@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
The Hon''ble Mr. Justice T. Raja
1. The Petitioner herein, a Special Cadre Assistant in the Respondent/Indian Overseas Bank of its Bokara Steel City Branch, challenges the charge memo/show case notice, dated 17.07.2000, issued by the Bank requiring the Petitioner to show cause in writing as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on the allegation of criminal conspiracy and fraudulent act by the Petitioner against the Bank in issuing antedated pay orders from the accounts of the private persons and enabling them to obtain delivery of coal from Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL), Dhanbad, on priority basis; and also the subsequent Communication of the Bank, dated 10.10.2002 (received by the petitioner on 17.10.2002), calling upon the Petitioner to attend the departmental enquiry proceedings by informing him that there is no bar for the Bank to continue the departmental enquiry against the petitioner as the criminal case launched against him and other co-delinquents before the CBI Court at Dhanbad has not yet reached the trial stage.
2. For better appreciation, it would be of much relevance to refer to the factual backdrop in which the impugned proceedings emanated from the Respondent-Bank as against the Petitioner/delinquent employee and other co-delinquents.
On 27.07.1994, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered an FIR on the basis of a complaint lodged by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that, during the year 1991-92, the Petitioner and codelinquents/ other employees of the Bank at Dhanbad Branch, entered into a criminal conspiracy and, in furtherance of the same, by abusing their respective official positions, they issued 49 Nos. of ante-dated Pay Orders/Bankers Cheque worth Rs. 2,06,44,853/- in favour of BCCL on the application of private parties in order to facilitate advance booking of coal at Sales and Marketing Division of Dhanbad; thereby, the delinquent employees had allowed persons known to them to obtain pay orders previous to the date of application and remittance of cash and enabled them to dishonestly utilise the pay orders for purchase of coal from BCCL after expiry of dates of offer. The CBI conducted investigation and ultimately filed a charge sheet on 31.05.2000 to the effect that ante-dated pay orders were fraudulently and dishonestly issued in fictitious names and addresses by the delinquent employees of the Bank to unduly favour some private individuals with a specific conclusion that, had the pay orders not been ante dated, the coal could not have been released to the accused persons in the name of private parties, thereby offences u/s 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 & 477A of Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are attracted. Since the accused persons including the petitioner were not put on trial for a long time, the respondent/Bank thought it fit to proceed against them by initiating departmental proceedings. Consequently, the Petitioner herein was issued with the impugned show cause notice/charge sheet in DO:DGM(JKG):2000, dated 17.07.2000, stating that he had caused damage to the property of the Bank and its customers and thereby committed gross misconduct within the meaning of para 17.5 (d) of the Bipartite Settlement, dated 14.12.1966, entered between the Bank and its workmen as amended upto date, and was called upon to show cause within 10 days from the date of receipt of the charge memo as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on the charges contained therein.
After receiving the charge memo, dated 17.07.2000, the Petitioner sent a protest letter dated 22.06.2002, requesting the Enquiry Officer to stay the domestic enquiry proceedings as the criminal case that has been filed by the CBI is pending before the CBI Court, Dhanbad, on the same set of charges and further, the Court has taken cognizance and persons also started appearing before Court, therefore, in terms of what is provided under the Bipartite Settlement, it may not be proper to simultaneously conduct the disciplinary proceedings. On the plea being rejected by the Enquiry Officer, the Petitioner''s defence representative sent a written letter, dated 12.08.2002, to the 2nd respondent/Disciplinary Authority for postponement of the disciplinary proceedings till the disposal of the criminal case and, for which, the 2nd Respondent, by the impugned communication, dated 10.10.2002 (Received by the Petitioner on 17.10.2002), replied that the prosecution evidence in the criminal case has not commenced and the case has also not reached the trial stage and therefore, there is no bar in continuing the departmental enquiry and so replying, informed the petitioner to attend the enquiry proceedings. By letter, dated 24.10.2002, the Petitioner addressed the the Bank stating that his case before the criminal court would be prejudiced if his defence is disclosed at the domestic proceedings and requested not to continue with the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal case is over, however, by letter dated 26.10.2002, the Disciplinary Authority declined to accept such request.
Consequently, the Enquiry Officer posted the enquiry proceedings to 31.10.2002 for recording petitioner''s side evidence and submission of documents in defence. The Petitioner''s defence representative requested the Enquiry Officer to arrange for production of CBI Inspector/MW1 for additional cross examination in the circumstances stated in the letter dated 24.10.2002, addressed to the 2nd Respondent, subject to his submissions to the 2nd Respondent not to continue with the disciplinary proceedings until the proceedings before the Criminal Court are over, and such request was rejected by the 3rd Respondent vide letter dated 26.10.2002.
The Petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court of Jharkand at Ranchi in W.P. (S) No. 4229 of 2002 questioning the oral refusal of his request by the Disciplinary Authority. Ultimately, the writ petition came to be withdrawn on 03.10.2002 as it was filed without any written impugned order.
Subsequently, the Petitioner has come up with the present writ petition challenging the charge sheet/show cause notice, dated 17.07.2000, issued by the 2nd Respondent for initiation of the departmental proceedings and the subsequent communication dated 10.10.2002 (received by the Petitioner on 17.10.2002), informing the Petitioner to participate in the domestic enquiry proceedings.
3. Mr. C.R. Chandrasekar, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, in an assiduous endeavour to assail the impugned proceedings, has made the following fourfold submissions:
a) When both the domestic enquiry proceedings and the criminal proceedings are grounded on the same set of facts, it is just and proper that the departmental proceedings are stayed till the disposal of the criminal case before the CBI Court and, after a decision is rendered by the criminal court, based on the same, it is always open for the Respondents either to proceed further or not with the disciplinary proceedings. If both the proceedings are allowed to continue simultaneously, disclosure of his defence during the disciplinary proceedings would cause prejudice to the defence in the course of criminal proceedings, thereby, the right guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution would be put at stake.
b) Had the Disciplinary Authority properly applied his mind to the crucial aspect that, subsequent to the filing of the charge sheet by the CBI way back on 31.05.2000 after investigation into the alleged acts of the year 1994, the court proceedings are still pending only at pre-trial stage, he would not have simultaneously ordered for the departmental proceedings on the same set of charges, that too, 9 years after the alleged occurrence. In support of such submission, a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in
c) At any rate, the allegations levelled by the 2nd Respondent as against the Petitioner in the charge sheet/show cause notice, on the face of it, do not come within the purview of misconduct as outlined and explained in the Bipartite settlement in matters of disciplinary action. Also, Paragraph No. 17.4 of the First Bipartite Settlement, which is the reproduction of para 521(3) of the Sastry Award, prescribes that pending completion of criminal trial proceedings, departmental proceedings are to be stayed. In this regard, referring to a same line of argument advanced before the Calcutta High Court in
9. In short, the Petitioner tried to make out a case of double jeopardy within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which runs as follows:
Article 20(3): No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
10. Mr. Altamas Kabir, appearing in support of the writ petitioner has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.
The said view has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of
There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this Court has held in
and the following conclusion reached by the Calcutta High Court,
Accordingly, in my opinion, it would be just and proper to direct the Inspector, Central Bureau of Investigation, to expedite the criminal case, as soon as possible, without taking any adjournment and it is also desired that the writ petitioner will co-operate in the matter, without taking any unnecessary adjournments, so that the trial may be concluded at an early date. However, during the pendency of the criminal trial, the Respondentbank authorities will be restrained from proceeding further with the departmental enquiry, against the petitioner, in terms of the chargesheet, referred to, in the writ petition.
Learned Counsel would submit that, in the light of the said decision, the present prayer may also be allowed.
d) One Mr. J.K. Gupta, Deputy General Manager/Disciplinary Authority, who issued the sanction order as well as the show cause notice against the petitioner for initiating the departmental proceedings, also tendered evidence before the criminal court; therefore, inasmuch as the authority concerned has simultaneously acted as prosecutor, witness and judge, the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated in the light of the observation of the Apex Court in
4. Per contra, Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents/Bank would submit that the present writ petition, pointlessly challenging a mere show cause notice/charge sheet, dated 17.07.2000, and the further notice/communication, dated 10.10.2002, whereby, the Petitioner is just informed to attend the enquiry proceedings, is not at all maintainable, for, no cause of action whatsoever has arisen from the proceedings impugned herein as there was no adverse order passed against the Petitioner. In this regard, he referred to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006 (12) SCC 28) to focus on the settled legal principle that a writ petition challenging a show cause notice or charge sheet should not be entertained because a mere charge sheet or show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action; more so, it does not even amount to any adverse order which affects the right of any party.
4-a. It is further submitted that, having conspired with the co-delinquents with a fraudulent intention to cause damage to the properties and reputation of the Bank, the Petitioner successfully avoided the departmental proceedings by filing one writ petition or the other. By taking me through Clause 17.4 of the bipartite Settlement, he would submit that the above provision unambiguously makes it clear that departmental proceedings are to be stayed only in cases where the delinquent employee is put on trial in the criminal case. According to him when admittedly, in the present case, the Petitioner is not put on trial in the pending criminal case before the CBI Court at Dhanbad, the vague contention that the enquiry is to be stayed in terms of the bipartite settlement should be straight away discarded.
4-b. By referring to the proviso to Regulation 48(1) of the Pension Regulations of the Bank to the effect that no departmental or judicial proceedings, if not initiated while the employee was in service, shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution, it is contended that, in line with what is provided above read with Clause 17.4 of the bipartite settlement, the respondent Bank has rightly initiated the departmental proceedings against all the delinquents and finally, except the Petitioner, all other delinquents were punished by the Disciplinary authority but the case of the Petitioner alone could not be taken up by the Department for the reason that he has obtained an order of stay from this Court on 29.10.2002 and such stay was made absolute on 25.09.2003. Only after initiation of the departmental proceedings, the CBI Court took cognizance of the offence based on the charge sheet filed way back on 31.05.2000, however, the case has not even reached the trial stage yet. Therefore, in the light of Clause 17.4 of the bipartite settlement, which enables the Bank to go ahead with the domestic enquiry if the employee is not put on trial in the criminal case, the Petitioner cannot have any grievance since the Bank has rightly proceeded with the departmental proceedings as admittedly, the Petitioner is not put on trial in the criminal case before the CBI Court.
4-c. Ultimately, by submitting that, in the given case, both the proceedings are exclusively different in nature and that is why the Supreme Court also, in umpteen number of alike cases made it clear that departmental proceedings can be continued even during the pendency of the criminal case, learned counsel pleads that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced on either side. The core issues need to be answered are:
(a) In the light of the bipartite settlement, in particular Clause 17.4 thereof, whether the act of the Bank is justified in initiating the disciplinary proceedings even during pendency of criminal proceedings before the CBI Court, Dhanbad?
(b) Whether pendency of the criminal proceedings would serve as an embargo in going ahead with the departmental proceedings even while the delinquent is not put on trial and incidentally, continuance of the departmental proceedings would affect the defence of the Petitioner in the criminal trial?
(c) whether appearance of the Disciplinary Authority, who initiated departmental proceedings against the Petitioner, as a witness before the criminal court would lead to an inference that he assumed the role of a witness in the departmental proceedings and thereby, the entire departmental proceedings against the Petitioner are vitiated?
(d) After withdrawing similar petition before the Jharkand High Court, whether the Petitioner is right in approaching this Court in challenging show cause notice/communication to attend for the enquiry, when there is no adverse order arising there-from so as to suggest any cause of action to sustain the prayer?
6. Admittedly, this is a case where, the CBI, Dhanbad, filed an FIR against the Petitioner and other co-delinquent employees for fraudulently and dishonestly issuing pre-dated pay orders favouring BCCL, Dhanbad, on behalf of M/S. Sahyogi Int.Nirmata Kalyan Samiti and Ors. for the purpose of purchasing coal from BCCL and to enable the BCCL authorities to deliver coal after expiry of the date of offer. After the charge sheet was laid by the CBI on 31.05.2000 as stated above, the Petitioner is not put on trial in the criminal case as per the communication, dated 05.05.2003, received from the CBI. It is the emphatic stand of the Bank that they patiently waited for 9 years to tackle the delinquents indulged in gross misconduct and, after noting that the Petitioner is not put on trial and that offences committed by the group of delinquents run into a large number of transactions and for a long period, without any delay, charge memo came to be issued to the Petitioner. Even before approaching this Court, the Petitioner addressed the Enquiry Officer himself through a letter dated 22.06.2002 requesting to stay the enquiry proceedings in terms of the bipartite settlement as charges are same both in the criminal proceedings and in the domestic enquiry proceedings and further, the court had taken cognizance of the charge sheet filed by the CBI. The Enquiry Officer, after properly dealing with the same, ultimately, rejected the request holding that the trial before the criminal court having not been commenced, there is no embargo for the Bank to go ahead with the departmental proceedings in terms of what is provided in Clause 17.4 of the bipartite agreement. Interestingly, the present claim of the Petitioner is that the said clause favours only the case of the petitioner since it contemplates stay of domestic proceedings pending completion of trial by the criminal court. In this regard, it would be of much relevance to extract below Clause 17.4 of the bipartite agreement:
If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of gross misconduct or of minor misconduct as mentioned below, provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or comes to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in clauses 17.11 and 17.12 infra relating to the discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension if any and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in the service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in Clause 17.3 supra. If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put to trial, such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in clause 17.3 above shall apply.
A careful and cautious reading of the above clause would make it clear that the departmental proceedings instituted against an employee/delinquent are to be stayed where such employee is put on trial. In this regard, it is the admitted case of even the Petitioner himself that he is not put on trial as on the date of the charge memo or the subsequent communication and till date, the trial has not commenced. Further, the Criminal Court/CBI Court at Dhanbad had taken cognizance on the charge sheet of the year 2000 only in the year 2005. Therefore, the Respondents, having waited for a very long time to see that the court prosecutes the Petitioner/accused and Ors. finding no improvements in the criminal case, proceeded to initiate the departmental proceedings in terms of clause 17.4 of the bipartite agreement not only against the Petitioner but also against the co-delinquents. Further, none of the delinquents agitated against the launching of departmental proceedings, rather, they participated in the proceedings and the enquiry was also over except in the case of the Petitioner, who in an vain attempt moved the Jharkand High Court by filing W.P.(s) No. 4229 of 2002, however, withdrew the same on 03.10.2002 and, in the same month, on 28.10.2002, moved this Court with the present writ petition in continuation of the dilatory tactics to be away from the departmental proceedings under one pretext or other. Because of the stay order granted by this Court on 29.10.2002 and subsequently made absolute on 25.09.2003, the Department could not proceed further. In the above circumstances, this Court hardly finds any justification in the claim of the Petitioner regarding Clause 17.4 of the bipartite agreement as the said provision has been rightly understood by the Bank in its letter and spirit and correctly implemented by initiating the departmental proceedings to go into the gross misconduct which considerably affected the property and reputation of the institution.
7. Coming to the second question as to whether any prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner if departmental proceedings are allowed to continue pending criminal proceedings, it must be pointed out that though the FIR was registered in the year 1994, the CBI submitted the charge sheet on 31.05.2000 and the CBI Court at Dhanbad took cognizance only in the year 2005. Moreover, as pointed out already, the petitioner is not put on trial and, in spite of having taken cognizance, the criminal case before the trial court has not reached the trial stage. In the above circumstances, the Bank issued charge memos, dated 17.07.2000, not only to the Petitioner but also to the co-delinquents viz., William Minz, A.N. Singh, D.N. Sardar and T.N. Sinha, however, except the petitioner, who resorted to writ proceedings before the Jharkand High Court at Ranchi followed by the present writ petition, others participated in the proceedings resulting in the punishment orders and disposal of the appeals preferred against those punishment orders in 2003 itself. It is worthwhile to point out in this regard that, in the cases of William Minz, A.N. Singh and D.N. Sardar, after due enquiry, by orders dated 07.05.2003, penalty of reduction in pay by five stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year with further direction that they will not earn increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on the expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing their future increment of pay in terms of Regulation 4(f) of Indian Overseas Bank Officer Employees (D&A) Regulations 1976, as amended upto date, came to be imposed and on appeal, by orders dated 13.11.2003, the appellate authority modified the punishment imposed as reduction in their basic pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year with further direction that they will earn increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on the expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing their future increment of pay in terms of Regulation 4(f) of IOB Officer Employees (D&A) Regulations, 1976, as amended upto date. In the case of T.N. Sinha, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of bringing down his basic pay by two stages in the scale of pay in terms of the bipartite settlement and against the said order, the individual did not prefer any appeal. Thus, only in the case of the Petitioner, the Bank was not able to proceed for the reasons mentioned above. Had the petitioner participated in the enquiry proceedings, at least, he would have peacefully retired on attaining the age of superannuation by receiving the monetary benefits due to him, but, because of his imbalanced approach, he not only failed to make use of the best course open for him as availed of by other codelinquents but unnecessarily wasted much time in filing the litigation on fragile grounds. As the employee himself is a party to the Bipartite Agreement which enables the Bank to initiate the enquiry proceedings against him if he is not put on trial, I do not find any merit in the argument that prejudice would result to the Petitioner if he participates in the enquiry.
7-a. As to the allied issue viz., in the given case, whether there is any bar in proceeding with the departmental proceedings during pendency of the criminal proceedings which not yet reached the trial stage despite the court taking cognizance during the year 2005 itself, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in 2008 (1) SCC 650 (Indian Overseas Bank v. P. Ganesan), wherein, it is categorically held that a departmental proceeding pending criminal proceedings does not warrant an automatic stay. It is relevant to extract from the said decision the relevant portion here-under:
Legal position operating in the field is no longer res integra. A departmental proceedings pending a criminal proceedings does not warrant an automatic stay. The superior courts before exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in this regard must take into consideration the fact as to whether the charges as also the evidence in both the proceedings are common and as to whether any complicated question of law is involved in the matter.
It is also pertinent to extract below the observation of the Apex Court in
If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.
Coming to the case on hand, rightly the Bank, after patiently waiting for the outcome of the criminal proceedings and, noting that the criminal court may not conclude the case in the near future as cognizance over the charge sheet filed in 2000 was taken only during 2005 and that the Petitioner is not put on trial and that charges are yet to be framed, ultimately proceeded with the departmental enquiry against the delinquents, of whom, except the Petitioner all others were, after enquiry, dealt with suitably. None of the said delinquent officers ever questioned the departmental proceedings citing Clause 17.4 of the bipartite settlement in view of the clear position that the said provision enables the Bank to go ahead with the enquiry as the delinquents are not put on trial at the relevant time. It is only because of the delaying tactics adopted by the Petitioner, the proceedings have come to a grinding halt in his case and, if this Court looks at Clause 17.4 of the bipartite settlement in the perspective of the Petitioner, it would only amount to giving premium to a wrong practice and procedure. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that there may not be any prejudice for the Petitioner to participate in the proceedings as done by his colleagues.
8. Coming to the argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the Deputy General Manager/Mr.J.K. Gupta, who issued the sanction order as well as the charge memo, also tendered evidence before the trial court as provided under the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby, the entire proceedings are vitiated as the same authority cannot play the role of prosecutor and witness, it must be straight away said that such argument is as vague as it is and totally misconceived for the simple reason that the authority concerned, who initiated the departmental proceedings to deal with the delinquents departmentally, under valid summons of a court of law had to appear for the court proceedings at the instance of the CBI to apprise the court of the relevant details required therein. The authority had appeared before the court to honour the legal obligation saddled on him as failure to appear for court proceedings may amount to contempt of court. He would be tendering evidence as any other witness concerned with the particular case totally independent of the departmental proceedings. Had the disciplinary authority concerned in any manner given a statement or tendered evidence in the course of the departmental enquiry, the Petitioner is right and justified in making a claim against the officer concerned. But participation of an authority in a court proceeding in fulfilling a legal obligation can never be said to be adverse to the interests of the domestic enquiry launched at the hands of the Officer. Even otherwise, now, it is reported that the said officer was subsequently transferred and also retired from service. Therefore, the argument advanced is straight away rejected.
9. Lastly, it must be pointed out that the petitioner, despite withdrawing the writ petition filed before the Jharkand High Court as mentioned above, has preferred the present writ petition that too against the impugned communication whereby he was just informed to attend the enquiry based on the impugned charge memo. Therefore, having not suffered any adverse order against him so as to give rise to any cause of action, the Petitioner has resorted to writ proceedings at a premature stage in challenging a mere communication seeking attendance. Time and again, the Apex Court has deprecated the practice of entertaining such writ petitions which have been filed challenging mere show cause notice or charge sheets. In this regard, it is relevant to extract the following observation of the Apex Court in Kunnisetty Satyanarayana case (cited supra),
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give any rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the showcause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.
Looking at any perspective, this Court does not find a valid reason or ground to interfere with the impugned proceedings. Consequently, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed as devoid of any merit, however, there will be no order as to costs. Since the Petitioner is said to have retired and at the old age complains retention of the retiral benefits due to him, considering the quantum of punishment awarded to the co-delinquents and the fact that none of them was imposed with the major punishment of dismissal, he is directed to appear for the enquiry before the authority concerned, who shall fix an early date for enquiry and conclude the proceedings at the earliest. It is made clear that the Petitioner shall fully co-operate for early conclusion of the enquiry and the Department, in the event of either accepting the defence of the petitioner or taking the same decision as in the case of the co-delinquents and ultimately, deciding to settle the benefits, may release the same within a reasonable time after conclusion of the proceedings.
