D.S. Sinha, J.@mdashHeard Sri K. P. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners and Sri R. P. Goel, learned Senior Advocate representing the respondents.
2. For effective adjudication and resolution of controversy raised herein, it is expedient to recapitulate the chronology of acts and events constituting undisputed facts which are, as they emerge from the pleadings before the Court, as below.
3. At the relevant time, the petitioners were working as Branch Manager of Moradabad, Zila Sahkari Bank Limited at Moradabad.
4. By three separate orders dated 19th September. 1981. 22nd October, 1981 and 10th December. 1981, the petitioners were suspended pending disciplinary Inquiry against them.
5. The petitioners challenged the suspension before the Industrial Tribunal (II), U. P. at Lucknow.
6. While proceedings against the suspension orders were pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the petitioners were dismissed by three separate orders, two dated 13th May, 1983, and the third dated 23rd April, 1983.
7. The three Writ Petition Nos. 5383 of 1983, 7101 of 1983 and 7094 of 1983 were filed by the petitioners in this Court challenging the said dismissal orders. The Court admitted writ petitions and passed interim orders directing payment to the petitioners subsistence allowance, as payable to them if they were under suspension. Later on, by another order, the Court granted respondents the liberty not to take work from the petitioners.
8. On 30th September, 1985, the Tribunal gave an award setting aside the suspension order passed against the petitioners and directing them to be reinstated with effect from the date of suspension with full back wages and all consequential benefits.
9. On 25th June. 1986, three separate orders, copies whereof are Annexures-8, 9 and 10 to the petitions, were passed. By these orders, the petitioners were informed that in view of the award given by the Tribunal and the order of the ''ADHYAKSH. PRASHASHAK MANDAL'' dated 25th June. 1986, they were reinstated retrospectively from the date of their suspension with full wages and other benefits of service. The order further declared that their dismissal order became ''Nishprabhavi'' (ineffective). The order required the petitioners to assume charge at the Head Office within seven days of the receipt of the order.
10. In pursuance of the order dated 25th June. 1986, aforesaid, the petitioners joined and continued to work till 22nd March. 1995.
11. On 18th August. 1994, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the three writ petitions filed by them challenging their dismissal order stated before the Court that the petitioners had been reinstated by the order dated 25th, June, 1986. Accordingly, the Court held that writ petitions had become infructuous and dismissed them as not pressed. It also vacated the interim orders directing the payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioners.
12. Then, petitioners were served three show cause notices dated 1st October. 1994. Copies of these show cause notices are appended to the petition as Annexures-15, 16 and 17. By these show cause notices the attention of the petitioners was drawn to the factum of dismissal of their writ petitions and vacation of the interim orders, and the alleged consequential revival of the orders dismissing them from service passed in 1983. These show cause notices called upon the petitioners to clarify within 15 days as to why they should not be treated to have been dismissed in view of the dismissal orders passed in 1983.
13. The petitioners filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33240 of 1994 challenging the validity of the show cause notice dated 1st October. 1994. On 19th October, 1994 the learned single Judge of this Court permitted the petitioners to serve respondents personally within six weeks and take requisite steps in that regard. He also stayed the operation of the show cause notices dated 1st October. 1994 until further orders.
14. Apart from challenging the show cause notices dated 1st October, 1994 petitioners had also responded to the show cause notices by filing their reply.
15. It appears that on behalf of the respondents. It was contended before the learned single Judge that instant petition was not congnizable by learned single Judge, and was cognizable by a Division Bench.
16. Accepting the above contention raised on behalf of the respondents, learned single Judge passed the order dated 30th November. 1994 releasing the case and recalling the order dated 19th October. 1994.
17. Thereafter, three orders dated 23rd March, 1995 were passed by the relevant authority holding that in view of dismissal of the writ petitions against their dismissal orders and vacation of Interim order passed therein, the order of their dismissal passed in 1983 revived ; and that there was no force in their reply submitted in answer to the show cause notices. The order finally held that the petitioners stood dismissed from the services of the Bank as per order passed in 1983.
18. Confronted with the above situation the petitioners approached this Court for recalling the order dated 18th August. 1994 holding their writ petitions against dismissal as infructuous and dismissing them as not pressed. The Court vide its order dated 13th September, 1996 recalled the order dated 18th August. 1994. Consequently, the writ petitions challenging the order of dismissal against the petitioners in 1983 have revived and are pending. The petitioners also moved amendment application in Writ Petition No. 33240 of 1994 to challenge the orders dated 23rd March. 1994 holding them dismissed vide order passed in 1983: The amendment application has been, allowed. The writ petition has been amended. Thus, the three orders dated 23rd March, 1995, copies whereof are Annexures-22, 23 and 24 to the petition, are also under challenge. Relying upon the order dated 25th June. 1986 whereby the petitioners were reinstated retrospectively from the date of their suspension and paid full back wages along with other benefits of service and which declared the order of dismissal passed against the petitioners to be ''Nishprabhavi'' (Ineffective), Shri K. P. Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioners, submits that the order of dismissal of the petitioners from service had lapsed and vanished. Therefore, Shri Agarwal submits that the show cause notices dated 1st October. 1994 notifying to the petitioners that the orders dismissing them had revived and calling upon them to clarify as to why they should not be treated to have been dismissed and the orders dated 23rd March. 1995 holding the orders dismissing the petitioners in 1983 to have revived are clearly misconceived and illegal.
19. Countering the submissions of Shri Agarwal. Shri R. P. Goel, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, submits that the order dated 25th June. 1986 did not have the effect of wiping out the orders of dismissal passed against the petitioners. In only put the orders to abeyance. According to him, word ''Nishprabhavi'' used in the order dated 25th June. 1986 means inoperative. Therefore. Shri Goel submits that the authorities did not commit any illegality in either issuing show cause notices dated 1st October, 1994 or in passing the orders dated 23rd March. 1995.
20. In view of the fact that the fall of this petition and other connected petitions hinges on the, real import of the order dated 25th June. 1986 and the correct interpretation of the word. ''Nishprabhavi'' (ineffective) used in the said order, it will be apposite to have a close look at the orders dated 25th June, 1986 which are Annexures-8, 9 and 10 to the writ petition. These orders are identical except that they were addressed to the petitioners separately. One of the orders dated 25th June. 1986 is reproduced below :
21. A bare perusal of the orders dated 25th June. 1986 reveals that these orders were passed in compliance of the award dated 30th September, 1985 given by the Tribunal, a copy of which is Annexure-7 to the petition, and of the order dated 25th June. 1986 passed by the ''ADHYAKSH, PRASHASHAK MANDAL''. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice that the order of the ''ADHYAKSH, PRASHASHAK MANDAL'' dated 25th June, 1986 has not been produced before the Court. In pursuance of the award of the Tribunal and the order of the ''ADHYAKSH, PRASHASHAK MANDAL'', the petitioners were reinstated retrospectively with effect from the date of their suspension with full back wages and other service benefits. The orders do not stop there. In addition to reinstatement of the petitioners with full back wages and other service benefits, the orders declare that the orders dismissing the petitioners, passed in 1983, became automatically ''Nishprabhavi'' (ineffective). Further, the orders required the petitioners to join their post within seven days There is no dispute that the petitioners complied with the orders and Joined the services. It is also not in dispute that they continued to work till 22nd March, 1995, Thus, the orders of dismissal of the petitioners passed in 1983 were not enforced during the period when the petitioners joined their duties in pursuance of the order dated 25th June, 1986 and 23rd March, 1995 when orders were passed holding and declaring the petitioners dismissed from the service on the basis of alleged revival of the dismissal order passed in 1983.
22. The question, therefore, arises whether the orders dated 23rd March, 1995 passed on account of the alleged revival of the dismissal orders of 1983 as a consequence of the dismissal of the writ petition against the dismissal orders dated 18th August. 1994 can be sustained in law?
23. The foundation of the orders dated 18th August. 1994 dismissing the writ petitions against the dismissal orders passed against the petitioners is the statement of their learned counsel that the petitioners had been reinstated by the order dated 25th June, 1986. The Court had held the writ petitions to have become infructuous on the basis of the aforesaid statement of the counsel and dismissed the petitions as not pressed. It also vacated the interim order. A look to the interim order passed in the writ petitions reveals that the dismissal orders were not stayed by the Court. The interim orders only directed for payment to the petitioners of subsistence allowance as payable to them if they were under suspension. This Court had never stayed the operation of the orders dismissing the petitioners. Therefore, dismissal of the writ petitions and vacation of the interim orders could not ipso facto result in reviving of the dismissal orders of the petitioners. For revival of the dismissal orders neither dismissal of the writ petition nor vacation of the interim orders can be held to be valid reason. The petitioners were reinstated to their services retrospectively with effect from the date of suspension in pursuance of the award of the Tribunal and not in pursuance of any order passed by this Court in their writ petitions challenging the order of dismissal. In this view of the matter, the plea of the respondents that dismissal orders passed against the petitioners in the year 1983 revived as a consequence of the dismissal of the writ petitions and vacation of the interim orders passed therein does not hold water.
24. It will be pertinent to note that proceedings before the Tribunal were directed against the orders suspending the petitioners during the pendency of the disciplinary inquiry against them. The award of the Tribunal in the said proceeding held the orders of suspension passed against the petitioners to be illegal. The reinstatement of the petitioners was directed by the Tribunal. As a consequence of holding the suspension orders to be Illegal. But, before delivery of the award by the Tribunal the petitioners had already been dismissed from the service. Therefore, the respondents were under no obligation to reinstate the petitioners as a result of quashing of the suspension orders. The respondents could have, at best, treated the petitioners to be in service during the period between suspension and dismissal, and paid to the petitioners dues admissible to them for that period. So far as the direction for reinstatement is concerned they could have challenged the same by filing the writ petition in this Court. Indisputably, nothing was done for seeking remedy against the direction in the award regarding the reinstatement of the petitioners. On the other hand respondents passed the orders dated 25th June, 1986 reinstating the petitioners and declaring that the orders of dismissal passed against them had become ''Nishprabhavi'' (Ineffective).
25. There is yet another aspect which deserves notice. At no point of time either by the orders dated 25th June, 1986 or by any other means petitioners were notified that their reinstatement of the service was subject to the result of the writ petitions filed by them against the orders of dismissal which were, admittedly, pending at the time of their reinstatement. On the contrary, the petitioners were allowed to continue for about nine years after the reinstatement without any rider. It cannot, therefore, be held that the petitioners were wrong in assuming that their dismissal had lapsed and they were entitled to continue in service until fresh termination of their services in accordance with taw. It is reasonable to believe that on account of their bona fide belief that their dismissal orders had lapsed after their reinstatement in pursuance of the orders dated 25th June, 1986 the counsel for the petitioners made a statement before the Court which led the Court to hold the writ petitions to be infructuous and dismiss the same as not pressed and also to vacate the interim orders vide its order dated 18th August. 1994.
26. It is only after dismissal of the writ petitions against the dismissal orders that the respondents woke up to issue to the petitioners show cause notices dated 1st October, 1994 notifying them that their dismissal orders had revived as a consequence of the dismissal of the writ petitions and called upon them to clarify their stand, and, eventually, by the order dated 23rd March, 1995 held that the dismissal orders against the petitioner had revived, and that the petitioners stood dismissed retrospectively with effect from the date/dates oil which dismissal orders had been passed.
27. In the opinion of the Court, the respondents did not act legally in holding that the dismissal orders against the petitioners passed in the year 1983 had revived and declaring the petitioners dismissed retrospectively with effect from the date/dates on which the dismissal orders were passed in the year 1983. Indeed, the respondents were estopped from doing so. The action is wholly arbitrary and cannot be countenanced.
28. Now the attention may be focused on the word ''Nishprabhavi'' occurring in the orders dated 25th June. 1986. In the Legal Glossary, 1992 published by the Government of India (Law, Justice and Company Affairs) Ministry (Vidhayi Vibhag Raj Bhashakhand) words ''NISHPRABHAVI KARNA'' is stated to mean (1) annul and (2) vacate. Further the words ''NISHPRABHAVI PADRATH'' is stated to mean neutral material. The other expression which is relevant in the context is" ''NISHPRABHAVI KARNA'' which is stated to mean neutralisation. ''NISHPRABHAVI KARNA'' is verb. ''NISHPRABIIAVI'' is adjective. Thus, the word ''NISHPRABHAVI'' would mean annulled or vacated. The word ''NISHPRABHAVI'' is antonym of word ''PRABHAVI''. The root of the word ''PRABHAVI'' is PRABHA which means radiance. Therefore, the word ''PRABHAVI'' would mean radiant and its antonym ''NISHPRABHAVI'' would mean not radiant. ''NISHPRABHAVI'' is also called ''NISHPRABH''. One of the meaning of the word ''NISHPRABH1, as given !n the Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary (1993) published by Oxford University Press, New Delhi, is lifeless. Obviously, the lifeless means dead. According to Shri Goel, learned counsel of the respondents, by the word ''Nishprabhavi'' the respondents meant inoperative. Even if it is taken to be correct that by the word ''Nishprabhavi'' respondents meant inoperative, it cannot be held that by declaring the dismissal orders of the petitioners to be ''Nishprabhavi'' the respondents merely purported to put the dismissal orders in abeyance.
29. In the Legal Glossary, referred to above, the word inoperative has been defined to mean without practical force. The order which is without practical force cannot be enforced. Thus, the declaration in the order dated 25th June. 1986 to the effect that the orders dismissing the petitioners from the service has become ''Nishprabhavi'' has the effect of rendering the dismissal orders lifeless and Incapable of being enforced. Lifeless order cannot be rejuvenated. In the instant case, the orders dismissing the petitioners from service become dead about nine years ago. They cannot be allowed to be so interpreted as to revive after nine years resulting in serious miscarriage of Justice.
30. The reinstatement of the petitioners in the service retrospectively with effect from the date of their suspension with full back wages and other service, benefits, and declaration in the orders dated 25th June, 1986 that dismissal orders against the petitioners passed in the year 1983 had become ''Nishprabhavi'', render the writ petitions challenging the dismissal orders passed in the year 1983 infructuous and liable to be dismissed as such.
31. On the facts and circumstances, and for the reasons given above, the impugned show cause notices dated 1st October. 1994 and the orders dated 23rd March, 1995 cannot be sustained. They must perish.
32. In the result, the Writ Petition Nos. 5383 of 1983. 7101 of 1983 and 7094 of 1983 are held to have become infructuous, and shall stand dismissed accordingly. The Writ Petition No. 33240 of 1994 succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notices dated 1st October, 1994 (Annexures- 15. 16 and 17) and the orders dated 23rd March, 1995 (Annexures-22, 23 and 24) are quashed. The petitioners shall be deemed to be continuing in service, ff any of the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the writ petitions, he shall be deemed to have ever continued in service till the date of superannuation. Further, they would be entitled to all the benefits of service. The parties shall bear their own costs.
