1. The petitioner filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition under the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(‘the Act’ for short) for appointment of the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties, in terms of Clause-25 of the Joint
Development Agreement (‘JDA’ for short) dated 30.3.2009 entered into between the parties as per Annexure-H.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
2. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 2004, Mantri Developers Private Limited entered into Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’)
with the petitioner for development of the schedule property excluding Sy. No. 1B at Jakkur Plantation Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North
Taluk, Bangalore. However, Mantri Developers Private Limited was unable to implement the terms of the MoU and failed to commence the
development of the property. On 9.1.2006 M/s Abhishek Developers, a partnership firm and a sister concern of Mantri Developers Private Limited
entered into a Joint Development Agreement (‘JDA’ for short) dated 09.01.2006 and General Power of Attorney dated 09.01.2006 for the
development of the schedule property excluding Sy. No.1B at Jakkur Plantation Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore. The
said partnership firm and the petitioner entered into a registered Supplemental JDA dated 14.12.2006 and power of Attorney dated 14.12.2006,
wherein Survey No.1B, Block 41 situated at Jakkur Plantation Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, ad measuring 1 Acre was included
for development.
3. It is further case of the petitioner that the said Abhishek Developers failed to commence development work within six months of execution of the
2006 JDA and the 2006 Supplemental JDA as stipulated in the said agreements. Therefore the petitioner issued a letter on 2.6.2008 to Abhishek
Partnership firm rejecting the untenable reasons assigned by the said firm for the delay in commencement of development work and brought to the
notice of the said firm that delay has resulted in adverse financial implications upon the petitioner. Considering the failure in commencing the
development of the Schedule property, the petitioner was constrained to revoke the Powers of Attorney dated 09.01.2006 and 14.12.2006 as per Deed
of Revocation dated 20.06.2008.
4. It is further contended that considering the subsequent representations of M/s Abhishek Developers that they were capable of executing the
development of the Schedule Property as envisaged, the petitioner entered into a Supplemental JDA dated 26.12.2008 and power of Attorney dated
26.12.2008 with the said firm for development of the Schedule Property. Inspite of the same, the said firm failed to commence development of the
Schedule Property in accordance with the terms of the Supplemental JDA dated 26.12.2008. Thereafter, M/s Abhishek Developers requested that it
be permitted to nominate its affiliate, the respondent herein, to develop the Schedule Property, to which the Petitioner acceded. Accordingly, the
petitioner and respondent entered into a JDA dated 30.03.2009 for development of the schedule property.
 As per the terms of the JDA dated 30.3.2009, the Respondent has to complete development of the schedule property and obtain completion
certificate within 3 years from 26.12.2008 i.e., by 26.12.2011. The Respondent failed to commence the development of the Schedule Property within
the stipulated time stated supra and from 6.1.2012 to 21.12.2012 the respondent illegally created an equitable mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds
of the Schedule Property with Indian Overseas Bank for Rs.100,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Hundred Crores) as per Memorandum of Deposit of Title
Deeds dated 21.01.2012 (’Mortgage Deed’). The Credit Sanction letter dated 06.01.2012 issued by the bank for the said mortgage evidences
that the monies from the mortgage were diverted to the Respondent’s sister concern i.e., M/s Mantri Developers Private Limited and utilized for
development of alternate projects. The petitioner issued number of letters to the respondent in the year 2004 bringing to its attention the delay in
completing the development of the schedule property. On 19.5.2017 the petitioner addressed a detailed letter to the Respondent bringing to its attention
the history of the transaction and its failure to develop the Schedule Property as envisaged in terms of JDA dated 30.3.2009 and calling upon them to
complete the project within 12 months from the date of the letter. On the same day, the respondent gave its reply giving untenable reasons for its
failure to develop the Schedule Property till date and did not mention whether it would execute the development within the time stipulated in the
petitioner’s letter.
5. It is further case of the petitioner that on 7.6.2017 it issued one more letter bringing to the notice of the respondent illegal mortgage of the Schedule
Property and sought an explanation for the same. On the same day, the respondent gave reply providing untenable explanations for its illegal activities.
Therefore the petitioner was constrained to file A.A.No.368/2017 on 12.10.2017 before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru seeking an ad interim order of
injunction against the respondent. The trial Court granted an ad interim order of injunction on the same day and the same continued to be in force.
Thereafter on 29.12.2017 the Petitioner issued arbitral legal notice for appointment of Arbitrator under Clause 25 of the JDA dated 30.3.2009 entered
into between the parties. On 11.1.2018, the respondent issued untenable reply denying the petitioner’s claims. Hence the petitioner is before this
Court for the reliefs sought for.
II. OBJECTIONS FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
6. The respondent filed the statement of objections mainly contending that the petition is not maintainable and the petitioner has wantonly mis-
described the respondent - Mantri Promoters, which is now a company registered under the Indian Companies Act and operates under the name and
style of Jakkur Promoters Private Limited (‘JPPL’ for short) and the array of parties being wrong, the petition is liable to be dismissed for mis-
joinder of parties. It is further contended that there are criminal proceedings pending between the parties. Further, the clause relied upon by the
petitioner provides for a panel of arbitrators contrary to the claim of the petitioner for a sole Arbitrator. The respondent further contended that the
agreement between the parties continued to be in force and the petitioner is abusing the process of law and Courts to pressurize JPPL. The petitioner
has suppressed the material facts. It is further contended that M/s Mantri Promoters does no longer exist as a partnership firm as described in the
cause title of the petition and knowing fully well that Mantri Promoters now being Jakkur Promoters Private Limited, in terms of the letter dated
12.10.2017, still the petitioner impleaded the Mantri Promoters. It is further contended that the Mantri Promoters has been registered under the
Companies Act, now known as Jakkur Promoters Private Limited. Therefore the petition against Mantri Promoters is not maintainable. In fact in the
reply to the notice nominating an arbitrator, JPPL by its letter dated 11.1.2018 had categorically stated about registration of Mantri Promoters as
Jakkur Promoters Private Limited and inspite of which, the present petition has been filed against the Mantri Promoters and the same is not
maintainable. Therefore respondent sought for dismissal of the petition.
III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
8. Sri Srinivasa Raghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the averments made in the petition contended that the existence of the JDA
dated 30.3.2009 and existence of the Arbitration Clause i.e, Clause-25 in the JDA is not in dispute. The petitioner issued legal notice as contemplated
under the provisions of Section 11(5) of the Act. He would further contend that even the respondent filed Criminal Petition No.8203/2017 under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the name of ‘M/s Mantri Promoters’ against the petitioner in the month of October-2017. He
also contended that in the reply dated 11.1.2018 given by the respondent to the notice issued by the petitioner, the respondent has not taken any
contention with regard to fraud and also not arbitrable. Therefore the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for in the petition.
9. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments:
1. (2017)9 SCC 729 {DURO FELGUERA S.A. v. GANGAVARAM PORT LTD., … Paragraphs 14, 17, 18, 19, 48 and 59}.
2. (2009)7 SCC 545 {SIME DARBY ENGINEERING SDN. BHD vs. ENGINEERS INDIA LIMITED … paragraphs 23, 24, 26 and 27.
3. Judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Arbitration Petition No.22/2016 decided on 19.10.2016 {PICASSO DIGITAL MEDIA PVT. LTD., vs.
PICK-A- CENT CONSULTANCY SERVICE PVT. LTD…. Paragraphs 4 and 5 }
4. Judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Arbitration Petition No.9/2015 decided on 10.1.2018 {PADMINI CHANDRAN MENON vs. VIJAY
CHANDRAN MENON AND OTHERS … paragraphs 24, 29, 46 and 48}
10. Per contra, Sri Suraj Govindraraj, learned counsel for the respondent reiterating the averments made in the statement of objections contended that
the petitioner has not followed the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of Section 11(5) of the Act by issuing arbitral legal notice to the
JPPL. He would further contend that under Clause-25 of the JDA dated 30.3.2009, the dispute has to be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal and
therefore the sole Arbitrator cannot be appointed. Further, there are serious allegations of fraud. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any relief
before this Court under the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Act.
11. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following Judgments:
1. (2010)1 SCC 72 {N. RADHAKRISHNAN vs. MAESTRO ENGINEERS AND OTHERS}
2. (2016)10 SCC 386 {A. AYYASAMY vs. A.PARAMASIVAM AND OTHERS}
3. (2017)10 SCC 706 { HIMANGNI ENTERPRISES vs.KAMALJEET SINGH AHLUWALIA}
4. (2011)5 SCC 532 {BOOZ ALLEN AND HAMILTON INC. vs. SBI HOME FINANCE LIMITED AND OTHERS}
5. 2018 SCC OnLine SC 487 {AMEET LALCHAND SHAH AND OTHERS vs. RISHABH ENTERPRISES AND ANOTHER}
6. Judgment of the High Court of Delhi in 2017 SCC OnLine Del. 11036 {M/s KR IMPEX vs. M/s PUNJ LIOYD LIMITED}
IV. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION
12. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the only point that arises for consideration in the present
Civil Miscellaneous Petition is:
Whether the petitioner has made out a case to refer the matter for arbitration under the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996?
V. CLAUSE-25 OF THE JDA DATED 30.3.2009
13. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the petitioner and the respondent have entered into JDA dated 30.3.2009. Clause 25 of the said JDA
reads as under:
25. ARBITRATION:
The parties hereto agree that in the event of there being any disputes with regards to this Agreement or interpretation of any of the terms Agreement,
the same shall be referred to the Arbitration in terms hereof:
Arbitration shall be conducted as follows:
a) All proceedings in any arbitration shall be conducted in English;
b) The arbitration award shall be final and binding on the parties, and the Parties agree to be bound thereby and to act accordingly;
c) The arbitral tribunal may by unanimous agreement, award to a party that substantially prevails on the merits its costs and reasonable expenses
(including reasonable fees of its counsel;
d) Seat of such arbitration tribunal shall be at Bangalore;
e) The Arbitration Proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
VI. REGARDING COMPLIANCE OF SECTION
11(5) OF THE ACT
14. It is not in dispute that the parties to the JDA i.e., the petitioner, respondent and M/s Abhishek Developers, the authorized signatory of the
respondent have duly signed the said registered document as contemplated under the provisions of Section-7 of the Act. The respondent filed
objections and seriously contended that the petitioner has not followed the procedure by issuing the legal notice to the JPPL knowing fully well that the
respondent â€" M/s Mantri Promoters operates under the name and style of JPPL. The same cannot be accepted on going through the reply dated
11.1.2018 issued by the respondent himself to the petitioner’s notice. At the top of the reply dated 11.1.2018, it is mentioned as “mantri†and
at the bottom of the reply notice it is mentioned as “Jakkur Promoters Pvt. Ltd., CIN: U70100KA2017PTC1058212; Mantri House, 41, Vittal
Mallya Road, Bangalore-560 001â€. Further in the reply, it is stated that “Even the present notice has been addressed to the said non-existent
“Mantri Promotersâ€. However, since it has been received at our address and we are concerned with the subject matter of the notice we are
addressing this reply lest it be contended that no reply has been issuedâ€. In the reply, it is also stated that “a perusal of clause 25(c) which
requires an award to be passed by unanimous agreement, which essentially means, indicates and establishes that the tribunal shall comprise of more
than one arbitrator. The interpretation now sought to be given by your client that the arbitration is by sole arbitrator is one more example of the long
line of wrong interpretation given by your client and contentions raised by your clientâ€. It is also stated in the reply that at the most, the petitioner can
nominate one person as its nominee arbitrator and not as a sole Arbitrator. Therefore it clearly indicates that the petitioner has complied the provisions
of Section 11(5) of the Act.
15. It is also relevant to state at this stage that the very respondent â€" M/s Mantri Promoters now known as M/s ‘Jakkur Promoters Private
Limited’ filed Criminal Petition NO.8203/2017 in the month of October-2017 against the present petitioner and the State under Section 482 of
Code of Criminal Procedure and has given its address as “ Mantri House, No.41, Vittal Mallya Road, Bangalore-560001, represented by its
Authorized Signatory Mr. Ravishankar B.S. That is the address given in the present Petition. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the
respondent that the petitioner has not complied the provisions of Section 11(5) of the Act against the JPPL, cannot be accepted.
VII. REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND EXISTENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
16. Insofar as the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that there are serious allegations of fraud and the dispute cannot be
referred to arbitration, the same cannot be accepted in view of the fact that very respondent in the affidavit filed in support of the application under
Section 9 r/w Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate the interim order passed by the trial Court in Arbitration Application No.368/2017,
has specifically stated at paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:
13. I say and submit and during the subsistence of the JDA and the PoA, none of the actions authorized under the JDA and PoA can be curtailed by
the Petitioner. Admittedly, all the allegations made by the petitioner are required to be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal to be appointed. This
Hon’ble Court is only concerned as regards protecting the subject matter of the agreement which contains the arbitral clause. With respect, it is
submitted that the subject matter of the JDA is development of the schedule property and sale/lease of the development which would include
alienating, disposing, dealing with, encumbering or parting with or creating any third party rights including but not limited to an agreement of sale, sale
deed, mortgage, deed, charge, encumbrance etc., There cannot be an injunction sought for by one of the parties to the JDA which goes against the
subject matter of the JDA. Hence, the ex parte injunction order obtained by the Petitioner being contrary to the terms of the JDA/PoA is required to
be vacated.
14. In view of the injunction order being contrary to the JDA it is required to be vacated to enable the Respondent to act in terms of the JDA. The
vacating of the ex parte order of injunction will not cause any loss, harm, injury or injustice to the Petitioner. All the disputes and matters which have
been raised by the Petitioner are disputed by the Respondent and can only be adjudicated during the trial by the Arbitral Tribunal yet to be appointed
and cannot be done so in a summary proceedings of the present nature.
17. On careful perusal of the above averments made by the respondent in the affidavit filed in support of the application for vacating the interim order
passed in AA No.368/2017, it clearly depicts that the respondent has admitted in categorical terms that all the allegations made by the petitioner are
required to be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal to be appointed and all the disputes and matters which have been raised by the petitioner are disputed
by the respondent and can only be adjudicated during the trial by the Arbitral Tribunal yet to be appointed and cannot be done so in a summary
proceedings of the present nature. Therefore primafacie the respondent has admitted the existence of arbitration clause i.e, Clause 25 in the JDA
dated 30.3.2009 entered into between the parties. Further, it is also relevant to state that in the reply notice dated 11.1.2018, the respondent has not
taken any contention with regard to the fraud and that the dispute cannot be referred to arbitrator. In view of the above, the contention of the
respondent that there are serious allegations of fraud and the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration, cannot be accepted.
VIII. JUDGEMENTS RELIED UPON AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
18. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Radhakrishna cited supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered the provisions of Sections 5,8 and 27 of the Act and the facts of the said case and the facts of the present case are entirely different and
the said judgment is not applicable to the present case. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of N.
Radhakrishnan has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A. AYYASAMY vs. A. PARAMASIVAM AND OTHERS
{(2016)10 SCC 386), wherein at paragraph-18, it is held as under:
18. When the case involves serious allegations of fraud, the dicta contained in the aforesaid judgments would be understandable. However, at the
same time, mere allegation of fraud in the pleadings by one party against the other cannot be a ground to hold that the matter is incapable of settlement
by arbitration and should be decided by the civil court. The allegations of fraud should be such that not only these allegations are serious that in normal
course these may even constitute criminal offence, they are also complex in nature and the decision on these issues demand extensive evidence for
which civil court should appear to be more appropriate forum than the Arbitral Tribunal. Otherwise, it may become a convenient mode of avoiding the
process of arbitration by simply using the device of making allegations of fraud and pleading that issue of fraud needs to be decided by the civil court.
The judgment in N. Radhakrishnan does not touch upon this aspect and said decision is rendered after finding that allegations of fraud were of serious
nature.
19. It is also relevant to state at this stage that the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the nature and scope of Sections 11 and 8 of the Act
in the case of BOOZ ALLEN AND HAMILTON INC. vs. SBI HOME FINANCE LIMITED AND OTHERS reported in (2011)5 SCC 532 has
specifically held at paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 as under:
32. The nature and scope of issues arising for consideration in an application under section 11 of the Act for appointment of arbitrators, are far
narrower than those arising in an application under section 8 of the Act, seeking reference of the parties to a suit to arbitration. While considering an
application under section 11 of the Act, the Chief Justice or his designate would not embark upon an examination of the issue of `arbitrability' or
appropriateness of adjudication by a private forum, once he finds that there was an arbitration agreement between or among the parties, and would
leave the issue of arbitrability for the decision of the arbitral Tribunal. If the arbitrator wrongly holds that the dispute is arbitrable, the aggrieved party
will have to challenge the award by filing an application under section 34 of the Act, relying upon sub-section 2(b)(i) of that section.
33. But where the issue of `arbitrability' arises in the context of an application under section 8 of the Act in a pending suit, all aspects of arbitrability
have to be decided by the court seized of the suit, and cannot be left to the decision of the Arbitrator. Even if there is an arbitration agreement
between the parties, and even if the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, the court where the civil suit is pending, will refuse an application
under Section 8 of the Act, to refer the parties to arbitration, if the subject matter of the suit is capable of adjudication only by a public forum or the
relief claimed can only be granted by a special court or Tribunal.
34. The term `arbitrability' has different meanings in different contexts. The three facets of arbitrability, relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal, are as under :
(i) whether the disputes are capable of adjudication and settlement by arbitration? That is, whether the disputes, having regard to their nature, could be
resolved by a private forum chosen by the parties (the arbitral tribunal) or whether they would exclusively fall within the domain of public fora
(courts).
(ii) Whether the disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement? That is, whether the disputes are enumerated or described in the arbitration
agreement as matters to be decided by arbitration or whether the disputes fall under the `excepted matters' excluded from the purview of the
arbitration agreement.
(iii) Whether the parties have referred the disputes to arbitration? That is, whether the disputes fall under the scope of the submission to the arbitral
tribunal, or whether they do not arise out of the statement of claim and the counter claim filed before the arbitral tribunal. A dispute, even if it is
capable of being decided by arbitration and falling within the scope of arbitration agreement, will not be `arbitrable' if it is not enumerated in the joint
list of disputes referred to arbitration, or in the absence of such joint list of disputes, does not form part of the disputes raised in the pleadings before
the arbitral tribunal.
20. The provisions of sub-section 6A of Section 11 of the Act after amendment w.e.f 23.10.2015 has brought substantial changes in the Act. As per
the amended provisions of sub-section 6A of Section 11 of the Act, the power of the Court is confined only to examine the existence of an arbitration
agreement. Further as per sub-section (7) of Section 11 of the Act, the decision of appointment of an arbitrator is made by Hon’ble Supreme
Court or the High Court instead of Chief Justice and no appeal lies against such decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the
provisions of sub-sections 6 and 6A of Section 11 of the Act in the case of DURO FELGUERA S.A. vs. GANGAVARAM PORT LIMITED
reported in (2017) 9 SCC 729 held at paragraphs 48 and 59 as under:
48. Section 11(6A) added by the 2015 Amendment, reads as follows:
“11(6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or
sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement.â€
From a reading of Section 11(6A), the intention of the legislature is crystal clear i.e. the Court should and need only look into one aspect- the existence
of an arbitration agreement. What are the factors for deciding as to whether there is an arbitration agreement is the next question. The resolution to
that is simple - it needs to be seen if the agreement contains a clause which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen
between the parties to the agreement.
59. The scope of the power under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act was considerably wide in view of the decision in SBP and Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd.
{(2005)8 SCC 618} and National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Baghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., {(2009)1 SCC 267}. This position continued till the amendment
brought about in 2015. After the amendment, all that the courts need to see is whether an arbitration agreement exists â€" nothing more, nothing less.
The legislative policy and purpose is essentially to minimize the Court’s intervention at the stage of appointing the arbitrator and this intention as
incorporated in Section 11(6-A) ought to be respected.
IX. REGARDING DEFINITION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
21. The ‘Arbitral Tribunal’ as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act means “a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitratorsâ€. Section 10 of the
Act reads as under:
10. Number of arbitrators:- (1) The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such number shall not be an even number.
(2) Failing the determination referred to in sub-section (1), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.
22. As per Clause 25(c) of the JDA dated 30.3.2009, the Arbitral Tribunal may by unanimous agreement, award to a party that substantially prevails
on the merits, its costs and reasonable expenses (including reasonable fees of its counsel). Admittedly in the present case, there is no unanimous
decision in view of the controversy between the parties and the arbitration clause 25 of the JDA dated 30.3.2009 is silent as to the number of
arbitrators. The said clause read with sub-section 2 of Section 10 of the Act makes it clear that the Arbitral Tribunal in the instant case would
consist of a sole Arbitrator. My view is fortified by the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SIME DARBY ENGINEERING
SDN. BHD. vs. ENGINEERS INDIA LIMITED reported in (2009)7 SCC 545 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the
provisions of Sections 2(1)(d) and 11 of the Act, held at paragraphs 21 and 23 as under:
21. The Arbitration Tribunal as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act means ""a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators"". Section 10(2) of the Act is
very relevant in order to resolve the controversy in this case in as much as Section 10(2) makes it very clear where the number of arbitrator is not
determined, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator. In this connection if UNCITRAL rules are referred the position will remain the same.
UNCITRAL model law on International Commercial Arbitration also accepts the same definition of Arbitration Tribunal in Article 2(b). Article 10 of
those rules is almost identical with Section 10 of the said Act.
23. Section 10 deviates from Article 10 of the UNCITRAL law only in the sense that Section 10(1) of the Act provides that despite the freedom given
to the parties to determine the number of arbitrators such numbers shall not be even number. But in default of determination of the number, Section
10(2) provides the tribunal is to consist of a sole arbitrator. Therefore, scheme of Section 10(2) of the Act is virtually similar to Article 10.2 of the
UNCITRAL model law.
X. CONCLUSION
23. The material on record clearly depicts that there is no dispute with regard to existence of JDA dated 30.3.2009 as well as existence of the
arbitration clause i.e., clause 25 in the said JDA entered into between the parties and the petitioner has complied the provisions of Section 11(5) of the
Act by issuing the legal notice.
24. For the reasons stated above, the point raised in the petition has to be answered in the affirmative holding that the petitioner has made out a case
to refer the matter for arbitration under the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
25. In view of the above, the Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed. Hon’ble Sri Justice Ashok B. Hinchigeri, former Judge of this Court is
appointed as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes, in terms of Clause-25 of the Joint Development Agreement dated 30.3.2009 as per
Annexure-H entered into between the parties, in accordance with law. Registry is directed to send copy of this order to Hon’ble Sri Justice Ashok
B. Hinchigeri, former Judge of this Court as well as to the Arbitration Centre for intimation forthwith.
