit the weapon of offence at GTB Hospital and to obtain the
expert opinion from the concerned doctors and to submit the supplementary chargesheet in the Court on 23.08.12.
2. On 23.08.12, Inspr. Rakesh Kumar, No. D/3099 does not file the expert opinion of the doctor of GTB Hospital and next date of hearing was fixed
for 07.09.2012.
3. On 07.09.12. Inspr.Rakesh Kumar, No.D/3099 was absent again.
The Hon’ble ASJ, K.K.D Court has taken a serious view and directed to take disciplinary action against him for his willful & deliberate non-
compliance of the Courts Orders.
He is, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why his conduct should not be censured for this lapse. His reply, if any, should reach this office
within 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice failing which it will be presumed that he has nothing to say in his defence and the matter will be
decided ex-parte on merits.â€
4. The applicant did not submit any reply to the SCN, despite issuing four reminders. The disciplinary authority confirmed the SCN and imposed a
penalty of ‘Censure†on the applicant vide order dated 26.11.2012. The appeal filed by the applicant was considered by the appellate authority, and
by a reasoned and speaking order dated 04.03.2014, the appeal was dismissed. The counsel for the applicant has not pleaded violation of any of the
principles of natural justice or violation of any procedural rules in holding of the departmental enquiry.
5. The counsel for the applicant vehemently and strenuously contended that he had complied with the initial orders of the ASJ passed on 8.08.2012
and 23.08.2012 and he has further submitted that he has not shown any disrespect or disobeyed the orders of the ASJ, and as per the orders of the
ASJ he had submitted the charge sheet in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the Metropolitan Magistrate in due course submitted the file in
the Court of ASJ as such he had nothing more to comply with. We have perused the impugned orders and all the annexures produced by the
applicant. The disciplinary authority has considered the allegations and the facts of the case and came to the conclusion that there is respect and
disregard and insubordination on the part of the applicant.
6. The law relating to judicial review by the Tribunal in the departmental enquiries has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
following judgments:
(1). In the case of K.L.Shinde Vs. State of Mysore (1976) 3 SCC 76), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 9 observed as under:-
“9. Regarding the appellant's contention that there was no evidence to substantiate the charge against him, it may be observed that neither the High
Court nor this Court can re-examine and re-assess the evidence in writ proceedings. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence against a delinquent
to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. It may also be observed that departmental proceedings do not
stand on the same footing as criminal prosecutions in which high degree of proof is required. It is true that in the instant case reliance was placed by
the Superintendent of Police on the earlier statements made by the three police constables including Akki from which they resiled but that did not
vitiate the enquiry or the impugned order of dismissal, as departmental proceedings are not governed by strict rules of evidence as contained in the
Evidence Act. That apart, as already stated, copies of the statements made by these constables were furnished to the appellant and he cross-
examined all of them with the help of the police friend provided to him. It is also significant that Akki admitted in the course of his statement that he
did make the former statement before P. S. I. Khada-bazar police station, Belgaum, on November 21, 1961 (which revealed appellant's complicity in
the smuggling activity) but when asked to explain as to why he made that statement, he expressed his inability to do so. The present case is, in our
opinion, covered by a decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, (1963) 2 SCR 943=AIR 1963 SC 375 where it was held as follows:-
Domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of
actions in courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry
from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in court. The only obligation which
the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against who it is to be used
and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but where such an
opportunity has been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure
followed in courts.
2. In respect of taking the evidence in an enquiry before such tribunal, the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is
given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation. When the evidence is oral, normally the explanation of the witness will in its
entirety, take place before the party charged who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called,
the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him ,and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party and he
is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness
word by word and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. They
are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to
the person charged and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine them.
Again in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. UOI & Others (AIR 1996 SC 484) at para 12 and 13, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the
Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to
make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964)
4 SCR 718 : (AIR 1964 SC 364,) this Court held at page 728 (of SCR): (at p 369 of AIR), that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence,
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issuedâ€.
Recently in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. P.Gunasekaran (2015(2) SCC 610), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary
proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and
was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of in conducting the proceedings; natural justice
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e the authorities have allowed themselves to be influence by irrelevant or extraneous consideration;
f the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.â€
7. In view of the facts of the case narrated above and in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court referred to above and in view of the
fact that the counsel for the applicant has not brought to our notice violation of any procedural rules or principles of natural justice, as such the
impugned orders passed by the respondents cannot be interfered with.
8. Accordingly, OA is dismissed. No order as to costs.
