Shishir Kumar, J.@mdashBy means of this writ petition the petitioner-State has approached this Court for quashing the orders dated 23.8.1995
passed by respondent No. 1, Annexure-4 to the writ petition and order dated 11.4.1994 passed by respondent No. 2, Anneuxre-3 to the writ
petition.
2. The facts as stated by the petitioner in the present writ petition are that proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act
(for short the Act) were initiated against respondent No. 3 and a notice u/s \0 (2) of the Act was given on 19.8.1991 proposing an area of 30.7.4
Bighas of land as surplus. An objection was filed by respondent No. 3 stating therein that Chak No. 29 belongs to Thakur Ji Laxmi Narain and the
land of Khata No. 69 belongs to Khata of Mahavir Ji, therefore, clubbing the aforesaid land in the Khata of holding of respondent is illegal and that
'' cannot be done. Respondent No. 3 is only manager of the trust in the name of Thakur Laxmi Maharaj and Mahavir Ji. It was also stated in the
objection filed by respondent No. 3 that in the year 1975, the respondent received a notice as manager of trust. A case was initiated which was
numbered as Case No. 64 of 1975. The matter was decided against respondent by the Prescribed Authority. Then an appeal was preferred which
was allowed vide its order dated 30.3.1977 and the notice was discharged.
3. The Prescribed Authority on the basis of the objection decided the case vide order dated 11.4.1994 holding therein that as the second notice is
not maintainable and the matter has already been finalised, therefore, the notice given subsequently is hereby discharged and the objection of
respondent No. 3 was allowed. The said order was passed on 11.4.1994. The petitioner aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed an appeal before
the Commiissioner, Varansi Division and the appeal has been dismissed. Hence the present writ petition.
4. The learned Standing Counsel submits that the points raised on behalf of the petitioner has not been considered by both the courts below and
the appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected on the ground that the subsequent notice is not maintainable. A finding to this effect has been
recorded by the appellate authority that proceeding has become final is not correct.
5. On the other hand learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 has submitted that authorities below has considered each and every aspect of the
matter and has recorded a finding that as the proceeding has already been finalised by order dated 30.3.1977, therefore, the second notice u/s 10
of the Act itself is barred by the principles of res-judicata and the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority has recorded a finding to
this effect after considering the various points and the decision Learned Counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon a judgment of
this Court reported in Lady Parassan Kaur Charitable Educational Trust Society Vs. State of U.P. and others, . Placing reliance upon the aforesaid
judgment learned Counsel for the respondent submits that as in the earlier proceedings under the Ceiling Act it has been decided that the property
is of Charitable Trust and has become final between the parties, therefore, giving a second notice operates as res-judicata and it has been held by
this Court that the same is bad in law. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this Court reported in 2002 (93), R.D. 702 Asghar
Abbas v. State of U.P. and Anr.
6. In view of the aforesaid fact, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that there is no illegality committed by the authorities below and the
writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the record. Admittedly from the record it clearly appears that
the proceedings between the parties have become final by order dated 30.3.1977 in the appeal filed by the State. From the record it is also clear
that the State petitioner has not filed any writ petition against that order. In the earlier proceedings it has been decided that the property which was
clubbed in the holding of respondent No. 3 is a charitable Trust property in the name of Thakur Laxmia Narain Ji and Mahavir Ji. Therefore, the
Prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority has rightly held that second notice is not maintainable and is barred by res-judicata. This
Court in judgements mentioned above has also taken the same view.
8. From the perusal of the Act it also appears that there is no provision for second notice u/s 10 (2) of the Act and for the redetermination of
surplus land except Sections 13-A, 29, 30 and 31 of the Act. The scope of Section 13-A came to be considered before the Apex Court in
Devendra Nath Singh and Ors. v. Civil Judge and Ors. 2000 (91)RD 28 (SC). In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has held as under:
Having examined the provisions of Section 13-A and Section 38-B of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that u/s 13-A the Prescribed
Authority has the power to reopen the matter within two years from the date of the notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 14 to ratify any
apparent mistake which was there on the face of the record. That power will certainly not include the power to entertain fresh evidence and re-
examine the question as to whether the two sons, namely, Hamendra and Shailendrea were major or not. The power u/s 38-B merely indicate that
if any finding or decision was there by any ancillary forum prior to the commencement of the said sections in respect of a matter which is governed
by the Ceiling Act, then such findings will not operate as res-judicata in a proceeding under The Act That would not cover the case where findings
have already reached its finality in the very case under the Act. In this view of the mater we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the
Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to reopen the question of majority of the two sons in purported exercise of the power u/s 13- A. If the
authority had no jurisdiction question of waiver of jurisdiction does not arise, as contended by the learned Counsel for respondent.
In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority as well as that of the High Court are set aside and it is held that in the
computation of the ceiling Hamendra and Shailendra will be treated as two major sons.
9. In Prakash Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Bilaspur and Anr. 1985 (11) ALR 772 (FB) this Court has observed as under:
It is only in those cases where the amendments require the Prescribed Authority to redetermine surplus land that the notice u/s 10 (2) be issued. It
is, therefore, obvious that there may be cases where the earlier decision as a whole may not require modification at all, or there may be cases
where only partial modification may become necessary. For example, if the question is as to whether a particular plot of land is irrigated or not has
been determined and does not call for any fresh decision. Since thee is no amendment to the relevant provisions in this regard by the 1976
Amendment there would be no necessity of the Prescribed Authority embarking on a fresh enquiry as to whether the said plots are irrigated or not.
In such an event the previous order of the Prescribed Authority made before 10th October, 1975 will neither stand annulled nor be non-est.
10. In view of the aforesaid fact, I find no merit in the writ petition and writ petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.''
11. Interim order, if any is hereby discharged.
12. No order as to costs.
