1. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.
2. By means of this writ petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order dated 22nd June, 1989, passed by the Cane Commissioner/Registrar, Cooperative Societies, by which an interim committee of Management has been appointed.
3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has made two submissions before us. His first submission is that, in fact, the case of the Petitioner falls under Rule 434 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968, but the order has been passed under Rule 435 of the said Rules and, as such, the exercise of power by the Authority under Rule 435 is beyond jurisdiction making the order void in law. His second submission is that the Registrar could nominate an interim Committee of Management for the Petitioner society only on the date when the society was registered and not there after.
4. Rules 434 and 435 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968, which are relevant for the purposes of this petition, are quoted below:
434. In case a new cooperative society has been formed by amalgamation of two or more cooperative societies, the Registrar, while registering the new society and its bye-laws shall also nominate an interim committee of Management to perform the duties of its office until a regular committee of Management is constituted in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the Society:
Provided that the interim committee shall be so constituted that as far as may be, all amalgamating societies may have their due representation on such committee
435. Where a co-operative society is divided into two or more societies, the Registrar, while registering the new societies and the bye-laws thereof, shall also nominate interim Committee of Management for each such society. The interim committee of a Society shall function till the regular committee of vianagement of the society is constituted in accordance with the rules and the bye-laws of the society.
5. In regard to the first submission, it is now settled law that when an Authority makes an order, which is otherwise within its competence, it cannot fall merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision of law if it can be shown to be within its powers under any other provision ; a wrong label cannot vitiate an order which is otherwise within the power of the authority to make. See
6. It is not disputed that the order would be a valid order if passed under Rule 434. The argument of the learned Counsel is based simply on the ground that in the order, a wrong rule has been quoted. The submission is that the power could not be exercised under Rule 435, but under Rule 434. We do not find any force in the first submission of the learned Counsel.
7. In regard to the second submission, the argument of the learned Counsel is that under Rule 434 or under Rule 435, the order could be passed nominating an interim committee of Management only on the date when the society was directed to be registered and not on any subsequent date. In support of this submission, he relies upon the expression "while registering the new society" used in Rule 434 & 435. His submission is that this expression indicates that the Registrar has the power to nominate an interim committee only on the date when he registers the society and not on a subsequent date.
8. On a reading of Rules 434 and 435, it is clear that these rules empower the Registrar to nominate an interim committee till a regular committee of Management of the society is constituted. In our opinion, the interpretation put by the learned Counsel on the expression "While registering the new society" cannot be accepted. This expression would empower the Registrar to either nominate an interim committee on the date he orders registration, but he can also nominate an interim committee subsequent to the date of registration, but such nomination can be made only till a regular committee of management of the society is constituted.
9. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the regular committee of Management of the society has not been constituted. The society was registered only on 28th April, 1989, and the impugned order has been passed within two months from the date of registration of the society, before a regular committee of Management had been elected. In the circumstances, we do not find any force in the second submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner.
10. In the result, we do not find any manifest error in the impugned order. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.
