@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. The tenant is aggrieved by the order of eviction concurrently passed against him by the Authorities under the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and
Rent Control Act 1960 (the Act in short). There is a big building on Station Road, Chrompet, Madras-44 and the ground floor is divided into 6
shops and the door numbers are 62 to 67. The present civil revision petition is with reference to number on which to an area of about 160 sq.ft.
The respondent is the landlord. The respondent is carrying on business at No.67, which is adjacent to the petition premises. His business is textile
business carried on under the name style of ""PALANIAPPA TEXTILES"". The area is very small and in view of expansion of business, the
respondent filed the petition for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation since he needed the additional space which is occupied by the
petitioner and which lies adjacent to the shop occupied by the respondent to store his goods and to carry on his textile business. Since he bona fide
needed the extra space, he filed the application for eviction u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act. The petitioner denied the requirements of the respondent or the
so-called expansion of business. According to him the petition is not bona fide and that already one shop in the same road in which one
Ambalavanan was carrying on business has been vacated and the petitioner had gained larger area. The petition is only a device to collect extra
rent. The petitioner having been in business at this premises for more than 14 years will suffer great hardship and the advantage or benefit that
would be derived by the respondent- landlord will relatively be less than the hardship though the petitioner-tenant would suffer. Therefore eviction
petition would be dismissed. Both the Courts however, held that the landlord required the premises as additional accommodation and that his bona
fide and also that the relative hardship was only in favour of the landlord and therefore, ordered conviction. The unhappy tenant has filed the civil
revision petition.
2. Mr.K. Alagirisamy, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was several factors which would show the need of the
respondent has obtained vacant possession of Door.No.65, and the tenants in all the other shops in the said room had vacated and therefore, the
requirement of the landlord did not exist as on date. The subsequent developments must be taken note of by the Courts as per the pronouncements
of the Supreme Court. The learned counsel also submitted that Section 10(3)(c) will not lie, since each of the premises is separate. Therefore, the
landlord should have filed an application for owner''s occupation but not for additional accommodation. Further the learned Senior Counsel
submitted that since the respondent had not pleaded in the petition regarding relative hardship, the Rent Control Authorities ought to have rejected
the application since it is contrary to the statutory provisions. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that when all that the landlord wanted is
additional space for storing his godown and when he had already got possession of the other shops on the same road, the authorities ought to have
considered this fact. He also submitted that the respondent''s case is that because of increased turnover he needs the extra space but there was no
document to show increased business. It is the case of the landlord that now he is storing his goods in Tambaram and has to shift it to Chrompet
and therefore, he wants the additional accommodation. But when the shop No.2 is vacated then it was open to the landlord to shift his godown to
that shop so that he would not have to transfer is stock from Tambaram to Chrompet. To ask for eviction on this ground clearly shows that there
are no bona fides. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the evidence of P.W. 1 where in cross examination, P.W.1 has said that there are
ledgers to show how such capital was ploughed in when the business was slated in 1987, but he also has admitted in his evidence that he has not
increased the capital for the expansion. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out to this to show that this prima facie proved that the case of
expansion the business is falls. He also referred to the evidence of P.W.2 the son of the petitioner wherein he has stated that he has planed to
increase his business. The learned Senior Counsel submits that mere desire to expand is not sufficient. The evidence in cross-examination of P.W.2
also referred. Where the witness has stated that though there are documents to show the increase in turnover they have not been produced before
Court. From this the Senior Counsel wanted adverse inference to be drawn. The learned Senior Counsel then referred to several decisions.
(1) Jothi Ammal and three others Vs. Kulandai Vadivel and others, ; (2) Md. Jaffer v. Palaniappa Chettiar, 1964 (I) MLJ 112; (3) Shivaji Rao v.
Bhulanga Rao, 1974 TLNJ 183; (4) Kuthalingam v. Jahir Hussain, 1997 (2) LW 470 and (5) Gangaram Vs. N. Shankar Reddy, to support his
case.
3. To sum up, the learned senior counsel submitted that the subsequent events would shows that the need of the landlord can be satisfied by
occupying the shops which have since fallen vacant and that strictly speaking, this is not a case of eviction on the ground of additional
accommodation since each of the shops are separate and therefore, petition u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act wilt not apply; and that there being no pleading
regarding relative hardship the Rent Controller ought to have rejected the applications outright and finally the case of the landlord is based on
necessity on account of the expansion in turnover for which there is no legal evidence.
4. Mr.R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the landlord-respondent submitted that two courts had concurrently held, not only that the
requirements for additional accommodation was justified but also that it was bona fide and further has considered the question of relative hardship.
The senior Counsel admitted that one of the shops had fallen vacant subsequent to the filing of the R.C.O.P but would however, wrote that it was
not open to the tenant to dictate the manner in which the landlord who get back possession of his properly and in any event this petitioner premises
is adjacent to the shop already occupied by the respondent and in the evidence of the tenant as R.W. 1 it is stated that of the separating wall
between his shop and the landlord is pulled down, the accommodation available to the respondent will be much more spacious. He referred to the
evidence of the respondent as extracted in the judgments of the court below wherein the Rent Controller has considered the evidence of R.W.1
and had come to the conclusion that there was no denial by the tenant that the respondent was doing business in the petition premises. The Rent
Controller also has pointed out that the petitioner has not denied the case of the landlord that he had to bring the goods form Tambaram to
Chrompet.
Then again, in his cross-examination the petitioner admits that of the middle wall is brought down the landlord will have better facility not only for
the customers but also to keep stocks.
5. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that though the building was separated into six shops it was one building and a prayer for additional
accommodation was justified. He also referred to the admission of R.W.I that he had four shops all over Chennai. Considering the oral and
documentary evidence, learned senior counsei submitted that the Rent Controller Authorities had not only found that the prayer for additional
accommodation is maintainable and also that it was bona fide. As regards relative hardship the learned Senior counsel had submitted that even
when there are no pleadings regarding relative hardship, if this issue has been dealt with and there are materials before the Rent Controller to arrive
at the conclusion then the mere lack of pleadings cannot bar the relief. In the instant case, the learned senior counsel pointed out that there was a
detailed discussion and consideration of the relative hardship and a conclusion was arrived at that the benefit derived by the landlord will far
exceed the hardship that the tenant would suffer. The learned senior counsel relied on the following judgments in support of his case.
(1) N. Dakshinamoorthy v. Ataphose Celestine Kamala Benjamins, 2000 (3) LW 482 ; (2) S.V.M. Nagavairava Sundaram Vs. S. Bageerathan
and Another, ; (3) The Nilgiris Co-op. Marketing Society v. C.T. Uthandi, 1998 (2) LAV. 216; (4) Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s.
Traders and Agencies and another, ; (5) Mookkan Vs. A. Abdul Rasheeth (decased) and Others, ; (6) Mst. Bega Begum and Others Vs. Abdul
Ahad Khan (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, ; (7) J. Jermons v. Allimal, 1997 (3) LW 235; (8) Hotel De-Broadway Vs. Snow White Industrial
Corporation and Others, ; (9) A. Mohammed Jaffar Saheb Vs. A. Palaniappa Chettiar, ; (10) Shivaji Rao v. Bhajanga Rao, 1974 TLNJ 183;
(11) P.K. Suraivele Mudaliar v. S.P. Mohana Sundraam, 2000 (1) LW 578 and (12) S. Mohammed Iqubal Vs. M. Padmanabhan, .
In any event, according to the learned counsel the findings of the court below being concurrent the scope for interference of this court u/s 25 of the
Act was limited and therefore, the order of eviction should be confirmed.
6. The respondent has come to the court pleading for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. According to him his shop is small and
in view of expansion in his textile business he is in need of adequate and additional space to store his goods and to carry in his day to day business.
The shop in his occupation is only 20x16 feet and there is difficulty in storing the ready-made goods in this area and to accommodate the flow of
customers. He has admitted that he is taking steps to evict other tenants in the road but had specifically stated that since the petition premises is
adjacent to the shop in his occupation this will be more convenient to him if he gets back possession of the same. The petitioner of course had
denied it in the counter. But, however, in his evidence which has been extracted above he has admitted that if the dividing wall between his shop
and the respondent''s shop is removed, the respondent will have additional space and if he gets additional space there will be more accommodation
not only for the customers to look at the merchandise, but also io store the goods. Therefore, virtually the petitioner has admitted that the
respondent will be able to keep his goods conveniently if the dividing wall is removed. The Rent Controller has considered in detail and has found:
Therefore, the finding of the Rent Controller is that the requirement of the additional accommodation is bona fide. This is confirmed by the
Appellate Authority who holds that the prayer for additional accommodation is justified since the landlord may want to recover the additional
accommodation in one building with a view to efficient management. The objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel that the respondent had
got back possession of other shops and therefore, the requirement is not bona fide is anticipated by the respondent in his pleadings where after
admitting that he has taking steps to evict the other tenant, he clearly states that he needs this particular premises because it is situated ""cheek by
jowl"" to his shop and it is also the petitioner''s own admission that if the dividing wall is removed it will become one big area. The fact therefore,
that he has got back possession of other shops ceases to have relevance and in any even, it is not open to the tenant to dictate which premises the
landlord shall occupy. Now as regards the point advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that strictly speaking this is not one
shop but two shops and therefore, additional accommodation is not the prayer that should have been asked, a plan was produced by the learned
senior counsel for the respondent to show that the two shops were actually small, remains separated by walls in one building. They were not two
adjacent door numbers in different buildings. The integrity of the unit of the whole building is clear and apparent and the removal of the dividing wall
would not destroy the construction, but on the other hand will enlarge the space that is available to the petitioner. Therefore, the prayer u/s 10(3)
(c) is also justified and the Rent Controller has found that in the cross-examination there was an admission by R.W.2 that the various shops are
door numbers in a row in one building and therefore, the Rent Controller held that they are only portions of one and the same building and the
landlord was entitled to file an application u/s 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation. The Rent Controller also held that the fact that different
shops have been assigned different door numbers is irrelevant for ascertaining the landlord''s requirement. The Appellate Authority has also
considered this and has found the two shops of the petitioner and the respondent are in one row in the same building and that where the two door
numbers are divided by a common wall what is relevant is oneness of the building and not oneness of ownership. Therefore, the Rent Control
Authorities have concurrently held that it is the same building in which the respondent and the petitioner are occupying separate areas and
therefore, an application u/s 10(3)(c) will lie. As regards relative hardship the petitioner has not pleaded relative hardship. But the respondent had
specifically stated in his counter, this respondent is running the business for more than 14 years and he may be put to great loss and much hardship
will be caused to this respondent if he has to vacate. The hardship which will be caused to this respondent will be grater. In this regard, the Rent
Controller considers the fact that the space now available to the landlord is very constricted and it is this constraint which has necessitated the filing
of the petition and therefore, if eviction is ordered the landlord will be able to acquire to himself larger area for storing stock and receiving
customers. On the other hand, the petitioner-tenant who has four shops elsewhere in Chennai, will not suffer much hardship as compared to the
benefit that will enure to the respondent. Therefore, the Rent Controller considers this aspect and finds the question of relative hardship in favour of
the landlord. The Appellate Authority also deals with this, and rejects the hardship pleaded by the petitioner. Even as regards relative hardship
there is a detailed consideration by both the authorities and concurrent conclusion has been arrived at in favour of the respondent.
7. Now the authorities that were cited by the counsel may be taken up. First the decisions relied on by Mr.K. Alagirisamy, learned senior counsel
for the petitioner.
(1) Jothi Ammal and three others Vs. Kulandai Vadivel and others, .
In this case building bearing door No.18 and 18(c) both were owned by landlord. Door No.18 was in the occupation of ihe landlord and door
No.l8(c) in the occupation of the tenant. Two buildings were divided by a common wall. The landlord sought eviction on the ground of additional
accommodation. Eviction was ordered on the ground that the report of the Advocate Commissioner appoint by the Rent Controller showed that
there were two houses and the learned Judge held factually that the two door numbers are two different building, one was a terraced one and the
other a tiled one and relying on the decision reported in Gangaram Vs. N. Shankar Reddy, dismissed the eviction petition. The learned Judge held
that the fact that there was only a single wall between the two building did not make the entire building one, because the identity of the two building
were different. Therefore, the learned Judge held Section 10(3)(c) will not apply unless the building that are in question are portions of one and the
same building.
(2) Gangaram Vs. N. Shankar Reddy, .
This decisions was relied on by the learned Judge in the judgment reported above where the Supreme Court held that:
What Section 10(3)(c) envisages is the oneness of ownership of two different building, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant.
(3) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., etc. v. B. Saravanan and others, 1997(2) L.W.81.
In this case the landlords were residing in the eastern end of the entire property and the tenant was residing in the other corner and a lane separated
the petition premises from the portion in occupation of the landlord. The learned Judge dismissed the application on the ground that when the
landlord who is in occupation of one premises and wants to occupy the portion occupied by the tenant, since the area in his possession is
insufficient then he could file an application u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act. Since the occupation of both landlord and tenant is in one building and one
structure. In that case, since one facts it was found that the two premises could not they have been brought under the same roof, eviction was not
granted.
8. A consideration of the decisions referred to above would show that in all those cases it was found on facts that there was no structural unity in
the building that was in the occupation of the landlord and the building that was in the occupation of the tenant. They were all cases where the two
premises where two different buildings were separated by a single wall. In this case, the two shops are part of one building which is divided by a
wall therefore, these decisions will not apply.
9. Next, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions with regard to relative hardship.
(i) S. Mohammed Iqubal Vs. M. Padmanabhan, .
In this case, the learned Judge found that the tenant will have to undergo hardship in setting up a business in a different place and the landlord had
also failed to prove the advantages for him of eviction is ordered and since there was absolutely no pleading regarding the hardship of the landlord
the learned Judge held that the proviso to Section 10(3)(c) would apply and the petition for eviction cannot succeed. The learned Judge had
referred to various decisions in this case for the issue of relative hardship namely.
(ii) P. Annakili Ammal and Another Vs. H.C. Hussain and Hassan and Another, , where it was held that
Though the proviso directing the rejection of an application u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act is in the nature of an instruction addressed to the Rent
Controller to do so if the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that the hardship that may be caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will
outweigh the advantage to the landlord, yet in order to enable the Rent controller to give effect to the proviso, it would be necessary for the parties
to plead so and place necessary materials in support Ihereof, as otherwise the question of relative hardship cannot be satisfactorily decided.
(3) R. Krishnaswamy Vs. N. Arumugam, in which it was held that
.....according to the proviso the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by grant
in il will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In order to decide this question of hardship there must be proper pleadings in the petition, if the
hardship is not pleaded in ihe petition that is fatal to the petition and to,
(4) T.S. Sethuraman Vs. J. Nagalakshmi and Another, in which it was held that,
For maintaining petition under this section relative hardship should be pleaded and established. Relative hardship can be decided only on basis of
facts available in pleadings and evidence -There should be categorical finding by authorities that hardship which may be caused to tenant by
granting decree for eviction would outweigh advantage to landlord -No pleading regarding relative hardship and no evidence available on record -
No finding in this regard by Authorities-Eviction cannot be ordered.
The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submitted that in the absence of pleading it was not open to the Rent Controller to order eviction in view of
the proviso in the Act.
10. In this case, however, the finding regarding the relative hardship cannot be said to have taken the tenant by surprise since he was aware of his
rights under the Act and had himself focused the attention of the Authorities on the issue on relevant hardship. Therefore, this issue had been gone
into and evidence was also let in. There is sufficient evidence to show that the facility to do business would increase for the landlord not only
because he need not carry his goods from Tambaram to Chrompet but can store it in one single room if the dividing wall is not there. Also he could
accommodate an increased flow of customers and to store his stock inside the shop. This is admitted even in the evidence of R.W.I and both the
authorities have dealt with it and found in favour of the landlord. Therefore, the lack of pleadings is really not a ground to attack this order since
there is enough basis for arriving at the conclusion regarding relative action.
11. Now let us look at the authorities cited by Ihe learned counsel for the respondent.
(1) N. Dakshinamoorthy v. Alaphose Celestine Kamala Benjamine, 2000 (3) LW482.
In this case, the lack of pleading about the relative hardship was raised as a ground. The learned Judge held as follows:
Rent Control proceedings is not to be compared with ordinary civil suits. Rent Control proceedings is only a summary procedure and when the
parties are aware as to the point which they have to meet and if evidence is let in, decision will have !o be taken following the principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. The only requirement under Rent Control Act is that the parties must be aware about the case which they have to
meet and even if there is no pleading, if parties have let in evidence, the same could be considered by Rent Controller.
......From the above decision, it is clear that even if there is any lack of pleadings, if the parties understood the case and have adduced evidence,
application is not liable to be rejected merely on the ground of lack of pleadings, or vague pleadings. In this case, tenant volunteered and out a
contention that if he is liable to be evicted, he will be put to greater hardship than the landlord and, therefore, he wanted the petition to be
dismissed. For the said purpose, he gave evidence that he has invested huge amounls in the business and how far he will be put to great hardship
since he cannot collect his dues from the customers, etc. Tenant knew that the relative hardship is a matter which has to be considered.
In this case also the tenant knew that relative hardship was an issue to be decided and therefore, it was held that it would be an unnecessary
technical approach to dismiss the eviction petition on the ground of lack of pleadings when the matter had been reached before the authorities and
decided properly.
(2) S.V.M. Nagavairava Sundaram Vs. S. Bageerathan and Another, .
In this case also the learned Judge held that a lack of pleadings should not be a ground for dismissal of eviction petition when,
The purpose of pleading is only to satisfy the principles of natural justice i.e. the opposite party must be made known about the case which he has
to meet. If the opposite party himself is aware of what he has to plead and prove, and joint in issue with the landlord, and he has no case of any
prejudice even if mere is lack of pleading is the Rent Control petition, no Rent Control petition should be dismissed on the ground of this
technicality.
This also applied to this case.
(3) The Nilgiris Co-op. Marketing Society v, C.T. Uttiandi, 1998 (2) LW 216 in which the learned Judge he!d as follows:-
In the case on hand though there is no pleading in the side of the landlord regarding the relative hardship, yet the tenant had chosen to plead in
delail on that aspect. Oral evidence is available on both sides on the issue of relative hardship on both the courts below have considered it and had
come to the conclusion that the relative hardship is in favour of landlord. Under these circumstances, want of pleading in this case on the part of the
landlord regarding the relative hardship does not affect his case and in any event no prejudice to the tenant has been passed. Therefore, the
requirement of the landlord on the ground of additional accommodation is also clearly made out and no grounds whatsoever are made out to
interfere in the finding as well.
The above decisions fairly apply to this case since though had not pleaded relative hardship the tenant had raised the question and the matter was
considered in detail. Both the authorities have concurrently found in view of the fact that tenant had shops all over Chennai and could carry on the
business elsewhere that the hardship he would suffer by vacating the premises is not as much as the advantages that the landlord would obtain if his
business space is enlarge by 150 sq.ft.
(4) Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another, The Supreme Court in this case held as follows:
Landlord in the best Judge of his residential requirement and if the landlord decree to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property
occupied by him as a tenant of on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it to not for the courts to dictate him to continue to occupy such
premises.
This was rightly relied on by the learned Senior counsel in answer to the objections made on behalf of the tenant that the landlord could very well
occupy the premises that had fallen vacant in the same building in the different door numbers.
(4) Mookkan Vs. A. Abdul Rasheeth (decased) and Others, where it was held as follows;
In view of the well seltled proposition it is for the landlord to choose the portion for his additional accommodation. The bona fide requirement of
the petition premises for the residential purpose of the respondent/landlord cannot be rejected outright merely because he had occupied the other
shop for running a petty shop, which became vacant subsequent to the filing of the present eviction petition under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act. It is not
the object of the provision of sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act to weigh the hardship of the tenant as against the test of the landlord on delicate scale, giving
the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant, as observed by this Court in Hotel De-Broadway Vs. Snow White Industrial Corporation and
Others, .
In that case, the tenant argued that since subsequent to the filing of the eviction, another porlion of the shop had become vacant and he had
occupied. The tenant shall not be evicted. The learned Judge rejected this plea. Similarly, in this case also the fact that the other door numbers
were occupied by the landlord subsequent to the eviction petition is not relevant, when the landlord has specifically pleaded that he wanted this
particular door number because it is immediately next to the premises that is in his occupation.
(5) Mst. Bega Begum and Others Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, .
Section 11(1)(h) of the Act uses the words ""reasonable requirement"" which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as
opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubt less be kept in mind but not so as to make even the
genuine needed as nothing but a desire. The connotation of the term ""need"" or ""requirement"" should not be artifically extended not its language so
unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would
defeat the very purpose of Ihe Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds.
This was relied on to demonstrate that the very fact that the landlord and his sons were carrying on the textile business intend to expand it and
further it is obvious that the additional accommodation will help them draw more customers would show that it is not a mere desire as in the case of
the whim or a fancy, it is a requirement that it palpably genuine.
(6) J. Jermons v. Allimal, 1997 (3) LW 235, in which the learned Judge held that sufficiency of the area is not something to be deduced by the
tenant, but it is for the landlord to decide. That was also a case where there is a row of shops. The learned Judge held that the landlords have
shown genuine requirement that they want to augment their business.
(7) Hotel De-Broadway Vs. Snow White Industrial Corporation and Others, . In this decision the learned Judge held that the mere inconvenience
of the tenant cannot deprive the landlord of his bona fide right and had relied on a decision of this Court in P.Srini-vasulu v. M/s Shanthi Traders,
AIR 1982 Mad. 126 held as follows:
As the landlord wants additional accommodation for the purpose of carrying on his iron and steel business and wants Ihe tenants to be evicted
form the remaining shops on the ground floor, the requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation is a bona fide one. The tenant may, no
doubt, be put to some inconvenience by being asked to vacate the premises in his occupation. That will not deprive the landlord of his bona fide
right to require additional accommodation, and viewed in this light, the order of the Rent Controller ordering eviction of the tenant has to be
upheld.
(8) A. Mohammed Jaffar Saheb Vs. A. Palaniappa Chettiar, . This is a decision of a Division Bench of our Court where the landlord owned a
building in Erode consisting of one block and there was sufficient door numbers which are portions of the said building. The controversy before the
Court was whether eviction could be ordered on the ground of additional accommodation. The Division Bench held as follows:-
The words ""Part of building"" occurring in this section are not abstruse and do not present a problem to be solved by seeking the aid of any rule of
interpretation of statutes. The words employed are plain English words whose meaning is simple and whose grammar is not difficult. The plain
meaning of this section, is that a landlord in occupation of a portion of a block of building can, for his own accommodation evict the tenant in
occupation of another of the same block. This he would be entitled to whether or not the portion in the occupation of the tenant has got, means of
separate ingress and egress, whether it has been registered in the Municipal properly Register as a separate unit of assessment or not, and whether
the access to the house is by the same street from which the landlord has got access to his own portion or not. These are wholly irrelevant
circumstances in order to ascertain the true position u/s 7(3)(c) whether a landlord requires additional accommodation being in occupation of a
portion the building and seeking to evict a tenant in occupation of another portion of the same building.
So all the above decisions apply clearly to this case in favour of the landlord.
(9) More apposite is the decision reported in Shivaji Rao v. Bhujanga Rao, 1974 TLNJ 183, where there were 8 shops which were physically
part of the building. The shops were given different numbers only a partition wall separated one shop from the other. The learned Judge held that
the landlords claim for additional accommodation was bonafide.
(10) P.K. Suraivele Mudaliar v. S.P. Mohana Sundraam, 2001 (1) LW 578, in which it was held as follows:
The Rent Control Legislation, though restricts the rights of the landlord to get possession of the building, it enables him to get possession on certain
specified grounds. If those specified grounds are made ""oul, to put further restrictions on the landlord to get possession is not permissible in law. If
the contention if learned counsel for revision petition is accepted, even if it is proved by the landlady that her son is not in possession of any building
and is occupying a rented premises, the eviction petition will have to be thrown out only on the ground that the landlady detained possession of
some other building, which will meet the requirement of the son. Therefore, in view of the legal position and the circumstances of the case. I do not
find any reason to differ from the view taken by the Courts below. 1 have to uphold the order of the courts below and hold that the requirement of
the landlord is bona fide.
All these decisions would show that when there is on building which is divided into one portion separated by a dividing wall and there is oneness of
structures of ihe building and that application u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act would apply, notwithstanding lack of pleadings if the parties are aware that the
issue of relative hardship has to be decided. Mere technicalities should not come in the way of giving effect to the logical conclusion. Existence of
business is not denied. There is material to show that the expansion of space would mean increase in business. There are also materials to show
that the earlier inconvenience of the landlord would be minimised if the additional accommodation is obtained. The desire exhibited by the landlord
is not a mere want but a genuine need. In this case, both the authorities have considered in detail all these aspects and have ordered eviction.
Above all, one also has to see the extent to which this court can interfere u/s 25 of the Act. It has been repeatedly held the revisional jurisdiction is
not akin to a full-fledged appeal and the Judge sitting in revision must be very careful about launching on a independent re-appreciation of the
evidence and to substitute the findings of the Rent Control Authorities with another when the materials before the Court equally sustain the
conclusion arrived at by the authorities below. Unless there is misapplication of law or a legally wrong approach or grave and substantial injustice,
the Revisional Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and their satisfaction regarding bona fide need and relative
hardship.
In this case, I find that both the Rent Control Authorities and the Appellate Authority have considered in detail the material before them and have
arrived at a reasonable and legal conclusion and had therefore, ordered eviction. There is no reason to interfere with the order of eviction. In the
result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.
