B.L. Yadav, J.@mdashThis petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the Petitioners challenging the order dated 29-4-86 passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation, Meerut Camp at Muzaffarnagar, in a revision filed by the Petitioners u/s 40 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short the Act), and the order dated 31-5-85 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).
2. The facts of the case are that in respect of the land in dispute a case was registered after the commencement of consolidation operation and the same was taken in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who decided the same on 8-7-1964 in favour of contesting Respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The Petitioners did not challenge that order by filing any writ petition or in any other manner. It appears that in pursuance of the order dated 8-7-64 necessary amendments in revenue papers or relevant CH Forms were not made. After some time the consolidation operation in the area was closed and consequently notification u/s 52(1) of the Act was issued just after two years in 1966. After the date of notification u/s 52(1) of the Act, Respondent Nos. 4 & 5 discovered that their names did not appear in the relevant revenue papers and they being advised by a local counsel filed an application u/s 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 with a prayer for correction of the map and papers and also praying that the order dated 8-7-64 may be given effect to in revenue papers. It may be stated that this was actually an application for correction of papers u/s 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and by bonafide mistake it appears that the same was filed u/s 28 of the Act. It appears that in the application Section 28 was quoted so that necessary correction in the map may also be made.
3. The aforesaid application for correction of papers purporting to be u/s 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act was forwarded by the Sub-Divisional Officer to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), who heard the parties and held by the impugned order dt. 21-5-85 that as the village has been denotified u/s 52(1) of the Act, it appears just that in order to give effect to the order dated 8-7-64 passed by the then Deputy Director of Consolidation which became final between the parties in all respects, the dispute may be decided in reference proceedings u/s 48(3) of the Act. A reference accordingly was sought to be made so that the order dated 8-7-64 may be given effect to. Against that order a revision was filed by the present Petitioners which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 29-4-86. It is against these two orders that the present petition has been filed.
4. Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that as the notification u/s 52(1) of the Act has been published, consequently the consolidation operation was closed in the area and there could be no revival of the proceedings u/s 48(3) of the Act nor the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directing the reference to be made was correct and it was open to the contesting Respondents to have sought the effect of the order dated 8-7-64 only by the time the consolidation operations were not closed, and till the notification u/s 52 of the Act was issued. After issuance of the notification u/s 52(1) of the Act the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to pass any order except that an order, passed by the High Court in proceedings which were pending before the consolidation anthorities when the notification u/s 52(1) of the Act was issued, can be given effect to. It appears that the intention of legislature was that only the proceedings which were pending at the time when the notification u/s 52(1) of the Act was issued, the order in those proceedings, even though passed after the issuance of notification u/s 52(1), can be given effect to by the consolidation authorities and no other order can be given effect to. In case the contesting Respondents sought the effect of the order dated 8-7-64, they should have done so only before the issuance of notification u/s 52(1) of the Act and not thereafter. Reliance was placed on Raja Ram v. D.D.C. 1982 AWC 437.
5. Having heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner I am of the view that there are no merits in the writ petition. The first point which requires determination is as to, whether the effect of the order dated 8-7-64 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which became final between the parties in all respects during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings, before the issuance of notification u/s 52(1) of the Act, can be sought to be given effect to by the successful party after the notification u/s 52(1) has been issued. The reply to this argument is not too far to seek. The relevant provisions of the Act coupled with the intention of the legislature in enacting the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has to be ascertained. Under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, unlike the provisions of UP ZA and LR Act, when any order has been passed in favour of any party, its effect has to be given in the relevant revenue papers and in the relevant C.H. Forms by the consolidation authorities themselves. No application to give effect to that order is required. In other words, there is no provision under the Act for the execution of any order under the Act, unlike in a suit filed u/s 9 of the CPC or under the Specific Relief Act or u/s 202 or 203 of U.P. ZA and LR Act.
6. The scheme of the Act and the intention of the legislature has to be ascertained. The U.P. Legislature has enacted U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act with a view to provide for consolidation of agricultural holdings in U.P. and for the development of agriculture. With that object a notification is made u/s 4 and by that the consolidation operation commences in respect of any land, area, or the village. What is the effect of notification u/s 4, has been provided u/s 5. In brief, the duty of maintaining records of rights and preparing village map, field book and annual register is transferred to the consolidation authorities. Any suit or proceeding pending in respect of agricultural land is ordered to abate u/s 5(2)(a) of the Act. Thereafter field book and current annual register is revised u/s 8 and u/s 8-A statement of principles are prepared. u/s 9 the statement from the records are issued and records mentioned under Sections 8, 8-A are published, clerical mistakes are corrected and notices are issued to tenure holders concerned. The objections are invited and they can file objections within 21 days from the date of receipt of such notice. For filing objection u/s 9-A(2), limitation is 21 days.
7. Any person feeling aggrieved with the order u/s 9-A(2) can file appeal u/s 11 and also a revision u/s 48 within the limitation prescribed. Thereafter Provisional Consolidation Scheme is prepared and objections are invited and the same is decided and appeal and revisions follow. New records are prepared u/s 28. The entries in new records are to be deemed as correct unless contrary is proved.
8. The Legislature was conscious in providing limitation of 21 days for filing objection u/s 9(2) after the notices have been issued. Similarly, Rule 111 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules provides 30 days limitation for filing revision. In case the legislature intended that any particular application seeking the effect of an order or for execution has to be moved within certain period that would have been specified. But in the case of seeking effect of an order which has become final between the parties or for correction of papers no limitation has been provided under the Act.
9. In Kamta Prasad v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow 1986 RD 206 Hon''ble K.N. Misra, J. in his usual style of clarity, has held that for moving an application for correction purporting to be u/s 33/39, U.P. Land Revenue Act, there was no limitation. All the provisions of the Limitation Act or different articles providing for filing of different applications and filing of different suits have not been made applicable to consolidation proceedings. u/s 53-B of the Act only Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been made applicable and other provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable.
10. It is not the duty of a Court to fill up any lacunae if there are any in the Act or the Rules. In other words the function of the Court is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and even if there is some omission, or a case of ''Causus Omisus'', in that event also it is not for the Courts to substitute some words or to rectify the mistake, but only to carry out the intention of the Legislature in the words expressed. The jurisdiction of a Court is just to interpret and not to legislate. It would not be out of place to mention an observation in Gladstone v. Bower (1960) 3 All Eng. R 353, to the following effect:
The Court will always let the intention of a statute to override the defects of wording. But the Court''s ability to do so is limited by recognized canons of interpretation. The Court may, for example, prefer an alternative construction which is less well fitted to the words but better fitted to the intention of the Act.
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So we see that the primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to so interpret the statute as to promote/advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language.
12. It is, thus, clear that the intention of the Legislature was that if an order has to be passed by a particular consolidation authority, it has to be given effect to in revenue papers and if the same has not been given effect to by either side, in that event the successful party should not suffer. There is a maxim ''Actus Curae Neminem Gravabit'', which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. It is, thus, clear that once an order was passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in favour of the contesting Respondents, which became final and if the consolidation authorities failed to carry out that order or to give effect in the revenue papers, it is not for the contesting Respondents to suffer. Further that order could have been given effect to during the consolidation operations by making an application for correction of papers and even after the close of the consolidation operation. The application for correction of papers, even if moved by the contesting Respondents, for which there was no limitation provided, it could not be said that application became time barred. In case the Petitioners have any grievance they could have challenged the order dated 8-7-64. But they did not do so. Now there is no justification on their part to object to the application for correction of papers moved on behalf of the successful party. In case there would have been any limitation provided for application for correction of papers, the Petitioners would have been justified in raising the objection. But as there was no limitation provided for that application, it can be moved either during the consolidation operations or after the close of consolidation operation. Even during the consolidation operation the Legislature did not require the successful party to make an application for execution for seeking effect to a particular order. It was for the consolidation authorities to carry out the effect of the order passed in favonr of a party.
13. The scope for reference has not been defined u/s 48(3). It has been left to the discretion of the Court. There is no denying the fact that where grounds have not been stated in the text the task of a court becomes heavier. In this connection it is better to quote an observation in C.K. Allen''s Law. In the Making, (6th Edn.) at page 1292 as follows:
The Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. His decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers ''ad rem.'' Even purely unofficial practice may be prayed in aid as precedent to interpret documents (or statute). If the matter is governed by the clear and unambiguous prevision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many cases, no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable it is frequently the reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning or by use of examples or by rules of natural reason and discretion.
14. There is no limitation provided for making application for a reference nor there is any condition laid down u/s 48(3) beyond which the reference cannot be preferred by any subordinate consolidation authorities. The only requirement of Section 48(3) of the Act was that after hearing the parties concerned a reference can be made to the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding any order u/s 48(1) i.e. to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of an order. In the instant case I don''t think there could be any better case for "propriety of an order". Where an order between the parties has become final and the same was not given effect to in the revenue papers, then the intention of the Legislature was that such order passed in favour of any party has to be given effect to by the consolidation authorities and there was no necessity for making any application for execution of that order. Under these circumstances, even if after the close of consolidation operation an application for correction of papers was moved seeking effect of the order which became final, the prayer in that application could be granted only by making a reference, particularly when the consolidation authorities were actually functioning in the area as provided under Rule 109-A. In case the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not functioning in the area or in the District, his power would then be exercised by the Assistant Collector or some other appropriate revenue authority. But as in the instant case the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directed the Consolidation Officer to submit a reference purporting to be a reference u/s 48(3) of the Act, I don''t find that there was any mistake or error in that order. The Deputy Director of Consolidation was justified in rejecting the revision against that order preferred by the present Petitioners.
15. As regards the case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C. (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, suffice it to say that in that case a suit for partition was pending between the parties at the time of application u/s 109-A was filed and in that circumstances this Court took the view that the parties can press their claim in the partition suit and Section 49 of the Act would not apply. In the instant case the application for correction of papers was correctly moved by the contesting Respondents seeking effect of the order dated 8-7-1964 which had become final and it was the duty of consolidation authorities to have given effect to that order when the consolidation operation was not closed in the area by issuing a notification u/s 52(1) of the Act. But as the application was made by the contesting Respondents, 1 am of the view that the ends of justice requires that that application should be allowed by making a reference u/s 48(3) of the Act. Further the aforesaid case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C. (supra), appears to be based on particular facts of that case and with profound regards 1 have to say that that case law is not the whole law, but is governed by the facts of a particular case. In this connection I am reminded of an observation made by Lord Macmillan, who was a distinguished Judge of his time, in Berch v. Brown (1931) AC 631, to the effect that "precedent should be stepping stones and not halting places".
16. It is pertinent to mention an observation by Earl of Halsbury L.C. in Quinn v. Leatham (1890) ACC 495 as follows:
Now before discussing the case of Allah v. Flood (1889) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character, which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expression which may be found, they are not intended to be exposition of whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case on which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for which it actually decided. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.
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Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament nor can we read a judgment on a particular aspect of a question as a Holy Book covering all aspects of every question, whether such questions of facts arose for consideration or not in that case.
18. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directing the Consolidation Officer to submit a report u/s 48(3) does not suffer from any mistake or error, much less an error apparent on the fax of record. I am accordingly of the view that there are no merits in the writ petition and the same deserves to be dismissed.
19. The writ petition accordingly fails and it is hereby dismissed.
