Veeraswami, C.J.@mdashThe common point in these cases is whether cinder is coal and, if it is not, its sale will be subject to multi-point tax. The point is really covered by Varadarajulu Naidu v. State of Madras [1965] 16 S.T.C. 684. There, one of us in detail considered the question and held that cinder was the residue or ash that was left when coal or coke was burnt and was removed of its combustible matter. Reference in that judgment was made to Fletcher v. Fields [1891] 1 Q.B. 790. That was a case decided with reference to the Metropolitan Streets Act, 1867, and there it was held that, looking into the object of the statutory inhibition of loading and unloading coke on or across the footway between certain hours, coke was no more coal than cinders were. We do not think it necessary to reiterate what has been stated by one of us in Varadarajulu Naidu v. State of Madras [1965] 16 S.T.C. 684. Nothing that has been said at the Bar has persuaded us to take a contrary view. We may also mention that the Allahabad High Court in Mahabir Singh Ram Babu v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer [1962] 13 S.T.C. 248 took a similar view. Chiita Reddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 S.T.C. 317 decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court accepted as correct the view in Varadarajulu Naidu v. State of Madras [1965] 16 S.T.C. 684. It is contended that though cinder is the residue of burnt out coal, it may still possess the combustible property. It may perhaps be in a very diluted form. But the fact remains that cinder is not regarded as a combustible matter. Apart from what we have stated, the word "cinder" must be given its commercial meaning and no man who wants to purchase coal would take cinder when it is offered for coal.
2. The tax cases and the writ appeal are dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 100 in each.
