@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
G. Rajasuria, J.@mdashInveighing the order dated 02-06-2009 passed by the learned District Judge, Villupuram in LA. No. 247 of 2008 in
C.M.A. No. 16 of 2006 in H.M.O.P. No. 82 of 2002, this civil revision petition is focussed.
2. Heard both sides.
3. A summation and summarization of the relevant facts, which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this civil revision petition
would run thus:
The Respondent herein filed HMOP No. 82 of 2002 seeking divorce as against the revision-Petitioner herein. During the pendency of the HMOP,
petition u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed seeking interim maintenance and the same was awarded. It so happened that the HMOP was
allowed. Being aggrieved by such order in allowing the HMOP, the revision-Petitioner herein preferred appeal in C.M.A. No. 16 of 2006. During
the pendency of the said appeal I.A. No. 247 of 2008 was filed so as to enforce the arrears, which, alleged to have accrued even after the
disposal of HMOP No. 82 of 2002. It appears that the interim order of maintenance was passed by the Court during the pendency of the HMOP
No. 82 of 2002. The Appellate Court after hearing both sides and referring to various decisions in this regard dismissed the application by giving a
specific finding that the interim order awarding interim maintenance, during the pendency of the HMOP No. 82 of 2002 would not enure to the
benefit of the revision-Petitioner herein after the HMOP No. 82 of 2002 having been disposed of.
4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, this revision has been filed.
5. The learned Counsel for the revision-Petitioner reiterating the grounds of revision, would develop his argument to the effect that once u/s 24 of
the Hindu Marriage Act interim maintenance was awarded then that would ensure to the benefit of the person concerned till the matrimonial
proceedings are over even before the Appellate Authority. However, despite granting ample opportunity, the learned Counsel for the revision-
Petitioner did not produce any precedents in support of his proposition. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Respondent would invite
the attention of this Court to the following decisions and would develop her argument that absolutely, there is nothing wrong in the order passed by
the Appellate Court in dismissing the said application. Certain excerpts from those decisions would run thus:
1. Kashi Math Samsthan and Another Vs. Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy and Another, .
10. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and examined the impugned order of the High Court as well as the judgment of the trial
Court, which dismissed the suit of the Appellants in respect of which, appeals are now pending before the High Court for final adjudication. Befure
us, Mr. R. F. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants submitted that since an interim order or status quo regarding
the functioning of the Mathadhipathi of the Math was operative during the pendency of the suit and triable issues have to be gone into by the High
Court in the first appeals, it was fit and proper for the High Court to direct the parties to maintain the interim order which was granted by the trial
Court during the pendency of the suit. This submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellants was hotly contested by Mr. K. K.
Venugopal. learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents. According to Mr. Venugopal, since the Appellants could not make out any
prima facie case to get an interim order of injuction during the pendency of the appeals, question of continuance of the interim order, which was
granted by the trial Court during the pendency of the suit, cannot arise at all.
11. Having heard the learned senior counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned order and also the judgment of the trial Court
dismissing the suit of the Appellants, we do not find any worthy reason to pass an interim order in the manner suggested by Mr. R.F. Nariman.
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, in the exercise of our discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution.
2. Mst. Mukan Kanwar Vs. Ajit Chand, :
3. I have given the matter my careful consideration and am disposed to hold the view that the order of this Court dated the 19th March, 1958,
cannot be held to be effectual after the termination of the proceeding in the trial Court. I am prepared to accept that an appeal is a continuation of
the proceeding in the original Court; but this principle cannot be over-stretched to hold that any interim order passed at the stage of the proceeding
in the primary Court automatically can operate even after the proceeding is decided by that Court.
....
He cannot be heard to insist that as the appeal is a continuation of the suit, therefore, the order passed by the appellate Court pending the decision
of the suit in the trial Court must hold good even after the suit happens to be decided by the trial Court. I have, therefore, arrived at the conclusion
that the correct legal position would be to hold that the order for temporary alimony passed by this Court earlier enured during the life of this suit in
the trial Court only and cannot survive....
A mere poring over and perusal of those decisions would clearly demonstrate and display that the lower Court correctly applied the law and
dismissed the application.
6. Accordingly, I find no merit in this revision and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are
closed.
