@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
V. Kanagaraj, J.@mdashThough all the above three writ petitions have been filed by different concerns, the first respondent in all the above writ
petitions being the Union of India, represented by its Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi and the second
respondent in W.P. No. 10747 of 1990 is the Superintendent of Central Excise, Sivakasi, the second respondent in W.P. No. 13580 of 1993 is
the Superintendent of Central Excise, Sathoor Range, Sathoor and the second respondent in W.P. No. 13581 of 1993 is the Superintendent of
Customs and Central Excise, Sathoor Range II, Sathoor and further the legal question and the relief sought for in all the three writ petitions being
one and the same they are jointly heard and a common order is passed.
2. In all the above writ petitions, the petitioners would pray for a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents to apply the Notification No.
175/66, dated 1-3-1986 without reference to the amending Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989 issued by the first respondent herein in so
far as the petitioners are concerned.
3. For easy reference and for the sake of convenience, W.P. No. 10747 of 1990, W.P. No. 13580 of 1993 and W.P. No. 13581 of 1993 are
respectively hereinafter referred to as the first, second and third writ petitions and the petitioners therein as the first petitioner, second petitioner and
third petitioner respectively.
4. So far as the first writ petition above is concerned, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner would submit that it is a
Partnership firm and a licensee under the Central Excise and Salt Act (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') for the purpose of manufacture of
Potassium Chlorate, which is an excisable item under Chapter 28 of the Central Excise Tariff and they obtained Small Scale Industries Certificate
from the Department of Industries and Commerce on 8-12-1987; that the plant and machinery of the industry should not exceed Rs. 35,00,000/-
for the issue of SSI Certificate; that the Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, Madras by its S.O. No. 7350/CS (2) 88
dated 28-3-1988 had sanctioned Rs. 5,43,360/- as Central Investment Subsidy for the capital investment of building and plant & machinery of Rs.
36,22,459/- and that the State Bank of India, Kovilpatti Branch by its SIB No. 412, dated 30-12-1988 had sanctioned Rs. 28,00,000/- as Term
Loan and working capital facilities.
5. So far as the second writ petition above is concerned, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner would submit that it is a
Private Limited Company; that it started manufacturing Potassium Chlorate in the year 1988 having purchased the land, registering for sales tax
under TNGST Act and completing the construction of the industry respectively on 28-7-1988, 15-9-1988 and 1-9-1988; that the SSI Certificate
(Provisional) was issued by the Department of Industry and Commerce, Virudhunagar on 29-7-1988 and made permanent on 29-11-1989 and
observing such other formalities, the petitioner applied for the sanction of loan of Rs. 33,00,000/- with the Karoor Vysya Bank, Kovilpatti and the
Bank has sanctioned the abovesaid amount and disbursed Rs. 32,24,950/- on 20-2-1989 and commenced the production on 25-10-1989.
6. So far as the third writ petition above is concerned, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner would submit that it is a
Partnership firm and it started manufacturing unit of Potassium Chlorate in the year 1988 having purchased the land on 22-8-1988; that the Sales
Tax Department issued the Certificate of Registration on 22-2-1988 under the TNGST Act and CST Act; that the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control
Board, Madras has issued consent on 12-5-1988 and it is valid up to 11-5-1994 after the renewal; that the Department of Industries and
Commerce has issued provisional Small Scale Industries Registration Certificate on 18-8-1988; that the permanent SSI Certificate was issued on
6-9-1989; that the Central Excise Department has issued L4 licence on 17-5-1989 and the petitioner has commenced the production on 2-9-
1989.
7. In all the three writ petitions, the legal question involved since being one and the same, it has been pleaded in common, the sum and substance of
which is that the first respondent under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules issued the Notification No. 175/86 dated 1-3-1986 giving
exemptions to the first clearances of the excisable goods of the description specified in the Annexure to the Notification (specified goods) up to the
value of Rs. 20,00,000/- and concessional duty on subsequent clearances in the case of manufacturer having clearances all excisable goods not
exceeding two crores of rupees in the preceding year, subject to certain conditions; that under Notification No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986, the
Potassium Chlorate which falls under Chapter 28 of the Central Excise Tariff and classified under the subheading 2829.10 was exempt from excise
duty subject to the conditions mentioned in the abovesaid Notification for SSI Units; that the first respondent by Notification No. 142/89, dated
16-5-1989 without any reason arbitrarily amended the Notification No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 and as per the amendment, the Potassium
Chlorate, which falls under sub-heading 2829.10 alone has been denied exemption from payment of excise duty. Hence, contending that the
Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989 amending the Notification No. 175/86 issued for the benefit of Small Scale Industries is bad in law, all
the petitioners have come forward to file the above writ petitions seeking the relief extracted supra.
8. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the first writ petition, it would be submitted that the petitioner therein applied for L4
licence on 2-3-1990 and the same was issued on 9-3-1990 for manufacture of Potassium Chlorate; that though the Notification No. 175/86 gives
concession to Small Scale Industries including Potassium Chlorate, the Government withdrew the concession extended to Potassium Chlorate by
issuing amending Notification No. 142/89; that the Government as a policy decision has thought this commodity under physical control with
specific rate of duty of Rs. 5/- per Kg., consequent to which the Central Excise Notification 175/86 was amended by Notification No. 142/89,
dated 16-5-1989 to remove the Potassium Chlorate falling under sub-heading 2829.10 from the scope of eligibility under Notification No. 175/86;
that the Central Excise licence was issued to the unit only on 9-3-1990 long after the introduction of the amended Notification; that the decision
was a policy matter decided by the Government on various circumstances and hence there is no arbitrariness involved; that consequent to increase
in excise duty on Potassium Chlorate from 15% ad valorem to Rs. 5/-per Kg. in 1989 Budget on reports received from field formations that there
has bean proliferation of units in the Small Scale Industries Sector for manufacture of Potassium Chlorate and this trend of proliferation started on
account of wide duty difference between the organised sector units and the units in the Small Scale Sector which were availing the exemption under
Notification No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 and this led to considerable loss of revenue as more and more numbers of SSI units started
manufacturing Potassium Chlorate; that further the Department of Chemicals and Petro-chemicals had recommended that besides the revenue
considerations, Potassium Chlorate is an explosive and hazardous chemical whose production should not be encouraged in the SSI Sector and
taking into account all these factors, the Government of India have issued Notification No. 142 of 1989, dated 16-5-1989 so as to exclude
Potassium Chlorate, from the purview of Small Scale exemption scheme; that the petitioner''s single unit alone is not affected but all the Potassium
Chlorate manufacturers in the Small Scale Sector in the countries are affected and hence the petitioner''s claim that he has been put under grave
hardship and prejudice is not correct and it is only to mislead this Court. With such and other averments, the respondents would pray to dismiss
the writ petition as devoid of merits.
9. In the common counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the second and third writ petitions above, besides emphasizing what has
been averred in the counter affidavit filed in the first writ petition, it would further be contended that it is well settled that under the General Clauses
Act, an authority which has the power to issue Notification has the undoubted power to rescind or modify the said Notification in the like manner,
which is ascertained u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act; that it has been held by the Patna High Court in the case of Khas Karanpura Collieries
Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, that ""Inequality even if any, resulting from two different enactments made by two different
legislatures is not liable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution of India""; that the applicability of the Article 14 of the Constitution providing
for ""equality before Law"" to a large extent depends upon the question of fact as to whether the commodities treated differently were of a similar
character or not; that since Potassium Chlorate is an explosive and hazardous chemical; that it was singled out by the respondents from other
commodities falling under sub-heading of the Chapter 28 and hence, the averments that the object of the first respondent to extend the protection
to the SSI are not eligible for exemption are not maintainable; that this Court in Jayprakash Match Works, Kovilpatti and Others Vs. Union of
India and Others, has observed that the ""Government''s policy cannot be questioned by Courts""; that it is not open to the Court to pronounce
either on the wisdom or propriety of the Government Policy; that the Court''s role is confined to adjudge the constitutional validity and to see
whether the powers conferred are exercised bona fide or mala fide; that the High Court of Bombay in a case reported in 1984 (17) E.L.T. 281
has remarked that the Government is competent to amend or withdraw the exemption and such power is not arbitrary; that the exemption granted
by the Government only by way of concession and it is revokable at any time; that the Notification issued u/s 5A of the Act has statutory force and
validity; that since the Notification had been issued under delegated legislative powers, it is within the meaning of Section 57 of the Indian Evidence
Act and hence the amendment Notification 142/89 is legal, lawful and reasonable; that the withdrawal of exemption by Notification is not against
the rules of promissory estoppel, when exemption is not granted for any fixed period of time; that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to
compel the Government to continue the exemption as in terms of Section 5A of the Act, which underlines the importance of the common good viz.
public interest, which dominates the economic scene. On such and other grounds, the respondents would pray for dismissal of the above two writ
petitions.
10. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the above writ petitions, besides laying emphasis on what the
petitioners pleaded in the writ petitions would lament that among all the goods specified in the Notification No. 175/86 dated 1-3-1986 the
exemption granted to Potassium Chlorate alone was withdrawn in the Amendment Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989 without any valid or
tangible reason offered and it caused great loss to the petitioners, who established the industries for the production of the said item mainly based on
the subsidy announced by the Government of India and would say that the withdrawal of the same all of a sudden is not only arbitrary,
discriminatory in nature but also violative of the rules of promissory estoppel; that while all the goods falling under Chapter 28 have been
exempted, only the exemption granted to Potassium Chlorate has been withdrawn from the subsidy thereby jeopardising the petitioners and
crippling their industrial activity by the introduction of the Amendment u/s 5A of the Act, which empowers the first respondent to grant exemption
from duty of excise. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite a decision of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in Sun Paper Mills Ltd.
v. Union of India and Ors. reported in Reports of Sales (1991) 80 Tax Cas. `1 while dealing with withdrawal of certain concessions granted u/s
8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, it has been held therein:
the proceedings of the Board produced by the department giving reasons for the withdrawal of concessions, referred only to concessions given
u/s 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and made no reference to Section 8(2)(b) of the Act, under which provision the concession in
question was given. Item 10 of the withdrawal Notification was, therefore, included by non-application of mind, and was, therefore, vitiated.
Citing the above judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioners in all the above writ petitions would pray for allowing the writ petitions as prayed
for.
11. In reply, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would argue that it was by Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989, the
concession was withdrawn; that in the second writ petition above, the petitioner commenced production on 25-10-1989 and in the third writ
petition above, the petitioner commenced production on 2-8-1989 and they were fully aware that the concession was withdrawn by that time and
that because of the earlier Notification, more number of persons started producing Potassium Chlorate and there arose a price disparity. At this
juncture, the learned counsel would rely on a decision of the Apex Court delivered in Union of India Vs. Paliwal Electricals (P) Ltd. and another,
wherein dealing with the same Notification No. 175/86-CE. and the exemption Notification issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules (now
Section 5A of the Central Excises and Salt Act), the Apex Court held :
...Exemption Notification and the terms and conditions prescribed therein represent the policies of the Government evolved to sub-serve public
interest and public revenue.... The power of exemption is a potent weapon in the hands of the Central Government to regulate and manage the
economy and to achieve the various social and economic objectives of the State.... Power to grant exemption is part and parcel of the enactment
and is meant to further the objects of the enactments, however, subject to the condition that they are not ultra vires of the Act/or Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
The Apex Court relied on its own earlier judgment delivered in Union of India and Ors. v. Jalyan Udyog and Anr. reported in 1994 (1) SCC 319
wherein dealing with Section 25 of the Customs Act which is in pari materia with Rule 8. It has been observed :
It is a power given to the Central Government to be exercised in public interest. Such a provision has become a standard feature in several
enactments and in particular, taxing enactments. It is equally well settled by now that the power of taxation can be used not merely for raising
revenue but also to regulate the economy, to encourage or discourage as the situation may call for, the import and export of certain goods as also
for serving the social objectives of the State [Vide Elel Hotels and Investments Limited and Others Vs. Union of India, ], Sri Srinivasa Theatre and
Others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, and Subhash Photographics and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Since the
Parliament cannot constantly monitor the needs of and the emerging trends in the economy and is in no position to engage itself in day-to-day
regulation and adjustment of import-export trade accordingly, power is conferred upon the Central Government to provide for exemption from
duty of goods, either wholly or partly, and with or without conditions, as may be called for in public interest. We see no warrant for reading any
limitation into this power. If the public interest demands that the exemption should be absolute, the Central Government can do so. Similarly, if the
public interest demands that the exemption should be granted only subject to certain conditions it can provide such conditions. Then again if the
public interest demands that conditions specified should relate to a stage subsequent to the date of clearance it can do so. The guiding factor is the
public interest.
12. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel is an unreported judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Union of India and Ors. v. Mahavir
Vanaspati Company in Civil Appeal No. 7439 of 1996, dated 15-7-1997 which is extracted hereunder:
These appeals are directed against the judgments of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated February 13,1991 whereby the Writ Petitions
filed by the respondents have been allowed. In the said Writ Petitions the respondents had challenged the validity of the notification dated August
25, 1989 issued under Rule 57K of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, whereby the earlier notification dated March 1, 1987 was rescinded. By the
notification dated March 1, 1997 it was provided that if certain inputs, i.e. specified vegetables were used in the manufacture of vanaspati falling
under subheading No. 1504.00 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, credit at a certain rate could be utilised for payment of duty
on the said final products. By the impugned judgments the High Court has felt that the said notification dated August 25, 1989 does not take away
the right of the respondent to utilise the credit earned prior to August 25, 1989 for payment of excise duty on vanaspati till the credit is exhausted
and has allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The High Court has placed reliance
on its earlier judgment in Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Writ Petition No. 11654 of 1989, decided on January 22,1990. In the
case of Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. (supra) the High Court has disagreed with the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Kasinka
Trading and another, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and another, , and Shrijee Sales Corporation and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), , wherein
this Court has approved the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Bombay Conductors & Electrical & Anr. (supra). In these
circumstances, the impugned judgments of the High Court cannot be upheld and have to be set aside. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the
impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside and the Writ Petitions Nos. 14078 of 1989 and 13260 of 1989 filed by the respondents are
dismissed. No order as to costs.
13. The learned counsel for the respondents would further argue that admittedly, the petitioners commenced production in 1990 and they say that
for preparation like construction, power supply etc., it took three years for them to get ready with; that the Supreme Court confirmed the
Notification No. 175/86; that when the petitioners challenged the amended Notification No. 142/89, they were not considered; that it is the Writ
of Mandamus directing to comply with Notification No. 175/86 without reference to Notification No. 142/89 relying on the judgment of the Apex
Court reported in 1986 SC 515 wherein it is that even though the Notification may be a piece of Subordinate Legislation it is open to the scrutiny
of the Court the Legislator must satisfy the Court that it is not unreasonable and arbitrary, which cannot be applied here and would pray to dismiss
all the above writ petitions.
14. The short question that falls for consideration in all these writ petitions is, whether the amending Notification No. 142/89 dated 16-5-1989
issued by the first respondent withdrawing the concession granted already under Notification No. 175/86 dated 1-3-1986 is improper, arbitrary,
discriminatory or in violation of rules of promissory estoppel, as it is claimed on the part of the petitioners?
15. Assessing the facts and circumstances as pleaded on the part of the petitioners and the respondents as well, respectively in their writ petitions
and the counter affidavits and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, the case of the
petitioners as brought forth in a nutshell is that based on the Notification issued by the first respondent in No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 since
certain categories were exempted to the first clearances of the excisable goods up to the value of twenty lakhs of rupees and on concessional duty,
the subsequent clearances not exceeding two crores of rupees in the preceding year subject to certain conditions and Potassium Chlorate being
one among those items specified for such exemptions from excise duty, they made all preparations to start industries for the manufacture of
Potassium Chlorate in Small Scale Sector and besides applying and obtaining such certificates, which were required for not only getting exemption
from excise duty but also to get all the subsidy provided with for manufacture of such item, started establishing the industrial units raising loans from
various sources and having very many commitments and applied for the L4 licences for manufacture of the said item, but by the amending
Notification No. 142/89, the first respondent Government removed the Potassium Chlorate falling under sub-heading 2829.10 from the scope of
eligibility and such a sudden decision on the part of the first respondent, according to the petitioners, is not only arbitrary but also discriminatory
besides being violative of the rules of promissory estoppel as a result of which, the petitioners have been subjected to irreparable loss and hardship
and hence they would pray for the reliefs extracted (supra).
16. On the contrary, on the part of the respondents, it would be submitted that the petitioners applied for L4 licences either in late 1989 or early
1990 but prior to such applications by the petitioners, as early as on 16-5-1989 itself, by the amendment Notification, the respondents have
removed the Potassium Chlorate from the scope of eligibility under the original Notification No. 175/86 granting exemption from excise duty and
the decision was a policy decision made by the Government of India on various circumstances and hence there is no arbitrariness or high-
handedness involved.
17. It would reasonably be argued on the part of the respondents that in 1989, the budget on reports received from field forms revealed that there
had been proliferation of units in the Small Scale Industries Sector for manufacture of Potassium Chlorate and this trend of proliferation started on
account of wide duty difference between the organised sector units and the units in the Small Scale Sector, which were availing the exemption
under Notification No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 and this led to considerable loss of revenue as more and more number of SSI units started
manufacturing Potassium Chlorate; that further the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals had recommended that besides the revenue
considerations, Potassium Chlorate is an explosive and hazardous chemical whose production should not be encouraged in the SSI Sector and
taking into account all these factors, the Government of India have issued Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989, so as to exclude Potassium
Chlorate from the purview of Small Scale exemption scheme and in such event, when it is not the petitioners'' units alone which got affected, but all
the industries of like nature manufacturing Potassium Chlorate as a Small Scale Sector and when the Government had changed the policy on
various grounds, there is no question of the petitioners'' claiming that they have been put to hardship or could they plead any discrimination when
there is no discrimination at all made among the producers of Potassium Chlorate in Small Scale Industries and hence would plead to dismiss the
writ petitions.
18. It would further be submitted on the part of the respondents that u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act, the authority which has the power to issue
a notification has the undoubted power to rescind or modify the same. In the like manner, they would also cite the judgment delivered by the Patna
High Court in the case of Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, wherein it is held that ""Inequality even if any,
resulting from two different enactments made by two different legislatures is not liable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution of India"". Citing
yet another judgment delivered in Jayprakash Match Works, Kovilpatti and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, wherein it is held that the
Government''s policy cannot be questioned by Courts"", the learned counsel for the respondents would argue that it is not open to the Court to
pronounce either on the wisdom or propriety of the Government policy and that the Court''s role is confined to adjudge the constitutional validity
and to see whether the powers conferred are exercised bona fide or mala fide. The other judgment cited on the part of the respondents is one
reported in 1984 (17) E.L.T. 281 wherein also it is held that the Government is competent to amend or withdraw the exemption and such power is
not arbitrary. The learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the exemption granted by the Government is only by way of concession
and it is revokable at any time and would pray for dismissal of the above writ petitions.
19. So far as the competence of the Government to issue such notifications is concerned, it has been done u/s 5A of the Act. There is no doubt
that the first respondent Government is within such delegated legislative powers and the notification issued has all statutory force and validity. Even
on the part of the petitioners, they do not question the validity or wisdom of the Government of India, so far as it had issued the first Notification in
No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 but their attack is only the amended Notification No. 142/89, thereby withdrawing the exemption granted under the
first notification for Potassium Chlorate. When the petitioners agree that the first notification had been issued validly by the Government, it goes
without saying that the same Government have all legislative competence to issue the withdrawal Notification No. 142/89, thereby withdrawing the
exemption granted already in favour of the industries of such nature manufacturing Potassium Chlorate. Since valid reasons have been offered on
the part of the Government, as it comes to be seen from the arguments advanced on the part of the respondents that on account of proliferation of
units of such nature in the Small Scale Industries Sector, since such spiraling of units in causing the production of a single item in abundance is likely
to cause imbalance in the marketability and maintenance of prices on par with similar items, the Government in order to control not only the
excessive production but also in realisation of the danger caused in allowing such massive production of Potassium Chlorate, which is an explosive
and hazardous chemical, that has to be kept under control, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Department of Chemicals and
Petro-chemicals, had introduced the amending Notification No. 142/89 with the general honest thought and common good of all and not in a
narrow snese, and hence this Court does not see any arbitrariness or high-handedness involved in such a right decision made on the part of the first
respondent at the right time and context.
20. Coming to the question of discrimination, the petitioners would argue that among all other items which were exempted under the original
Notification No. 175/86, it is only relating to the manufacture of Potassium Chlorate, the exemption had been withdrawn and it is nothing but a
discrimination in law. But the explanation offered on the part of the respondents would show that it was only regarding the Potassium Chlorate, a
hazardous and dangerous item, there had been proliferation of units in the Small Scale Industries Sector as it came to be revealed from the budget
on reports and not any other item exempted under the first Notification No. 175/86 and moreover, the recommendations of the Department of
Chemicals and Petro-chemicals are only pointing towards the manufacture of this item stating thereby that its production should not be encouraged
in the SSI Sector and no such objections were raised relating to other items for which the exemption was allowed. This explanation is quite
convincing and reasonable. Moreover, by the amending Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989, since all such industries manufacturing
Potassium Chlorate as SSI Units in the country have been made bereft of the concession, the petitioners themselves cannot plead discrimination
since they have not at all been discriminated among other units of the same nature or against any other industry of like nature and in withdrawing the
concession, so far as the reasons assigned on the part of the first respondent Government, is concerned it is on sound reason and the same is not
discriminatory and hence at this score also, the petitioners cannot succeed.
21. The third point alleged on the part of the petitioners is that the amended notification had been introduced by the first respondent in violation of
the rules of promissory estoppel. On facts, it is an open case of the petitioners that they have come forward to apply for the L4 licence only after
the introduction of the amended Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989 and in such event, whatever commitments they might have had prior or
after such Notification, they would not bind the respondents Government since they were not parties to such of the acts perpetrated on the part of
the petitioners at volition and on their own speculation. When the Government changes its industrial policy in the larger interest of the nation as a
whole, such hardships by certain individuals, which were the results of their own anticipation, are inevitable. There is no promise made on the part
of the first respondent through its Notification No. 175/86 declaring thereby that those concessions for items of goods mentioned therein would
exist either for a shorter or a longer period than what it had been allowed to exist and hence when there is no such promise, regarding the time of
the existence of the concessions or exemptions made and since the Government is at liberty to withdraw the same when it changes its policy, no
estoppel would come into play and hence this argument that the withdrawal of the exemptions announced under Notification No. 175/86 by the
amending Notification No. 142/89 cannot also be termed to have been introduced in violation of the rules of promissory estoppel and on this
ground also, the case of the petitioners falls to the ground.
21. In view of the above discussions, there is absolutely no infirmity or inconsistency or patent error of law or perversity in approach so far as the
introduction of the Notification No. 142/89, dated 16-5-1989 by the first respondent and the withdrawal of exemption under this Notification that
had already been granted under Notification No. 175/86 by the first respondent so far as the item of Potassium Chlorate is concerned and it is
perfectly within the competence of the first respondent Government and on valid, tangible and convincing reasons offered on the part of the
respondents, the amended Notification had been issued. In these circumstances, there is absolutely no need to issue any such Writ of Mandamus
directing the respondents to apply Notification No. 175/86, dated 1-3-1986 without reference to the amending Notification No. 142/89, dated
16-5-1989 issued by the first respondent as prayed for by the petitioners herein.
In result, all the above writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs.
