@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Natesan, J.@mdashThese two revision petitions are preferred by a tenant, and arise out of proceedings instituted under the Madras Cultivating
Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The petitioner had to pay arrears of rent Rs. 79-24. He was directed to deposit the amount in Court on or before
3rd April, 1962. He paid part of the amount towards arrears and was granted time till 17th April, 1962, for the payment of the balance. He had
applied for more time, but was not granted. On 7th April 1962, when the matter was called in Court, he was absent and the arrears had not been
paid, with the result that the Court passed orders directing eviction of the petitioner, The next day the petitioner came up with an application setting
out that he was under the impression that time had been granted till 18th April 1962 and had noted the date of hearing as 18th April 1962. The
Revenue Court rejected this application for setting aside the ex parte order in the view that it was his duty to have noted the data correctly, and,
secondly, the Revenue Court had not been conferred with the power to set aside ex parte orders. One revision is directed against the order made
on 17th April 1962 directing eviction. The other revision petition is directed against the order refusing to set aside the ex parte order for eviction.
With reference to the first one, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that the Court having granted time till 17th April 1962, the
petitioner, under law, had the whole of 17th April 1962, for making payment. It may be that for the purpose of administrative convenience the time
during which amounts would be received may be limited. It may be that out of office hours, he may not be able to comply with the order. But this
practical difficulty it is contended by the petitioner, does not mean that he had not the whole of the day for making the payment. The argument is
that, having had the whole of the day for payment, no order on nonpayment could be passed on 17th April 1962 itself. For this position, reliance is
placed on two decisions of this Court and, in my opinion, they directly cover the point : T.A. Janakumara Nainar Vs. Periaswamy Goundan and
Others, and M. Ct. Muthiah Vs. The Deputy Controller of Estate Duty, In T.A. Janakumara Nainar Vs. Periaswamy Goundan and Others, , in an
execution application filed on 24th September 1945, which was in time allowed by law time for compliance with certain orders of the Court was
extended periodically and finally time was granted till 2nd November 1945. But on 2nd November 1945 itself, it was dismissed for non-
compliance with the orders. this Court held, on appeal therefrom, that the Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the application on the 2nd
November 1945 itself. The decisions of this Court in Perumal Nadar v. Sivamanji Nadachi (1915) 39 Mad. 583 = 2 L.W. 729, Muthu Chettiar v.
Narayana Chettiar 51 Mad. 672 = 28 L.W. 297 and Chinniah Chettiar v. Kumaraswamiah 1933 M.W.N. 88 = 64 L.W. 431 were followed. The
principle of the decision is that, when the Court fixes a date for the fulfilment of a certain condition, the person on whom that obligation is imposed,
will have the whole of that day for complying with the order. It follows that in the present case the Court had no jurisdiction to pass an ex parte
order directing eviction on the 17th April 1962 itself.
2. On the very next day, the petitioner had come up and submitted to the Court that he had noted 18th April as the date of hearing. On that date
he also deposited the arrears as claimed and produced into Court the challan in proof of compliance, along with the petition for setting aside the ex
parte orders. The Court rejected this application, as already stated, in the view that the Court had no power to set aside ex parte orders. It is
obvious that the attention of the Court was not drawn to the rules framed under the Act empowering the Court not only to pass ex parte orders,
but to set them aside for good cause. R. 8 of the Rules entitled the ""Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Rules 1955,"" provides that every Court
constituted under the Act shall have the powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits and over and above this, certain powers are
particularly set out and of this, R. 8 (ii) (f) is the one which provides for passing of ex parte orders and setting them aside for good cause. R. 8 (ii)
(g) provides the ordering and dismissal for default of appearance and setting aside such orders for good cause. It follows, therefore, that the Court
had ample power and jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order if good cause was shown. Evidently, in the view the Court had no jurisdiction, the
matter has not been gone into fully. It appears to me from the conduct of the petitioner that he must have been under a bona fide impression, and it
is needless to remit the matter back again for deciding this matter. But these proceedings had been necessitated by the petitioner by his own act,
and, in the circumstances, he must pay some cost to the respondent in these proceedings. While allowing both the revision petitions, I direct that
the petitioner shall pay the respondent a sum of Rs. 35 as and for costs in C.R.P. No. 1648 of 1962. The order of eviction is set aside. The
respondent may draw the money deposited by the petitioner in the Revenue Court. There will be no order as to costs in C.R.P. No. 1135 of
1962.
