Lotte Confectionery Co. Ltd. Vs Qrion Corporation And Ors.

Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai Circuit Bench At Kolkata 16 Jul 2018 ORA/317/2013/TM/DEL (2018) 07 IPAB CK 0006
Bench: Division Bench
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

ORA/317/2013/TM/DEL

Hon'ble Bench

Manmohan Singh, J; Sanjeev Kumar Chaswal, Technical Member

Advocates

Shivani R., Ipsita M., Anuradha Salhotra

Acts Referred
  • Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Section 9, 9(1)(a), 9(1)(b), 9(1)(c), 18, 18(1), 47, 57

Judgement Text

Translate:

Sanjeev Kumar Chaswal, Technical Member

The applicant filed the Rectification application for removal of Trademark ""CUSTARD"" registered under No. 1444980 in class 30 registered under the

name of the respondent company

FACTS

1. The Applicant Company was established in the year 1967 in Korea, it is South Korean subsidiary company and first company of the Lotte family of

Companies founded by Mr. Shin Kyukhjo and is the Lotte Group's flagship company leader in Foods and Beverages category. The Applicant parent

company i.e. Lotte Group has its presence in Food & Beverages Distribution, Tourism and Leisure business; Heavy Chemicals, Construction and

Machinery Information, Communication and Electronics, Trading and Services apart from Welfare Research and Support Services. The Applicant's

main line products are Chewing Gun (Lotte Xylitol, Lotte Juicy & Fresh, Lotte Spearmint, Lotte Fresh Mint, Flavono, White & E, Spout Cafe Coffee)

Candy, Biscuits, Chocolates, Snacks, Ice cream and health care products. Today the Applicant is the No. 3 chewing gum manufacturer in the world.

The Applicant's Indian subsidiary, Lotte India Corporation Limited was established in the year 2004 and has been carrying on extensive business in

India ever since. Today, the Applicant has acquired an impeccable reputation and importance in the field of confectionary not only abroad but also in

India.

SUBMISSIONS BY APPLICANT

2. The respondent has obtained the registration of the trademark 'CUSTARD' vide registration no 1444980 in class 30 since the year 10th of April

2006, the said registration of the respondent is subsisting and continuing till date. The respondent has obtained registration of the non-distinctive and of

the generic term for the goods falling in class 30.

3. The impugned mark consists of word ""CUSTARD"" that is devoid of distinctive character in the trade, since the same is wholly descriptive. The

word 'CUSTARD' is descriptive and the generic name for the goods in class 30 and such use is common to the trade. Apart from it is a dictionary

word of ordinary and descriptive usage, so it is not capable of distinguishing the goods of the Respondent from any other person. The mark applied for

is incapable of acquiring a distinctive character by any amount of use, whatsoever. The mark 'CUSTARD' wrongfully reregistered in the name of the

Respondent is devoid of any distinctive character and not capable of distinguishing its goods or services from any other person during trade. The

Registration of the impugned mark is liable to be dismissed being in violation of Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

4. The mark 'CUSTARD' is commonly used in the trade and indicates the quality and characteristic of the goods on which the said mark is applied,

and word custard is indicative of the nature, quality and character of the goods namely ""Chocolates, Biscuits, Cookies, Crackers, Wafers,

Confectionery, Corn Chips, Bread Pastries, Cakes, Pies, Puddings, Sherbets, Ice Creams, Candy, Caramels, Chewing Gum (Not for Medical

Purpose)"" applied by the Respondent. As such the trade mark 'CUSTARD' registered by the Respondent is liable to be dismissed being in violation of

Section 9(1)(b) of the Act.

5. To elaborate further the mark 'CUSTARD' of the respondent the dictionary meaning of the term 'CUSTARD' is ""A dish consisting of milk, eggs,

flavouring and sometimes sugar, boiled or baked until set"". Hence, Custard is a culinary preparation made by blending eggs with milk or cream.

Custard is mainly used as a dessert or as a base for a dessert or as a dessert sauce. Further, pastry cream or creme patisserie, which is used as a

filling for classic desserts like cream puffs and eclairs, is made by adding some sort of starch, such as flour, to the custard. Custard is usually sweet,

but it can also be savoury. Quiche is an example of a savoury custard.

6. The term 'CUSTARD' is used in all confectionary goods, and due to this reason, it is descriptive of the goods registered by the applicant. The

confectioners' custard made with a combination of milk or cream, egg yolks, fine sugar, flour or some other starch and usually a flavouring such as

vanilla, chocolate or lemon. Even cooled custard is the active ingredient of making ice-cream with the help of egg yolks milk and/or cream. The Yema

Custard Candy is made with the help of the egg yolk, condensed milk, chopped nuts, jack fruit and custard. The registration of the impugned mark in

relation to the impugned goods is contrary to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act since the Respondent was not and cannot be the bona fide

proprietor of the impugned mark in relation to the impugned goods and hence to the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act.

7. The trade mark 'CUSTARD' of the Respondent is a generic term and the said generic expression is bonafidely required by the members of trade

and purchasing public in the ordinary course of trade. The adoption and proposed use of the trade mark custard in relation to Chocolates, Biscuits,

Cookies, Crackers, Wafers, Confectionery, Corn Chips, Bread Pastries, Cakes, Pies, Puddings, Sherbets, Ice Creams, Candy, Caramels, Chewing

Gum by the Respondent is likely to cause confusion and/or deception among consumers and the public at large. This mark being a generic expression

cannot be adopted to distinguish goods with which a proprietor of a mark is connected in the course of trade from goods in the case of which no such

connection subsists. Thus, the mark is hit by the provisions of Section 9(1)(c), (2) (a) of the Act and is thus disentitled to registration.

8. The Applicant had filed an application for the registration of the identical trade mark ""CUSTARD"" under No. 757775 on 30-07-1997 in the Trade

Marks Registry Office, Kolkata which was refused by the Registrar on the ground that the same is not distinctive in respect of the goods and hence

no appeal was filed subsequently against the order of the Registrar.

9. It is also submitted that even a public search of the Register of Trade Marks in class 30 reveals the presence of various third-party marks, who

have acquired registration for ""CUSTARD"" only as part of its mark. Further, the Registrar of Trade Marks has granted registrations to the marks by

appending condition of disclaimers against the exclusive right over use of the term ""CUSTARD"" in the said trademarks. Even though the Respondent

has obtained registration of the trade mark ""ORION CUSTARD"" under No. 2705684 in class 30 registered and is valid up to 25/03/2024. This shows

that the Applicant has a genuine concern and objection to registration of the term ""CUSTARD"" per se by the Respondent

10. It is submitted that the Applicant is the aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 47 and 57 of the Act, as the Applicant is under the threat

of an infringement action by the registered proprietor of such a trade mark, if the Respondent finds the Applicant bonafidely using the ""CUSTARD"" to

describe his particular goods in a non-trade mark sense, as the trade mark of the Respondent ""CUSTARD"" on the Register of Trade Marks with

respect to the impugned goods would limit the legal rights of the Applicant; and the trade mark of the Respondent on the Register of Trademarks

would deprive the Applicant and other traders in the same field from using the common word 'CUSTARD' in non-trade mark sense.

11. Both parties had a dispute in Korea, where the marks in question were 'LOTTE CUSTARD' and 'ORION CUSTARD', it was held that custard is

a dessert made of eggs, sugar and milk and is baked, boiled or frozen. Therefore, the mark 'CUSTARD' is non-distinctive and common descriptive

name. Accordingly, the marks were compartmentalised into 'LOTTE AND ORION', and exclusive rights to ""CUSTARD"" were disclaimed.

12. The applicant counsel has referred the citations to buttress his pleadings and arguments in the matter (i) HBI Branded Apparel Limited Inc. v. The

Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks and Hrsi Ms. R. Hema [2009] IPAB 121):- Decided on August 21, 2009.

The Appellant filed application for registrations of the mark BRA-LET under No. 1401104 in class 25 in respects of Brassieres on 23rd November

2005 on propose to be used basis. Objection under Section 9 was raised. Registrar of Trade Marks refused registration holding that the mark

designates the kind and quality of goods and is not capable of distinguishing the appellant's goods from those of others. The appellant appealed against

this order, it was held that any word which may be used to describe the character or quality of goods/services can be used only for such purpose and

not to distinguish the goods/services of one person from those of another. The words which are descriptive of goods are not considered prima facie

capable of distinguishing. The mark BRA-LET is too descriptive.; It has not acquired distinctiveness or is capable of acquiring distinctiveness as the

mark is only proposed to be used. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

In other case of Lal Babu Priyadarshi v. Amritpal Singh: AIR 2016 SC 461 : 2016 (66) PTC 18 [SC]):- Decided on October 27, 2015 Appeal filed

against IPAB order allowing the appeal filed by Amritpal, while setting aside the order passes by Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. The mark

'RAMAYAN' with device of crown in class 3 for incense sticks was applied by Lal Babu. The Respondent claimed that the mark is similar to their

mark ""BADSHAH RAMAYAN' held: the word 'RAMAYAN' represents the title of a book written by Maharishi Valmiki and is considered to be a

religious book in India. Thus, exclusivity over the word for any commodity is not permissible. If any other word had been added as a prefix or suffix,

then the same could have been registerable. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

In other case of Indus League Clothing Limited v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks ([2009] IPAB 136) Application for registration of

'CONTRA FORMALS' for clothing was refused. Contra means against. 'Formals' meaning an evening or formal dress. The mark as a whole

indicates to clothing in casual (not formal) wear. The quantum of use prior to the date of application is not sufficient to make the mark distinctive. It

was held that 'CONTRA FORMALS' is a descriptive word and thus the appeal was dismissed.

In other case of Lincoln Global, Inc. v. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, the Application filed for the mark METASHIELD in respect of arch

welding electrodes in class 9. The Appellant argued that the mark was registered in many countries. It was held that it cannot be ascertained under

what facts and circumstances the registration was granted to the mark in other countries and that cannot be made applicable in this case in India. The

mark is descriptive and was refused registration in the interest of the public at large and to maintain the purity of the Register of Trade Marks as the

mark was not capable of distinguishing the Appellant's goods from those of others.

In other case of Messrs. Hindusthan Development Corporation Ltd. v. The Deputy Registrar of Trademarks and Another AIR 1955 Cal 519) the

Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. Made an application to register the mark ""RASOI"" in respect of hydrogenated coconut oil. The mark was

used by them for less than two years before the filing of the application; it was held the Application was refused on the grounds that the word

RASOI"" in its ordinary significance meant 'cooking, cookery and kitchen, dressed or cooked food'. As applied to hydrogenated oil, the word had a

direct reference to the character and quality of the goods. The evidence of the user adduced by the applicants was not sufficient to establish that the

mark had become distinctive. Even otherwise, the word was such that no amount of evidence could show that it had lost its primary meaning and

become adapted to distinguish. Even if distinctiveness had been established or was not required, registration of such a common word of the language

which others may also legitimately require ought not to be allowed. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

In other case of Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 448 : 1995 (15) PTC 165 (SC), It is a settled principle of law

relating to trade marks that there can be only one mark, one source and one proprietor. It cannot have two origins. In other case of) National Bell Co.

v. Metal Goods Mfg. Col (P) Ltd. (1970) 3 SCC 665 : 1950-2000 (22) PTC(Suppl)(1) 586 (SC) it was held the distinctiveness of a mark is relation to

the goods may be lost in a variety of ways, e.g. by the goods not being capable of being distinguished as the goods of the proprietor.

13. The respondent has made submitted their submissions rebutting the claim of the applicant that the mark 'CUSTARD' of Respondent No. 1 is an

inherently distinctive mark which bears no direct and immediate reference to the goods for which it is used/registered i.e. ""cakes"". It is submitted that

a trade mark can only be considered descriptive if it exclusively consists of marks or indications which describe the goods covered under the trade

mark. Such connection must thus be exclusive and direct. In support of the said contention, the respondent has placed a reliance i on the following

extract from Law of Trade Marks & Passing Off by P. Narayanan, Sixth Edition.

What is capable of distinguishing is a matter of interpretation. Marks which have only an indirect reference to or are suggestive of the character or

quality of the goods may be considered as being capable of distinguishing if not now, in the near future by actual user. Ultimately, what degree of

capability to distinguish is required is a question of fact and degree depending upon the facts of each case.

14. The respondent has place further reliance on the following judicial principles in support of the contentions which vividly enunciate the principles

which determine descriptiveness of a trade mark:

In the case of A.R. Khaleel and Ors. v. Registrar of Trade Marks AIR 1962 Kant 122, while examining descriptiveness of the mark 'SPEED

MASTER' with respect to time pieces and watches, it was observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka held that the word 'SPEED MASTER'

did not have direct reference to the character or quality of the goods (watches) and was therefore a registerable trade mark. It was further held that

the Court was concerned only with the ordinary meaning of the words and special or specific use of the word must be disregarded; that a mere

suggestive significance in connection with the goods would not render it inappropriate for use as a trade mark; that the test was the imagination

involved in the suggestion, that is whether the suggestion was so close and direct that it was apparently descriptive or so remote an subtle that it was

fanciful and not needed by other merchants; that one had to look at the word not in its strict grammatical significance, but as it would represent itself

to the public at large who were to look at it and to form an opinion as to what is connoted. (Keystone Knitting Mills TM (1928)45 RPC 421 at 426);

that such a question was a practical question to be decided by the common understanding of the term amongst those who use it and not by what might

be recondite meaning to be found in dictionaries (Rasoi Cased AIR 1955 Cal 519 to 521); that prima facie, the Register was created for the purpose

of enabling Trade Marks to be upon it; and that it would be very unfortunate if bonafide and honest application for Trade Marks were to be refused on

grounds which were fanciful and which, in a business sense, were unsubstantial.

In the other case of People Interactive (India) Private Limited v. Vivek Pahwa and Ors. 2016 (6) ABR 275 : 2016 (68) PTC 225, 509 [Bom], while

denning a suggestive mark, it was held by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court that ""These marks only hint at a feature or a specialty. The consumer

must, in his mind, make the necessary link between the word and the goods. This class of expression requires no proof of acquisition of a secondary

meaning to proceed to registration.

15. The respondent has submitted that in light of the of the aforesaid contentions and judicial principles it is submitted that the word 'CUSTARD' does

not bear any direct or exclusive reference to the goods with respect it is used/registered and is therefore prima facie distinctive of the goods of

Respondent No. 1.

16. It is further submitted that the Respondent No. 1 has been continuously and extensively using its mark 'CUSTARD' with respect to its goods of

interest since as early as the year 2003. The said mark is presently in use in several countries of the world. The Respondent No. 1 has already

submitted substantial documentary evidence showing continuous use of its said trade mark, since as early as 2003 along with its Counter Statement

filed in the year 2014. It is therefore submitted that the mark has acquired distinctiveness through significant and continuous use and is now exclusively

associated with the goods of Respondent No. 1, as such the mark 'CUSTARD' of the Respondent No. 1 is not only an inherently distinctive mark but

has also acquired distinctiveness through open, continuous and extensive use since as early as 2003.

17. The registrations of the trademark 'CUSTARD' vide application No. 1444980 of the Respondent No. 1 is therefore a valid registration and must

not be expunged from the Trade Marks Register. It is submitted that cancellation of the aforesaid registration will cause irreparable loss and injury to

the business of the Respondent No. 1. The Respondent No. 1 reiterates and reaffirms the contents of its prayer in the Counter Statement.

18. After going through the documents submitted by the respective counsels, in our considerable opinion the applicant has a bonafide case the mark

'CUSTARD' is commonly used in the trade and indicates the quality and characteristic of the goods on which the said mark is applied and word

custard is indicative of the nature, quality and character of the goods namely ""Chocolates, Biscuits, Cookies, Crackers, Wafers, Confectionery, Corn

Chips, Bread Pastries, Cakes, Pies, Puddings, Sherbets, Ice Creams, Candy, Caramels, Chewing Gum (Not For Medical Purpose)"" applied by the

Respondent. As such the trade mark 'CUSTARD' registered by the Respondent is liable to be dismissed being in violation of Section 9(1)(b) 9(1)(c),

(2) (a) of the Act.

19. Further, in our considered opinion even the Registrar of Trade Marks has granted registrations to the marks by appending condition of disclaimers

against the exclusive right over use of the term 'CUSTARD' for the registered trademarks. Even though the Respondent has obtained registration of

the trade mark 'ORION CUSTARD' under No. 2705684 in class 30 registered and are valid up to 25/03/2024. This shows that the Applicant has a

genuine concern and objection to registration of the term 'CUSTARD' per se by the Respondent.

20. We are tending to agree with the citation referred by the applicant in the case of Messrs. Hindusthan Development Corporation Ltd. v. the Deputy

Registrar of Trademarks and Another AIR 1955 Cal 519) the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. Made an application to register the mark

RASOI"" in respect of hydrogenated coconut oil. The mark was used by them for less than two years before the filing of the application; it was held

the Application was refused on the grounds that the word ""RASOI"" in its ordinary significance meant 'cooking, cookery and kitchen, dressed or

cooked food'. As applied to hydrogenated oil, the word had a direct reference to the character and quality of the goods. The evidence of the user

adduced by the applicants was not sufficient to establish that the mark had become distinctive. Even otherwise, the word was such that no amount of

evidence could show that it had lost its primary meaning and become adapted to distinguish. Even if distinctiveness had been established or was not

required, registration of such a common word of the language which others may also legitimately require ought not to be allowed. The appeal was

accordingly dismissed;

21. In the instant case the respondent has obtained the registration of the trademark 'CUSTARD' vide application No. 1444980 in class 30 for the

goods Chocolates, Biscuits, Cookies, Crackers, Wafers, Confectionery, Corn Chips, Bread Pastries, Cakes, Pies, Puddings, Sherbets, Ice Creams,

Candy, Caramels, Chewing Gum and the word 'CUSTARD' is descriptive and the generic name for the goods in class 30 and such use is common to

the trade. Apart from it is a dictionary word of ordinary and descriptive usage, so it is not capable of distinguishing the goods of the Respondent from

any other person. The mark is incapable of acquiring a distinctive character by any amount of use, whatsoever and the mark 'CUSTARD' wrongfully

reregistered in the name of the Respondent is devoid of any distinctive character and not capable of distinguishing its goods or services from any other

person in the course of trade.

22. Further the mark 'CUSTARD' is commonly used in the trade and indicates the quality and characteristic of the goods on which the said mark is

applied, and word custard is indicative of the nature, quality and character of the goods qua ""Chocolates, Biscuits, Cookies, Crackers, Wafers,

Confectionery, Corn Chips, Bread Pastries, Cakes, Pies, Puddings, Sherbets, Ice Creams, Candy, Caramels. As such the trade mark 'CUSTARD'

registered by the Respondent is liable to be dismissed being in violation of Sections 9(1)(b) 9(1)(c), (2) (a) of the Act. As such the registration of the

impugned trademark 'CUSTARD' vide application No. 1444980 in class 30 remains on the register without sufficient cause thus the existence of the

impugned entry in the Register of Trademarks affects the purity of the Register of Trademarks. Keeping in view of the extensive submissions made

herein above by the respective counsels, we are of the considered opinion that the mark is incapable of acquiring a distinctive character by any

amount of use, whatsoever and the mark 'CUSTARD' wrongfully reregistered in the name of the Respondent is devoid of any distinctive character

and not capable of distinguishing its goods or services from any other person in the course of trade thus the impugned registration of trademark

application No. 1444980 in class 30 is contrary to the provisions of Sections 9(1)(b) 9(1)(c), (2) (a) and section 18 of the Act. The registration of the

impugned trademark application No. 1164072 for 'CUSTARD' in class 30 remains on the register without sufficient cause thus the exists No. 1444980

hence of the impugned entry in the Register of Trademarks affects the purity of the Register of Trademarks.

Order as no cost

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