M. Katju, J.@mdashHeard learned Counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner is challenging the Transfer Order dated 19.12.2002.
2. In our opinion this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two grounds. Firstly, transfer is an exigency of service and the Court cannot ordinarily interfere with a Transfer Order. Secondly, the writ petition has been filed against a private company i.e., Samtal Color Ltd. Ordinarily no writ lies against a private body except a writ of habeas corpus.
3. No doubt the language of Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide. Article 226 states :-
"226. (1) Notwithstanding, anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights covered by Part-Ill and for any other purposes."
4. A perusal of Article 226(1) shows that it is mentioned therein that the High Court can issue writs to any person for enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. If a literal interpretation is given to Article 226(1) it will follow that the scope of Article 226 is very wide, and writs can be issued to any person i.e., writs can even be issued to private bodies of individuals, and for any purpose whatsoever e.g., for granting divorces, holdings in criminal trials, etc. However, by judicial interpretation narrower interpretation has been given to Article 226.
5. The correct interpretation of Article 226 is that a writ can be issued to the person to whom, and for the purpose for which writs were traditionally issued by British Courts on well established principles. No doubt the powers of the Indian High Courts, under Article 226 are wider than those of the British Courts as held by the Supreme Court in
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision in
7. We find no merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Merely because there are statutory rules governing the services of the petitioner, it does not mean that the respondent-Company is an instrumentality of the State. If the plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted then logically it will have to be held that a writ can be issued against a private factory owner since every factory is governed by statutory rules, e.g., the Factories Act, Industrial Disputes Act. etc. Such a view cannot be countenanced. It is in very exceptional cases, where a public duty is imposed upon the person concerned that a writ can be issued to him. No such public duty has been shown to exist in the present case.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the petitioner has no other remedy except to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, assuming that there is no other remedy, yet this does not entitle the High Court to issue a writ in a case, where a writ petition is not maintainable at all.
9. There is no merit in this petition and it is dismissed.