@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Honourable Mr. Justice G. Rajasuria
1. Animadverting upon the common judgement dated 3.2.2012 passed by the VIII Small Causes Court, Chennai, (Rent Control Appellate
authority), Principal Subordinate Judge, in R.C.A.Nos.684, 686, 688, 690, 692, 695 of 2011 in ordering redelivery in favour of six second
respondents herein, setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Rent Controller, Executing Court, in E.A.Nos.136, 137, 139, 129, 133, 131
of 2011 in E.P. No. 263 264, 265, 266, 267, 1200 of 2010 in RCOP Nos.1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 268 of 2007, these civil revision
petitions are focussed. A recapitulation and r_esume of relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of these revision petitions
would run thus:
(i) The revision petitioner herein-Chandrasekaran filed six RCOPS as against six persons, namely, S. Karthik, V. Gangadharan, A. Jayakumar, S.
Velayutham, M. Etheeswaran, A. Sathasivam and sought for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying the rents in respect of the six
demised premises described therein.
(ii) Separate enquiries were conducted and during RCOP enquiry, the landlord examined himself as P.W.1 in all the petitions and marked Ex.P1.
The respondents therein examined themselves as R.W.1 in each petition and no document was marked.
(iii) Whereupon, the Rent Controller passed eviction orders, as against which no appeal emerged.
(iv) Thereafter, six E.Ps were filed and under that delivery of the demised premises was taken by the revision petitioner herein.
(v) However several persons filed Execution applications before the learned Rent Controller, invoking Section 144 of C.P.C. for redelivery of the
said properties, among them, the second respondents in all these revision petitions were the petitioners in E.A.Nos.136, 137, 139, 129 and 133 of
2011, respectively, on the ground that they have been illegally disposed and those six respondents in the RCOPs had nothing to do with the suit
properties, but the said Chandrasekaran, in collusion with those six persons obtained RCOP decrees and illegally dispossessed those petitioners,
who sought redelivery in the E.As.
(vi) Pendente lite, those Execution Applications were converted into one u/s 151 of C.P.C.
2. At this juncture, it has to be pointed out by me that no application under Order 21 Rule 99 was filed for obtaining redelivery of possession.
3. A mere running of the eye over the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller in those E.As. would highlight that the Rent Controller did not
adhere to the procedure contemplated under law and dealt with the matter like a suit strictly as per O.21 Rule 103 of C.P.C. No issues were
framed and the matter was not processed as a suit. However, he ultimately dismissed the applications as untenable, as against which, the six
second respondents in these revisions, each preferred two RCAs, one agitating as against the order passed by the Rent Controller in dismissing
their applications for redelivery and another for directing the rent controller, Executing Court, not to record delivery.
4. The appellate authority, after hearing both sides, ordered redelivery, vide the common judgement dated 3.2.2012.
5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the common judgement passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, these revisions have been
focused by the revision petitioner-Chandrasekaran, setting out various grounds.
6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placing reliance on the grounds of revision would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and
precisely be set out thus:
(i) The appellate authority, without any valid reason simply ordered redelivery, accepting the evidence of he witnesses and documents produced by
the six second respondents herein, before the Rent Controller.
(ii) In fact, the respondents herein should have been driven to the extent of filing a suit, had they desired so, instead of ordering redelivery.
(iii) The appellate authority dilated on various issues, including the one relating to transfer effected by the revision petitioner herein in favour of his
relative and those are all not germane for deciding the appeal.
(iv) The appellate authority has no right to decide on title.
7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would also raise a law point to the effect that under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, the appellate authority cannot entertain any appeal as against any order passed by the Rent Controller, as an executing Court.
Accordingly, the learned counsel for the revision petition would pray for setting aside the order passed in the RCAs.
8. In a bid to torpedo and pulverize and to make mincemeat of the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the revision petitioner, the
learned counsel for the respondents would advance her arguments, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus:
(a) The appellate Court, taking into consideration the evidence on record placed by the six second respondents herein, appropriately and
appositely, correctly and legally ordered redelivery, warranting no interference in appeal.
(b) The evidence of bailiffs, in E.A.Nos.136, 137, 139, 129, 133, 131 of 2011 would exemplify and demonstrate that ex facie and prima facie the
acts of Bailiffs were wrong and they, on the date of allegedly effecting delivery in favour of the revision petitioner herein, noted that the six second
respondents herein and the others like them were there in occupation of the properties concerned and on that the bailiffs ought to have refrained
from delivering the properties in favour of the revision petitioner and reported the matter to the Rent Controller. Whereupon, under Order 21 Rule
97 of C.P.C, the revision petitioner herein, ought to have filed the applications citing those occupiers as respondents therein and got the matter
processed. Instead of resorting to such legal procedures for removal of obstruction, the revision petitioner herein, simply, with the help of the Court
Bailiffs took delivery, illegally, and the real persons in possession, namely, the said occupiers were dispossessed and the appellate Court rectified
the mistake committed by the Rent Controller and the Bailiffs and accordingly ordered restoration of possession, warranting no interference in
revisions.
Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondents would pray for the dismissal of the revisions.
9. The points for consideration are as under:
(i) Whether the appellate Court was justified in ordering redelivery in favour of the six second respondents herein based on the evidence, both oral
and documentary adduced by them before the lower Court, in E.As.Nos.136, 137, 139, 129, 133, 131 of 2011?
(ii) Whether the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeals and order for redelivery?
(iii) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the appellate Court?
10. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with one another.
11. A mere poring over and perusal of the entire evidence adduced before the Rent Controller in the relevant E.As. would project and convey,
connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that the that the delivery was wrongly effected by the bailiffs. The appellate Court meticulously
analysed the evidence and found that as on the date of delivery of the demised premises concerned in favour of the revision petitioner herein, the
six second respondents herein were very much in occupation of the suit property in occupation. He referred to the oral evidence of the witnesses
and also the exhibits concerned. Before the Rent Controller in each of the six EAs witnesses were examined, including the respective bailiffs, who
delivered the six demised premises found referred to in those RCOP eviction orders. In fact, the previous owner of the property-
Gopalakrishnamurthy (P.W.5) in unison with his agent Bilal Ansari(P.W.2) would depose in favour of redelivery in favour of the six second
respondents herein on the ground that his agent Bilal Ansari (P.W.2) was collecting rent from the occupants, including the said six second
respondents herein.
12. What I could understand from the submissions made by both sides was that the present revision petitioner happened to be the successful
bidder in the auction relating to the demised premises, conducted by the creditor of P.W.5-Gopalakrihnamurthy, u/s 69 of the Transfer of Property
Act. However, it appears that there is some dispute between the said Gopalakrishnamurthy and the revision petitioner, with which, at present this
Court is not concerned. Prima facie it is not evident as to how the revision petitioner took delivery of the said property, after the auction
proceedings u/s 69 of the Transfer of Property Act.
13. However, it is the precise case of the revision petitioner that consequent upon the acquisition of ownership by the revision petitioner in respect
of the demised premises, there was attornment of tenancy by the six respondents referred to in six RCOPs; whereupon he was deemed to be in
possession through them; subsequently, those tenants committed default in paying rents; wherefore such RCOPs were filed and decrees were
obtained as against them and that delivery of possession was taken.
14. Per contra, the respondents herein would vehemently dispute such narration of facts on the side of the revision petitioner. They would dispute
the very claim of the revision petitioner as the one who got attornment of tenancy from those six persons, who were collusive parties, so as to aid
the revision petitioner to get delivery of possession of the premises, which were under the effective occupation of the said second respondents
herein and the others like them.
15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners also would argue that the six demised premises referred to in the RCOPs were all imaginary
divisions, which could not be located on ground, whereas all the six demised premises put together constituted one premises, which was under the
ownership of Gopalakrishnamurthy, who through his agent Bilal Ansari, collected rent from the six second respondents herein and 40 to 50 other
occupants like them, and they were doing business in fish and vegetable vending there in that premises and it is a small market. There were
platforms, over which those persons were doing such business and that those six respondents in the RCOPs had nothing to do with that property.
Such was the sum and substance of the evidence adduced before the Rent Controller in the EAs. The photographer concerned was also examined
and the Photos were marked to display and demonstrate that effectively the said vendors were in occupation of the entire demised premises and
that it was a mini market. As per the appellate authority, the documents such as cash bills and other records marked before the Rent Controller
would also exemplify and demonstrate that the claim of the revision petitioner that he had been in possession through his six tenants were found to
be untenable.
16. The appellate authority, considering all these facts appropriately and legally gave a finding to the effect that the bailiffs were not justified in
ordering delivery of possession of the premises in favour of the revision petitioner and accordingly, gave certain other findings also relating to the
alleged collusion between the revision petitioner herein and the respondents in the RCOPs and ultimately rendered the verdict.
17. I am of the considered view that the appellate authority sparing no effort in scanning and analysing the evidence, arrived at the just conclusion
that as on the date of delivery, the six second respondents herein and the others like them were there in occupation of the premises and they were
dispossessed, illegally.
18. The bailiffs concerned, ought to have informed the Rent Controller about the corpus possessionis of the said property with the respondents
herein; whereupon the Rent Controller should have ordered steps to be taken by the revision petitioner herein, for filing necessary applications for
removal of obstruction, presumably under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C., citing those occupants as respondents, but such a course was not at all
adhered to and hence, the appellate Court was perfectly correct in ordering redelivery.
19. The core question might arise as to whether in the absence of the respondents herein having invoked Order 21 Rule 99 of C.P.C, the appellate
authority was justified in ordering redelivery.
20. No doubt, the Rent Controller, simply concentrated on the Section of law i.e. Section 144 of the Act and at the very beginning of his order
itself he started commenting upon it and he proceeded to decide allegedly on merits and landed himself in a can of worms and wrong decision,
which the appellate authority correctly rectified it by pointing out that the Rent Controller was not justified in failing to rectify the mistake committed
by him, based on the said bailiffs erroneous and illegal actions.
21. At this juncture, I recollect the following maxims:
(1) Actus curiae neminem gravabit-An act of court shall prejudice no man;
(2) Actus legis nemini facit injuriam-the act of the la does injury to no one;
(3) Executio juris non habet injuriam- The execution of law does no injury.
22. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautalogous, I would like to point out that the respondents herein ought to have filed
applications under Order 21 Rule 99 of C.P.C, but they have filed the applications initially u/s 144 of CPC and thereafter got them converted into
the ones u/s 151 of C.P.C.
23. The trial Court instead of ignoring the wrong provision of law cited by the petitioners in the E.As., simply treated them as such as ordinary
petitions, without treating them as suits and dismissed the same.
24. Now, my discussion supra would highlight and convey that such dispossession of the actual occupants is turned out to be illegal and erroneous
and hence, status-quo-ante has to be restored, cutting across technicalities, which are handmaids of justice.
25. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the following maxims:
(i) Nul Prendra advantage de son tort demesne _ No one shall take advantage of his own wrong.
(ii) Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria _ No one can gain advantage by his own wrong.
26. A person cannot capitalize his own mistake or wrongful act, is the sum and substance of those maxims.
27. The revision petitioner by citing technical defects in ordering redelivery cannot try to retain the illegal delivery obtained by him.
28. I hark back to the following maxims:
(i) Ex turpi causa non oritur actio: Out of a base illegal, or immoral consideration, an action does not arise.
(ii) Ex dolo malo non oritur actio _ Out of fraud no action arises; fraud never gives a right of action.
29. The revision petitioner cannot lay his claim to retain such possession which resulted out of illegality.
30. The higher fora in the judicial hierarchy cannot simply keep its fingers crossed on seeing the irregularities and illegalities having been committed
by the bailiffs of the Court. In the meantime, the substantive right of the parties also should not be allowed to get eroded.
31. The appellate authority, while rectifying the mistake in ordering delivery cannot also decide once and for all that there was collusion between
the revision petitioner herein and the respondents in the RCOPs., when there had been no proper application before the Rent Controller-Executing
Court. There should have been appropriate application filed by the revision petitioner herein under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C.citing the six
second respondents herein and the others like them, who were actually in occupation of the demised premisses and whereupon, the Rent
Controller was expected to treat it like a suit and deal with it strictly in accordance with Order 21 Rule 103 of C.P.C., coupled with Section 18 of
the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Appropriate issues should be framed so as to enable the parties to address themselves to
the real controversy and adduce evidence.
32. In this case, because of the non-framing of the issues and also non-conducting of those EAs as suits, the revision petitioner herein had not at all
adduced any evidence. There was no oral or documentary evidence adduced on his side. In such a case, the Court also cannot simply once and
for all hold that the revision petitioner should be simply left high and dry without seeking his remedy in the way known to law.
33. Regarding the plea raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act, had no jurisdiction at all to entertain any appeal as against the order passed by the Rent Controller in EAs, he would cite
the following decisions:
(i) Ghan Shyam Das Gupta and another Vs. Anant Kumar Sinha and others,
(ii) Unreported judgement of the Supreme Court dated 4.7.2011 in Mangluram Dewangan v. Surendra Sing and Others.
(iii) Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Indian Automobiles and Co. and others,
(iv) 2002(2) CTC 385 - Vummidi Bangaru Chetty (P) Ltd., VS. M/s. Spencer & Co Ltd.
34. Whereas, the learned counsel for the respondents cited the judgements of the Division Bench of this Court.
(i) (1965) 2 MLJ 102 - P. Ramachandra Sastri V. S. Mohamed Hussain;
(ii) 1984 T.L.N.J. 364 - Fathima Automobiles V. P.K.P. Nair and 2 Others;
(iii) 1983 MLJR 220 - k. Sundaram v. Balraj
(iv) Unreported judgement of this Court dated 9.7.1990 in Vincent Poobalarayar v. The Rent Controller (District Munsif)
(v) 1990-2-L.W.522 _ Venkatesa Mudaliar and 6 others v N. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar Trust, Vellore.
35. I have perused the precedents cited on both sides. The following two Division Bench judgements of this Court, namely,
(i) Fathima Automobiles Vs. P.K.P. Nair and Another, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
.... As already stated S. 23(1)(b) talks of any person aggrieved filing appeal, as also any order passed. Since S. 23(1)(b) does not refer to an
order passed by the Rent Controller under S. 18(1) we have to hold that any order passed by the Rent Controller against which a person is
aggrieved can be taken in appeal by that aggrieved person under S. 23(1)(b) of the Act. Thus, in our view, S. 23(1)(b) enables any person
aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller to file appeal and it is not possible to restrict application of S. 23(1)(b) as applying only to
parties to the eviction proceedings and to orders passed by the Rent Controller in exercise of the order of eviction under S. 18(1) of the Act. In
this view of the matter, we have to hold that under S. 23(1)(b) of the Act an obstructor who is aggrieved against an order directing removal of
obstruction passed by the Rent Controller could file an appeal under that section and the bar contained in S. 18(2) will not apply to such an order.
We have to hold that in this case the appellant has a right to appeal under S. 23(1)(b) of the Act against the order impugned in the writ petition
directing removal of obstruction which is an order not passed under S. 18(1), but one passed under O. 21, R. 97 C.P.C. Since the petitioner has
got a light of appeal, we cannot in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction go into the merits of the rival contentions urged by the parties in this writ
appeal. Even now the appellant is at liberty to file an appeal under S. 23(1)(b) of the Act against the order impugned in writ petition, with a petition
under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the same and if such a petition for condonation of delay is filed, the time taken by the
appellant in prosecuting the writ petition and the writ appeal before this Court would naturally stand excluded. With this observation, the writ
appeal is dismissed.
(ii) Vincent Poobalarayar v. The Rent Controller (District Munsif), Tuticorin and 2 others (1990) 2 LW 521, 521, certain excerpts from it would
run thus:
1.....The learned single Judge found a warrant to follow the pronouncement of a Bench of this court in Fathima Automobiles v. P.K.P. Nair 1 to
hold that the inhibition with reference to filing of an appeal set out under S. 18(2) of the Act would apply only to an order passed under S. 18(1) of
the Act directing delivery in execution, of the enumerated orders under S. 18(1) of the Act. We have been taken through the pronouncement of the
bench of this court referred to above. We find a sound reason behind a ratio adopted by the bench. We have not found a warrant to take a view
different from that of the bench of this court in the decision referred to above. Hence, this writ appeal directed against the order of the learned
single Judge remitting the matter to the appellate authority under the Act, the second respondent herein for consideration of the matter in
accordance with law, is dismissed. No costs.
would highlight that such Rent Control appeals were tenable; however the learned counsel for the revision petitions would submit that the
subsequent Hon''ble Apex Court''s judgement even though not under Rent Control Act, would contemplate only regular appeal and not R.C.A.
36. For the purpose of the disposal of these revisions, my discussion supra would reveal that deciding on that big issue is not necessary. The
dismissal order passed by the Rent Controller in EAs can never be termed as decrees because he never dealt with any application under Order 21
Rule 99 of C.P.C and for that matter, he never also treated them as the ones under Order 21 Rule 99 of C.P.C. Whereupon, the appellate
authority being the higher authority interfered and rectified the mistake committed by the Rent Controller and the bailiffs and in RCAs no such plea
of jurisdiction also was taken by the revision petitioner herein. Fraud vitiates all proceedings and any forum at any stage can treat such acts borne
out of fraud as non est and rectify the illegality.
37. The Honourable Apex Court in the judgement in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Ramesh Gandhi, held as under:
25.This Court on more than one occasion held that fraud vitiates everything including acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, this Court
observed as follows:(SCC p.2, para 1)
1. ''Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal'' observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the
settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a
judgment/decree _ by the first Court or by the highest Court _ has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It cann be
challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.
26. Again in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt.of A.P.this Court reviewed the law on this position and reiterated the principle. In paras 38 and 39 it
was held as follows: SCC pp.236-37
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties
and an order is passed in favour of the applicant plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where
this Court does not dismiss SLP but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a
judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All others passed by the
Courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to
approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
38. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by
practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot
be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree
or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non
est by every court, superior or inferior.''
27. If a judgment obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and is to be treated as non est by every court, supeior or inferior, it would be
strange logic to hear that an enquiry into the question whether a judgment was secured by playing fraud on the court by not disclosing the
necessary facts relevant for the adjudication of the controversy before the court is impermissible. From the above judgments, it is clear that such an
examination is permissible. Such a principle is required to be applied with greater emphasis in the realm of publc law jurisdiction as the mischief
resulting from such fraud has larger dimension affecting the larger public interest.
28. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the judgment under appeal that no court can examine the correctness of the contents of the impugned
FIR, is unsustainable and without any basis in law. The very complaint in the FIR is that the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, as affirmed by
this Court, is a consequence of a deliberate and dishonest suppression of the relevant facts necessary for adjudicating the rights and obligations of
the parties to the said litigation.
29. Coming to the question as to what amounts to securing a judgment by playing fraud in the court, in Chengalvaraya Naidu, this Court
categorically held that the non-disclosure of all the necessary facts tantamounts to playing fraud on the courts. In para 6 of the said judgment, it was
held as follows:
6......If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as
on the opposite party.
38. This Court, exercising revisional powers u/s 25 of C.P.C, entertained the revisions by way of correcting the error and setting aside the illegality
committed by the Rent Controller and the bailiffs concerned and passed orders and in such a case, the question of deciding on that big issue as to
whether normally the order passed under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C.should be appealed before the regular civil appellate Court or before the Rent
Control Appellate Authority, does not arise now. As such, I leave that issue open at present.
39. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would put forth and set forth his arguements to the effect that this Court, in the event of finding
fault with the Rent Controller for the method and manner in which he conducted the EAs, and remanding the matter, the status-quo-presente
should be ordered to be maintained by both and redelivery should not be ordered and if so done, then the valuable right of the revision petitioner
would be affected and there would be no protection of the right of the revision petitioner over the property.
40. Whereupon the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the revision petitioner is having no vested right to retain the fruit of the
illegal procedure followed by the bailiffs of the Court and consequently by the Rent Controller, and deprive the respondents of their right to
reoccupy the premises.
41. I am of the considered view that it is quite obvious and axiomatic that but for the erroneous action of the bailiffs of the Court and the Rent
Controller, the six second respondents herein would have continued to occupy the premises and as such, status-quo ante has to be restored and
thereafter, it is for the revision petitioner to work out his remedy in the way known to law.
42. I could also see considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the six second respondents herein that once the Court is
convinced of the fact that there was wrongful dispossession of her clients, then, necessarily that has to be rectified and status-quo ante has to be
restored in the form of ordering redelivery in their favour.
43. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised a pertinent point as to which portion of the property is going to be
restored to the six second respondents herein, for which, the answer is clear that here this revisonal Court is ceased of only six revisions and there
are six second respondents and they approached with their respective EAs, specifying their respective shop numbers, over which they are having
their own identity and they could identify to the Court Bailiffs, at the time of redelivery, which cannot be disputed by the revision petitioner herein,
and accordingly, with the help of the rent Controller-Executing Court directly, by all means, within a month, as per this order of High Court, should
put the six second respondents herein in possession in those areas, subject to the following conditions:
(i) They should maintain their respective shop premises as such without effective any change.
(ii) On restoration they should not modify the structure or encumber or in any manner put the premises for any different use;
(iii) They should also undertake that in the event of them ultimately losing in the litigative process, could hand over possession, as per the Court
order to the person concerned, without driving him to seek eviction through execution and to that effect necessary affidavit also should be filed
within ten days.
44. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would also raise a contention as to how the respondents could be allowed to occupy without
any liability on their part to deposit any rent.
45. I could see that necessary orders also should be passed in that regard.
46. The learned counsel for the respondents herein would state that there is no evidence adduced regarding the quantum of the rent. In such a
case, I am of the considered view that since each of the six second respondents herein were occupying small portions and that they were doing fish
and also vegetable vending business, as an interim measure, each one could be directed to deposit Rs. 500/-(rupees five hundred) per month in the
lower Court from the date of they be put in possession of the premises concerned.
Accordingly, I am of the considered view that all the revision petitions should be disposed of with the aforesaid conditions and accordingly, it is
ordered.
38. After redelivery in favour of the six second respondents herein, the revision petitioner herein could file an application under Order 21 Rule 97
of C.P.C., citing them as the respondents therein and the Rent Controller shall do well to see that those applications are treated like suits, as
observed by me supra, and dispose them of within a time frame of four months from that date.
39. Redelivery shall be given by the Rent Controller directly as per this order without any more procedure to be adopted, as expeditiously as
possible, preferably, within a month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
43. In the result, the civil revision petitions are disposed of accordingly. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petitions are closed.
